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Foreign Direct Investment in Saudi Arabia: 
Joint Venture Equity Shares and Source Country Characteristics 
 
Abdulaziz Almahmood 
 
Abstract 
The thesis explores the nature and determinants of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Saudi 
Arabia over the period 1960-2005. Saudi Arabia is of interest as it lies between a traditional 
developed and developing country. The thesis utilises a unique project-based dataset on about 
19,000 investments in the Kingdom, of which 5,000 involve foreign ownership.  The data 
were supplied by the government of Saudi Arabia, the first time they have been released for 
study. Overall, the thesis makes three main contributions. First, it analyzes the nature of FDI 
in Saudi Arabia.  The analysis shows that most FDI has occurred since the major 
liberalisation under the 2000 Foreign Investment Act, which is comparable in scale to total 
investment in domestic projects since 1960. By volume of FDI, the thesis highlights the 
importance of oil and related industries, although the vast majority of projects are non-oil 
related. These are principally in manufacturing, from nearby Arab states and located in the 
Middle region around Riyadh. 
 
Second, following a review of the relative literature on the determinants of FDI, the thesis 
analyzes the source characteristics of the investors by aggregating the data at the country 
level. It finds that a range of factors affect the number of foreign-owned projects, including 
size, distance, economic freedom and past investment levels, but much poorer explanations 
ii 
 
are found for the investment scale, possibly reflecting the dominance of the oil sector. Third, 
following a further literature review, it analyzes the effect of country political risk on the 
foreign equity share in joint ventures at the project level. Here, it finds that severe risk may 
actually increase the foreign equity share, which is attributed to the benefits that ownership 
brings in the form of control. Further, those projects in minority foreign ownership appear 
most sensitive to risk. These results contribute to a literature, which to date has focused 
almost solely on the FDI entry mode either as whole or joint venture. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1   Motivation for the Study 
 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is one of the main drivers of economic efficiency and 
growth for many developed and developing countries.  This has led policymakers to search 
for ways to attract foreign investors, using instruments at both the macro and microeconomic 
levels. At the macro level, research in developed countries over the last few decades has 
shown that the relationship between foreign investment and country risk is negative, implying 
that higher risk leads to lower levels of foreign ownership.  Further, an increasing number of 
studies, but mainly for developed countries, show that source country characteristics can help 
explain the overall pattern of FDI inflows.  Consequently, in order to encourage FDI, policy-
makers have increasingly focused on the factors that could be improved in order to encourage 
this investment as a possible method for achieving sustainable economic development.  
 
In Saudi Arabia, attracting FDI as a means to reduce the dependence on the oil revenues has 
gained critical importance to policymakers. FDI inflows rose over the period 1960-2005 from 
a relatively low level of about SRs 5 billion in the early 1960s to reach nearly SRs 170 billion 
over the period 2001-05 (constant prices). However, the contribution of the private sector to 
the economy has declined from 33 per cent of Gross Domestic Product in 1968 to 28 per cent 
in 2007.  It suggests that the problems of a small private sector and the lack of diversification 
of the Saudi economic structure are likely to worsen if anything. 
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Given these difficulties, there is a general agreement between policymakers that the future 
economic and political stability of Saudi Arabia will depend on its ability to attract FDI to 
strengthen the private sector and diversify the economy.  However, while more FDI is needed 
to sustain economic growth, the question is how is this to be achieved?  One necessary step is 
to determine the factors that increase the investment share of the foreign investors in projects, 
as these investors play a substantial role in the economic development of many developed 
and developing countries.  The motivation for this thesis is to explore the determinants and 
nature of FDI in the rapidly developing economy of Saudi Arabia over a long time period, 
and in particular whether risk discourages the equity stake of foreign investors.  
 
1.2   Objectives and Contribution of the Study 
 
Prior to the Second World War, the share of FDI inflows in global business was small, but 
since this time there has been a major increase in the share of FDI inflows in global business, 
mainly arising from the developed countries.  Thus, global inflows of FDI were $13 billion in 
1970, but increasing to $2,100 billion in 2007.  Despite this enormous increase in FDI, there 
has been a shift of FDI inflows over time away from the developed countries and towards 
developing countries. In relation to Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries, the 
share of FDI inflows has increased by around fourteen-fold over 1986-05, although MENA 
countries account for a small share of FDI within developing countries.  
 
The  pattern of global FDI flows relate to a range of determinants in the economic, political, 
cultural, technological and financial spheres, although the findings on these derive mainly for 
developed countries and only occasionally from developing countries, so that their relevance 
of the MENA countries is questionable.  In relation to Saudi Arabia, this is a wealthy country 
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within MENA, but somewhere between a traditional developed and developing country.  
Since Saudi Arabia differs from a developed country in many respects, including its human 
capital, institutions and culture, as well as the nature of its industries, then by analyzing FDI 
determinants for this country potentially offers fresh insights on the nature of FDI. 
 
The objectives of this thesis are to examine FDI in Saudi Arabia over the period 1960-05, and 
then focus on the effects of different country risk factors on the foreign joint venture equity 
shares, and the source country determinants of incoming FDI flows at the country level. 
Many studies show a negative relationship between country risk and foreign ownership, 
implying higher risk leads to lower equity shares, while other studies analyze the 
determinants of FDI flows from the host country point of view.  However, these studies are 
mainly for developed countries, whereas it is argued above that different conditions apply in 
Saudi Arabia, possible leading to different results.  For the first time, this study undertakes a 
detailed analysis of FDI in Saudi Arabia, analyzes the source country characteristics of this 
FDI and the factors that determine the joint venture equity shares of foreign investors. 
 
In summary, the thesis focuses on foreign projects in Saudi Arabia over the period from 1960 
to 2005.  Its main objectives of the study are to: 
 
 Describe, in detail, the pattern of FDI in Saudi Arabia over this period. 
 Examine the effect of risk on the foreign joint venture equity share. 
 Investigate the source country determinants of incoming FDI. 
 
The thesis makes a number of important contributions.  First of all, and for the first time, it 
“unpicks the locks on the doors” of the Saudi Ministry of Commerce and Industry in order to 
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obtain a large micro dataset on foreign and domestics projects. It consists of observations on 
around 19,000 projects that include 5,000 projects in foreign ownership.  These data are 
described in detail, and analyzed at the level of the project, the level of the individual investor 
and at the level of total investment arising from different countries.  This enables a broad 
understanding to be gained on the nature of foreign investment in Saudi Arabia, and 
compared to domestic investment.  The data on projects with foreign ownership form the 
basis for the remainder of the thesis in order to explore the joint venture equity shares and 
source country characteristics of FDI, but for investments occurring since the early to mid-
1980s.  These represent the other two major contribution of the thesis.   
 
In the case of the empirical analyses, the recent literature for developed countries enables us 
to identify many of the factors that potentially influence the equity share and source country 
characteristics, and to test these for Saudi Arabia. According to my knowledge, only a 
handful of similar studies have been undertaken for developing countries, but using only a 
small sample of firms. The thesis uses techniques such as Ordinary Least Squares, but also 
other estimation methods such as the negative binomial model, , tobit model, logit model and 
the Heckman selection procedure.  To the best of my knowledge, these methods have not 
previously been applied in such as way in these contexts.    
 
1.3   Organization of the Thesis 
 
The thesis is divided into two main parts and six chapters.  Part I, which comprises chapters 2 
to 4, discusses the general geographical, political, social and economic background of Saudi 
Arabia, including the legislation in relation to FDI (Chapter 2).  Part I also undertakes the 
literature review on the determinants of FDI from both theoretical and empirical perspectives 
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(Chapter 3), and considers the literature on the FDI ownership structure (Chapter 4). Part II of 
the thesis comprises Chapters 5 to 7, and contains the empirical parts of the study in line with 
the above three objectives. These are for the analysis of the pattern of FDI in Saudi Arabia 
(Chapter 5), the examination of the effect of risk on the foreign joint venture equity share 
(Chapter 6) and analysis of the source country determinants of incoming FDI (Chapter 7).  
Finally, Chapter 8 concludes and gives some recommendations to policymakers. 
 
In more detail the chapters are as follows:  
 
Part I: Economic Background and Literature Review 
 
Chapter 2: The Saudi Economy and Legal Framework for FDI. This gives a general 
overview of Saudi Arabia, and aims to give the reader a broad knowledge of the country, 
covering three main features: its economy, its legal framework for FDI and its FDI inflows in 
the context of the wider region. The chapter shows that not only does Saudi Arabia hold a 
strategic position in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, but that it is well-
endowed with energy. However, it faces acute economic problem arising from its dependence 
on oil, so that since 2000 it has sought to liberalise its economy by encouraging FDI. 
 
Chapter 3: The Determinants of FDI: Theoretical Conceptualizations and Empirical 
Studies. The chapter reviews and describes the determinants of FDI. It begins by considering 
the definitions of FDI, and considers the evolution of the determinants of FDI from different 
theoretical perspectives. Empirical studies that seek to test these different theories are then 
surveyed, which shows the importance of FDI inflows. The chapter reviews the different 
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definitions of FDI, and relating this to that adopted by Saudi Arabia.  It surveys in detail the 
literature on the determinants of FDI from both theoretical and empirical points of view. 
 
Chapter 4: The Ownership Structure of Foreign Investment. The chapter reviews and 
describes the literature on the ownership structure of foreign investments. It begins by 
considering the different theoretical motivations for the ownership structure, discussing four 
mainstream perspectives on this. Empirical evidence on the choice between whole ownership 
or a joint venture, and in the case of the latter on the choice of the equity share are 
considered. The chapter reviews the empirical evidence on the implication of risk for the 
equity share.  
 
Part II: Empirical Analysis 
  
Chapter 5: Foreign Direct Investment in Saudi Arabia. This chapter explains the nature of 
the data used in the study. The data were originally collected by Saudi Arabia Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry. They cover investments by all licensed companies in Saudi Arabia 
dating back to the year 1960. The chapter describes how this study managed to obtain these 
data, which are confidential to this study.  The chapter then compares foreign and domestic 
investment in projects, before focusing on the foreign investment.  It considers the pattern 
according to projects, individual investor and the number of investors arising from different 
countries, showing that the FDI is heavily concentrated according to several factors.   
 
Chapter 6: Political Risk and the Ownership Structure of Foreign Direct Investment. 
The chapter considers the relationship between country political risk and ownership level in 
FDI joint ventures.  Its purpose is to examine the effect of different kinds of political risk on 
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the foreign equity share at the project level for Saudi Arabia over 1985-2005.  Two stages of 
estimation are employed for the study of the effect of political risk on ownership share.  First, 
for the investment scale and number of investors, and second, using these as instruments, for 
the estimation of the equity share on risk.  The chapter finds that the response varies 
according to the severity of the risk, so that for more serious risks firms increase their share 
to get more ownership, whereas for less serious risks they cut their share, which is like 
elsewhere. 
 
Chapter 7: Source Country Characteristics and FDI Inflows to Saudi Arabia. 
Aggregating the FDI data at the country level, the chapter examines the source characteristics 
of incoming FDI to Saudi Arabia over the period 1980-2005 to investigate the extent to 
which these explain the inflow of FDI. In explaining the determinants of FDI, it utilizes a 
range of project-related and country-related variables from various sources. The FDI inflows 
equation is estimated using two measures of FDI: the number of investment projects 
incoming in each year from each country and the total amount of investment inflow. This is 
separately estimated using techniques such as a negative binomial, for the first measure, and 
tobit regression and Heckman selection procedure, for the second measure.   
 
Chapter 8: Conclusions and Recommendations. Finally, the concluding chapter discusses 
the main findings on the study of country political risk and the source country characteristics 
and FDI in Saudi Arabia, and relates these to the literature reviews and also to the problems 
faced by Saudi Arabia.  It concludes that foreign investments are highly concentrated in its 
scale in the manufacturing sector and the Middle region around Riyadh, and the main source 
of FDI by project is the West Asia part of the MENA region, although it is the North America 
followed by Western Europe regions in terms of investment amount. It was also found that 
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with serious risks firms will increase their equity share, but will reduce it in the case of less 
risk. It also concludes that the economic size of the source country, the geographical distance, 
cultural distance and past investment experience are important determinants of FDI. The 
chapter considers the limitations of the study, including the data used. Recommendations and 
suggestions for further research are also presented.   
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Chapter 2 
The Saudi Economy and Legal Framework for FDI 
  
2.1   Introduction 
 
In the last 70 years Saudi Arabia has become the world's largest economy in the production 
and exporting of oil, which has promoted its economic development. During this time, the 
amount of inward FDI has grown substantially, from around Saudi Riyals (SRs) 5.2 million 
in 1961 to SRs 83,798 million in 2005 (about £13.4 billion), and which has been encouraged 
by policymakers.  The purpose of this chapter is to provide background information about the 
economy of Saudi Arabia, and about the nature and growth of this FDI, focusing particularly 
on the legal environment for FDI, which was relaxed from the year 2000.  The aim is to give 
a foundation for the subsequent detailed analysis of FDI in Saudi Arabia in Chapter 5. To this 
end, the chapter gives background information on the global trends in FDI. 
 
The chapter begins by giving an overview of the Saudi economy in Section 2.2 using the 
main indicators to describe the development of this economy. It shows the importance of oil, 
and the attempts by the Saudi Arabia government to diversify its economy, including by FDI. 
Section 2.3 presents the legal framework governing FDI in Saudi Arabia. Broadly, before 
2000, the Kingdom had a highly restrictive policy towards FDI, and whole investments were 
virtually allowed only in exceptional circumstances, but since then it has been encouraged in 
order to promote economic development. Finally, FDI flows in the wider region and in Saudi 
Arabia are considered in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 concludes this chapter.    
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2.2 The Economy of Saudi Arabia  
 
2.2.1   Overview 
 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is both an Arab and an Islamic country. It was established by 
King Abdulaziz Al-Saud as the modern Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932, since when it has 
been under the leadership of six different rulers. Throughout, the country has witnessed 
massive development in every part of its economic and social fabric. This has enhanced real 
changes of people's economic and social life, and indeed since 1968 Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) in Saudi Arabia has increased by about ten-fold in real terms. The Kingdom is 
characterized geographically by its location at the crossroads between the Asian and African 
continents, and specifically by its location in the Arabian Peninsula. Historically, the 
Peninsula has played a vital role as a trade centre and a land for several civilizations over past 
millennia. The Peninsula is also the birthplace of the Islamic religion. 
 
According to Ham et al, (2004) the size of Saudi Arabia is about the size of Western Europe, 
covering around 80% of the Arabian Peninsula; or about 2,149,690 square kilometres. It is 
bounded by seven countries and three substantial bodies of water, as shown in Figure 2.1. 
The Red Sea lies on the west coast and the Arabian Gulf, Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab 
Emirates on the east. Saudi Arabia has borders with Yemen and Oman in the south, and 
Jordan, Iraq and Kuwait to the north. Saudi Arabia's terrain is varied but on the whole fairly 
barren and harsh, with salt flats, gravel plains, and sand dunes, but few lakes or permanent 
streams. In the south is the Rub Al-Khali (Empty Quarter), the largest sand desert in the 
world. In the southwest, the Tihama mountain ranges of Asir Province rise to over 9,000 feet. 
The "Najd" plateau of the Central Region is where the capital city of the kingdom, Riyadh, is 
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located. There are five geographical regions, which together are sub-divided into thirteen 
provinces (see Figure 2.1). These are the: Middle region (Riyadh and Alqassim Provinces); 
Western region (Makka and Almadinah Provinces); Eastern region (Eastern Province); the 
Southern region (Jazan, Najran, Asir and Albaha Provinces); and the Northern region (Hail, 
Tabuk, the Northern frontier and Aljawf Provinces. 
 
Figure 2.1: Map of Saudi Arabia and its Provinces 
 
Source: Saudi Central Department of Statistics and Information, 2009.  
 
Most of the population of Saudi Arabia is concentrated in the cities of Jeddah and Makka in 
the west, Riyadh in the centre and Dammam and Al Khobar in the east. Three great deserts 
isolate Najd from the north, east and south, as the Red Sea escarpment does from the west. In 
the north, the An Nafud desert covers about 55,000 square kilometres. Stretching more than 
125 kilometres south from the An Nafud in a narrow arc is the Ad Dahna desert. At its 
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southern end, it merges with the Rub Al-Khali which covers more than 550,000 square 
kilometres. Most of this area is waterless and uninhabited, except for a few Bedouin tribes. 
 
The total population of the Kingdom in 2007 was 24.2 million, and the population structure 
indicates that the Kingdom has a distinctive demographic trend. The annual report of the 
Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency (SAMA) for the year 2008 shows that the population aged 
below 15 years-old represents 34.5 per cent of total population, compared with 28.3 per cent 
for the world as a whole. Further, the population of 65 years of age and over represents just 
2.8 per cent compared with 7.3 per cent for the world. So, generally speaking, the Kingdom 
has a relatively young population, like many developing countries.   
 
The Kingdom is considered to be one of the major countries of the Middle East and North 
African (MENA) region. According to the World Bank report (Middle East and North Africa 
Region Economic and Development Prospects, 2007), the MENA region consists of three 
kinds of economy: resource-poor, labour-abundant economies (i.e. Arab Republic of Egypt, 
Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, Lebanon, and Djibouti); resource-rich, labour-abundant 
economies (i.e. Algeria, Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Syrian Arab Republic, and Yemen); 
and resource-rich, labour-importing economies (i.e. United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Libya, 
Qatar, Oman, and Bahrain). Saudi Arabia is included in the latter group, being resource rich 
but labour importing. In the year 2000, MENA accounted for five per cent of the world‟s 
population and two-and-a-half per cent of world output. Saudi Arabia has the largest 
economy of all MENA countries. In 2005, its GDP was approximately 315 billion US dollars, 
which represents more than 25 per cent of the total output of all the MENA countries (World 
Bank, 2008). Over the last few decades the World Bank has stated that MENA has narrowed 
the gap with other developing countries.  
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The dominant output of the Kingdom's economy is oil. According to SAMA (2008), the share 
of oil revenue in Saudi national gross domestic product (GDP) was approximately 55 per cent 
in 2007. The private sector share of the GDP is much smaller, and only represents around 28 
per cent. Table 2.1 shows oil has taken an increasing share of total output from 46 per cent in 
1968 to 55 per cent in 2007, which is an increase over the whole period of around 20 per 
cent, while both public and private sectors have decreased, each by about the same amount. 
 
Table 2.1: GDP by Sector 
 
Sector 1968 2007 
 % % 
   
Oil 46 55 
Private 33 28 
Public 21 17 
Total 100 100 
 
Source: Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency (SAMA), Annual Report, 2008.  
 
The major partners in the non-oil trade for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia are the Gulf 
Corporation Council (GCC) countries. These include the United Arab Emirates, the Kingdom 
of Bahrain, Oman, Qatar and Kuwait, as well as Saudi Arabia. According to SAMA (2008), 
trade with other GCC countries represented 32.7 per cent of the Kingdom's total non-oil 
exports in 2008. Trade with other Arab trading partner countries in the non-oil goods and 
services is only about 18 per cent.  
 
2.2.2   The Development of the Saudi Economy  
 
Since its foundation in 1932, Saudi Arabia has achieved a phenomenal transformation of its 
economy, which is quite different to anywhere else in the world (Knaverhase, 1978; Askari, 
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1990). The country, which started almost from scratch, has become a major influence in the 
world economy and is able to interact economically with the rest of the world, including 
foreign investors (SABB, 2007). Prior to this transformation, Saudi‟s economy was marked 
by relatively primitive economic activities. In the 1940s it was characterized by fragmented 
rural areas and isolated tribes, and it had no health system or formal education, which was 
reflected in a high degree of illiteracy among people. To illustrate this, then as observed by 
Knaverhase (1978), in his work on the Saudi Arabian economy: 
 
"In 1940 the wheel was not in general use in most areas of the nation. Saudi Arabia 
had a pastoral economy based on the raising of goats, sheep and camels. The majority 
of the urban population lived in small villages built of mud-brick and earned a living 
from subsistence agriculture…" (p. 57). 
 
Overall, Saudi economic development has been supported by the exploitation of its 
tremendous oil reserves since 1938, which has enabled the Kingdom to establish institutions 
and to build basic infrastructure. It has gradually become the world's leading oil producer and 
exporter, and is at the top in terms of the world's leading proven oil reserves.  Table 2.2 
shows the real growth rate of the Saudi economy for different sub-periods from 1971 to 
2005.
1
 Generally it reveals good growth rates throughout the period, indicating continued 
expansion. The major contributing factor to this was the incremental discovery of huge 
reserves of oil. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1  It shows the rapid development of Saudi Arabia in the early 1970s and the contraction in the early 1980s. 
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Table 2.2: Real GDP Growth Rate, 1971-2005 
(Five Year Averages) 
  
Period Real GDP Growth Rate 
  
1971-1975 20.62 
1976-1980 7.06 
1981-1985 -4.48 
1986-1990 3.42 
1991-1995 2.98 
1996-2000 2.54 
2001-2005 3.94 
 
Source: Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency (SAMA), Annual Report, 2008. 
 
The discovery of oil commenced in 1938 with the Aldahran field on the east coast by the 
California Arabian Standard Oil Company (CASCO), an affiliate of the American company 
Standard Oil of California (SOCAL), which is known today as the Chevron Corporation. 
However, initially this discovery led only to a small change in development. Of greater 
significance were two critical factors that triggered a real change in the Saudi economy and 
life. The first of these was the establishment in 1944 of the Saudi American Oil Company 
(Aramco, predecessor of Saudi Aramco), which has dominated the production of oil in the 
country since its first commercial exports in 1939. The second factor was the discovery of 
massive oil fields and the establishment of new towns from 1946 onwards. Figure 2.2 shows 
that these oil fields are mainly located in the Middle and Eastern regions of Saudi Arabia. 
More than one-half are located in eight super-giant fields (see below). The Saudi Oil Minister 
recently stated that proven reserves will grow from 262.3 billion of barrels currently to 
around 420 billion barrels by 2025 as a result of exploration and further appraisal drilling 
(International Energy Agency, 2005). 
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Figure 2.2: Oil Fields in the Middle and Eastern Regions 
 
 
Source: Greg Croft Inc. 
  
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia currently utilizes around 30 fields to produce oil, as shown in 
Table 2.3. The largest fields in terms of reserves are Ghawar, followed by the other six super-
giant fields of Safaniyah, Manifa, Shaybah, Zuluf, Khurais and Berri. These fields represent 
approximately 76 per cent of total Saudi reserves (Table 2.3), with Ghawar the world's largest 
oil field.  So far, the cumulative production from these fields represents 36 per cent of the 
remaining reserves (105.6 billion barrels of 289.4 billion barrels of reserves in Table 2.3). 
The lion share of the oil production in Saudi Arabia comes from the Ghawar, Safaniyah and 
Abqaiq fields, which account for more than 80% of Saudi's total oil production (Table 2.3). 
  
 17 
Table 2.3: Oil Fields in Saudi Arabia 
 
Field 
Year of first 
Production 
 
Remaining Proven and Probable 
Oil Reserves at 2004  
(Billion Barrels) 
Cumulative 
Production to 2004 
(Billion Barrels) 
    
Abqaiq 1946 5.5 13 
Qatif 1946 9.2 0.8 
Ghawar 1951 86.3 60.7 
Safaniyah 1957 39.6 15.4 
Khursaniyah 1960 3.3 1 
Abu Hadriyah 1961 1.2 0.6 
Fadhili 1963 0.6 0.3 
Khurais 1963 16.8 0.2 
Abu Sa'fah 1966 6.8 1.7 
Manifa 1966 22.8 0.3 
Berri 1967 15.3 3.1 
Harmaliyah 1973 1.9 0.2 
Marjan 1973 9.3 0.7 
Zuluf 1973 18.2 1.8 
Ghinah 1994 0.3 0 
Hawtah 1994 2 0 
Hazmiyah 1994 0.5 0 
Umm Jurf 1994 0.2 0 
Shaybah 1998 20.7 0.8 
Other fields - 29 5 
Total - 289.4 105.6 
 
Source: International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook, 2005. 
 
The possession of huge oil fields puts Saudi Arabia at the top of world's proven oil reserves. 
According to the US Energy Information Administration (2008), Saudi Arabia has the 
world's largest proven oil reserves at 262.3 billion barrels at 2007, followed by Canada, Iran, 
Iraq and Kuwait.  The dominant position of Saudi Arabia is shown in Table 2.4. 
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Table 2.4: Proven World Oil Reserves, 2007 
 
Country 
Proven Oil Reserves 
(Billion of Barrels) 
  
Saudi Arabia 262.3 
Canada 179.2 
Iran 136.3 
Iraq 115.0 
Kuwait 101.5 
United Arab Emirates 97.8 
Venezuela 80.0 
Russia 60.0 
Libya 41.5 
Nigeria 36.2 
 
Source: US Energy Information Administration, 2008. 
 
As mentioned, Saudi Arabia was able to first exploit these reserves through the establishment 
of the Saudi American Oil Company (Aramco) in 1944, but this was enhanced by the Saudi 
Government's acquisition of Aramco in 1980, since when the new state monopoly company, 
Saudi Aramco, has made Saudi Arabia the world's leading oil producer (Table 2.5 below). 
According to the President and Chief Executive Officer of the company, it has been able to 
do this due to several core competencies: an emphasis on innovation, an efficient network of 
consumers and reliable managerial skills, as well as of course the utilization of the rich oil 
fields (Saudi Aramco, 2007). According to the company, these have contributed to the 
gradual expansion of its operations. 
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Table 2.5: Top World Oil Producers, 2007 
 
Country 
Production 
(Thousand Barrels Per Day) 
  
Saudi Arabia 10,248 
Russia 9,784 
United States 8,457 
Iran 4,034 
China 3,912 
Mexico 3,500 
Canada 3,422 
United Arab Emirates 2,948 
Venezuela 2,670 
Kuwait 2,616 
 
Source: US Energy Information Administration, 2008. 
 
The oil has contributed either directly or indirectly to economic development through the 
building of macroeconomic systems and microeconomic improvements. However, the thrust 
of economic growth and development in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia have occurred only 
within the past three decades (Hashem and Diyab, 1990), after the establishment of the 
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1960, and particularly in the 
1970s, when there was a remarkable increase of oil prices as a result of economic and 
political factors. Table 2.6 shows that the oil price 'shocks' of 1974 and 1979 helped the 
Kingdom to increase its output in nominal terms by more than two-fold between the sub-
periods of 1971-75 and 1976-80. 
 
Although the Kingdom witnessed and enjoyed an economic boom during the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, which generated unprecedented revenue, the country was lacking in physical 
infrastructure, as well as effective health, education and other services. It was also lacking 
strategic reinvestment plans for its acquired revenues. Equally, of concern was that the 
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Kingdom faced a potentially serious problem of economic structure due to its heavy 
dependence on oil and lack of economic diversification (Abdel-Rahman, 2002). In fact, oil 
revenues represent the majority of the country‟s total GDP. The share of the oil revenue of 
the total Saudi GDP was high and approaching 70 per cent in the early 1970s (Table 2.6). It 
shows the Kingdom‟s heavy reliance on oil revenues, and which has been increasing since 
the late 1980s. 
 
Table 2.6: Output of the Saudi Oil Sector over Time 
 
Period 
Output of the Oil Sector Share of GDP  
% (SR m, current prices) Growth Rate 
    
1971-75 303,894 - 68.5 
1976-80 960,573 216.0 57.5 
1981-85 1,043,775 8.7 44.0 
1986-90 485,524 -53.5 27.9 
1991-95 906,596 86.7 36.4 
1996-00 1,095,708 20.9 36.3 
2001-05 1,891,804 72.7 44.2 
 
Source: Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency (SAMA), Annual Report, 2008. 
 
As well as a dependence on oil, the other concern is a lack of diversification of the economy, 
which raises questions about the sustainability of the economy. This became apparent in the 
late 1960s and was a key issue leading to the publication of the first Development Plan in 
1970 (see Saudi Ministry of Economy and Planning, 2006).  Since 1970, and despite Saudi‟s 
oil-driven economy, the country has managed to register some impressive economic growth 
rates, as reported in Table 2.2 above. However, the lack of diversification has meant that with 
the global fluctuation in oil prices, and with a continuing need for revenue to finance its 
consumption and investment expenditures, the Kingdom has sometimes ended up with 
remarkable budgetary deficits, for example a deficit of 25.3 per cent of GDP in 1987. As an 
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explanation for this, Abdel-Rahman (2002) notes that Saudi‟s oil production in 1980-81 
reached nearly 10 million barrels per day, but due to the discovery of new oils fields in other 
parts of the world, the development of energy substitutes and a global economic downturn, 
production declined to just 3 million barrels per day by 1985 (see Table 2.7). As a result, 
revenues dropped sharply and a massive budgetary deficit ensued. The Kingdom also 
suffered a similar fate in 1997 due to factors including the East Asian economic crisis and an 
increase in non-OPEC oil production, such that the "combination of such factors led to a 
slack in the demand for oil and cut oil prices by over one-third" (Abdel-Rahman, 2002: p. 4). 
 
Table 2.7: Saudi Oil Production 
 
Year 
Oil Production 
(Million Barrels Per Day) 
  
1981 9.81 
1982 6.48 
1983 4.54 
1984 4.08 
1985 3.17 
1986 4.78 
1987 4.12 
1988 5.16 
1989 5.06 
 
Source: Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency (SAMA), Annual Report, 2008. 
 
2.2.3   The Development Plans 
 
The realization that the heavy reliance on oil meant economic growth might be unsustainable 
in the long-run, coupled with instabilities in the short-run, fuelled the Kingdom‟s desire to 
implement development plans to help foster and achieve economic diversification. The 
Kingdom began to implement a new development approach in 1969, when the oil revenues 
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started to rise dramatically creating huge budget surpluses with which to build the necessary 
infrastructure and services. The first development plan commenced in 1970 covering the five-
year period up to 1974, and since then there have been seven plans, covering five year 
periods up to 2005.
2
  The main long-term objective of these plans is to enhance the economy 
and improve economic well-being, which is reflected in the first plan that focused on giving 
the private sector a greater role in the economy. In order to achieve this, the government then 
formed five-year development plans, aimed principally at organizing and better-utilizing the 
country's resources and reducing its dependence on oil revenues.  
 
At the core of the development plans is a strategy for economic reform through privatization 
and the promotion of private investment. The most distinctive feature of these plans is the 
adoption of free market principles in order to enhance private sector efficiency and growth. 
Ramady and Saee (2007) note that in trying to achieve economic diversification the Kingdom 
opted to promote decentralized, private and market-based economic activities. This took the 
form of a three-pronged approach, involving: the attainment of membership of the World 
Trade Organization; privatization of core government services; and the promotion of foreign 
direct investment to foster technology transfer and domestic economic stimulus (Najem and 
Hetherington, 2003). Abdel-Rahman (2002) eloquently sums up the approach as follows: 
 
"To achieve the desired liberalisation and reform, the deployed mechanisms focused 
on privatisation and investment promotion. Private investment was encouraged and 
the Kingdom turned to Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) as an appropriate vehicle that 
could revitalise its economy and diversify its productive base through its anticipated 
                                                 
2 The plans are not formally published, but the key objective and aims were later made available in the 2006 
Achievements of the Development Plans: Facts and Figures, and this forms the basis for the discussion.   
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contributions to the manufacturing and other sectors and hence to production, income 
and employment" (p. 4). 
 
The first three development plans covered the years from 1970 to 1984.
3
 Since these plans 
came at a time when the oil revenues increased substantially, they shared similar targets. 
According to the Saudi Ministry of Economy and Planning (2006), "the first three 
development plans (1970-84) aimed to enhance the infrastructure, diversify the economy, 
develop the human resource and encourage the private sector to play an active role in the 
economy" (p. 32). This period was therefore characterized by an expansion in government 
spending and the establishment of funds to support industrial and agricultural projects.  
 
The next four development plans went from 1985 to 2005.
4
 At this time, the Kingdom faced 
serious financial difficulties caused by the instability of the international oil market, which 
contributed to falling oil revenues. However, the Kingdom managed to accommodate these 
difficulties, and according to the Saudi Ministry of Economy and Planning (2006) "the 
fluctuation and decline in the oil prices led to a fall in national income, but the Kingdom was 
able to overcome these difficulties by giving greater focus to reducing government spending" 
(p. 32). Hence, by controlling and balancing revenues and expenditures, as well as enhancing 
                                                 
3 The first development plan, over the period 1970-74, was aimed at enhancing economic growth rate by 
increasing government spending.  These aims were rolled over into the second plan over 1975-79, however with 
greater emphasis on government spending.  The third plan over 1980-84 also focused on increasing government 
spending and expanding the finance of the private sector to stimulate investment.  
4 The fourth development plan over the period 1985-89 was aimed at improving non-oil exports focusing mainly 
on the manufacturing industry and especially the petrochemical sector. The fifth plan covered the period 1990-
94 and focused on stabilizing the economy, improving the business environment and enhancing living 
standards. The sixth plan over 1995-99 focused on improving human resources, increasing productivity and 
enhancing living standards. The seventh plan over 2000-04 was based on previous plans, giving priority to 
human resources, privatization, increasing productivity and improving public services. The eighth plan covered 
the period 2005-09 and was aimed at further enhancing living standards, creating more jobs, expanding the 
public services and improving the competitiveness of the economy. The ninth plan over 2010-14 will focus on 
enhancing and balancing regional development, improving living standards, further enhancing the human 
resources and reducing the unemployment rate, reinforcing the contribution of the private sector in the economy 
and encouraging the orientation towards achieving the knowledge-based economy.     
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the efficiency of public institutions, the Kingdom was able to overcome the decline in growth 
rates and to continue to develop its infrastructure, as well as diversifying the economy.    
 
Nevertheless, despite the private sector growing substantially over the past four decades, the 
Kingdom's economy is still dominated by oil revenue. The private sector grew by more than 
50-fold in nominal terms over the period 1970-2007, but its contribution to GDP still fell 
from 33 per cent in 1970 to 28 per cent in 2007. This compares with the oil sector, which 
grew by 75-fold in nominal terms over 1970-07, an increase from 47 to 55 per cent of GDP. 
The expansion of production and investment in the private sector has been supported by a 
strong increase in foreign direct investment. This was promoted by the seventh development 
plan (covering 2000-04) through government policy, and attention now turns to this.  
 
2.3   Legal Framework for Foreign Direct Investment 
 
The dependence on the private sector as a driving force for the Kingdom's economy has been 
a central part of a strategy to attain sustainable and rapid economic growth. To improve the 
private sector's participation in the economy, an enhancement to the 'business climate' was 
essential, and a crucial part of this was legislation to encourage foreign direct investment that 
was at the forefront of the development plan for 1975-79. Up to that time FDI was governed 
by the 1979 Foreign Investment Act, which had sought to boost foreign investment into Saudi 
Arabia, and hence enhance the private sector‟s contribution to the Saudi economy. However, 
a review of the 1979 Foreign Investment Act at the end of 1990s showed that it deterred FDI 
flows. 
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This was because the 1979 Foreign Investment Act gave priority to Saudi firms and to joint 
ventures with Saudi participation, as well as prohibiting foreign investment in some sectors 
(Khyeda, 2007). Further, it prevented foreign investors from obtaining a license unless it is 
accompanied by foreign technical expertise. This led to a re-evaluation of the existing law 
and the subsequent introduction of a new law in the year 2000. The Saudi Arabia‟s Council 
of Ministers approved the 2000 Foreign Direct Investment Act under a Royal Decree and it 
established a new Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority (SAGIA). Overall, the law 
introduced a number of changes that relaxed the restrictive rules against foreign investment, 
seeking to make Saudi Arabia more open and to liberalize trade. Given its importance, the 18 
Articles comprising the 2000 Foreign Investment Act are presented in Appendix 2.1. These 
are referred to below. 
 
2.3.1   The 2000 Foreign Investment Act 
 
The new law was administered by the Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority (SAGIA) 
under the guidance of the Supreme Economic Council. A number of significant changes were 
made under the Act, which are as follows. First, certain restrictions were made against FDI 
under the old law, including the prohibition of foreigners from investing in sectors that were 
reserved for the government and domestic investors, such as printing and publishing services, 
telecommunications services, the transmission and distribution of electrical power, pipeline 
transmission services, education services, hospital and health services, insurance and the 
electric power generation (Khyeda, 2007, p. 82). Under Article 3 of the new law (see 
Appendix 2.1), these sectors were no longer closed and foreign investors were able to freely 
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invest, except for certain sectors that are given in a 'Negative List' designation, and which is 
compiled by SAGIA and approved by the Supreme Economic Council.
5
  
 
This 'Negative List' is updated and revised from time to time. The latest list (2009) includes 
15 sectors, two of which are industrial sectors and the other thirteen are in service activities. 
The industrial sectors are oil exploration / drilling and the manufacture of military equipment, 
while the service sectors include real estate investment in the holy cities of Makka and 
Almadina, security and detective services and printing and publishing. The Saudi Arabian 
government policy is focused on a continued reduction of the 'Negative List', with complete 
abolishment the ultimate goal (see Khyeda, 2007, p. 80). 
 
Second, the new law has relaxed other restrictions that faced foreign investors, including 
investment licenses, but which are still required by all investments in Saudi Arabia. By an 
'investment' it is meant any domestic or foreign project for both transferring capital and 
production, and by any mode of entry. The new law changed the licenses in two ways: 
foreign investors were allowed to obtain more than one license across different activities; and 
the processing of licenses was speeded up. Under the old law, the granting of a license was a 
complicated and time-consuming process, but this is now no longer the case. Article 2 gives 
SAGIA thirty days to make a decision about an investment application (see Appendix 2.1), 
such that if the decision has not been made by then SAGIA is obligated to issue the required 
license for the investor regardless. This change facilitates the exploitation of opportunities by 
foreign investors as they occur across different sectors.  
 
                                                 
5 This Negative List sets out all those activities in which foreign investment is prohibited in accordance with 
Article 3 of the 2000 Foreign Investment Act. 
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Third, as a further change to facilitate the establishment of foreign companies, Article 5 of 
the new law allows foreign companies 100 per cent ownership of projects (Appendix 2.1). 
Further, under Article 6, a foreign investment enjoys the same fiscal and other incentives 
afforded to domestically-owned projects, such as that under the National Industries 
Protection and Encouragement Regulations and the industrial loans offered in accordance 
with the provisions of the Industrial Development Fund. Another issue that was resolved by 
the new law concerns foreign sponsors. In Saudi Arabia all foreigners need a local legal 
sponsor in order to work in the country. Article 9 states that foreign investors as well as their 
foreign employees shall be sponsored by their licensed investment project.  They are also 
entitled to possess the required real property for practicing the licensed activity.     
 
Finally, the taxation of foreign investment is also modified by the new law. In general, 
domestic firms are required to pay a 'zakat' (a charitable donation), which is a 2.5 per cent tax 
on assets. Article 14 of the new law states that foreign investors are treated in accordance 
with the tax codes valid in Saudi Arabia that states that foreign-owned corporations and the 
foreign-owned portion of joint ventures are subject to corporate income tax, which is 20 per 
cent of net profit. This level of corporation tax is considered to be among the five countries 
with the lowest company taxes in the world (World Bank, 2007). To protect foreign investors 
from paying „double taxation‟, Article 5 of the Executive Rules of the Foreign Investment 
Act states that investors can benefit from any agreements on the avoidance of double taxation 
to which the Kingdom is a signatory. The Executive Rules are given in Appendix 2.2.
6
  
 
As a result of the improving climate for foreign investment in Saudi Arabia and sustained 
high oil prices, foreign direct investment has boomed since the Foreign Direct Investment 
                                                 
6 The Executive Rules of Foreign Investment Act are the rules for implementation. 
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Act in 2000 (Library of Congress, 2006). Table 2.8 shows the total number of foreign 
projects and FDI flows over 1960-05 prior to and after the introduction of the new law in 
2000. It shows that the number of foreign projects has more than doubled between 2000 and 
2005, and the FDI flows have increased to a level equal to the whole period 1960-99, 
indicating a remarkable improvement in the attractiveness of the country to FDI. As such, 
Saudi Arabia has become the largest host economy for FDI in the MENA region, overtaking 
the previous largest attractor of FDI, which was Turkey (UNCTAD, 2008; p. 8).
7
  
 
Table 2.8: Total FDI Flows Prior to and After the New Law, 1960-2005 
 
Share of 
Projects (%) 
No. of Projects 
Share of 
FDI Flow (%) 
FDI Flows 
(SR m) 
Period 
     
31.8 1,589 49.8 175,159 1960-1999 
68.2 3,409 50.2 176,297 2000-2005 
100.0 4,998 100.0 351,456 Total 
  
Source: Investment Database, Saudi Ministry of Commerce and Industry. 
 
Overall, the replacement of the rigid old law by the new law has its positive impact not only 
on promoting the entry of foreign investment but more generally on the environment in 
which it operates. Under the old law, even after the approval of proposed projects by the 
authorities, foreign investors often still have to deal with more than a dozen government 
offices to see their project through (El-Sheik, 1984; p. 63). Since the introduction of the new 
law, the process is now concerned with encouraging rather than impeding foreign investment. 
    
 
                                                 
7 Recently, under the leadership of King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al Saud (the sixth ruler of Saudi Arabia), the 
Kingdom has adopted several reform initiatives with the aim of reinforcing democracy and further opening-up 
of the country to new investment. The aim is to achieve a stable political environment, sustainable economic 
growth and an attractive business-friendly climate (Saudi Ministry of Economy and Planning, 2006). 
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2.4    FDI Inflows to Saudi Arabia and the Wider Region 
    
Over the recent decades there has been a phenomenal worldwide expansion of FDI inflows.
8
  
In this section, we will briefly consider the recent trends in global FDI inflows, but focusing 
on the MENA region, and in particular on FDI inflows to Saudi Arabia.   
 
2.4.1   World FDI Inflows  
 
Prior to the Second World War, international production (including foreign direct 
investment) comprised only a very small share of global business (Hosseini, 2005). The 
economic and political instability during this period, besides the remarkable cultural, political 
and economic differences between countries, imposed many restrictions on direct investment. 
Thus, before the War, FDI was considered to be a special case of portfolio investment, that of 
the parent firm lending to or investing in a subsidiary (see Chapter 3 for definitions of 
portfolio versus direct investment). However, after 1945 a new era of international business 
commenced, of which there were several notable features in the general climate for 
international investment (Jones and Wren, 2006; Hood and Young, 1999). These are 
improvements in technology and communication systems, greater economic and political 
stability, the formation of trading blocks and a more liberalized attitude of host governments. 
FDI inflows in the immediate post-war period were relatively stable, and so we focus on FDI 
in the years since 1970. 
 
                                                 
8
 FDI inflows need not be the same as outflows, as according to the World Investment Report (2006) the former 
refer to “the activities of foreign affiliates in the host economy” (p. 297), while outflows refer to “the activities 
of foreign affiliates of home-based TNCs abroad” (p. 297). 
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With the general improvement of the worldwide business environment, FDI inflows grew at 
an unprecedented level over 1970-09. Figure 2.3 shows that there was a substantial increase 
in world FDI inflows after 1970, measured by inward FDI at current prices, from $13 billion 
in 1970 to $2,100bn in 2007 (UNCTAD FDI Database, 2009).  In fact, FDI was stable up to 
1976, with yearly average flows of $19bn, but then it fluctuated between 1977 and 1985 (not 
apparent from Figure 2.3), but at low levels, after which the substantial increase began.  
 
Figure 2.3: Global FDI Inflows, 1970-2009 
 
Source: UNCTAD, Foreign Direct Investment Database, 2009. 
Note: FDI measured by inflow at US Dollars at current prices in billions. 
 
Figure 2.3 shows that FDI reached a peak of $1,401bn in 2000, but after which was followed 
by a severe downturn, and reaching a trough of $566bn in 2003, before rising again towards 
the end of 2007.  This was followed by a severe downturn in the last two years of the decade. 
We now briefly discuss each of the main phases, distinguishing between three sub-periods: 
the early stage (1970-76), the intermediate stage (1977-85) and the growth stage (1986-date). 
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2.4.1.1   The Main Phases of Global FDI 
 
In 1960, the US accounted for about three-fifths of the accumulated foreign direct investment 
stake in market economies, the UK was responsible for one-sixth, and the rest was fairly 
evenly distributed between other OECD countries. Perhaps the most striking feature of the 
changing pattern of international production over the post-war period is its diversification by 
the country of origin (Dunning, 1979), with FDI becoming increasingly important as one of 
the main forms of international production (Hosseini, 2005).   
 
Table 2.9 shows the stock of FDI according to the country of origin for years between 1967 
and 1976. In total the FDI stock rose by more than two-fold over 1967-76. It also shows that 
the United States and United Kingdom were the main generators of FDI, representing around 
70 per cent of the total FDI stock by 1967. However, their share of world FDI decreased to 
represent 59 per cent by 1976. The combined share of West Germany and Japan grew from 4 
per cent to 14 per cent over the same period. 
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Table 2.9: FDI Stock by Country of Origin 
 
Source : Dunning, 1979 from UN(1978). 
 
Over the period 1977-85, the world economy went from growth to recession, and FDI 
inflows reflected this. Table 2.10 shows that world FDI inflows increased from $27bn in 
1977 to $70bn by 1981, but that it fell back to around $50bn in the mid-1980s. The table also 
shows that FDI inflows to developed countries increased from $20bn at 1977 to $46bn by 
1981, representing 65 per cent of the world FDI inflows. However, while FDI inflows to 
developing countries remained stable at $7bn up to this time, it tended to increase thereafter. 
The year 1982 is notable, when around half of the world FDI went into developing countries, 
which is no doubt due to the much smaller flows between developed countries.  
 
 
 
Country of 
Origin 
1967 1971 1973 1975 1976 1967 1971 1973 1975 1976 
(US$'bn) Percentage distribution 
           
United States 56.6 82.8 101.3 124.2 137.2 53.8 52.3 51.0 47.8 47.6 
Great Britain 17.5 23.7 26.9 30.8 32.1 16.6 15.0 13.5 11.9 11.2 
West Germany 3.0 7.3 11.9 16.0 19.9 2.8 4.6 6.0 6.2 6.9 
Japan 1.5 4.4 10.3 15.9 19.4 1.4 2.8 5.2 6.1 6.7 
Switzerland 5.0 9.5 11.1 16.9 18.6 4.8 6.0 5.6 6.5 6.5 
France 6.0 7.3 8.8 11.1 11.9 5.7 4.6 4.4 4.3 4.1 
Canada 3.7 6.5 7.8 10.5 11.1 3.5 4.1 3.9 4.1 3.9 
Netherlands 2.2 4.0 5.5 8.3 9.8 2.1 2.5 2.8 3.2 3.4 
Sweden 1.7 2.4 3.0 4.4 5.0 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.7 1.7 
Belgium- 
Luxembourg 
2.0 2.4 2.7 3.2 3.6 1.9 1.5 1.4 1.2 1.2 
Italy 2.1 3.0 3.2 3.3 2.9 2.0 1.9 1.6 1.3 1.0 
All Others 4.0 5.1 6.3 15.3 16.8 3.8 3.2 3.1 5.7 5.8 
Total 105 158 199 259 287 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
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Table 2.10: FDI Inflows, 1977-1985 
(US $'bn) 
 
Source: UNCTAD, Foreign Direct Investment Database, 2009. 
Note: FDI inflows measured at current prices. 
 
Since the second half of the 1980s, foreign direct investment has emerged as an important 
channel for international business. In fact, the unparalleled growth of FDI since 1985 may be 
explained, in part, by the strong recovery of the world economy from the recession of the 
early 1980s, and the ensuing high growth rates in both developed and developing countries 
(UNCTAD, 1991). Table 2.11 shows world FDI inflows to both developed and developing 
countries over 1986-05 at current prices. This is now considered. 
 
Table 2.11: FDI Inflows, 1986-2005 
(US $'bn, five year averages) 
Region 1986-90 1991-95 1996-00 2001-05 
     
Developed Countries 656 742 2,989 2,426 
% of total  (83) (65) (74) (65) 
Developing Countries 134 389 1,014 1,195 
% of total  (17) (34) (25) (32) 
All Countries 790 1,143 4,042 3,723 
 
Source: UNCTAD, Foreign Direct Investment Database, 2009. 
Note: Shares may not sum to 100% due to transition economies.  FDI inflows measured at current prices. 
 
Region 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
          
Developed  
Countries  
20 25 34 47 46 32 33 39 42 
Share of Total  (74) (74) (80) (86) (65) (55) (65) (69) (75) 
Developing  
Countries 
7 9 9 7 24 26 18 18 14 
Share of Total  (26) (26) (20) (14) (35) (45) (35) (31) (25) 
All Countries 27 34 42 54 70 58 50 57 56 
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Table 2.11 shows that foreign direct investment inflows grew substantially over 1986-2005, 
increasing approximately five-fold from $790bn over 1986-90 to $3,723bn over 2001-05 
(current prices). UNCTAD (1991) attributes this to the strong recovery of the world economy 
from the recession of the early 1980s. FDI inflows to developed countries also grew 
substantially from about $656bn to $2,426bn over the same period, although it did not keep 
pace, and their share of total FDI inflows declined from 83 to 65 per cent.    
 
FDI inflows to developing countries increased at a faster rate, by about nine-fold from 
$134bn over 1986-90 to $1,195bn over 2001-05, and their share of the world FDI inflows 
grew remarkably from 17 to 32 per cent, although from a much smaller base. Overall, there 
has been a gradual shift of FDI inflows away from the developed countries, which reflects the 
incremental importance of the developing countries in the global landscape. We now examine 
these inflows in relation to the MENA region, and in particular to Saudi Arabia.  
 
2.4.2 FDI Inflows to the MENA region 
 
MENA refers to the Middle East and North Africa region, although the definition of MENA 
is not wholly agreed upon by the international agencies. UNCTAD defines MENA as two 
separate regions: West Asia, which includes Bahrain, Cyprus, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, 
Lebanon, Oman, Palestinian territories, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey, 
United Arab Emirates and Yemen; and North Africa, which includes Algeria, Egypt, Libyan 
Arab Jamahiriya, Morocco, Sudan and Tunisia. It differs from the World Bank definition of 
MENA, which includes Israel, but which is considered as a developed country by UNCTAD. 
Since our data on FDI flows were collected from the UNCTAD, Foreign Direct Investment 
Database, we follow the UNCTAD definition of MENA. 
 35 
The features of the MENA region play an important role in influencing FDI inflows. In 
general, the MENA countries rely heavily on oil, have a relatively weak economic base, high 
population growth and unemployment rates, but have low levels of integration with the world 
financial and capital markets and have underdeveloped institutions (Hisarciklilar et al, 2006). 
However, these factors vary between MENA countries, so that there is in fact a high variance 
in FDI inflows between countries. MENA countries have also implemented different reform 
programmes in order to enhance their competitiveness and attractiveness to FDI. According 
to the World Bank (2007), although many trade agreements have been initiated between these 
countries, bilateral trade between the MENA countries is still small compared with other 
global economic areas. Nevertheless, the World Bank (2007) reports that the business climate 
of the MENA countries has improved, as they strive to encourage FDI through liberalization 
of their economies and privatization. 
 
FDI inflow to the MENA region over 1986-05 is shown in Table 2.12, with a breakdown by 
North Africa and West Asia, and by sub-period. In general, FDI inflows into the region have 
increased monotonically over 1986-05, growing by around fourteen fold, and reaching $121 
billion over the sub-period 2001-05. This is not sufficient for MENA to substantially increase 
its share of developing countries FDI flows. The share of FDI inflows into MENA was 
around 10 per cent of total FDI inflows into developing countries over 2001-05, but growing 
by only 4 per cent over the whole period from 7 per cent over 1986-90. 
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Table 2.12: FDI Inflows in the MENA Region, 1986-2005 
 
  
Region 
Inflows 
(US $'bn) 
1986-90 1991-95 1996-00 2001-05 
     
North Africa 6.4 8.4 13.9 33.3 
West Asia 2.4 11.9 17.1 88.0 
MENA 8.8 20.3 31.0 121.3 
All Developing  133.8 389.5 1,013.6 1,195.0 
All Countries 789.6 1,142.6 4,041.9 3,723.5 
 
Source: UNCTAD, Foreign Direct Investment Database, 2009. 
Note: FDI inflows measured at current prices. 
 
FDI inflows in the North Africa and West Asia parts of the MENA region have, in general, 
increased over 1986-05. However, West Asia has performed better compared to North Africa, 
since while FDI inflows into West Asia increased sharply, by more than thirty-six-fold over 
1986-05, FDI inflows into the North Africa increased by only five-fold. Table 2.12 shows 
FDI inflows in the West Asia countries of the MENA region represented 27 per cent of the 
total MENA inflows over 1986-90, but since then FDI inflows to these countries steadily 
increased, such that over 2001-05 the share reached nearly 73 per cent.  
 
Table 2.13 shows the leading five countries within the MENA region with the highest share 
of FDI inflows over 1986-05. These are Turkey, accounting for 15.9 per cent, United Arab 
Emirates (15.6 per cent), Egypt (12.6 per cent), Saudi Arabia (9.5 per cent) and Lebanon (8.3 
per cent). Around half of FDI inflows were concentrated in just three countries: Turkey, 
United Arab Emirates and Egypt.  
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Table 2.13: Highest Country Shares of FDI Inflows in MENA Region, 1986-2005 
 
Country 
FDI Inflows 
(US $'m) % 
   
Turkey 28,908 15.9 
UAE* 28,245 15.6 
Egypt 22,813 12.6 
Saudi Arabia 17,280 9.5 
Lebanon 15,124 8.3 
Others 69,088 38.1 
MENA 181,458 100.0 
 
Source: UNCTAD, Foreign Direct Investment Database, 2009. 
 Note: FDI measured at current prices. *United Arab Emirates. 
 
2.4.3   FDI Inflows into Saudi Arabia 
 
FDI inflows to Saudi Arabia are shown in Table 2.14, which reveals that FDI amounted to 
SRs 344 billion over 1976-2005. The table gives a breakdown by 5-year periods. In general, 
FDI inflows over the whole period followed a U-shaped trend (see Figure 2.4 below), such 
that FDI initially declined after 1976, reaching the lowest level of only SR 9,225 million in 
the sub-period 1986-90, but since then FDI has increased, reaching SR 169,616 million 
between 2001 and 2005. UNCTAD (2006) attributes the huge increase of FDI inflows to 
Saudi's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in November 2005. According to 
the WTO, "this accelerated the country's integration into the global economy as well as its 
liberalization of inflows FDI" (UNCTAD, 2006; p. 66). A second factor was undoubtedly the 
2000 Foreign Investment Act and the establishment of SAGIA, which helped to stimulate the 
inflow of investment into the country and to promote business opportunities. 
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Table 2.14: FDI Inflows, 1976-2005 
 
Period 
FDI Inflows 
(SR m) 
 
Share of Total FDI Inflows 
   
1976-1980 64,997 18.9 
1981-1985 42,987 12.5 
1986-1990 9,225 2.7 
1991-1995 33,392 9.7 
1996-2000 23,705 6.9 
2001-2005 169,616 49.3 
1976-2005 343,922 100.0 
 
Source: Investment Database, Saudi Ministry of Commerce and Industry. 
Note: FDI measured at constant 2000 prices.  
 
Figure 2.4: FDI inflows to Saudi Arabia, 1976-2005 
 
Source: Investment Database, Saudi Ministry of Commerce and Industry. 
Note: FDI measured at constant 2000 prices.  
 
A further factor affecting FDI is the oil industry. Table 2.15 shows the relationship between 
FDI inflows into the Kingdom and the output of its oil sector. Allowing for the strong trend 
over time, it illustrates that FDI inflows to the Kingdom are to some extent positively related 
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with oil revenues. Increased oil activity suggests greater opportunities for investment, leading 
to both stronger revenues and to more FDI inflows, and vice-versa. 
 
Table 2.15: Output of the Oil Sector and FDI Inflows, 1976-05 
 
Period 
Oil Output 
(SR m) 
Inward FDI 
(SR m) 
   
1976-80 960,573 64,997 
1981-85 1,043,775 42,987 
1986-90 485,524 9,225 
1991-95 906,596 33,392 
1996-00 1,095,708 23,705 
2001-05 1,891,804 169,616 
 
Source: Investment Database, Saudi Ministry of Commerce and Industry and Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency 
(SAMA) Annual Report, 2008. 
Note: Oil output measured at current prices. FDI measured at constant 2000 prices. 
 
The FDI inflows to Saudi Arabia have come from a large number of source countries in 
different global regions. This is further analyzed in Chapter 5 using the unique dataset 
constructed for the purpose of this thesis. However, for now, the FDI inflows by the number 
of projects and size of investment by supra-national origin over the period 1960-05 are shown 
in Table 2.16. Not unsurprisingly, more than half of FDI projects in Saudi Arabia came from 
the MENA region, in which the West Asia part accounts for the vast majority of projects. 
However, this region accounts for only 20.6 per cent of the total foreign investment by 
amount, which indicates that these projects are smaller in scale. The largest amount of FDI 
inflows is from North America, accounting for nearly one-third of total volume of FDI. 
However, by average scale per project, it falls behind that of the Far East.  
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Table 2.16: Foreign Projects by Supra-national Origin, 1960-2005 
 
Country 
No. of 
Projects 
Investment 
Amount       
(SR m) 
Investment 
Share of Total 
FDI 
Average 
Investment Per 
Project 
(SR m) 
     
MENA (West Asia) 2,356 68,578 19.5 29.1 
MENA (North Africa) 487 3,947 1.1 8.1 
Western Europe 774 78,269 22.3 101.1 
North America 545 96,948 27.6 177.9 
Far East 216 73,336 20.9 339.5 
Rest of the World 547 22,060 6.3 40.3 
Not classified* 73 8,318 2.4 113.9 
Total 4,998 351,456 100.0 70.3 
 
Source: Investment Database, Saudi Ministry of Commerce and Industry. 
Note: Investments measured at constant 2000 prices. * = These are projects where several countries have equal 
biggest shares, and so are not classified.   
 
In terms of the number of projects, Table 2.17 shows the five countries with the largest 
number of inward FDI projects to Saudi Arabia. These are Jordan (519 projects), Syria (515), 
Egypt (442), the United States (404) and Palestine (376). The total number of projects from 
these five countries represents 45 per cent of the total number of FDI projects in Saudi Arabia 
over 1960-05. Four of these are from the West Asia part of MENA, indicating the importance 
of cultural distance between host and home countries as a determinant of FDI. However, 
while these countries are ranked the most important in terms of the number of projects, they 
have a small share of the total amount of FDI flows, which combined is only 4.9 per cent. 
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Table 2.17: Largest Country of Origin by Number of Projects, 1960-2005 
 
Country No. of Projects 
Share of 
Total Projects 
Investment 
Amount (SR m) 
Share of 
Investment 
     
Jordan 519 10.4 8,366 2.4 
Syria 515 10.3 3,692 1.1 
Egypt 442 8.8 3,666 1.0 
United States 404 8.1 68,157 19.4 
Palestine 376 7.5 1,536 0.4 
Other Countries 2,742 54.9 266,039 75.7 
Total 4,998 100.0 351,456 100.0 
 
Source: Investment Database, Saudi Ministry of Commerce and Industry. 
Note: Investments measured at constant 2000 prices.  
 
In terms of the amount of investment, Table 2.18 shows that the largest five countries ranked 
as a major source of FDI flows are: the United States (19.4 per cent of the total FDI inflows), 
Japan (18.4 per cent), France (8.8), Kuwait (8.4) and Bermuda (6.8). Since there is only one 
country from the MENA region, Kuwait, this clearly shows that the largest investors in terms 
of investment are outside of the MENA region.  
 
Table 2.18: Largest Country of Origin by FDI Amount, 1960-2005 
 
Country 
Investment Amount 
(SR m) 
Share of Total FDI 
   
United States 68,157 19.4 
Japan 64,694 18.4 
France 31,099 8.8 
Kuwait 29,476 8.4 
Bermuda 23,988 6.8 
Other Countries 134,042 38.1 
Total 351,456 100.0 
 
Source: Investment Database, Saudi Ministry of Commerce and Industry. 
Note: Investments measured at constant 2000 prices.  
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2.5   Conclusions 
 
This chapter has presented detailed background information about the economy of Saudi 
Arabia, focusing on FDI. Although the Saudi economy has grown from a relatively simple 
economy from just forty years ago to become a fairly sophisticated economy, the dependence 
on oil revenues has been a serious challenge facing the country. It has made the economy 
vulnerable to economic shocks, and has led to a series of development plans since 1970 that 
seek diversification through market reform and the encouragement of foreign investment. In 
2000 it includes the Foreign Investment Act and the establishment of the Saudi Arabian 
General Investment Authority (SAGIA), with the explicit purpose of promoting FDI. 
 
The chapter finds that the reform steps appear to have been successful in tackling the 
weaknesses in the old Foreign Investment Act and removing the restrictions facing foreign 
investors. It has meant that the amount of FDI inflows between 2000 and 2005 is roughly 
equal to that during the thirty years prior to the year 2000. While FDI to the MENA region 
represents only a small part of total inflows to the developing countries, it is concentrated in 
five countries, with Saudi Arabia in the fourth place. Further, the chapter finds differences in 
number of projects and amount of investment arising from different sources. Although half of 
projects originate from the West Asia part of MENA, around two-thirds of total investment 
originates from Northern America, Western Europe and the Far East. Nevertheless, if the 
primary purpose of FDI is to diversify the Saudi economy, then it remains heavily dependent 
on oil revenues.  In the next two chapters, we consider the literature, before examining in-
depth FDI in Saudi Arabia in Chapter 5. 
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Appendix 2.1: The 2000 Foreign Investment Act 
 
Article 1 
The following expressions and terms shall have the meaning ascribed beside each, unless the 
context deems otherwise: 
 
A. THE COUNCIL: The Supreme Economic Council. 
B. BOARD OF DIRECTORS: The Board of Directors of the General Investment 
Authority. 
C. THE AUTHORITY: The General Investment Authority. 
D. THE GOVERNOR: The Governor of the General Investment Authority and 
Chairman of the Board of Directors. 
E. FOREIGN INVESTOR: The natural person of non-Saudi nationality or otherwise the 
body corporate, where all partners are non-Saudi nationals. 
F. FOREIGN INVESTMENT: Investment of Foreign Capital in a licensed activity under 
this Act. 
G. FOREIGN CAPITAL: The Foreign Capital in this Act shall mean, for example but 
not limited to, the following funds and rights as long as they are possessed by a 
Foreign Investor: 
 
1. Money, instruments, securities and commercial instruments.  
2. Foreign Investment profits if they are invested to increase the capital, expansion of 
existing projects or establishment of new projects.  
3. Machinery, equipment, supplies, spare-parts, means of transportation and  
production requirements relevant to the investment. 
4. Legal fights i.e., licenses, intellectual properties, technical know-how,  
administrative skills and production techniques. 
 
H. PRODUCTION FACILITIES: Projects for the production of industrial and 
agricultural products (plant and animal). 
I. SERVICE FACILITIES: Service and construction projects. 
J. ACT: The Foreign Investment Act. 
K. THE RULES: The Rules of Implementation of this Act. 
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Article 2 
Without prejudice to the requirements of regulations and agreements the Authority shall issue 
a license for a Foreign Capital Investment in any investment activity in the Kingdom, 
whether permanent or temporary. 
 
The Authority shall make a decision about the investment application within thirty days after 
the completion of documents provided for in the Rules. In the event that the specified period 
elapsed without the Authority rendering a decision about the application it shall be obligated 
to issue the required license for the investor. 
 
If the Authority shall deny the said application within the specified period, then the pertinent 
decision of denial shall be justified, and the party against whom the decision of denial had 
been issued shall have the right to contest such decision according to regulations. 
 
Article 3 
The Council shall have the authority to issue a list of activities excluded from Foreign 
Investment. 
 
Article 4 
Subject to Article 2, the Foreign Investor may obtain more than one license in different 
activities, and the Rules shall specify the necessary measures. 
 
Article 5 
Foreign Investments licensed under the provisions of this Act, may be in either of the 
following forms: 
1. Facilities owned by a national and a Foreign Investor. 
2. Facilities wholly owned by a Foreign Investor. 
The legal form of the Facility shall be determined according to regulations and directives. 
 
 
Article 6 
A project licensed under this Act shall enjoy all the benefits, incentives and guarantees 
enjoyed by a national project according to regulations and directives. 
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Article 7 
The Foreign Investor shall have the right to reallocate his share as derived from the selling of 
his equity, or from the liquidation surplus or profits generated by the facility, out of the 
Kingdom or to use by any other legal means, and he shall also be entitled to transfer the 
required amounts to settle any contractual obligations pertaining to the project. 
 
Article 8 
The foreign facility licensed under this Act shall be entitled to possess the required real 
estates as might be reasonable for practicing the licensed activity or for the housing of all or 
some of the staff as per the provisions for non-Saudi nationals real estate acquisition. 
 
Article 9 
The Foreign Investor and his non-Saudi staff shall be sponsored by the licensed facility. 
 
Article 10 
The Authority shall provide all those interested in investment with all necessary information, 
clarifications and statistics, together with all services and procedures to facilitate and 
accomplish all matters pertaining to the investments. 
 
Article 11 
Investments related to the foreign investor shall not be confiscated wholly or partially without 
a court order, moreover, it may not be subject to expropriation wholly or partially except for 
public interest against an equitable compensation according to Regulations and Directives. 
 
Article 12 
1. The Authority shall inform the Foreign Investor in writing when violating the provisions of 
this Act and its Rules in order that such violation be rectified within a period of time 
determined appropriate by the Authority for rectifying such violation. 
 
2. Without prejudice to any greater penalty, the Foreign Investor under the existence of the 
violation shall be subject to any of the following penalties: 
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A. Withhold all or part of the incentives and benefits allocated for the Foreign 
Investor. 
B. Imposition of a financial fine not exceeding SR. 500,000 (Five hundred thousand 
Saudi Riyals). 
C. Cancellation of the Foreign Investment license. 
 
3. The imposition of the penalties referred to in paragraph (2) herein above, is rendered by a 
resolution by the Board of Directors. 
 
4. A petition against the penalizing resolution may be brought before the Board of Grievances 
according to its regulations. 
 
Article 13 
Without prejudice to the Agreements in which the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia shall be a party 
of: 
1. Disputes arising between the Government and the Foreign Investor relating to his 
licensed investments under this Act shall as far as possible be settled amicably, and if 
this shall prove to be impossible, then the dispute shall be settled according to 
regulations. 
2. The disputes arising between the Foreign Investor and his Saudi partners relating to 
his licensed investments under this Act shall as far as possible be settled amicably, 
and if this shall prove to be impossible, then the dispute shall be settled according to 
regulations. 
 
Article 14 
All Foreign Investments licensed under this Act shall be treated in accordance with the Tax 
codes valid in Saudi Arabia and its amendments. 
 
 
Article 15 
The Foreign Investor undertakes to abide by all regulations, rules and directives valid in 
Saudi Arabia together with international agreements in which it is a part thereof. 
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Article 16 
The implementation of this Act shall not prejudice the vested interests of Foreign Investments 
that legally existed before this Act shall come into force, however, these projects in 
conducting their activity or increasing their capital shall be subject to its provisions. 
 
Article 17 
The Authority shall issue the Rules, which shall be published in the Official Journal, and 
shall be effective as of the date of its publishing. 
 
Article 18 
This Act shall be published in the Official Journal, and shall be effective thirty days after its 
publishing, and shall invalidate the Foreign Capital Investment Act issued by the Royal 
Decree no. (M/4), dated 2/2/1399 (H), together with any contradicting provisions.  
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Appendix 2.2: The Executive Rules of the Foreign Investment Act 
 
First: Definitions 
 
Article 1 
For the purpose of implementing these Executive Rules the following terms and expressions 
shall have the meanings indicated opposite thereto, unless the context requires otherwise: 
The Council 
The Supreme Economic Council 
The Board of Directors 
The Board of Directors of the Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority 
The Chairman of the Board of Directors 
The Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Saudi Arabian General Investment 
Authority 
The Governor 
The Governor of the Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority 
The Authority 
The Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority 
Foreign Investor 
A natural person who is not a Saudi national, or a corporate entity, partners thereof are 
not Saudi nationals 
Foreign Investment 
Investment of Foreign Capital in an activity licensed under the Act and the rules 
Foreign Capital 
For purposes of the Act and the Rules, Foreign Capital shall mean, but is not limited to the 
following assets and rights so long as they are held by a Foreign Investor: 
1. Cash, securities and commercial papers.  
2. Foreign Investment profits if reinvested to increase capital expand existing investment 
entities or establish new ones.  
3. Machinery, equipment, fixtures, spare-parts, means of transportation and production 
requirements related to the investment.  
4. Intangible rights such as licenses, intellectual property rights, technical know-how, 
administrative skills and production techniques.  
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The Act 
The Foreign Investment Act 
Products Facilities 
Projects for the production of industrial and agricultural products (crops and livestock) 
Service Facilities 
Service and contracting projects 
The Rules 
The executive Rules of Foreign Investment Act 
The Center 
Investors Service Center Stipulated in Article (9) of the Saudi Arabian General 
Investment Authority‟s Act 
 
Second: The Fields of Investment 
 
Article 2 
The Authority is authorized to issue a license for foreign capital investment in the Kingdom 
for any investment activity whether permanent or temporary with the exception of the 
activities excluded under the third article of the Act. 
 
Article 3 
The Board of Directors shall periodically review the list of activities excluded from foreign 
investment in order to shorten it and submit it to the Council to consider its approval. 
 
Article 4 
Foreign Investments licensed under the provisions of The Act and The Rules may be in either 
of the following forms: 
1. Entities jointly owned by a national and a foreign investor. 
2. Entities wholly owned by a foreign investor. 
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Third: Benefits, Incentives and Guarantees 
 
Article 5 
Foreign Investment projects shall enjoy all the benefits, incentives and guarantees extended 
to national projects, including the following:  
1. The incentives stipulated in the Protection and Promotion of National Industries Act 
issued by Royal Decree No. 50 dated 23.12.1381 H. 
2. Ownership of real estate required to carry out the investor‟s licensed activity or for his 
residence and his staff housing according to the provisions of the Regulation of 
Ownership and Investment in Real Estate by Non–Saudis issued by Royal Decree No. 
M/15 dated 17.04.1421 H. 
3. The benefits ensuing from agreements of avoiding double taxation and agreements of 
promotion and protection of Investment which are signed by the Kingdom. 
4. Prohibition of any full or partial confiscation of investment without a court order or 
subjecting them to expropriation wholly or partly except for the public interest and 
against fair compensation. 
5. Foreign investors are entitled to repatriate their share that is derived from the sale of 
his equity, from surplus of liquidation or the profits generated by the entity and to 
dispose of it by any legal obligations. He is also entitled to transfer required amounts 
to fulfill any contractual obligations in respect of the project. 
6. Shares can be freely exchanged amongst partners and others.  
7. The licensed entity is entitled to sponsor the foreign investor and his non–Saudi staff. 
8. The licensed entity is entitled to obtain industrial loans in accordance with the 
regulations of The Saudi Industrial Development Fund.  
9. The losses incurred by the entity may me carried forward to the following years and 
will not be calculated at tax settlement of the years during which the entity reaps 
profits. 
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Fourth: Licensing Conditions and Criteria 
 
Article 6 
The conditions for granting a Foreign Investment license by The Authority shall include the 
following: 
1. The investment activity to be licensed should not be in the List of excluded activities 
from Foreign Investment. 
2. The intended Product should comply with the Kingdom‟s rules and regulations, or the 
laws of the European Union or the United States of America in the absence of those 
laws, in terms of standards and specifications, raw materials and production 
processes. 
3. The license applicant should be a natural or nominal person who has come to the 
Kingdom for investment. 
4. The Foreign Investor should not have been convicted in the past for substantial 
violations of the provisions of The Act.  
5. The Foreign Investor should not have been convicted in the past of financial or 
commercial violations whether in the Kingdom or in other countries.  
6. The grant of a license shall not result in the breach of any international or regional 
agreement to which the Kingdom is a party. 
 
Article 7 
The Foreign Investor may obtain more than one license to practice the same activity or a 
different activity(s) subject to the following conditions: 
1. The conditions set forth under Article (6) of The Rules must be satisfied. 
2. Licensing applications to practice the same activity submitted by natural or moral 
persons shall be considered as expansion of established projects applications. 
3. The Board of Directors will reconsider these conditions periodically or when deemed 
necessary. 
 
Article 8 
The Foreign Investor may purchase local or foreign investment entities or shares thereof 
subject to the conditions set forth in Article (5) and Article (6) of The rules. 
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Fifth: Licensing Procedures 
 
Article 9 
The Authority shall prepare an investment guide containing a description of the procedures 
for obtaining both permanent and temporary licenses and their modifications, as well as the 
forms, required documents to obtain the licenses and any information needed by the investor. 
The guide shall also list the incentives, benefits and guarantees to be enjoyed by The Foreign 
Investor. In addition, the guide must contain substantial information about the following: 
1. Foreign Investment Act, its rules and supplementary decisions.  
2. The Statute of the General Investment Authority and the Executive Rules of the 
General Investment Authority. 
3. The Regulation of Ownership and Investment in Real Estate by Non-Saudis.  
4. Protection and Promotion of National Industries Act.  
5. Labor and Workmen Act and Social Insurance Act.  
6. Zakat, Tax and Customs Regulations.  
7. Legal Sharia Procedures Act.  
8. Penal Procedures Act.  
9. Legal Profession Act. 
10. Companies Regulations (Commercial Register, Trade Fraud, Banks Monitoring).  
11. Intellectual Property Protection Regulations (Trade Marks Act, Copyrights Protection 
Act, Patents Act).  
12. Residence Act. 
The guide shall also contain special sections on the customs and traditions observed in the 
Kingdom and shall be updated regularly. 
 
Article 10 
Applications to obtain a foreign investment license shall be submitted to the Applications 
Reception Unit of The Center, using the designated form. The application must contain all 
the necessary information; satisfy all documentation requirements cited therein and be signed 
by the applicant or his duly authorized representative. The Center shall notify the license 
applicant by a written or electronic receipt note including the number of the application 
record and its date. 
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Article 11 
The Authority may accept complete licensing applications and the required attached 
documents that are delivered by post, e-mail or fax. The licensing decision may be issued 
accordingly; provided that it will be delivered to the applicant only after The Authority 
receives the original documents when deemed necessary.  
 
Article 12 
Decisions on submitted applications are subject to the provisions of The Act, The Rules and 
the resolutions of The Board of Directors. The Governor, or his assigned delegate, shall sign 
the licensing decisions within thirty days. National holidays shall be excluded from the 
mentioned period. 
 
Article 13 
The Center shall notify the investor, by hand delivery, registered mail, e-mail or any other 
means, of the final decision issued with respect to his application.  
 
Article 14 
If The Authority rejects the application for a new license or the modification of an existing 
license, its rejection shall be justified. The foreign Investor may object to the rejection 
decision before The Board of Directors within thirty days effective from the date on which he 
is notified of the rejection decision.  
 
Article 15 
The Board of Directors shall consider the objection and reach a decision on it within thirty 
days from the date of its submittal. If the objection was rejected, the license applicant shall 
have the right to challenge the rejection decision before the Board of Grievances. 
 
Sixth: Obligations of the Foreign Investor 
 
Article 16 
The licensed investor shall start the practical steps required for setting up the entity in 
accordance with the time schedule submitted by him to The Authority. The Authority shall, if 
The Foreign Investor shows adequate reasons for delays in the implementation procedures, 
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extend the period specified in the schedule, provided that the extensions shall not exceed one 
year in total. The extension shall not exceed one year unless a decision to that effect is made 
by The Board of Directors. 
 
Article 17 
When The Authority does not approve the extension requests specified by the time table, and 
if The Foreign Investor is found not to be diligent after the extension, The Board of Directors 
may then revoke the license. A Foreign Investor whose license is revoked under this Article 
shall bear the consequences of revocation. 
 
Article 18 
Licensed entities must abide by the conditions and primary objectives upon which the 
licenses are issued. No modifications shall be made unless approved by The Authority. 
 
Article 19 
Owners of licensed entities shall adopt an accredited accounting system and a budget for their 
entities approved by an authorized accounting office. Upon request, owners of licensed 
entities shall provide The Authority with statistics or information in respect of their entities. 
 
Seventh: Violations 
 
Article 20 
Authority officials, empowered by a written mandate by The Governor or his designated 
representative, shall have the right to monitor the implementation of the provisions of The 
Act and The Rules. For this purpose, they have the right to examine records and all 
documents relating to the investment activity and shall pinpoint violations and submit 
necessary reports to The Governor or his designated representative. The assigned officials 
shall maintain the confidentiality of the information and documents they examine. 
 
Article 21 
The Board of Director shall issue a list of violations and penalties pertaining to the violation 
of the provisions of The Act, The Rules, the licensing conditions and the rules of their 
implementation and the implementation of the penalties therein. 
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Article 22 
The Authority shall notify the Foreign Investor in writing regarding any violation of the 
provisions of The Act, The Rules and the licensing conditions; and shall allow a suitable 
period of time, as specified by the list of violations and penalties, to correct them. If the 
Foreign Investor fails to implement the necessary corrections, he shall be subject to any of 
the penalties provided for in the list of violations and penalties. 
 
Article 23 
The Board of Directors shall form a committee consisting of at least three members, one of 
whom shall be a legal counselor and shall develop rules and procedures for its functioning. 
The responsibilities of the committee shall be to review violations of the provisions of The 
Act provisions and The Rules and the licensing conditions. The committee shall hear the 
parties accused thereof, to consider their defenses and to suggest what it sees according to 
what specified by The Act and the list of violations and penalties. The Board of Directors 
shall render the penalty decision. 
 
Article 24 
The Foreign Investor with to whom the penalty decision is issued according to Article 23 of 
The Rules may object to the rejection decision before the Board of Directors within thirty 
days effective from the date on which he is notified of the rejection decision. 
 
Article 25 
The Board of Directors shall consider the objection and make a decision on it within thirty 
days from the date of its submittal. If The Board of Directors confirms the penalty the license 
applicant shall have the right to challenge the rejection decision before the Board of 
Grievances within 60 days effective from the date on which he was notified of the decision.  
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Eighth: Disputes Settlement Committee 
 
Article 26 
The Board of Directors shall form, subject to Article 13, paragraph 2 of The Act, a committee 
composed of at least a chairman and two members to be named The Investment Disputes 
Settlement Committee. This committee shall consider the disputes arising between the 
Foreign Investor and his Saudi partners in respect of a licensed investment under The Act. 
The committee shall work to settle the dispute amicably. In case an amicable settlement could 
not be reached, the dispute shall be settled through arbitration according to the Arbitration 
Act and its executive rules issued by Royal Decree No. (46) Dated 12.7.1403 H. This 
committee is the competent body to consider the dispute as stipulated in the Arbitration Act. 
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Chapter 3 
The Determinants of FDI: 
Theoretical Conceptualizations and Empirical Studies 
 
3.1   Introduction 
 
There is a large literature analyzing foreign direct investment (FDI), reflecting both the 
interest in understanding the determinants of FDI and its location. Many theories have sought 
to explain these from different perspectives, of which the early contributions essentially 
followed the developments in international trade. Later, other perspectives and 
conceptualizations of FDI were adopted, which differ in their theoretical foundations, and 
arising from literatures such as institutional and industrial economics. Empirically-based 
research has sought to test these different theories and to analyze the location of FDI, using 
data for countries that include both developed and developing countries. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to review this literature on the determinants of FDI from both 
theoretical and empirical points of view, in order to provide some motivation for the 
subsequent empirical work that examines FDI outflows and joint venture equity shares. The 
chapter is broadly based, while in Chapter 4 we consider the literature relating more 
specifically to the entry mode, making reference to the determinants of FDI considered in this 
chapter. This chapter starts in Section 3.2 by considering the definition of FDI, and relating 
this to that adopted in Saudi Arabia. It describes in Section 3.3 the evolution of the 
determinants of FDI from different theoretical perspectives. The empirical studies that seek to 
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test these different theories are then examined in Section 3.4, giving some weight to location 
studies, but which is conducted in light of the models discussed in Section 3.3.  Conclusions 
from this chapter are drawn in Section 3.5.  
 
3.2   The Definition of FDI 
 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF, 1993) and the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD, 1996) provide a widely accepted definition of FDI. 
They define FDI as the category of international investment that reflects the objective of a 
resident entity in one economy ("direct investor" or "parent enterprise") obtaining a „lasting 
interest‟ and control in an enterprise resident in another economy ("direct investment 
enterprise"). These criteria help us to distinguish a foreign direct investment from a portfolio 
investment, where the notion in the foreign direct investment enterprise is defined as "the 
percentage of ownership that should be used as a threshold (10 per cent) below which 
investments are treated as portfolio investments and above which they are treated as direct 
investments" (Brewer, 1994; p. 117). The definition of FDI in Saudi Arabia makes no 
distinction between FDI and portfolio investment, although very few projects in Saudi Arabia 
have less than 10% foreign ownership, so that for practical purposes the definitions are the 
same. 
 
According to the Executive Rule of Foreign Investments Act (2000) of Saudi Arabia, "FDI is 
investment of foreign capital in an activity licensed under the Act and the rules" (p. 1). The 
executive rules of the Act point out that foreign capital includes the following assets and 
rights, as long as they are held by a foreign investor: 
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 Cash, securities and commercial papers. 
 Foreign investment profits if reinvested to increase capital, expand existing 
investment entities or establish new ones. 
 Machinery, equipment, fixtures, spare-parts, means of transportation and production 
requirements related to the investment. 
 Intangible rights such as licenses, intellectual property rights, technical know-how, 
administrative skills and production techniques. 
 
In Saudi Arabia there is no threshold level that distinguishes between FDI and portfolio 
investment (i.e. 10% ownership), so that the executive rule of the Foreign Investments Act 
defines FDI in the following two forms: 
 
 Entities that are wholly owned by a foreign investor (s).  Full ownership may be made 
by either mode of entry, i.e. acquisition or „greenfield‟ start-up, and these may be 
joint ventures between foreign investors. 
 Entities jointly owned by a national and a foreign investor. In this form, a joint-
venture project is not subject to any threshold percentage share by the foreign 
investor, but less than a 100 per cent share.  
 
Although the definition of FDI used by Saudi Arabia could lead to the level of FDI in the 
country being overstated when compared to the OCED definition, in practice the number of 
investments below the 10% threshold level is very small (over the period 1960-05 we find 
below that there were just 97 projects were in this category, which is about 1% of total 
projects). However, the main premise of FDI in the theoretical literature relates to the concept 
of control that a single direct investor has in the overseas enterprise. It is this concept that has 
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been at the heart of the development of the theoretical literature on FDI, and it is the 
development of these theories that we shall look at in the next section. 
   
3.3   The Theoretical Determinants of FDI 
 
The interest in FDI, and the development of theoretical models and empirical studies used to 
understand it began to emerge in the period immediately following the Second World War, 
between 1945 and 1960, a period when FDI flows began to gain prominence in the global 
economy.  However, these early models (and consequently the empirical studies also) were 
missing a distinct theoretical underpinning, as FDI was treated on the same basis as trade 
theories, and so a separate conceptualization was lacking. FDI was given increasing attention 
from the late 1960s onwards, a period over which global FDI flows increased dramatically 
from $13 billion in 1970 to $1,800 billion in 2007. During this period, foreign direct 
investment began to emerge as a concept of its own right, crossing a number of disciplinary 
boundaries, including economics, politics and management.  
 
In essence, these theories try to answer the following questions: First, why do firms choose to 
transfer their operations from the home to the host country?  Second, why do they choose to 
do this instead of exporting or licensing?  Finally, why do they choose to locate in a 
particular area?  The chronological development of these new theories is now discussed in 
the following eight subsections of this chapter. 
 
3.3.1   International Trade Theory 
 
The early theoretical models that aimed to explain FDI were based on international trade 
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theory, and in particular the Heckscher-Ohlin model of neoclassical trade theory, within the 
framework of „the 2 x 2 x 2 model‟. As Lancaster (1957) puts it, "the Heckscher-Ohlin model 
provided, for the first time, an analysis that was capable of integrating the factor markets into 
international trade theory in a satisfactory way" (p. 19). It is a general equilibrium model that 
determines a country's comparative advantage, assuming that there are two countries (home 
and foreign) and two commodities requiring two factors of production (capital and labour), in 
addition to the use of land. It further assumes identical production technologies between the 
two countries and perfectly competitive commodity markets, but differences in the factor 
intensity of constant-returns-to-scale production functions and differences in the factor 
endowments of the two countries. 
 
According to Heckscher-Ohlin theorem, countries specialize in producing the commodity that 
utilizes the locally abundant factor of production most intensively.  So, for example, if the 
production of one commodity is relatively capital-intensive, then the country that has 
relatively more capital compared to the other country will produce that good.  This implies 
that labour is relatively scarce, so that it attracts higher wages.  Capital therefore flows 
elsewhere to seek cheaper labour in order to get higher returns.  This provides a powerful 
explanation for foreign direct investment. 
 
In the Heckscher-Ohlin model the countries are endowed with different quantities of factors 
of production, which determines their price, but Samuelson (1953) extended this model by 
arguing that the prices of the factors would gradually equalize between the two countries.  
This is the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) model. The basic logic of the HOS model is 
that under free trade, factor prices will be equalized across countries regardless of the 
difference in factor endowments. Vanek (1968) explored whether international trade occurs 
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according to the differences in factor endowments between countries.  He generalized the 
Heckscher-Ohlin model into a multi-factor, multi-good and multi-country model (i.e. more 
than two in each case) to analyze the actual relationships between countries, which is called 
the Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek (HOV) model.  
 
The role of FDI is described implicitly by the basic Heckscher-Ohlin model, whereby FDI 
occurs in the form of capital flows from capital-intensive countries to other countries that are 
characterized by cheap labour. However, Lancaster (1957) states that the Heckscher-Ohlin 
model can be sharply criticized on the grounds of its strong assumptions, i.e. the model has 
countries that have identical production functions that use identical factors to produce 
identical goods with the property of constant returns to scale. Lancaster points out that "these 
assumptions are necessary (but not sufficient) to result in the equalization of factor prices 
throughout the world" (p. 20). He states that "the assumptions of identical production 
functions and of constant returns to scale have been attacked as „unrealistic‟" (p. 20). The 
assumptions of the Heckscher-Ohlin model are also criticized in the sense that "they 
eliminate all differences between countries except with regard to factor endowment" 
(Kierzkowski, 1987; p. 2). According to Kierzkowski (1987), the criticisms have led 
economists to explore the implications of the assumptions, which in turn have led to the 
emergence of alternative models of FDI.     
 
3.3.2   The Theory of Firm-Specific Ownership Advantages 
 
The first attempt to treat FDI as a stand-alone theory, as opposed to a strand of international 
trade theory, was initiated by Hymer (1960). Hymer drew his framework from industrial 
economics and asserting that in order for a firm to overcome international barriers to 
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production a firm must possess firm-specific ownership advantages (i.e. some form of 
monopolistic advantage). These are intangible assets, such as patents, marketing experience, 
superior management or new technologies, without which the firm is at a disadvantage 
compared to domestic firms in the host country for FDI. 
 
Unlike conventional international trade theories, Hymer's theory distinguishes between 
portfolio investment and FDI. Hymer found that attributing portfolio investment to the 
interest differential between countries was an inadequate theoretical explanation of FDI since 
it ignores ownership advantages and the concept of control.  He pointed out that the inward 
movement of capital occurs not only in response to rising interest rates in the host country to 
gain higher returns, but also the desire to obtain a certain level of control over the firm to 
improve profitability and to transfer its ownership advantages. Thus, Hymer observed that 
FDI occurs when a firm possesses ownership advantages over its competitors in an industry, 
allowing the firm to enter markets in other countries. 
 
The early efforts to develop and extend this theory came from Kindleberger (1969), who 
emphasised Hymer‟s argument about market imperfections and firm-specific advantages that 
can be derived from acquiring intangible assets – such as superior technology, raw materials, 
management and other internal capabilities – that are not available to rivals in the host 
country.  Caves (1971) also adopted the theory to show how FDI provides a reliable 
explanation of the motives of firms to transfer operation across borders as a way of gaining 
hold of locational advantages.  According to Caves, FDI could be understood in the context 
of firms who seek to expand their monopolistic economic rent in order to penetrate other 
overseas markets.  In this sense, FDI was seen as a mode of international investment as 
distinct from the standard theories based on international trade.   
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3.3.3   Product Life Cycle Theories 
 
Another criticism of the neoclassical comparative advantage models came from Vernon 
(1966), who argued that it failed to take into account the role of innovation and economies of 
scale in explaining FDI.  As a consequence, Vernon developed the product life cycle model 
to explain FDI, conceptualizing it in terms of two factors: the nature of the product; and the 
development level of the country. Vernon suggested three stages of a „product life cycle‟: the 
new product, the mature product and the standardized product stages.  In the first stage, 
advanced countries will be the place to develop and produce the product, as most of the 
potential inputs are available, such as the advanced technology, qualified managers and 
skilled labour.  By the mature stage, the product characteristic and production processes start 
to become standardized, so that there is less emphasis on product development, and the 
product starts to become less dependent on being located close to the home economy.  The 
final stage is when the product starts to become fully standardized. At this stage, the 
production of the standardized product becomes more likely to move to foreign countries that 
are characterized by lower labour costs, such as less developed countries, so that a foreign 
investor can cheaply produce its product. 
 
Krugman (1979) supported Vernon's concept of the product cycle and developed a general-
equilibrium model of product cycle trade that highlighted the importance of „technological 
gaps‟ and „innovation circles‟. The model explains the role of the „gap‟ through an innovation 
circle that starts from the production of a new product by the industrialized country or region, 
"the North", which exports it to the less developed country or region, "the South". When the 
technology is disseminated to the South, the North will begin to import the goods that result 
from it, but then begin to produce another new product with a new technology, thus starting a 
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new innovation circle. This process implies a continuous gap in technology between the 
North and the South.  
 
Linked to the product life cycle theory is the Uppsala School theory of FDI, developed by 
Johanson and Wiedersheim (1975). Johanson and Wiedersheim investigated four large 
Swedish multinational corporations (MNCs).  During the course of their investigation, they 
observed the gradual development of small incremental changes in firm behaviour, which 
they believed to explain the process of firm internationalization. These changes occurred in 
four steps: from no exporting, to exporting via foreign agents, establishing a subsidiary, and 
finally transferring the production to foreign market.  
 
Johanson and Vahlne (1977) later gave more insight to Johanson and Wiedersheim‟s work by 
asserting that firms take steps by using foreign market intelligence that serves to push their 
level of commitment to investing abroad. When MNCs first intend to invest abroad there 
exists a „cultural distance‟, which limits their knowledge of the investment climate in the 
foreign market. However, once they make a commitment to invest and start the investment 
process, they gradually tend to gather knowledge and experience of the investment climate, 
which enables them to produce and operate more effectively in their given markets. The 
fundamental principle underlying both the product life cycle and the Uppsala school theories 
is the emphasis on the incremental commitment to international investment, both over a 
period of time and in a number of stages.   
 
3.3.4   Firm-based Theories of FDI 
 
Other theories of FDI also move away from traditional economic theory, and are instead 
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based on theories of the firm.  One such theory is by Aharoni (1966), who developed the 
behavioural theory of FDI.  Originally, the behavioural theory was initiated by March and 
Simon (1958) who attempted to provide a model to analyze intra-organizational decision-
making.  Their model considers the influences that affect individuals in their environment 
and the way that they respond to these. A significant contribution in formulating the model of 
the behavioural theory of the firm came from Cyert and March (1963) who focused on the 
firm, as well as economic decision-making processes. They clarified the effects of the 
organization's structure and practices on developing goals, formulating expectations and 
implementing choices in reaching a decision. According to the authors, the decision-making 
process has four major steps: organizational goals; organizational expectations; 
organizational choice and organizational control. 
 
Aharoni draws upon the behavioural model of Cyert and March (Dunning, 1974) using this to 
analyze the FDI decision-making process by MNCs operating in the US. Aharoni points out 
that this process depends not only on economic factors but also on other environmental 
factors, individual characteristics and relationships and structures within the organization that 
create conflicts and commitments during the process of decision-making.  Teece (1985) 
summarizes Aharoni's views by stating that "the direct investment process is governed by 
more than just economic incentives" (p. 237). Aharoni identified four stages upon which the 
foreign investment decision is made: the decision to target the foreign market; the 
investigation process; the reviewing process and finally the foreign investment process. In 
turn, these four stages depend upon behavioural theories of the firm, comprising the 
organizational structure, goals, expectations, choice and control. 
 
The behavioural theory of FDI is not the only theory to draw upon theories of the firm. The 
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„internalization theory‟ of FDI (Buckley and Casson, 1976) is based upon Coase‟s (1937) 
theory of the firm. Buckley and Casson (1976) initially make a comparison between the 
different forms of transactions amongst firms and then explore why firms are better-off 
internalizing these transactions within the firm rather than between different firms. Buckley 
and Casson attempt to explain the reason firms choose to invest overseas rather than licensing 
or exporting their product instead. They show that their theory is an extension of the firm-
specific theory of Hymer as they emphasize that it is not just firm-specific theories that are 
important for foreign investment, but crucially that the investment decision depends on 
internalizing the firm-specific advantage within the firm. Buckley and Casson assert that this 
is particularly relevant for MNCs, as markets of intermediate goods, such as production 
processes, marketing techniques and managerial experience, are characterized by high risk 
which can lead to high transaction costs, so that such markets are internalized. 
 
In summary, although expansion to other markets might be a profitable strategy, MNCs 
confront various trade restrictions, such as tariff or non-tariff barriers, that raise the cost of 
investment.  The creation and accumulation of firm-specific advantages enables MNCs to 
utilize their technological and marketing know-how and management capabilities to 
efficiently manage their assets and to produce more competitive products, but subject to 
behavioural and organizational structure constraints.  In order to remain more competitive 
than its rivals the MNC internalizes ownership to protect its advantages, but this makes it 
more capable of expanding across borders with the aim of exploiting foreign markets.  
  
3.3.5   The Eclectic Paradigm (OLI) 
 
Some economists have argued that even though the ownership specific advantages and 
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internationalization theories are capable of justifying the existence of FDI, they still lack a 
complete logical explanation. For instance, Dunning (1979) points out that it is "the 
dissatisfaction with these partial explanations of international production, and the lack of a 
formal model relating it either to trade or other modes of resource transfer that led economists 
to favour a more eclectic approach to the subject" (p. 274-5). In addition, Lall (1980) strongly 
suggests that "any study of international involvement which leaves one or other of these 
aspects out of account may be rather unrealistic" (p. 120). As Dunning (2001) states, "no 
single theory of international trade can satisfactorily explain all forms of cross-border 
transactions in goods and services" (p. 176), and furthermore these theories "are 
complementary, rather than substitutable, to each other" (Dunning, 2000; p. 166). 
 
Dunning (1979) argues that the occurrence of FDI cannot be related to one area of 
economics, instead it needs to bring several strands of theory together in order to draw a 
reliable and complete story that is capable of providing a logical description to the elements 
that determine the process of the flow of foreign direct investment. Though a lot of theorists 
concentrated mainly on one strand of thinking to provide an economic description to FDI, 
Dunning sought to bring all the strands together in his theory, which is known as the „eclectic 
paradigm‟ In a series of papers, Dunning (1977, 1979, 1981, 1988) utilizes international trade 
theory with other relevant economic theories in order to create a comprehensive explanation 
of FDI, which is known as the „eclectic paradigm of FDI‟ or the Ownership-Location-
Internalization (OLI) theory. Dunning observed that for a MNC to invest abroad it must 
acquire three specific advantages at lowest cost: ownership, location and internalization 
advantages. These are considered in turn.  
 
The ownership advantages (O), (as discussed by Hymer) require a firm to have in its 
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production process a competitive advantage over its foreign rivals, such as patents, new 
technologies, reputation or managerial knowledge. Exporting firms could be motivated to 
utilize their advantage for their own interest instead of selling or licensing the advantage to 
other firms.  The internalization advantages (I) (as discussed by Buckley and Casson) assume 
that contracting with external firms in a foreign market is a risky option. It might lead to 
revealing the ownership specific advantages to firms in foreign markets and hence current 
contracting firms could be potential future competitors. Therefore, internalizing the 
advantage becomes important since a firm hierarchy is a more reliable strategy for organizing 
transactions.  
 
Complementary to ownership and internalization advantages are the location specific 
advantages (L). Location specific advantages imply that firms need to gain benefits from 
locating in the foreign country, otherwise they would not need to undertake the foreign 
investment. For example, firms may need to produce close to the final customer in order to 
minimize transaction costs or to gain access to a particular input of production. In summary, 
the OLI paradigm emphasizes that for FDI to occur a firm should possess an ownership 
advantage that need to be internalized within the firm and should gain benefits from locating 
in the overseas country. 
 
Dunning (1988) extended his OLI framework by including country, industry, and firm-
specific structural variables, as summarized in Table 3.1. The Table shows how OLI 
characteristics may vary according to country, industry and firm specific considerations, 
which can be examined in further detail. For example, if the home country is characterized by 
advantages such as abundant factor endowments (resources and skilled labour), large market 
size and innovative oriented government policy, then country-specific advantages will define 
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the nature of the ownership, location and internalization advantages of firms. In the above 
example this will affect firm‟s ownership advantages and lead firms to have access to 
resources, be larger in size or to be more innovative. A similar story will occur within 
industry and firm specific considerations (see the columns of Table 3.1). For example, 
industries and firms characterized by high levels of technology will have ownership 
advantages of an innovative nature. 
 
Location advantages are determined according to the characteristics of the home and host 
country, but unlike ownership advantages, location advantages are immobile and difficult to 
transfer. Country characteristics will play a significant role to the choice of location. For 
example, physical and what Dunning refers to as ‟psychic distance‟ between countries 
indicates the economic and cultural differences between home and host country. The positive 
links between the home and the host country implies political relations between them, and 
hence firms will seek a foreign market in a country with links with their home country. 
Therefore, the economic and cultural ties will inevitably reduce the level of the host country 
political risk, which makes it more attractive for FDI. Government intervention through, for 
instance, tariffs or taxes also represents a significant role as a country specific factor in the 
choice of location. Tariffs barriers make host countries less likely to be favourable to FDI. 
Hence, proximity between countries and the policies of country‟s governments are important 
for MNCs to exploit their advantages. Industry factors can also be crucial to the location of 
FDI. In some industries, for instance, there can be high or low transportation costs of 
intermediate and final goods products and high or low tariff barriers that will affect the 
location decision of the foreign investor. The nature of competition between firms in the 
industry may also vary according to location.  
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Table 3.1: OLI Model: Country, Industry and Firm-Specific Considerations 
 
 
Country 
(Home - Host) 
Industry Firm 
    
Ownership  Factor endowments (e.g. 
resources and skilled labour) 
and market size and character; 
government policy towards 
innovation, protection of 
proprietary rights, competition 
and industrial structure, 
government controls on inward 
direct investment  
Degree of product or process 
technological intensity; nature 
of innovations; extent of 
product differentiation; 
production economics (e.g. if 
there are economies of scale); 
importance of favoured access 
to inputs and/or markets  
Size, extent of production, 
process or market 
diversification; extent to which 
enterprise is innovative, or 
marketing-oriented, or values 
security and/or stability, e.g. in 
sources of inputs, markets, etc.; 
extent to which there are 
economies of joint production  
    
Location  Physical and psychic distance 
between countries; government 
intervention (tariffs, quotas, 
taxes, assistance to foreign 
investors or to own MNEs, e.g. 
Japanese government‟s 
financial aid to Japanese firms 
investing in South East Asian 
labour-intensive industries)  
Origin and distribution of 
immobile resources; transport 
costs of intermediate and final 
goods products; industry 
specific tariff and non-tariff 
barriers; nature of competition 
between firms in industry; can 
functions of activities of 
industry be split? Significance 
of „sensitive‟ locational 
variables, e.g. tax incentives, 
energy and labour costs  
Management strategy towards 
foreign involvement: age and 
experience of foreign 
involvement (position of 
enterprise in product cycle, 
etc.); psychic distance variables 
(culture, language, legal and 
commercial framework); 
attitudes towards centralization 
of certain functions, e.g. R&D, 
regional office and market 
allocation etc.; geographical 
structure of asset portfolio and 
attitude to risk diversification  
    
Internalization Government intervention and 
extent to which policies 
encourage MNEs to internalize 
transactions, e.g. transfer 
pricing; government policy 
towards mergers; differences in 
market structures between 
countries, e.g. with respect to 
transaction costs, 
enforcement of contracts, buyer 
uncertainty, etc.; adequacy of 
technological, educational, 
communications, etc. 
infrastructure in Host countries 
and ability to absorb 
contractual resource transfers 
 
Extent to which vertical and 
horizontal integration is 
possible/desirable, e.g. need to 
control sourcing of inputs or 
markets; extent to which 
internalizing advantages can be 
captured in contractual 
agreements (cf. early and later 
stages of product cycle); use 
made of ownership advantages; 
cf. IBM with Unilever-type 
operation; extent to which local 
firms have complementary 
advantage to those of foreign 
firms; extent to which local 
firms have complementary 
advantage to those of foreign 
firms; extent to which 
opportunities for output 
specialization and 
internalization division of 
labour exist 
Organizational and control 
procedures of enterprise; 
attitudes to growth and 
diversification (e.g. the 
boundaries of a firm‟s 
activities); attitudes toward 
subcontracting ventures, e.g. 
licensing, franchising, technical 
assistance agreements etc.; 
extent to which control 
procedures can be built into 
contractual agreements 
 
Source: Dunning (1988), p.31, Table 1.4. 
 
Internalization advantages occur when MNCs tend to utilize its ownership advantages and 
place its investment in a foreign country in order to benefit from significant locational 
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advantages. At the country level, countries differ in terms of the extent to which policies 
encourage MNCs to internalize transactions, such as transfer pricing, government policy 
towards mergers and the ability to absorb contractual resource transfers. For example, if the 
policies encourage internalizing transaction costs (e.g. transfer pricing), MNCs will be more 
likely place its investment in this country. At the industry level, industries differ in terms of 
the level of controlling the sourcing of inputs, the extent to which internalizing advantages 
can be captured in contractual agreements and the extent to which local firms have 
complementary advantages to those of foreign firms. Organizational and control procedures 
may also differ between firms, as well as firms‟ attitudes towards growth and diversification 
such as subcontracting, franchising, licensing and technical assistance agreements. 
 
Dunning's eclectic paradigm is often seen to be the most comprehensive framework to 
describe FDI, with Dunning (1993) describing his work as "a general framework for 
determining the extent and pattern of both foreign owned production undertaken by a 
country‟s own enterprises and also that of domestic production owned by foreign enterprises" 
(p. 76). Indeed, "it also provided a framework for a comparison between theories, by 
establishing the common ground or the points of contact between them, and clarifying the 
relationship between different levels of analysis and the different questions theorists have 
been concerned to address" (Cantwell and Narula, 2001; p. 156).   
 
3.3.6   Classical Location Factors 
 
Within the framework of the eclectic paradigm, Dunning (1993) gave an insight into the 
location dimension of FDI by reflecting on the motivations for MNCs to utilize their 
ownership advantages to invest in foreign markets. The motives are classified as: market-
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seeking, resource-seeking, efficiency-seeking and strategic-asset-seeking.  They help to 
characterize the classical motives for FDI location, and can be considered as follows. 
 
According to Dunning (1993), from a market-seeking point of view, investors transfer their 
operations to other countries in order to protect their market shares from rivals or to increase 
their market shares by exploiting other markets to sell their products and services. Therefore, 
fast-growing industries in a host country will encourage MNCs to expand their activities in 
these industries, which is a market-seeking explanation for FDI. The resource-seeking 
investors tend to operate in the host country market if this country is resource abundant (e.g. 
raw materials, energy and cheap labour). This provides investors with supplies of cheap and 
stable resources and such advantages will reduce costs of production, making them more 
competitive. It encourages MNCs to move production to these countries.  
 
The efficiency-seeking investors look to reduce their costs and to become more efficient by 
operating in countries with different factors of endowments, economic and public policies or 
through receiving government incentives. Operating in only a few countries will reduce some 
costs and enhance the efficiency of MNCs, so that cost factors are important for investors 
who follow the efficiency-seeking strategy. Finally, strategic-asset-seeking investors aim to 
protect or enhance their ownership advantages and / or to diminish the importance of their 
competitors‟ advantages. 
 
These motives tend to base the location decision of foreign investors on, what are generally 
referred to in the literature as, classical location factors. Examples of such classical factors 
include market size and market growth for market-seeking FDI, wages for resource-seeking 
FDI, transports costs for efficiency-seeking FDI and managerial expertise for strategic-asset-
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seeking FDI. Dunning (2000) observed that "over the past two decades, changes in the world 
economic scenario and knowledge about MNE activity have led to a relative decline in 
market seeking (MS) and resource-seeking (RS) FDI both of which tend to be based on the 
static ownership advantages of the investing firms" (p. 173). Hollenstein (2005) also states 
that "strategic asset-seeking strategies have become more important, giving rise to mergers 
and acquisitions as well as to strategic alliances" (p. 436). In general, the location component 
of FDI has become increasingly analyzed and theories of FDI have begun to adopt a location 
dimension in these models.   
  
3.3.7   Agglomeration Location Factors 
 
Location factors have been further investigated in the literature through incorporating the 
concept of agglomeration. Agglomeration economies are defined by Guimaraes et al (2000) 
as "economies that are external to a firm, but internal to a small geographic area" (p. 116). 
Firms might agglomerate (i.e. locate close to one another) in the same industry in one area or 
across several industries within the area, and this location decision is based on the nature of 
the externalities.  According to Henderson et al (1995), externalities can be categorized as 
either static externalities or dynamic externalities. Static externalities emerge when firms deal 
and react to immediate information about the current situation in the market place. These 
externalities can take two forms: first, „localization economies‟, which occur when firms 
benefit from clustering in the same industry. The second is „urbanization economies‟, which 
occur when firms are located in diversified industries. 
 
Dynamic externalities deal with past and present accumulated information regarding 
productivity and employment. These long-run relationships provide MNCs and domestic 
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firms with accumulated knowledge about the industry. As with static externalities, there are 
two types of dynamic externalities: first, localization externalities, which Glaeser et al (1992) 
call Marshall (1890) - Arrow (1962) - Romer (1986) (MAR) externalities. This type of 
externality takes into account the benefits of accumulated knowledge among firms in the 
same industry.  The second is Jacobs externalities where firms cluster across industries. 
According to Jacobs (1969), technological spillovers arise between diversified industrial 
structures.  Firms are expected to yield more accumulated knowledge when they are located 
in proximity to other industries, since "the exchange of complementary knowledge across 
diverse firms and economic agents facilitates search and experimentation in innovation" 
(Panne and Beers, 2006; p. 879). 
 
For MAR externalities, Marshall (1890) observes three main reasons for spatially-
concentrated industries, which are: labour market pooling, intermediate goods supply, and 
demand and knowledge spillovers. First, in the case of labour market pooling, "the 
concentration of several firms in a single location offers a pooled market for workers with 
industry-specific skills, ensuring both a lower probability of unemployment and a lower 
probability of labour shortage" (Krugman, 1991a; p. 484).  Thus, firms will be induced to 
locate their production near to other firms in the same industry in order to gain access to the 
same pool of industry-specific skilled labour (Jones and Wren, 2006).  
 
The second force of localization emerges from intermediate goods supply and demand. 
"Firms in a downstream industry will create demands for intermediate products, this 
encouraging the development of an upstream industry supplying these products" (Venables, 
1996; p. 54). For example, in an imperfectly competitive industry, increasing returns to scale 
will encourage the entry of new firms who will, on one hand, be able to contribute to a 
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reduction in prices and production of new products. These will lead to the availability of 
various intermediate products with lower prices.  Thus, generally speaking, a growing 
industry induces the emergence of suppliers who provide tailored inexpensive inputs and 
services to buyers.  Finally, knowledge accumulated in one firm can be passed to other firms 
in the same industry when they are located close to each other. Head et al (1995) argue that, 
"physical proximity may enhance knowledge flows by making casual communication less 
costly" (p. 226). For example, when firms strongly concentrate in a certain geographical area, 
they create a better environment for knowledge dissemination and the promotion of 
innovative activities. 
 
Although, it is usual to explain the agglomeration of foreign and domestic investments in the 
light of localization and urbanization economies, recently Lee et al (2007) argue that the 
agglomeration of foreign firms differs from their domestic counterparts. According to these 
authors, foreign firms normally face barriers to entry such as culture, language and 
institutions, which do not hold in the case of domestic firms. Therefore, they suggest 
industrial linkage agglomeration that takes four types: agglomeration driven by the 
concentration of foreign direct investment in a region (and in particular FDI from the same 
home country); region-industry-specific endowment-driven agglomeration; forward linkage 
agglomeration; and finally, backward linkage agglomeration. 
 
The first type indicates that the communication network among firms from the same home 
country encourages start-ups firms from this country. The second, region-industry-specific 
endowment-driven agglomeration occurs since the heterogeneity between several regions 
allows firms to consider factors of endowment in their determination of the region in which 
they place their operations. The third, forward linkage agglomeration asserts that MNCs will 
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choose a location where there is a demand for its products. Finally, backward linkage 
agglomeration indicates that MNCs would be induced to enter a certain region when 
intermediate inputs suppliers are available. Therefore, a number of agglomerative forces may 
lead to the attraction and location of foreign direct investors. 
 
3.3.8   The New Growth Theories and Economic Geography 
 
The role of the MNC and the importance of agglomeration economies have also been 
highlighted by the new economic growth and economic geography literatures.  Martin (1999) 
points out that the locational concentration of economic activity is explained by the new 
endogenous growth theory by Romer (1986). The original contribution came from the neo-
classical growth theory by Solow (1956).  Solow's model was an attempt to explain the long-
run rate of growth as the result of the interactions between conventional factors of inputs and 
technology. The model treated technological progress as an exogenous process and the 
driving force for the steady-state growth rate. 
 
In the 1980s, the new growth theory, or endogenous growth theory, was developed by Romer 
(1983, 1986, 1990), which challenged the neo-classical growth model and attributed the 
sustained increase in growth rates to technological change. The creation of new knowledge 
was endogenized in the model as a main source of growth.  Profit maximizing firms engage 
in costly research and development activities in order to produce innovative products, which 
will efficiently allow them to undertake investments in foreign markets, and thus, will lead to 
transfer the knowledge to local economies.  Romer (1990) indicated the influential role of 
FDI as one of the contributing channels in the dissemination of knowledge and ideas and 
therefore the transferring of technology to other regions in the world, and this is expected to 
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generate growth endogenously to the local economy.  Lucas (1988) also incorporated 
explicitly technological change in the explanation of economic growth pointing out that new 
growth theory stressed the importance of technology in the growth rate, assigning minor roles 
to other contributory factors. The link between this theory and geographical concentration is 
highlighted by Martin (1999), who argues that “the new „endogenous growth theory‟ that has 
emerged in recent years by focusing either in inter-regional transfers of human capital or 
localized technological progress as the mechanisms underlying the locational concentration 
of economic activity” (p. 68). 
 
In relation to FDI, the emphasis of the new growth theory is how it affects economic growth, 
so that according to Lim (2001), "FDI's contribution to growth, which comes through its role 
as a conduit for transferring advanced technology from the industrialized to developing 
economies and the channel of such spillovers is through the linkages between MNCs and its 
domestic suppliers and customers" (p. 3).  However, according to Acs and Varga (2002), 
spatial issues are largely ignored, but which recent research has sought to rectify. Thus, 
economic geography seeks to explain the spatial concentration of economic activities, with 
the main development in this field coming from Krugman and the New Economic 
Geography, which explores why and when manufacturing becomes concentrated in a few 
regions, but stressing the importance of non-market agglomeration economies (Krugman, 
1991a).  Krugman (1991b) develops a general equilibrium model to explain the spatial 
concentration of economic activities by focusing on three factors: increasing returns, 
transport costs and the demand for manufacturing goods. For the spatial concentration to 
occur, low levels of transport costs and increasing returns to scale will encourage MNCs to 
concentrate in regions where there is high demand for their products, and where there is a 
greater supply of intermediate inputs. These models now play a crucial role in the theoretical 
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analysis of FDI location.  
 
3.3.9   Summary of the FDI Theory 
 
This section has presented an extended discussion on the evolution of research on the 
theoretical determinants of FDI, comprising its generation, nature and location.  It started by 
introducing the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem as an early explanation of FDI based on the 
concept of comparative advantage. However, this theory failed to recognise the unique nature 
of FDI and it was Hymer‟s firm specific theories that have become the backbone for 
understanding FDI. As Jones and Wren (2006) point out, "before Hymer, there was no theory 
of foreign direct investment as such, with FDI treated in the same way as any other cross-
border transfer of capital" (p. 40). Indeed, Hymer's theoretical contribution deepened our 
understanding of this phenomenon by attracting our attention inside the firm and noting the 
distinction between capital flows and FDI.  
 
This has been followed with the crucial contributions from a number of theories that have 
explored different aspects of FDI, most notably the OLI eclectic paradigm of Dunning. This 
paradigm has been extended over time to include strategic and social aspects of FDI flows, as 
well as focusing on the locational aspects of FDI. The location of FDI has played an 
increasingly central role in the theoretical literature of FDI, and has been extended by the 
recent theories of economic growth and new economic geography. These theories now supply 
us with a rich framework to develop the reasons behind why, how and where firms engage in 
foreign direct investment.  
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3.4   Empirical Studies on FDI Determinants  
 
According to Blonigen (2005), "real-world trends have led to substantial recent interest by 
the international economics literature to empirically investigate the fundamental factors that 
drive FDI behavior" (p. 383).  Thus, in line with the development of theory, there has also 
been a substantial increase in the number of empirical studies examining FDI. This seeks to 
examine empirically the factors that also give motivation to the theory, so that in this section 
a general overview of the empirical studies is presented in the light of the models discussed 
in Section 3.3, following broadly the same structure.  
  
3.4.1   International Trade Theory  
 
Most of the early studies of the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem were based on two countries, but 
with more than two factors of production. Tharakan (1978) analyzes location across 
European markets of manufacturing products arising from multinational corporations 
(MNCs). The study uses pooled data for 34 manufacturing products from Germany for the 
year 1972; for 15 manufactured products from France for 1970-72; and 18 manufactured 
products for the year 1968 from the Benelux countries (i.e. Belgium, Netherlands and 
Luxembourg). The Heckscher-Ohlin hypothesis is captured by the capital intensity (measured 
by physical capital per product in each country), the product differentiation terms, which 
include the levels of product differentiation and standardization (captured by advertising 
expenditure and the number of specified production standards registered in each country), 
and tariffs on the imports of product. The findings indicate that the most significant effect for 
FDI comes from capital intensity, which lends some support to the Heckscher-Ohlin model. 
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The production standards are more significant than advertising expenditure, while tariffs have 
a significant and positive influence on imports.  
 
The Heckscher-Ohlin model has been tested empirically by hypothesizing different factors of 
production in trade flows, instead of the traditional capital and labour. The argument is from 
Clifton and Marxsen (1984), who argue that traditional capital and labour are unreliable to 
determine country‟s factor abundance. In their study they use a different formula for 
determining factor abundance based on the profit and wage content. A capital abundant 
country is where its gross domestic product per worker is greater than the world gross 
product per worker. This measurement is used to examine trade patterns for a sample of nine 
countries in the year 1968, comprising Australia, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, the United 
Kingdom, United States, Israel, Korea and Kenya. The study finds that the first seven 
countries are capital abundant, but that the last two are labour abundant. It finds that the trade 
patterns support the theory for all countries except Israel, Kenya and the United Kingdom 
although of these had substantial trade deficits.  
 
In the context of Heckscher-Ohlin theory, Wood (1994) argues that these studies treat capital 
as an immobile factor, but that it is internationally mobile, which can lead to incorrect 
predictions. Wood examines the patterns of trade between the North (industrial countries) and 
the South (developing countries) using two factors (skilled and unskilled labour) and two 
goods (skill-intensive and labour-intensive manufacturers). The study finds that North 
countries are abundant in skilled labour and hence tend to export skilled-intensive products, 
while South countries are abundant in unskilled labour and trade in non-skilled-intensive 
products. However, empirical tests of the Heckscher-Ohlin theories have tended to 
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concentrate on trade patterns rather than FDI, so that attention is focused in the remainder of 
this section on the empirical work that is linked explicitly to FDI.  
 
3.4.2   The Theory of Firm-Specific Ownership Advantages 
 
Hymer‟s monopolistic advantages theory stresses the importance of acquiring ownership 
advantages in order for firms to offset the extra costs involved in overseas production. Based 
on this theoretical background, Lall (1980) attempts to explore the key factors that contribute 
to the growth of the multinational corporations (MNCs) in foreign production („transferable 
advantages‟) and in exports („non-transferable advantages‟).  This is for a sample of 25 US 
manufacturing industries, using a set of explanatory variables that include R&D expenditure, 
marketing expenditure (i.e. product differentiation), capital intensity, scale economies and 
production skills.  Using OLS the study finds that the technological intensity of an industry 
encourages both exports and the transfer of operations abroad, but with a slightly greater 
tendency to export.  Product differentiation encourages the transfer of operations across 
borders, while capital intensity does not show a significant influence on foreign production.  
Scale economies, production and other skills show a similar effect as technological intensity.  
The exploitation of intangible assets is therefore found to be a reason for transferring 
production between countries. 
 
In general, there has been a great deal of attention on US MNCs investing abroad.  This is 
understandable as the US accounts for a sizeable amount of global FDI, although it may give 
a misleading picture, as it may be that FDI from other countries seek a different set of 
advantages.  Lall and Siddharthan (1982) recognize this and take a different approach, by 
seeking to explore the nature of the monopolistic advantages of foreign investors that invest 
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in the US.  Their sample covers 45 industries in the US in 1974 and explanatory variables 
that include product differentiation advantages (measured by an industry R&D level and 
amount of advertising expenditure), skills (measured by average employee remuneration in 
each US industry), entrepreneurial advantages (non-production workers as a proportion of all 
employees in each US industry), multi-plant operations, economies of scale and tariff and 
non-tariff trade barriers. Neither product differentiation, skills nor entrepreneurial advantages 
were significant in explaining the distribution of foreign investments in the US. Firms with 
multi-plant operations showed a strong positive effect, which suggests that in industries in 
which multi-plant operations are common the foreign share of sales is higher, indicating an 
informational issue.  Trade protection showed a positive and highly significant effect, which 
reflects the important role of trade barriers in forcing foreign investors to transfer their 
production overseas. 
 
Other studies cover countries outside the US.  Saunders (1982) investigates the role of 
intangible assets in determining inter-industry variations in foreign ownership in the 
Canadian manufacturing sector. Using a two-stage least squares estimation technique for a 
sample of 84 three-digit Canadian manufacturing industries, several sets of explanatory 
variables are regressed, e.g. technology, innovative designs, sales promotion strategies, 
managerial resources, labour costs and tariff protection.  The findings support the view that 
intangible assets are important in determining the pattern of foreign ownership. The 
importance of ownership advantages for FDI is also investigated for FDI from European 
countries.  Thus, for Greece, Anastassopoulos (2003) analyzes the relative advantages of 
MNCs and domestic enterprises for the Greek food industry (the highest recipient of inward 
FDI).  Utilizing panel data for 1988-92 and a probability regression analysis, it is found that 
factors such as marketing, knowledge intensity and skill intensity all show a significant 
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positive relationship to the probability of these MNCs investing elsewhere in the food 
industry, supporting the role of ownership advantages. 
 
Finally, a feature of the literature is its focus on the investment flows from and between 
developed countries.  Recently, there has also been interest in explaining whether foreign 
investment in developing countries share similar ownership advantages. For Mexico, Love 
and Lage-Hidalgo (1999) use a panel data model to examine the determinants of sectoral FDI 
by US multinational affiliates. This study focuses on the effect of ownership advantages on 
the flow of investment to the industrial sector over the period 1989-92.  To capture the 
ownership advantages of the US FDI flows, the study implements cross-industrial sector 
analysis by exploiting several relevant explanatory variables, such as R&D for technological 
knowledge, capital expenditure for capital intensity, and employee compensation for 
ownership advantages that are related to human knowledge. The findings support the 
generally found view that emphasizes ownership advantages in both technological and human 
knowledge as the key determinants of FDI.  
 
3.4.3   Product Life Cycle Theories    
 
Vernon's product life cycle theory (1966, 1979) is relatively little examined empirically. 
However, one study is Hirsch and Bijaoui (1985) who use a sample of 111 manufacturing 
firms over 1977-81, and find that R&D-intensive firms gain higher exports in comparison 
with less R&D-intensive firms, which is used as evidence that the product life cycle model 
explains export performance. Mullor-Sebastian (1983) tested the product life cycle theory 
using three empirical tests of industrial groups based on the United States over 1965-73.  He 
finds a significant correlation between the growth rates of goods production and trade 
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balances, and that industrial groups perform better when they have higher growth rates. He 
argues that rapid growth of these industrial groups leads to a stronger competitive position, 
and concludes that the results support the product life cycle theory. 
 
Lutz and Green (1983) analyzed the difficulties that face the exports of manufactured 
products in the United States over the period 1963 to 1974, and whether there are any 
applications to the product life cycle theory. The level of exports of the United States was 
compared with the level of exports of the United Kingdom, West Germany and Japan for the 
same period. The results showed that the pattern in the export of technology-intensive 
products in the United States, the United Kingdom and Japan is relatively consistent with the 
product life cycle theory. 
 
The Uppsala School theory of Johanson and Wiedersheim (1975) that describes the four-step 
process by which firms enter foreign markets according to an "establishment chain", has been 
empirically examined in several countries.  It reveals similar patterns of entry. Thus, for the 
United States, Davidson (1980) examines the role of corporate experience in determining the 
mode of operation. By using a sample of 180 US MNCs for the year 1975, representing 
13,000 foreign investment projects, they conclude that MNCs tended to prefer countries in 
which they have previously had a successful investment experience. 
 
Related to this, a number of researchers have tested models that identify market specific 
experiential knowledge as a central concept to explain the internationalization process and 
the choice of entry mode into foreign markets. Erramilli (1991) examined the international 
experience effect in 151 United States service firms and found that firms diversify their 
investments geographically even in countries with very different cultures when their 
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experience increases, whereas firms with less experience tend to enter markets that are fairly 
similar to the US, thus emphasizing the importance of cultural distance. In addition, Kogut 
and Singh (1988) asserted the role of cultural distance and experience in the flows of foreign 
direct investments by examining 228 different types of entries into United States for the years 
1974 to 1980. Utilizing a multinomial logit model the results emphasized the role of cultural 
distance and experience, and indicate that the cultural distance effect tend to decrease with an 
increase in the experience of firms. 
 
Finally, Eriksson et al (1997) argue that as previous studies investigated the role of 
experience in specifying the entry mode they neglected to account for the perceived cost of 
the lack of knowledge in the internationalization process. They pointed out that the lack of 
foreign business knowledge implies a higher perceived cost. A sample of 362 service firms 
was used to test this hypothesis. The results of their study confirmed that experiential 
knowledge in the internationalization of a firm implies costs that are related to collecting, 
encoding, transferring and decoding this knowledge, as well as changing the organizational 
resource structures and routines, and that these costs are important determinants of foreign 
direct investment     
 
3.4.4   Firm-Based Theories of FDI 
 
In principle, the internalization theory helps to explain the best strategic direction MNCs 
need to follow in order to access foreign markets, i.e. FDI, exports and licensing.  This is 
because it stresses that if the benefits generated by internalizing the firm's advantage such as 
technology or innovation are greater than the costs of accessing them through either 
exporting or licensing then the MNC will choose FDI. In the review of the literature, only a 
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limited number of empirical studies was found concerning the internalization theory. We now 
consider a couple of these, although further studies examining the internalization theory are 
incorporated in the broader eclectic paradigm, which is discussed below 
 
An early empirical study that tested this theory was Rugman (1981), who examined it in the 
context of US technology transfer to Canada.  Technology was measured by R&D 
expenditure for a sample of 35 foreign subsidiaries and Canadian firms that are active in 
R&D for the year 1977.  Rugman hypothesized that subsidiaries undertake less R&D than 
Canadian firms since they internalize the firm-specific advantages of their parent firms if they 
gain net benefits that exceed those achieved by exporting or licensing. However, the study 
found no statistical support for the theory. Pugel et al (1996) examined Japanese FDI in US 
manufacturing industry. They found that technology and marketing assets (measured by 
R&D and advertising intensities respectively) have a significant positive effect on Japanese 
FDI, so that Japanese firms may be able to internalize these ownership advantages in 
investing into US industries.  
 
3.4.5   The Eclectic Paradigm (OLI) 
 
The eclectic paradigm of Dunning has been widely used as a comprehensive framework to 
examine the determinants of foreign direct investment. Dunning's framework has guided 
most of the recent empirical studies that have tried to identify the determinants of FDI and 
international production, as it is based on integrating various theoretical strands.  It is a 
powerful framework for the majority of studies that are concerned with explaining the 
activities of firms outside their home country boundaries, as we now see. 
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Early empirical work was undertaken by Dunning and McQueen (1981), who sought to 
support the eclectic framework by using a large dataset for the international hotel industry. 
The sample included 81 MNCs from 22 countries and 1,025 foreign hotels.  Perhaps not 
surprisingly, it was found that the framework was useful in explaining the patterns of foreign 
involvement in the industry. The nature of the ownership advantages of MNCs, such as 
trademarks, knowledge and operating experience, was found to explain the predominance of 
foreign investments in the hotel industries, and were also found to reduce the managerial 
costs compared with new entrants into the market. 
 
Much more recent work has built on the framework.  Galán and Benito (2001) examine 103 
Spanish MNCs to explore which of the Ownership, Internalization or Location factors 
determines FDI flows. The results confirm the significance of intangible assets, and more 
specifically experience, technological and innovative capabilities, and superior management 
in foreign investment. Using firm-level data, König (2003) seeks to identify the determinants 
of FDI using Swiss firm-level data by utilizing logit and probit methods. The role of the 
eclectic paradigm was used to develop the econometric model and choice of explanatory 
variables. The results confirmed the significance of ownership advantages, such as R&D 
expenditure, new products and firm‟s size in expanding internationally. 
 
Inward investment to the United Kingdom has also been investigated in the light of the 
eclectic framework. Driffield (2002) analyzed the FDI determinants utilizing panel data at a 
3-digit manufacturing industry level for the period 1984-92. The dependent variable is capital 
expenditure by foreign firms and the explanatory variables include industry profitability, 
market size, market growth, industry concentration, R&D, advertising intensity, capital 
intensity, economies of scale, industry exports and imports and regional concentration. While 
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ownership advantages through R&D, advertising intensity and capital intensity are significant 
determinants of FDI, the location advantages through past levels of inward investment and 
regional agglomeration were found to be more important than trade performance variables 
measured by industry exports and imports and regional concentration.  The results also 
showed that profitability and market size attract FDI. 
 
Tatoglu and Glaister (1998) use the eclectic paradigm to investigate the motivation for 
foreign-owned firms to invest in Turkey. The study involves a sample of 98 firms with 
Western foreign multinational parent firms investing in Turkey over the period from 1954 to 
1994.  A binomial logit regression was conducted, and the results supported several of the 
eclectic paradigm characteristics. It was found that the ownership advantages (e.g. 
international experience, trademark, economies of scale, technological and managerial know-
how) encourage firms to engage in FDI in each Turkish industry. However, firms may choose 
to internalize their ownership advantages (e.g. high technology and R&D intensity) more in 
the manufacturing sector than in the service sector due to the nature of the higher transaction 
costs in this sector. Locational advantages (e.g. market potential, host government policies, 
the level of infrastructure and the availability of qualified labours) are less significant, but it 
is more important in the service sector due to the importance of the level of infrastructure and 
the availability of qualified labour. 
 
Finally, for China, Pheng and Hongbin (2006) also support the eclectic framework when 
applying it to 31 Chinese construction MNCs in 2001. The ownership advantages, such as 
reputation and accessibility to resources are important for Chinese MNCs to engage in FDI. 
For the locational advantages, it was found that a large cluster of Chinese MNCs in the host 
country influences the decision of other Chinese MNCs. Finally, if the reduction of the 
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transaction costs (e.g. information search and business negotiation costs) leads to better 
performance then the internalization advantages is matter. 
 
Overall, this empirical literature highlights the importance of the ownership advantages in the 
decision of firms to engage in FDI, with the important ownership advantages found to be 
technological and managerial know-how, product differentiation, scale economies, trade 
barriers, marketing expenditure, firm‟s experience, firm size and trademarks. While 
ownership advantages are necessary conditions for FDI to locate, these studies also show the 
importance of locational factors, which are now considered empirically.   
 
3.4.6   Location Determinants  
 
A great majority of empirical studies on the locational determinants of FDI are based on the 
US as the home or the host country, since the US represents a large global proportion of both 
inward and outward FDI. In 1960, the US accounted for about three-fifths of accumulated 
FDI stake of market economies (Dunning, 1979).  The main determinants in the majority of 
these studies are found to be the size of the market, previous investment in the industry, entry 
barriers, business climate and the economic and political stability.  A notable study by 
Daniels (1970) sought to explain the motivation behind firms entering the US market 
between 1954 and 1968. This study found that the increase of the physic distance has an 
important role in discouraging firms from entering the US market, which reduces the volume 
of FDI. Scaperlanda and Mauer (1969) also sought to identify the determinants of US 
investments in the European Economic Community by hypothesizing three determinants 
(market size, market growth and trade barriers), but only the size of the market has a 
significant effect. 
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The empirical studies are guided by theoretical framework, but have utilized different 
analytical approaches between cross-section, time series and panel data, and have used a 
variety of explanatory variables. The studies have mainly focused on MNCs from the 
developed countries as the home or host country, and have been drawn from two streams. 
The first explains the characteristics of investments that come from one home country and 
flow to one or several host countries, and the second explains the characteristics of 
investments from a number of home countries to one host country. I review this literature by 
focusing on the countries or broad geographical regions that have been central to the 
empirical analyses, focusing on a range of factors that are discussed in the theoretical 
literature.  These are the United States, European countries, the Far East and Emerging 
Markets, and of course for the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries. 
 
3.4.6.1 The United States 
 
Lall and Siddharthan (1982) examine foreign MNCs in 45 US manufacturing industries and 
find that foreign MNCs are positively related with industries that are characterized by high 
effective protection rates and by high shares of shipments in the industry. They also find that 
foreign MNCs tend to avoid industries that are characterized by high levels of scale 
economies and concentration. Another study, by Wheeler and Mody (1992), focuses on the 
choice of location. They examined US MNCs in manufacturing industries in 42 countries 
using explanatory variables such as labour cost, the level of corporate taxation and market 
size for classical variables, as well as infrastructure, industrialization and the level of foreign 
direct investment as a measure of agglomeration. They found that agglomeration effects are 
large and positively related to FDI, but also that the classical variables of market size and 
labour costs also have a positive impact on FDI. 
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Grosse and Trevino (1996) find that FDI to the US has a significant positive relationship to 
source country exports to the US and source country GDP, whilst on the other hand FDI to 
the US has a significant negative relationship with exchange rates, source country imports 
from the US and the cultural and geographic distance between the US and source countries. 
In their analysis of US FDI, Barrell and Pain (1996) find that market size, R&D expenditure 
and labour and capital costs positively impact on outward US FDI. However, it was also 
observed that unstable short-term exchange rates discouraged the flow of investment. Love 
and Lage-Hidalgo, (2000) examine the determinants of FDI from US MNCs to Mexico for 
the period 1967-1994 using co-integration analysis. They find significant support for market 
size as a proxy for potential sales volumes (measured by GDP per capita) and find that labour 
costs are an attractive factor to FDI.  
 
In a further study of US outward investment, Biswas (2002) examined the flow of US FDI to 
44 countries over 1983-90 by incorporating non-traditional political risk factors, such as 
regime type (measured by country autocracy and democracy), regime duration (measured by 
the number of years the country has been democratic or autocratic), and property rights and 
corruption in government.  These are in addition to traditional factors such as the wage rate 
and infrastructure. It finds that country-specific characteristics (e.g., quality of infrastructure, 
regime type and property rights) positively impact on the flow of FDI, whereas a regime‟s 
duration and labour costs negatively affect FDI. 
 
3.4.6.2 European countries  
 
The investigation of FDI for European countries has received much less attention from 
economists compared to US inward and outward FDI.  However, Culem (1988) examined the 
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bilateral trade between six developed countries, including the European Economic 
Community (EEC) and the US. He found that growth rates and tariff barriers played a 
significant role in determining FDI location from the US to the EEC, and vice versa. 
However, whereas market size was significant for EEC FDI locating to the US, this did not 
appear to be the converse.  Other studies for Europe are more recent, and these can be 
examined for several leading European countries as follows. 
 
With reference to inward FDI to the UK, Pain (1993) used aggregate data of location factors. 
His results underscore the importance of market size, relative factor prices and the 
nonproduction costs of trade. Giulietti et al. (2004) criticize Pain‟s (1993) work for using 
aggregate data only that focuses on macroeconomic location determinants of FDI, and 
neglecting the variation of FDI across industries.  They carry out regressions on the role of 
FDI „ownership factors‟ using disaggregated panel data for 14 food processing industries in 
the UK manufacturing sector over 1982-91. They use a set of variables related to: ownership 
assets, including product differentiation, managerial skills and capital intensity; to market 
structure, such as sales growth rate, labour productivity, concentration ratios and imports 
level; and to macroeconomic and other location factors, such as the relative cost of capital, 
the cost of labour and exchange rates.  The results show that firm-specific characteristics and 
market structure contribute more in explaining FDI than do simple macroeconomic factors. 
 
The study of FDI has occurred in other European countries. For instance, Moore (1993) 
investigated FDI in Germany by conducting a series of estimations on a set of variables of 
outward German FDI for a number of foreign countries.  He finds that the market size and 
real wage of the host country attract German FDI.  In the Central and Eastern Europe (CEEC) 
countries, Resmini (2000) analyzes the determinants of European Union FDI in the CEECs in 
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manufacturing sectors. He finds that wage differentials and the degree of „openness‟, 
„proximity‟ and agglomeration economies (the latter measured by industrial concentration) 
all play important roles, but depending on the particular sector. Finally, Bevan and Estrin 
(2004) carry out a study on the determinants of FDI from Western countries to the CEEC 
countries. They found that the GDP of host and home countries, proximity and labour costs 
are important factors in determining FDI inflows, although the host country risk proves 
otherwise, acting as a deterrent.    
 
3.4.6.3 The Far East and Emerging Markets  
 
Kogut and Chang (1991) investigate Japanese FDI across 297 manufacturing industries in the 
United States and find that more Japanese outward FDI occurred in industries that had greater 
R&D expenditure, while voluntary restraints on Japanese exports encouraged FDI to flow to 
the US.  Kimino et al (2007) examine FDI inflows into Japan from 17 source countries for 
the period 1989-2002. They tested several variables relevant to the investing country such as 
the source country market size, bilateral trade, the relative exchange rate, exchange rate 
volatility, relative borrowing costs, relative labour costs and source country risk. They found 
that, contrary to previous studies, market size, exchange rates and labour costs are 
insignificant in determining the inflow of FDI, whereas the relative exchange rate fluctuation, 
higher borrowing costs and an attractive business climate in investing countries were 
encouraging factors to invest in Japan. They also found a negative impact from the export 
performance of the source country on MNCs in Japan.  
 
Elsewhere, using a gravity model, Frenkel et al (2004) examine the determinants of FDI 
flows from developed countries „G-5 countries‟ to emerging markets in three regions: Latin 
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American, Asia and Central and Eastern Europe for the period 1992-2000. They found that 
distance between the host and home countries, economic development, the GDP growth rate 
and host country risk all play a crucial role in determining FDI flows. No support is found for 
the effect of inflation nor for the exchange rate. 
 
In the context of emerging markets, Thomas and Grosse (2001) note that very little work has 
been carried out for the country-of-origin factors that are related to FDI into these developing 
nations, but which are increasingly important in the global economy.  In the context of 
Mexico, Thomas and Grosse (2001) carry out an experiment on country-of-origin factors 
related to Mexican FDI from 11 source countries for the period 1980-95.  They find that, in 
contrast to previous studies, cultural and geographical distance leads to increasing FDI, and 
they attribute this to two possible reasons. The first is that more FDI in Mexico flows from 
non-Latin countries such as the US, Germany and Japan, compared to Latin American 
countries, for the reason that economic factors are more important than cultural factors in 
explaining FDI in emerging markets. They also find, contrary to their expectation, that the 
higher is the GDP in the home country the lower the FDI level. They also found that bilateral 
trade, wage rate, GDP and exchange rate have positive effects on the inflow of FDI to 
Mexico.  Finally, for China, Liu et al (1997) examines the determinants of FDI into China 
from 22 source countries over the period 1983-94.  In this case, the relative real wage rate, 
exchange rate and bilateral trade influence FDI inflows to China.  However, they find no 
support for the effect of relative borrowing costs, for the country risk or for geographical 
distance. 
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3.4.6.4 Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Countries 
 
Finally, given the nature of the data used in this thesis, it is useful to consider those studies 
for the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries.  For these, there are a limited 
number of empirical studies, but which have considered various aspects of the determinants 
of FDI flows into these countries.  While Moosa (2007) argues that, "there is no widely 
accepted set of explanatory variables that can be regarded as the „true‟ determinants of FDI 
into these countries" (p. 1), Onyeiwu (2003) tries to identify these features, and whether they 
differ from the determinants for developing countries.  
 
Onyeiwu‟s data covers 51 developing countries, 10 of which are from the MENA region over 
the period 1975-99. Using a fixed effects panel regression to control for country and time-
specific factors, the results indicate that some of the determinants in the developing countries 
appear not to be important in the MENA countries. These include the rate of return on 
investment, infrastructure and economic fundamentals, such as the real growth rate in GDP, 
the inflation rate, tax rate and external debt. The significant determinants that explain the 
relatively low levels of FDI to the MENA are corruption / bureaucracy and the lack of 
openness to trade. 
 
Chan et al (2004) assert that "the need to account for stability in investment risk is 
particularly important for countries in the MENA region, which historically have a higher 
level of instability associated with investment risk than developed countries" (p. 14).  They 
studied the pattern of FDI in 19 countries in the MENA region and the role of risk, using both 
fixed and random effects dynamic panel models. They conclude that the degree of instability 
associated with investment risk is the most important contributory factor to the low level of 
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FDI flows in the MENA region.  The location drivers of FDI inflows to the MENA region are 
also investigated by Hisarciklilar et al (2006), who use a panel data for 18 countries over the 
period 1980-2001.  Applying a fixed effect model and Maximum Likelihood estimation, they 
find that FDI in the MENA region is driven by the market size of the host country and the 
ability to export to other MENA countries, which may give some explanation to the role of 
risk.  
 
Moosa (2007) uses cross-section analysis to examine the determinants of FDI inflows to 18 
MENA countries. He applied extreme bounds analysis to test a number of explanatory 
variables that include the real level and growth rate of GDP, real GDP per capita, exports, 
telephone lines per 1000 inhabitants (measuring economic development), commercial energy 
use per capita, R&D expenditure, students in tertiary education (measuring human capital), 
country risk and domestic gross fixed capital formation. The results are perhaps unsurprising, 
and indicate that FDI flows more to countries that have growing economies, better education 
and research, low risk and a higher return on capital. 
 
The only research I am able to find regarding the determinants of FDI in Saudi Arabia is by 
Abdel-Rahman (2002) who investigated the determinants of FDI inflows in the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia over the period 1970-2000. By applying pair-wise Granger techniques to the 
independent variables that include market size (GDP), „openness‟, international trade, wage 
rates and country risk, this study concludes that the level of GDP appears to have a 
significant positive effect on FDI flows, while international trade has a negative effect. In 
terms of the country risk, the results show, like the other studies for the MENA region, that it 
has a significant negative effect on the overall flow of FDI.    
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3.4.7   Summary of the Empirical Literature 
 
This section has presented the empirical evidence on the theoretical determinants of FDI. 
Overall, it is clear that the main focus of the empirical work is on FDI flowing between 
developed countries, but that researchers initially sought to explain it through differences in 
the characteristics of countries.  This was not wholly successful, and it was only after 
Hymer's theory that the focus of the empirical work shifted to focus on the characteristics of 
MNCs themselves. Subsequently, empirical work has largely been based on the widely 
accepted eclectic paradigm framework, examining the determinants of FDI in developed and 
developing countries. This paradigm draws attention to the location determinants of FDI, and 
research has been conducted for many different countries and regions, including the Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA) countries. From the vast literature, and which can sometimes 
produce contradictory results, it is possible to conclude that some of the main determinants of 
FDI flows include a whole array of factors, such as market size, labour costs, managerial 
resources, cultural and geographical distance, infrastructure, previous experience such as 
through bilateral trade and technological and marketing intensity.  These potentially give 
support to many of the above theories. It is also worth pointing that country risk is included 
in many studies, and has a negative effect on FDI flows.  
 
3.5   Conclusions 
 
To conclude, this chapter has reviewed the theoretical and empirical literature on the 
determinants of foreign direct investment. In the era before 1960, the pattern of trade was 
discussed largely on the basis of comparative advantage, and it was argued that it was the 
pattern of specialization between countries that was pushing the movement of capital. The 
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cornerstone to a new theory first emerged in the 1960, when Hymer introduced his own 
theoretical insight to the theory of international investment. Since then, the literature has 
taken many new directions to understand and describe the pattern of FDI flows. 
 
One new direction was the consideration of transaction costs, representing an extension to 
Hymer‟s theory, although it still left something of a gap in understanding.  Latterly, this has 
been filled by Dunning's so-called eclectic paradigm, incorporating ownership, 
internalization and location advantages into a single strand of FDI theory. While this 
framework is widely accepted for its comprehensiveness, recent insights have realized the 
need to add further motives, such as strategic, social and ecological aspects. With these 
developments, the Dunning framework has proved its flexibility, although it is something of a 
collection of ideas within a single framework, but which has yet to be fully unified. 
Nevertheless, it draws attention to the main features, including location, for which new 
theoretical developments attempt to explain the spatial concentration of FDI activity. 
 
The discussion of empirical literature on FDI determinants in this chapter has served to 
highlight that the factors that explain the pattern of FDI flows related to a range of factors in 
the economic, political, cultural, technological and financial spheres, so that there are many 
different factors that impinge of the decision to invest and locate internationally.  While the 
results are derived primarily for developed countries, they have implications for Saudi 
Arabia.  In relation to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries they show that 
the return on capital, „openness‟, market size and market growth, as well as risk, are the most 
important factors that explain inward FDI flows.  Nevertheless, within MENA there are 
relatively few wealthy and developed countries like Saudi Arabia, so that an analysis of FDI 
for this country might produce fresh insights. However, before we go on to describe FDI in 
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Saudi Arabia in detail in chapter 5, we focus in the next chapter on the choice of ownership 
structure that confronts foreign direct investors when they make their decision to invest 
overseas.   
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Table 3.2: Summary of the Literature Review on Theories of FDI 
 
Theory Author Contribution 
International trade theory Eli Heckscher and 
Bertil Ohlin 
These develop a general equilibrium model that determines a country's comparative advantage, 
assuming that there are two countries (home and foreign) and two commodities requiring two factors 
of production (capital and labour), in addition to the use of land. It further assumes identical 
production technologies between the two countries and perfectly competitive commodity markets, 
but differences in the factor intensity of constant-returns-to-scale production functions and 
differences in the factor endowments of the two countries. 
   
Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson 
(HOS) model 
Samuelson (1953) The basic logic of the HOS model is that under free trade, factor prices will be equalized across 
countries regardless of the difference in factor endowments. 
   
Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek 
(HOV) model 
Vanek (1968) This generalizes the Heckscher-Ohlin model to a multi-factor, multi-good and multi-country model 
and shows the patterns of trade between countries. 
   
The theory of firm-specific 
ownership advantages 
Hymer, S. H (1960) Hymer asserts that in order for a firm to overcome international barriers to production a firm must 
possess firm-specific ownership advantages. 
   
Product life cycle theories Vernon (1966) Vernon develops the product life cycle model to explain FDI, conceptualizing it in terms of two 
factors: the nature of the product; and the development level of the country. He suggests three stages 
of a „product life cycle‟: the new product, the mature product and the standardized product stages. 
   
 Krugman (1979) Krugman develops a general equilibrium model of product cycle trade that highlights the importance 
of „technological gaps‟ and „innovation circles‟ to explain there role in the trade between the 
industrialized country or region, “the North” and the less developed country or region, "the South".  
   
Uppsala School theory of 
FDI 
Johanson and 
Wiedersheim 
(1975) 
These observe the gradual development of small incremental change in firm behavior in the 
multinational dimension, which they summarize in four stages: from no exporting; to exporting via 
foreign agents; establishing a subsidiary; and finally transferring the production to foreign market. 
   
 Johanson and 
Vahlne (1977) 
These give more insight to Johanson and Wiedersheim‟s work by asserting that firms take steps by 
using foreign market intelligence that serves to push their level of commitment to investing abroad. 
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Table 3.2: (continued) 
Theory Author Contribution 
Behavioural theory of FDI Aharoni (1966) Aharoni identifies four stages through which the foreign investment decision is made: the decision to 
target the foreign market; the investigation process; the reviewing process; and finally the foreign 
investment process. 
   
Internalization theory Buckley and 
Casson, 1976 
Buckley and Casson‟s  theory is an extension of the firm-specific theory of Hymer, as they 
emphasize that it is not just firm-specific theories that are important for foreign investment, but that 
the investment decision depends on internalizing the firm-specific advantage within the firm. 
   
The eclectic paradigm 
(OLI) 
Dunning (1977, 
1979, 1981, 1988) 
Dunning utilizes international trade theory with other relevant economic theories to create a 
comprehensive explanation of FDI, which is known as the „eclectic paradigm of FDI‟ or the 
Ownership-Location-Internalization (OLI) theory. 
   
Classical location factors Dunning (1993) This gives an insight into the location dimension of FDI by reflecting on the motivations for MNCs 
to utilize their ownership advantages to invest in foreign markets. The motives are classified as: 
market-seeking, resource-seeking, efficiency-seeking and strategic-asset-seeking. 
   
(MAR) externalities Marshall (1890) - 
Arrow (1962) - 
Romer (1986) 
This type of externality takes into account the benefits of accumulated knowledge among firms in the 
same industry. Marshall (1890) observes three main reasons for spatially-concentrated industries, 
which are: labour market pooling, intermediate goods supply, and demand and knowledge spillovers.   
   
Jacobs externalities Jacobs (1969) Firms cluster across industries due to technological spillovers that arise between diversified industrial 
structures. 
   
The new growth theory Romer (1983, 
1986, 1990) 
Romer attributes the sustained increase in growth rates to technological change. Further, profit 
maximizing firms engage in costly research and development activities in order to produce 
innovative products, which will efficiently allow them to undertake investments in foreign markets, 
and thus, will lead to transfer the knowledge to local economies.   
   
The new economic 
geography 
Krugman (1991) Krugman develops a general equilibrium model to explain the spatial concentration of economic 
activities by focusing on three factors: increasing returns, transport costs and the demand for 
manufacturing goods 
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Chapter 4 
The Ownership Structure of Foreign Investment 
 
4.1   Introduction 
 
An important decision that a multinational corporation (MNC) faces when expanding abroad 
is to choose the optimal equity, ownership structure, and this issue has received considerable 
attention in the literature (see Benito, 1996). The expansion into a foreign market through 
foreign direct investment (FDI) is a strategic decision that in addition to the level of resources 
that are committed is related to the control that the MNC exercises over the assets. 
Ownership is defined by Grossman and Hart (1986) as “the power to exercise control” (p. 
694), and foreign ownership can imply different degrees of control.
9
  In general, the higher 
the degree of ownership, the higher is the level of control over the assets, so that control is 
normally higher in a wholly-owned subsidiary than in a joint venture. 
 
By exercising control, Benito (1996) points out that a firm can gain higher shares of the 
profits generated in operating in foreign market in the short-term, as well as protecting and 
developing their assets more securely in the long-term. Thus, if an MNC has superior assets, 
such as new technological equipment, an innovative product or superior skills and resources, 
it might prefer to have a high level of control to gain more economic rents and protect its 
firm-specific advantages. However, there is clearly a dilemma facing the MNC. By insisting 
on a high level of control it might face difficulties in carrying out any operations beyond its 
capabilities, e.g. if the MNC needs to exploit financial, natural or human resources that are 
                                                 
9
The definition of FDI implies the concept of control that MNCs intends to have through acquiring a certain 
level of ownership of the firm when locating its production in another economy (see Chapter 3).  
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local. However, while a low level of control might allow it to gain access to the foreign 
market through local partners, it also entails the risk of its specific advantages spilling-over to 
local partners, as well as the risk of opportunistic behaviour by these partners.
10
 
 
The same considerations apply to the choice between whole ownership and a joint venture, 
where a joint venture can be with domestic partners or between MNCs. Benito (1996) 
explains that if an MNC decides to set-up a wholly-owned foreign enterprise then it bears all 
the costs and risks alone. These may include the cost of establishing a new plant or operating 
costly equipment in foreign markets, which may be characterized by high barriers to exit. If 
they choose to form a joint venture they potentially reduce or share these costs and risks. 
Asiedu and Esfahani (2001) summarize the reasons behind the importance of the ownership 
structure in FDI projects. The structure may affect the extent to which their resources can be 
applied, the cost of capital, the level of investment, degree of technology transfer, distribution 
of the gains from FDI and the degree of control and protection of the assets. 
 
The reason for looking at the ownership structure is that in Chapter 6 we analyze the effect of 
country political risk on the joint venture equity share, so that to understand the factors that 
influence the choice of the foreign ownership structure this chapter reviews the theories and 
evidence. The former is based on the international business literature that was considered in 
the last chapter, and the motivations for the optimal equity share are discussed in Section 4.2. 
Following this, the empirical evidence is reviewed, which falls into two broad categories. In 
Section 4.3 the studies that measure ownership in a categorical fashion are considered. This is 
usually as a binary choice between full ownership and a joint venture, but occasionally for 
majority, equal or minority stakes. A distinction is made between studies that examine FDI 
                                                 
10
 Williamson (1973) defines opportunistic behaviour as „an effort to realize individual gains through a lack of 
candour or honesty in transactions‟ (p. 317). 
 105 
into many host economies and those that examine it into a single country, as the latter tend to 
be more recent and have richer data on the ownership. In Section 4.4 the smaller literature on 
the equity share is reviewed, which is measured continuously. The implications for risk are 
then summarised in Section 4.5, while Section 4.6 concludes. 
 
4.2   Theories of the Ownership Structure of FDI 
 
To examine the motivation for the ownership structure, four mainstream perspectives that 
have a bearing on the choice of foreign ownership preferences are considered in this section. 
These are: the transaction cost theory (see Anderson and Gatignon, 1986; Gatignon and 
Anderson, 1988; Gomes-Casseres, 1989; Hennart, 1991; Erramilli and Rao, 1993; Agarwal, 
1994; Cleeve, 1997; Hennart and Larimo, 1998; and Pan and Tse, 2000); the eclectic model 
of international production (Agarwal and Ramaswami, 1992; Kim and Hwang, 1992; Bell, 
1996; and Pan, 1996); bargaining power theory (Gomes-Casseres, 1990; and Ramamurti, 
2001); and the organizational capability theory (Madhok, 1997, 1998; and Tatoglu et al, 
2003). These different explanations are discussed in turn in this section. 
 
4.2.1   Transaction Cost Theory 
 
The transaction cost theory of Williamson (1985) appears to be the most accepted framework 
to explain the choice of ownership structure. According to Brouthers and Hennart (2007), “in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, several scholars began using transaction cost theory to both 
theoretically and empirically look at the mode-choice decision” (p. 396). The choice between 
full ownership and a joint venture depends on the benefits and costs from sharing equity. 
According to Hennart and Larimo (1998), “sharing equity is useful in combining the services 
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of assets (know-how, raw materials, parts and components etc.) held by two or more separate 
firms when (i) the services of the assets held by each firm are subject to high market 
transaction costs, and hence their purchase on markets or through contracts is costly; and (ii) 
replicating the assets yielding those services is more expensive than obtaining a right to their 
use through a shared-equity venture” (p. 520-1).  
 
The transaction cost framework of Williamson (1985) stresses that there are three key 
dimensions that determine the level of the transaction cost: the asset specificity, uncertainty, 
and the frequency of transactions. Each of these has implications for the equity share. First, 
the theory predicts that in order to control its assets the MNC will invest in full ownership if 
the asset specificity is high, e.g. in specialised equipment, superior technology and working 
relationships. However, if the asset specificity is low, this allows the MNC to benefit from 
the market place, which means that the transaction costs from retaining the control over the 
assets is low compared with the benefits of sharing these assets with domestic partners.   
 
Second, uncertainty plays a very specific role in the Williamson model, since a lack of 
information about particular markets or how to operate business functions in an unfamiliar 
setting creates uncertainty and heightens the perceived risk (Brouthers and Hennart, 2007). 
Lack of knowledge about the financial, economic and political climate in a foreign country 
may make a joint venture likely, but the internal risk of such ventures exposes the MNC to 
the opportunistic behaviour of domestic partners. Sharing with domestic partners is chosen if 
the cost of setting-up full ownership investment is more costly or less efficient. 
 
The third dimension to the Williamson framework is the frequency of transactions, as this 
will affect the investor‟s choice of whether to internalize the transaction within the firm or to 
 107 
contract it. For example, if an MNC engages in transactions in foreign markets on a recurrent 
basis then this will increase its familiarity with these markets and decrease its exposure to 
opportunistic behaviour. It will reduce the transaction costs of setting-up an operation in 
these markets and increase the likelihood of choosing higher share.  
 
4.2.2   The Eclectic Model 
 
The second paradigm that has implications for the equity share is the eclectic theory of 
international production, in which Dunning gives a comprehensive explanation for FDI, 
involving three specific advantages: ownership, location and internalization (see Chapter 3). 
In the case of the first of these, Tatoglu et al (2003) point out that “a firm will be more prone 
to adopt a wholly owned operation or a majority ownership in an overseas subsidiary in order 
to protect and fully exploit its ownership advantages” (p. 10). Firm-specific ownership 
advantages include intangible assets such as superior technology, trademarks, patents and so 
on. In the case of the locational-specific advantages, these stem from the attractiveness of the 
host country compared with the home country in terms of the availability of the raw materials 
and skilled labours, and factors such as the host government‟s incentives for or restrictions on 
FDI. These may also be expected to influence an MNC‟s choice of ownership structure. 
 
Finally, the internalization advantage explains the decision of an MNC to internalize its 
operations in foreign markets instead of contracting part of its activities with other firms. 
Although it is crucial to decide the degree to which an MNC will internalize its operations, 
the location advantages of a foreign market play an important role in this choice. This is 
because uncertainty in the host market might encourage the MNC to internalize its operations 
instead of contracting them out. Thus, Pan (1996) concludes that a certain level of both 
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location and internalization factors will motivate a firm to choose a higher degree of 
ownership, while other factors may discourage it. 
 
4.2.3   Bargaining Power Theory 
 
Another perspective on foreign ownership arises as a result of the bargaining power between 
an MNC and its local partners or host governments. According to Asiedu and Esfahani 
(2001), this bargaining approach was pioneered by Vernon (1971) but extended in a more 
rigorous form by Svejnar and Smith (1984). The theory supposes that “the ownership level 
chosen in an affiliate hinges on the bargaining power of the two sides, which, in turn, 
depends on their respective strengths” (Tatoglu et al, 2003; p. 11). Various sources for the 
strengths of both sides determine their bargaining power, which according to Tatoglu et al 
(2003) stems from their “proprietary technology, product differentiation, ability to contribute 
to export earnings of the host country and product diversity” (p. 11).    
 
Pan (1996) believes that the strength of local partners and host governments arises from 
location-specific factors, such the availability of raw materials and skilled labours and any 
incentives for or restrictions on FDI in the host economy. These strengths are the source of 
bargaining power, as they play an important role in the negotiations between the MNC and 
the host country agents for determining the MNC share in the enterprise. Hence, the level of 
foreign ownership is determined by the relative degrees of power, such that Pan (1996) points 
out that it is the ability of the foreign partners to contribute more to the initial capital that 
gives them the power to strongly negotiate for higher shares.  
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4.2.4   Organizational Capability Theory 
 
The final paradigm that may explain the foreign ownership equity share is the organizational 
capability theory. According to Tatoglu et al (2003), this was developed by Madhok (1997, 
1998) as an alternative to the transaction cost approach. It is concerned with the efficient 
mechanism for developing and exploiting a firm‟s capabilities so as to compete successfully 
in foreign markets. It shifts attention away from the characteristics of the transaction to the 
capabilities of firms, so that according to Madhok (1997) the entry mode is related to the 
ability of the MNC to develop or exploit its capabilities. Thus, the choice of full ownership 
would be preferable if MNC has a strong capabilities such as knowledge, which can be 
internalized, in low cost, within the firm to undertake activity in other market, while choosing 
a joint venture might be seen as a way to further develop these capabilities with partners. 
 
4.3   The Discrete Measurement of Ownership 
 
Overall, the above four perspectives provide us with a theoretical understanding to the issues 
surrounding the choice of the foreign ownership structure. The empirical evidence is now 
reviewed. In so doing, existing studies inevitably focus on the characteristics of both the 
source and host countries. For example, differences in the political stability of countries will 
be reflected in the level of risk, and given the importance of uncertainty to several of the 
above theories this is likely to affect their ownership preference. 
 
Early studies typically focus on the US and Japan as source countries for FDI that takes place 
in many different countries. This has advantages, as the US is the world‟s largest economy, 
but it may be difficult to generalize since “the size of the US market and the vast financial, 
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managerial, and technological resources available to many US multinationals, it is far from 
clear as to whether the insights gained from these studies can readily be transferred to 
contexts that deviate strongly from the US” (Benito, 1996, p. 159). Scholars have more 
recently considered the ownership choice of MNCs from different source countries that 
invest in a single host country such as in Japan (Hennart and Larimo, 1998); Greece (Louri et 
al, 2002); Turkey (Tatoglu et al, 2003); Vietnam (Tsang, 2005); and even Mongolia (Kaynak 
et al, 2007). These studies are now reviewed, where a distinction is made between those 
studies for a single source country and those studies for a single host country.  
 
4.3.1   FDI into Many Host Countries 
 
The first study of interest is Gatignon and Anderson (1988) who use the transaction theory to 
explore the determinants of the degree of foreign control over investments. The study utilises 
a sample of 180 US firms, which between 1960 and 1975 established 19,000 foreign affiliates 
in 87 countries. To construct the dependent variable the ownership structure of the affiliates 
was divided into four organizational forms: wholly owned subsidiaries (the MNC has 100 per 
cent of equity), dominant partnerships (the MNC has a dominant share of equity, i.e. more 
than any other partner), balanced-roughly equal-partnerships (the same as that of the largest 
partner); and minority partnerships (less than the largest partner). The explanatory variables 
include R&D, proprietary content, advertising intensity, legal restrictiveness, country risk, 
cumulative company experience, socio-cultural distance and size of operation. A binomial 
model was used to estimate the choice of entry between full ownership or joint venture. The 
study also utilises the multinomial logit model to test the choice among the three remaining 
options, i.e. majority ownership, balanced equity and minority ownership.  
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Gatignon and Anderson (1988) find that the transaction cost theory is useful to explore the 
determinants of foreign ownership, but that the findings do not support country risk, socio-
cultural distance and R&D as influences on the degree of ownership. If the MNC gained 
previous experience abroad, they tend to choose full ownership, whereas an MNC might 
choose low control on entry even if it has a brand name. This is because advertising can 
generate brand loyalty instead of it requiring more ownership control.  
 
Gomes-Casseres (1989) investigates the role of the transaction costs in explaining MNC 
ownership preferences by utilising a sample of 20,000 manufacturing subsidiaries from the 
187 largest US MNCs in 1975. In this case the dependent variable is measured as full 
ownership or a joint venture, depending on whether the ownership was either at least 95 per 
cent or less than this. The explanatory variables include experience, familiarity with the host 
country, and host country industrial growth, sales expenditure, marketing expenses and the 
industry R&D. The study finds that restrictive host-government policies strongly encourage 
joint ventures, while previous MNC experience and familiarity with the host country has a 
negative effect on this, which is taken as support for the transaction cost theory. High sales, 
marketing and R&D-intensive factors all encourage full ownership. 
 
In a further study, Gomes-Casseres (1990) argues that an MNC prefers the structure that 
minimizes the transaction costs of investing in a foreign market, but that the bargaining 
power of the firm is crucial in its negotiations, so that these jointly determine the ownership 
structure of an MNC. It utilized the same data and binary choice of ownership structure, but 
now tries to separate the effects of transaction cost and bargaining power on ownership 
choice, which can share many explanatory variables, by making a distinction between 
restrictive and open countries by separating them into two groups and then controls for 
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differences in firm and country characteristics for each group. The study finds that an 
attractive market gives a power to the local government. It also found that there is no support 
to the R&D and marketing variables in determining the ownership structure preferences, but 
it concludes that large firms with high sales deter more than others.  
 
A further examination of the transaction cost theory was undertaken by Erramilli and Rao 
(1993), but this time for the entry into the service industry by 114 US MNCs engaged in 381 
international investments. Again, the choice is between full or joint ownership, where these 
were explained in terms of capital intensity, cultural distance, the country risk and firm size. 
The results showed that the MNC will prefer to share risk in a risky environment through a 
joint venture. A similar approach was adopted by Benito (1996), but this time for 174 
Norwegian manufacturing subsidiaries in the 1970s and 1980s.
11
 The explanatory terms were 
classified into three groups: country terms, including political risk; industry factors, such as 
proprietary assets and R&D; and firm-level factors, including experience. It finds that greater 
political risk in the host country made a joint venture more likely. Padmanabhan and Cho 
(1996) also investigate the same choice of ownership structure, but this time for 839 foreign 
investments by Japanese MNCs in 36 host countries over 1969-91. They include as 
explanatory variables, firm size, firm size relative to parent, experience, familiarity with host 
country, cultural distance, host policy, parent establishment mode and R&D intensity. In this 
case familiarity with the host country, R&D intensity and cultural distance all have a positive 
effect on full ownership, whereas a restrictive host policy has a negative effect. 
 
 
 
                                                 
11
 Like the Padmanabhan and Cho (1996) study below, this measures full ownership if the Japanese firms own 
more than 95 per cent and joint venture if equal or less than 95 per cent and equal or above 10 per cent. 
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4.3.2   FDI into One Host Country 
 
The above studies examine FDI from a single source country into a range of host economies, 
but several studies look at FDI between a single source and host country. Hennart (1991) 
looks at ownership structure between full and joint ownership for a sample of 224 Japanese 
manufacturing subsidiaries established in the US in 1985.
12
 A good range of variables are 
included, such as industrial diversification, the parent experience of FDI, the relative size of 
affiliate to the parent, the age of affiliate, concentration ratio, growth of shipments, R&D and 
advertising. The study finds that R&D and advertising are insignificant, while the experience 
of a Japanese investor is significant and increases the probability of full ownership. On the 
other hand, diversification makes a joint venture more likely. The growth rate of the host 
country industry that is entered by the affiliate encourages the choice of full ownership.  
 
A similar study of bilateral FDI is analyzed by Bontempi and Prodi (2008), but this time for 
the choice between full ownership and joint ventures for 100 Italian MNCs investing in 
China. The factors influencing this decision were classified into three groups: country-
specific factors: such as cultural distance, investment year and risk; industry-specific factors, 
including innovation and intermediate goods industry; and firm-specific factors, including 
R&D, firm size and experience. The study finds that the greater is the cultural distance or risk 
the more likely is a joint venture, but that innovation has the opposite effect, which supports 
the transactions costs theory, suggesting that the MNC seeks to control specific assets. 
 
More recently, researchers have turned their attention to FDI occurring in a single host 
country, possibly because of the more detailed data that this possibly affords. In an early 
                                                 
12
 Again, wholly-owned is defined when the Japanese parent owns more than 95 per cent of the equity, and a 
joint venture is if it owns between 5 and less than 95 per cent of the equity. 
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study, Saunders (1982) examines foreign ownership in Canadian manufacturing over 1960-
70, but owing to data limitations the average value of shipments per firm was used as a proxy 
for foreign ownership, covering the largest firms. This was regressed on factors such as 
advertising expenditures, unit labour costs, tariff protection, exports, managerial personnel 
and R&D. Using two-stage-least-squares to tackle endogeneity in the model, the study finds 
that the managerial resources and labour costs influence the pattern of foreign ownership. It 
supports the view that the ability of foreign firms to exploit intangible assets by producing in 
Canada determines the foreign ownership preference.   
 
Hennart and Larimo (1998) explore the determinants of the ownership choice of 266 
Japanese and 135 Finnish MNCs investing in the US over 1977-93, representing two distinct 
cultures. The dependent variable is binary, where full ownership is considered if MNC owns 
more than 95 per cent and joint venture if it has a share between more than 95 per cent but 
more than 10 per cent. The explanatory variables include cultural distance, diversification, 
experience, know-how, parent size at entry, growth of shipments and industry concentration 
ratio. Cultural distance is found to be crucial in determining the ownership choice, such that 
Japanese parents are more likely to have a joint venture with a US affiliate. 
 
Nakamura and Xie (1998) explore the importance of intangible assets in determining the 
ownership choice of 231 foreign manufacturing MNCs investing in Japan. Again, the choice 
is between full and joint ownership, which is explained in terms of variables such as R&D, 
price-earnings ratios, brand name and firm size. It finds that a firm will choose full ownership 
if its intangible assets are very important for its operations, but that this is not necessary when 
it requires intangible assets from a local partner. In the later case, the study confirmed the 
importance of the bargaining power explanation in determining the ownership level, so that 
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the bargaining power of MNC is more likely to increase with the importance of its intangible 
assets relative to its local partners. 
 
This gives support for the bargaining power theory, while Barbosa and Louri (2002) examine 
this alongside the transaction cost argument using a sample of 469 foreign affiliates in 
Portugal and 363 foreign affiliates in Greece. The dependent variable is now three-fold – full 
ownership, majority and minority ownership – and explained in terms of the transaction cost 
measured by affiliate size, industry profitability, industry growth, industry R&D intensity, 
labour costs, origin of foreign investment as a measure of geographical and cultural distance, 
industry oligopolistic structure and industry marketing intensity variables, and in terms of the 
bargaining power measured by industry capital intensity, intensity of foreign firms in the 
industry and resource intensity variables. In Portugal, the ownership structure depends on the 
firm size and labour costs, but in Greece, profitability, industry growth and the concentration 
of FDI are found to influence the ownership structure, while R&D has no support. In a 
further study, Louri et al (2002) use a similar framework, but for a smaller sample of 216 
MNCs located in Greece over 1997-98. The choice of full ownership is positively related to 
resource intensity and profitability, but negatively influenced by cultural distance. Majority 
ownership is negatively related to capital intensity, and conversely for minority ownership, 
since large project encourages the sharing of risk, but projects in R&D intensive industries 
are associated with higher ownership, which again supports the transaction cost approach. 
 
Some other studies examine the ownership structure for investors from a large number of 
countries. Tatoglu et al (2003) examine the choice of ownership structure for 659 MNCs 
investing in the manufacturing sector of Turkey in 1997 from 43 different countries. In this 
case, full ownership occurs at shares over 90 per cent and joint venture if it owns a share in 
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the range from 10 to 90 per cent. They find a strong negative effect on full ownership from 
cultural distance, the diversification of the parent-affiliate and concentration ratios.    
 
Tsang (2005) explores the ownership structure of FDI in Vietnam arising from 64 countries 
since 1988. Like elsewhere, the explanatory variables are classified into three groups: 
country-specific factors, which includes the country risk and the cultural distance between the 
host and source countries; industry-specific factors including advertising intensity and 
competitive intensity; and firm-specific factors such as the investment amount, duration, 
partner alignment and location. The result of country risk is significant and has a complicated 
impact on ownership level. Contradicting to the study‟s hypothesis, foreign partners tended to 
acquire less equity ownership as Vietnam becomes less risky, but the majority share is found 
to be more preferable than 50 per cent when Vietnam was perceived as a safer country. On 
the entry mode choice, as expected, foreign partner tended to prefer full ownership over joint 
venture when Vietnam is perceived less risky. In terms of investment amount, the results on 
entry mode also indicate that when investment amount increases, foreign firms prefer joint 
venture over full ownership, and the study also found that the percentage of foreign equity is 
negatively related with the investment amount. The study also found that foreign partners are 
less likely to own a 50 per cent or majority share when the number of local partners 
increases, and at the same impact, the percentage of foreign equity is negatively related with 
the number of local partners. However, foreign partners have no support on ownership 
preferences. 
 
Finally, Kaynak et al (2007) examine the choice between a wholly-owned subsidiary and a 
joint venture for 1,033 foreign affiliates investing in Mongolia over the period 1990-03, using 
the same definition as Tsang (2005), except that joint ventures are classified as majority, 
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equal and minority foreign-owned. The study is based broadly on the transaction cost theory 
and institutional model. The explanatory variables include the nationality of foreign 
investors, the normative distance between host and home countries, concentration ratios, 
industry natural resource intensity, location and the capital size of the affiliate and controlling 
for the period of formation pre and after the year 1998, when the legislations were revised to 
relax equity ownership of foreign investors and allow them to have full ownership. It also 
finds that the greater the importance of an industry for foreign investors and the more 
developed the region in which MNCs are located are both associated with full ownership or 
higher equity share preference. The results suggest that relaxing the restriction on foreign 
ownership in 1998 encouraged full ownership.  
 
4.4   The Continuous Measurement of Ownership 
 
The above studies define foreign ownership structure either as a binary variable between full 
ownership or a joint venture (generally, greater than and less than a 95 per cent equity share) 
or occasionally distinguishing between majority and minority ownership (greater or less than 
50 per cent for joint ventures). This discrete measurement of the equity share may arise from 
a lack of sufficient data at the investment project level, but could produce unreliable results 
on how foreign investors decide the degree of equity ownership. There are a very limited 
studies that use the actual equity shares, although usually just for joint ventures only, with 
most relevant to the US or China, either as the source or the host country. 
 
Shan (1991) analyzes the equity share for 141 US MNCs investing in joint ventures in China 
over 1980-87. Several explanatory variables are used to explain the effect of risk on the 
equity share such as the location of operation in China, the investment amount and the 
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duration of the negotiated joint-venture agreement, plus business scope or area including 
resource-related ventures, manufacturing operations, service industries and construction 
business. The results show that the investment amount and the contractual duration are 
significant and as expected foreign firms prefer lower share when the investment amount 
increases and when the contractual duration decreases, reflecting the effects of the level of 
uncertainty for foreign partners. It also shows that the location factor has a significant and 
positive impact on ownership decisions, as a foreign firm is likely to commit a large share of 
equity for investment ventures located in more developed and liberalised regions. In terms of 
the business areas, the resource-related sector has a significant and positive impact, indicating 
that foreign firms tend to prefer a larger share of ownership, while in manufacturing, services 
and construction areas, foreign firms tend to prefer smaller share of ownership.   
 
Some of these variables are tested by Zhao and Zhu (1998) who investigate the equity 
ownership of 818 international joint ventures in China in 1993. The dependent variable is the 
foreign equity share, ranging between 25 and 99 per cent, which is explained in terms of 
industry-specific factors, such as scale, contractual duration and location, and host country 
contextual factors, such as market concentration, R&D intensity, skill intensity, productivity, 
cultural distance, foreign agglomeration and market potential. The results of Zhao and Zhu 
have interest, as they find foreign investors tend to have large equity shares in large joint 
ventures with long contractual periods. In terms of host country factors, the agglomeration of 
foreign business represents a favourable environment, as does market concentration and 
skills, each having a positive effect on foreign equity preferences, but productivity and R&D 
intensity have a negative influence. Finally, location and cultural distance are insignificant.  
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Perhaps the best-known study of foreign equity shares is Asiedu and Esfahani (2001), who 
consider 2,658 non-bank US parents and 21,300 affiliates investing in a number of host 
countries in 1997. Their study tests the bargaining power and transaction cost theories. The 
explanatory variables comprise firm characteristics, including non-contractible assets, size, 
public trading and international experience; industry characteristics, such as technology 
intensity, resource intensity and vertical Integration; and country characteristics, including 
resources and institutions, local knowledge and connections, technological capabilities of 
domestic firms and FDI policy of the host government. Using probit and tobit regressions, 
they find that the ownership structure depends on the relative productivities of the MNC‟s 
assets, the local entrepreneurs‟ capabilities and the host country‟s physical infrastructure and 
institutional setting. Further, there is little effect of removing equity restrictions on the 
country‟s environment for foreign investment in terms of equity shares. 
 
Recently, there are several studies that include more than a single country in their 
investigation of the determinants of foreign equity shares. Richards and Yang (2007) examine 
the impact of uncertainty and national culture on MNC equity share in international R&D 
joint-ventures using a sample of 543 international R&D joint-ventures of foreign enterprises 
from China, India, Japan and the US over 1985-04. The dependent variable is the share of 
each joint-venture partner, which is regressed on explanatory variables that include two 
uncertainty dimensions, environmental uncertainty in the host country (i.e. country risk) 
measured by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), available from the Political Risk 
Services (PRS) group, and behavioural (or strategic) uncertainty, which includes two factors. 
These are R&D for the local market, which is measured by a dummy variable that gives 
MNC the value of unity if it engages in marketing activities but zero otherwise, and the 
second factor is prior joint-venture collaboration with a local company.  
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Richards and Yang also include the national culture of the MNC dimension, which has two 
attributes, power distance, which refers to “the extent to which the less powerful members of 
institutions and organizations within a country expect and accept that power is distributed 
unequally” (Hofstede, 1994: p. 28), and the uncertainty avoidance, which refers to the extent 
to which the members of a culture feel threatened by uncertain or unknown situations. Both 
of these were measured by scores derived from Hofstede (1980, 2001). There are also other 
control variables such as whether the MNC is a member of Global 500 or the foreign partner 
is a government or high-tech industry. They find that there is no support for the country risk, 
but the behavioural uncertainty is partially supported, as foreign partners prefer higher equity 
share in joint ventures that are oriented toward the local market. It was also found that 
national culture is related positively to the foreign equity ownership. 
 
Finally, Indro and Richards (2007) analyze the relationship between ownership and 
uncertainty for 375 joint ventures between two partners (one local and one foreign) in six 
Southeast Asian countries over 1990-99. Explanatory variables include partner uncertainty 
(which is measured by cultural dissimilarity), prior joint-venture experience and four types of 
joint-venture, comprising site specificity, physical asset specificity, human asset specificity 
and dedicated assets. Control variables are included for the country risk, industry uncertainty, 
R&D intensity, advertising intensity, investment scale, operational alignment, involvement of 
the government as a partner and the relative bargaining power (which is measured by the size 
of the joint venture parents). Using ordinary least squares, they find that the relationship 
between the foreign partner‟s equity ownership and partner uncertainty depends on the type 
of joint-venture activity. This implies that a foreign partner with greater cultural dissimilarity 
tends to prefer a higher level of equity share when engaging in marketing activity, while it 
tends to reduce its share when involved in manufacturing or R&D activity in Vietnam than in 
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the other Southeast Asian countries. Finally, the study finds that there is a positive 
relationship between the foreign partner‟s equity share and prior joint-venture collaboration. 
 
4.5   The Implications for Risk 
  
Tsang (2005) defines risk in relation to the host country as “the likelihood that changes in the 
business environment will reduce the profitability of doing business there” (p. 445), while 
Ahmed et al (2002) believe risk has two aspects: “the uncertainty associated with exposure to 
a loss caused by some unpredictable events and the variability in the possible outcomes of an 
event based on chance” (p. 805). Risk, which features in both the transaction cost and the 
eclectic theories, has received relatively little attention in the literature, often being included 
as one of several possible explanatory factors. Nevertheless, the general finding from these 
studies is that increased risk reduces the equity share by making full ownership less likely.  
 
Cyert and March (1992) believe that the expansion of an MNC into a foreign market reflects 
their desire to have greater control over the investments in order to manage their exposure to 
risk. However, the general view is that greater risk in the host country leads an MNC to 
reduce its control over the investment and its degree of ownership. As Ahmed et al (2002) 
point out, “when the perception of risk is too high, management might no longer believe that 
it has control over the risk. At this point, the strategy change and the firm seeks to relieve 
itself of some portion of control by sharing responsibility and shifting the risk” (p. 806). 
Likewise, Tsang (2005) adds that, “when the host country is risky, foreign investors avoid 
committing large amounts of non-deployable assets in order to minimize their loss in case 
they need to withdraw from the country” (p. 445).     
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Country risk is measured in different ways in the literature. Gatignon and Anderson (1988) 
adopt the country risk cluster from Goodnow and Hansz (1972), who classify countries as 
„safe‟, „somewhat risky‟ or „highly risky‟. This measure of risk is also used by Erramilli and 
Rao (1993) and Benito (1996). Tsang (2005) uses the Vietnam Institutional Investor, which 
measures risk on an annual ratings basis using information provided by 75 to 100 of leading 
international banks. According to Tsang (2005) the ratings reflect changes in a country‟s 
economic and political situations. Of course, other risk indicators are available, such as the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) that is available from the Political Risk Services 
group, but this has mainly been used to examine FDI flows.
13
 It is this measure of risk that 
we subsequently adopt in Chapter 6, where further discussion can be found. 
 
In general, the view that risk decreases equity shares is a reasonably solid finding in the 
literature, being supported by Erramilli and Rao (1993), Tsang (2005) and Bontempi and 
Prodi (2008). However, all of these studies are for the choice between full or joint ownership, 
while in the recent study of equity shares by Richards and Yang (2007) the host country risk 
is found to be insignificant. It is also found by Gatignon and Anderson (1988), who use a 
four-fold classification of FDI, i.e. wholly-owned, dominant, equal and minority partnerships, 
while Agarwal (1994) finds that country risk actually encourages foreign ownership, 
indicating that MNCs tend to choose higher control in the case of higher uncertainty in the 
foreign markets, although this has been criticized.
14
 
 
 
                                                 
13
 The ICRG data assesses the political stability of countries on a subjective and comparable basis according to 
twelve indicators. Studies using the ICRG data to investigate FDI or growth include Busse and Hefeker (2007) 
who use all twelve of the indicators, Harms and Ursprung (2002) who use aggregations of the indicators, and 
Glaeser et al (2004) and Egger and Winner (2005) who use selected indicators to examine specific issues. 
14
 Brouthers and Brouthers (2001) argue that Agarwal‟s sample was biased toward less risky countries, with 
only two per cent of observations involving truly high-risk countries. 
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4.6   Conclusions 
  
Ownership brings control but also risk, and there are many explanations for the optimal entry 
mode by multinational corporations when undertaking foreign direct investment. In this 
chapter four main theories have been considered that derive from the international business 
literature. These comprise motivations arising from transaction costs (i.e. asset specificity, 
uncertainty and the frequency of transactions), the eclectic paradigm (e.g. the exploitation of 
ownership advantages from internalization), bargaining power and organizational capability. 
As we have seen, much of the empirical literature has examined the entry mode as a way of 
providing support and distinguishing between these different explanations, although they are 
not mutually exclusive. It is mainly as a choice between entry by either whole ownership or 
joint venture (with a host country firm), which seems to reflect data constraints, so that more 
recently some studies have looked at the actual equity share for joint ventures.  
 
In terms of the effect of risk on the choice of entry mode, there is fairly good evidence that 
country political risk causes firms to enter as a joint venture rather than by whole ownership. 
This is principally as a means to reduce risk, and runs counter to the view that ownership 
brings control and that this can serve to mitigate the effect of risk. Nevertheless, it is difficult 
to conclude with confidence that risk unambiguously reduces the equity share in FDI joint 
ventures, as most of the studies are for the choice between whole and joint ownership, which 
may depend differently on risk. This issue is explored in Chapter 6, but before this the nature 
of the data is discussed in Chapter 5. This is the Investment Dataset for Saudi Arabia, which 
was constructed as a part of this thesis and records FDI projects and their equity shares. 
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Table 4.1: Summary of the Literature Review on Ownership Structure 
 
Theory Author Contribution 
   
The transaction cost 
theory 
Williamson (1985) Williamson points out that the choice between 
full ownership and a joint venture depends on 
the benefits and costs from sharing equity. He 
stresses that there are three key dimensions that 
determine the level of the transaction cost: the 
asset specificity, uncertainty, and the frequency 
of transactions. 
 
   
The eclectic theory Dunning (1977, 
1979, 1981, 1988) 
According to the eclectic theory, a firm will 
choose a wholly owned or a majority ownership 
when investing abroad in order to protect and 
fully exploit its ownership advantages. The 
locational-specific advantages may also be 
expected to influence an MNC‟s choice of 
ownership structure.The internalization 
advantage explains the decision of an MNC to 
internalize its operations in foreign markets 
instead of contracting part of its activities with 
other firms. 
 
   
The bargaining power 
theory 
Vernon (1971) The bargaining power between an MNC and its 
local partners or host governments plays an 
important role in the MNC‟s choice of 
ownership structure. 
 
   
The organizational 
capability theory 
Madhok (1997, 
1998) 
The theory developed by Madhok as an 
alternative to the transaction cost approach. 
It shifts attention away from the characteristics 
of the transaction to the capabilities of firms. It 
is concerned with the efficient mechanism for 
developing and exploiting a firm‟s capabilities 
so as to compete successfully in foreign markets. 
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Chapter 5 
Foreign Direct Investment in Saudi Arabia 
 
5.1   Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to outline the pattern of foreign direct investment (FDI) in 
Saudi Arabia over the period 1960-2005. This utilizes data that is collected by the Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry of Saudi Arabia, which since 1960 has collected information on all 
investment projects for the purpose of granting investment licenses. These data cover both 
domestic and foreign-owned projects, although the focus is on the latter. They mainly 
comprise start-ups, i.e. new ventures, but also potentially include some reinvestments, and 
mergers and acquisitions, while investments may be in the form of either a joint venture or 
whole investment. It is the first time these data have been released for academic study, 
providing a unique opportunity to explore the pattern of FDI in a rapidly developing 
economy over a long time period.   
 
The data comprise about 19,000 investment projects over 1960-2005, of which about 14,000 
are domestic projects and 5,000 involve foreign ownership in some form. These data were 
referred to in Chapter 2 when describing broad trends in FDI in Saudi Arabia, but here much 
more detail is presented, representing an important contribution of the thesis. These data are 
used in the main empirical work in Chapters 6 and 7. The chapter begins by outlining the 
investment dataset in Section 5.2. This includes the way in which the data were collected by 
and obtained from the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Commerce and Industry. Section 5.3 
compares the investment between foreign and domestic projects, looking at differences in the 
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number of projects, investment size and amount, and the sector, region and number of jobs. 
Attention then focuses on examining the data for foreign investment only. In Section 5.4 the 
pattern according to projects is again considered, but in more detail, while in Section 5.5 the 
analysis is according to the individual investor. Section 5.6 looks at the total number of 
investors arising from different countries. Finally, Section 5.7 concludes this chapter. 
 
5.2   The Investment Dataset 
 
5.2.1   Data Collection 
 
Research that has been conducted on Saudi Arabia has encountered the fact that detailed data 
on Saudi Arabia is rare and difficult to obtain. Bhuian (1997) states that, “it is important to 
note that Saudi Arabia is a country where collecting empirical data from primary sources is 
extremely difficult as has been experienced by several authors” (p. 319). Since this thesis is 
about foreign direct investment in Saudi Arabia, it was realized from an early stage that this 
is a difficulty that needs to be overcome. Thus, contact was made with a number of sources to 
inquire about the availability of data on individual foreign investment projects. In some cases 
this involved asking for help from my contacts, including relatives and friends, in order to 
obtain the required information. The extensive contacts also included sources at the Ministry 
of Finance, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, the Saudi Arabia General Investment 
Authority (SAGIA), the Ministry of Economy and Planning and the Central Department of 
Statistics and Information. 
  
After making many calls and visits, I was informed that the required data are collected by the 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry. This Ministry is the authority that is in charge of 
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regulating and promoting business activities in the country, although the Saudi Arabia 
General Investment Authority has become the specialized authority for organizing business 
activity with respect to foreign investment since its foundation in 2000. All domestic and 
foreign companies are required to register with the Ministry of Commerce and Industry in 
order to gain licenses to establish their companies. Therefore, I had to make regular contact 
and visits to this Ministry asking them for access to these data. I was invited to meet the 
Director of the Companies General Department, who informed me that they have a database 
of all domestic and foreign companies in Saudi Arabia over the years 1960 to 2005, but that 
this had not been released before to any study. After informing the Director that the reason 
for obtaining this data was solely for the purpose of academic research, and assuring him that 
we are committed to maintaining data confidentiality, he agreed to release the data, but 
conditional on the non-disclosure of the names of listed companies, which were replaced by a 
project number. 
 
Subsequent to this, a meeting was arranged with the Manager of the Information Technology 
Centre in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, where the database is located. This was in 
order to discuss the nature of the required data and the type of variables available in the 
database. I was eventually provided with a copy of the database containing all their recorded 
data, but only after deletion of the names of companies. I refer to this as the Investment 
Dataset. All companies have to register with the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, and the 
database comprises all licensed companies in Saudi Arabia dating back to the year 1960.
15
 It 
includes projects that are undertaken by foreign investors.  
                                                 
15
 Under 1965 Company Law a minimum capital is Saudi Riyals (SRs) 500 thousand (about £80,000) is required 
for the issuing of a license, but there have been a number of amendments since that time in relation to Foreign 
Direct Investment. Under the old 1979 Foreign Direct Investment Act (see Chapter 2) there was no minimum 
threshold to gain a licence from the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, which lasted until the year 2000 when 
the Executive Rules of the 2000 Foreign Investment Act raised the minimum threshold: to SRs 25 million 
(about £4,000,000) for agriculture projects; to SRs 5 million (£800,000) for industrial projects; and to SRs 2 
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5.2.2   The Nature of the Investment Dataset 
 
The data in the Investment Dataset are organized on a project basis, and include details of 
18,911 projects over the period 1960-2005. A project may be carried out by single or many 
investors, and from one or more countries, including the host economy Saudi Arabia. Of the 
total, there are 13,913 domestic projects and 4,998 foreign projects, where the former do not 
have any foreign involvement, and the latter have one or more foreign investors, which might 
include domestic investors (or possibly none at all). Of the 4,998 foreign projects, these 
involve a total of 6,566 foreign investors, while if foreign investments from the same source 
country are aggregated together then there are 5,432 foreign investments from different 
countries. Generally, we shall use these three ways to analyze the data, for which the number 
of observations is summarized in Table 5.1. 
 
Table 5.1: Foreign Investments in Dataset 
 
Categorization of FDI Number of Observations 
  
By project 4,998 
By investor 6,566 
By investors from different countries 5,432 
 
Each project is associated with the year in which the investors commit to the project, at which 
time each investor must give detailed information to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry 
to meet the requirements to gain a license. The data records successful applicants only. The 
information recorded at this time helps define the project characteristics that are used in the 
descriptive analysis. These project-level characteristics are now considered, for which details 
                                                                                                                                                       
million (£325,000) for other industries. It also stated that the Board of Directors of SAGIA is entitled to reduce 
the minimum threshold for any project, and in July 2005 the Board of Directors of SAGIA decided to amend 
this article by removing the restrictions on the minimum threshold on FDI in any industry. However, for most of 
the period 1960-2005 there has been little exemption for the foreign projects required to obtain licenses, through 
minimum thresholds, although stronger over 2000-05.  
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are shown in Table 5.2. The data are mainly categorical in nature (e.g. region and sector), 
which may be binary (e.g. project type). For a few variables the data is held continuously 
(e.g. investment scale). The variables define the characteristics of each project, for which data 
are available in virtually every case, and the nature of these variables are now discussed.  
 
Table 5.2: Descriptive Statistics on Project Characteristics 
 
Characteristics Obs. Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. 
      
Identification number 18,911 1 18,911 - - 
Year 18,911 1960 2005 1996 - 
Project type 18,911 1 2 1.26 0.44 
Number of investors 18,911 1 27 1.08 0.49 
Foreign share 18,911 0.98 100 - - 
Country of origin 18,911 1 91 - - 
Investment scale (SR millions) 18,853 0.00002 30,223 42.91 457.68 
Industrial sector 18,908 1 7 - - 
Region of location 18,911 1 5 - - 
Province of location 18,911 1 13 - - 
Number of jobs 16,083 1 4,000 60.2 126.7 
 
Note: The characteristics are described below. 
 
Project identification: The Ministry of Commerce and Industry redacted the company 
names, so that each project has a unique number to identify it. These numbers range from 1 to 
18,911.  
 
Year of project: The calendar year in which the firm commits to the project and gains a 
licence that entitles it to start production. The years cover 1960 through to 2005.  
 
Project type: The project type is determined according to the degree of ownership. Based on 
the Saudi definition of FDI, a project is domestic if it is 100 per cent owned by domestic 
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investors, but if there is any international involvement it is considered a foreign project. It 
was mentioned in Chapter 3 that this is not wholly consistent with the definitions of FDI used 
by the IMF and OECD, which require a threshold of international involvement of 10 per cent, 
but there are only a small number of projects with foreign involvement below this level (that 
is 97 of the 4,998 projects, which is just 1.9 per cent).     
 
Number of investors: Within a given project there could be single or multiple investors, and 
in the latter case from one or more foreign countries. In the Investment Dataset, the number 
of investors in each project ranges from 1 to 27 investors, but the mean number of investors 
is 1.08 (see Table 5.2).  
 
Share of foreign investors: This defines the share of the firm‟s capital paid in by all foreign 
investors. It enables the ownership structure of FDI in Saudi Arabia to be analyzed since it 
potentially takes values from just above zero to 100 per cent. 
 
Country of origin: This defines the country of ownership, which is either Saudi Arabia for a 
domestic investment, or for a foreign investment it is the foreign country with the largest 
investment share.
16
 In total there are investors from 90 different countries, excluding Saudi 
Arabia, that have invested in the Kingdom.  
 
Investment scale: This variable gives the total amount of money in Saudi Riyals (SRs) to be 
invested in the project at the date of commitment. All prices are measured at constant year 
2000 prices, using a GDP deflator. As Table 5.2 shows, the investment scale ranges between 
SRs 20 and SRs 30.2 billion, such that the mean is SRs 42.9 million. The scale is not 
                                                 
16
 In 73 projects the largest foreign investors have an equal share, which represents 1.5% of the 4,998 projects. 
For these cases we treat the project source as not classified. 
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available for 58 cases, but which only 7 are foreign projects. The distribution is skewed, so 
that the median investment scale is SRs 4.7 million. 
 
Industrial sector: The industrial classification used in Saudi Arabia is that of the United 
Nation Statistics Division (ISIC Rev. 2). According to this 2-digit classification, industries 
fall into seven sectors: 1= agriculture, 2= manufacturing, 3= construction, 4= wholesale and 
retail, 5= transport and communication, 6= financing and real estate and 7= social services. 
Around 85% of projects are in manufacturing and much of the remainder is in construction 
and services (8.4 and 6 per cent respectively). It is not known for three projects.   
 
Regional location: The spatial distribution of projects represents the firms choice of regional 
location in which they decide to locate their operations. There are five regions in Saudi 
Arabia: 1= Middle, 2= Western, 3= Eastern, 4= Southern and 5= Northern. Around half of 
the projects are concentrated in the Middle region, around the capital city of Riyadh (see 
Figure 2.1), followed by the Western and Eastern regions which account for a third and a 
quarter of total projects respectively. 
 
Province of location: Each region consists of one or more province, of which there are 
thirteen provinces in Saudi Arabia: 1= Riyadh, 2= AlQassim, 3= Makka, 4= Almadinah, 5= 
Eastern, 6= Asir, 7= Jazan, 8= Albaha, 9= Najran, 10= Tabuk, 11= Aljawf, 12= Hail and 13= 
The Northern frontier. Around 86% of all projects are concentrated in only three provinces, 
these being, Riyadh, Makka and Eastern. The majority of these projects take place in Riyadh, 
which received up to 41 per cent of all projects, while around 25 and 20 per cent were located 
in the Makka and Eastern provinces respectively.      
 
 133 
Number of jobs: These are the prospective jobs outlined in the license. There are 2,828 
projects where the number of jobs is not known, representing around 15 per cent of all 
projects, of which 2,779 (55.6%) are foreign projects and 49 (0.35%) are domestic projects. 
Of those that are known, domestic projects account for around 80 per cent of jobs, but of 
course these are much more likely to be known.  
 
5.3   Comparison of Foreign and Domestic Projects   
 
The purpose of this section is to compare the nature of the foreign investment with that of the 
domestic projects (i.e. where there is an absence of foreign involvement) according to the 
above criteria that are given by the variables. 
 
5.3.1   The Temporal Pattern of Projects 
 
Figure 5.1 shows that it was not until the second half of the 1970s that the number of both 
domestic and foreign projects in Saudi Arabia began to increase. This was mainly as a result 
of the sharp increase in the oil prices worldwide and reflects the global trends of FDI (see 
Chapter 2). The nature of the growth of the projects over time can be described as follows.   
  
At the beginning of the 1960s there were only a small number of inward FDI projects in 
Saudi Arabia, but through to the middle of the 1970s the number began to rise, with FDI 
projects increasing by about five-fold by 1980. The worldwide recession and the decrease in 
oil prices in the early 1980s led to a pronounced business cycle in Saudi Arabia, (since its 
economy is driven by oil revenues), and to a slight fall in the number of projects in the early 
1980s. However, the number of projects recovered in the late 1980s and increased rapidly, 
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such that by 1994 domestic and foreign projects stood at about 650 and 65 respectively, and 
by 2000 the total number of projects had increased by more than double on 1990.    
 
Since 2000 there has been an unprecedented increase in the number of projects, which is 
driven by foreign projects, increasing by more than four-fold over 2000-05, and which 
compares with an increase in domestic projects of 36 per cent over the same period. The 
number of foreign projects reached a high of over 900 foreign projects in 2002, and continues 
to be at a high level since then, highlighting the importance of FDI to Saudi Arabia. 
 
Figure 5.1: Number of Domestic and Foreign Projects, 1960-2005 
 
Source: Investment Database, Saudi Ministry of Commerce and Industry. 
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5.3.2   Investment Size 
 
There are a total of 18,911 projects over the period 1960-2005, and Table 5.3 shows that 
these are associated with investment of over SRs 800 billion. The vast majority of the total 
projects are domestic (73.6 per cent), and the table shows that these account for investment of 
SRs 457,488 million, but which is a much smaller share of total investment (56.6 per cent).  
This is reflected in the larger investment scales of foreign projects, which is more than double 
that of domestic projects on average (SRs 70 million compared to SRs 33 million), and which 
further highlights the importance of foreign investors to the Saudi economy.  
 
Table 5.3: Total Foreign and Domestic Projects, 1960-2005 
 
Project Type 
No. of 
Projects 
Total Investment 
Amount (SR m) 
Share Investment 
Amount (%) 
Average Investment 
Scale (SR m) 
     
Foreign 4,991 351,456 43.4 70.42 
Domestic 13,862 457,488 56.6 33.00 
Total 18,853 808,944 (100.0) 42.91 
 
Source: Investment Database, Saudi Ministry of Commerce and Industry. 
Note: Investments measured at constant year 2000 prices. There are 58 missing cases. 
 
The comparison of the number of projects and the amount of investment is made in Table 5.4 
between foreign and domestic projects for different sub-periods. A visual representation of 
the same data is given over the page in Figures 5.2 and 5.3. These show that it was not until 
the sub-period 1976-80 that investment increased both for foreign and domestic investors. 
However, a different pattern pursued thereafter, since whereas domestic investment broadly 
increased after that time, for foreign projects it was not until the final period that investment 
took-off, no doubt related to the 2000 Foreign Investment Act. Indeed, the sub-period 2001-
05 accounts for 65 per cent of foreign projects and about half of all investment over 1960-05. 
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It illustrates the much more recent nature of FDI in Saudi Arabia, although the average scale 
of investment has if anything fallen over time, especially since the mid-1970s. 
 
Table 5.4: Foreign and Domestic Projects by Investment Amount, 1960-2005 
 
 Foreign  Domestic 
Period 
No. of 
Projects 
% 
Total 
Investment 
Amount 
(SR m) 
Average 
Investment 
Scale 
(SR m) 
 
No. of 
Projects 
% 
Total 
Investment 
Amount 
(SR m) 
Average 
Investment 
Scale 
(SR m) 
          
1960-65 6 0.1 5,189 864.83  27 0.2 500 18.52 
1966-70 23 0.5 917 43.67  103 0.7 700 7.07 
1971-75 68 1.4 1,428 21.64  175 1.3 6,291 36.16 
1976-80 353 7.1 64,997 184.13  738 5.3 30,765 42.38 
1981-85 267 5.3 42,987 161.00  753 5.4 53,558 71.89 
1986-90 181 3.6 9,225 50.97  982 7.1 30,230 31.39 
1991-95 346 6.9 33,392 96.79  2,491 17.9 73,493 29.52 
1996-00 492 9.8 23,705 48.28  3,395 24.4 84,691 24.99 
2001-05 3262 65.3 169,616 52.01  5,249 37.7 177,260 33.77 
Total 4,998 100.0 351,456 70.32  13,913 100.0 457,488 32.88 
 
Source: Investment Database, Saudi Ministry of Commerce and Industry. 
Note: Investments measured at constant 2000 prices. Table shows total investment amount, including domestic 
contribution.  Average scale is calculated for projects only where investment size is known.   
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Figure 5.2: Temporal Pattern of Foreign Investment, 1960-2005 
 
 
Source: Investment Database, Saudi Ministry of Commerce and Industry. 
 
Figure 5.3: Temporal Pattern of Domestic Investment, 1960-2005 
 
 
Source: Investment Database, Saudi Ministry of Commerce and Industry. 
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5.3.3   Industrial Sector 
 
The distribution of investment across the seven major activities (agriculture, manufacturing, 
construction, wholesale and retail trade, transport and communication, financing and real 
estate and social services) is shown in Table 5.5 for both foreign and domestic projects. The 
dominance of manufacturing can be seen, with practically all of domestic investment in this 
sector, but about 45 per cent of foreign projects and 80% of the investment amount. The 
average investment scale of foreign manufacturing projects is nearly four times greater than 
that for domestic projects. Construction and financing also received a relatively large number 
of foreign projects, representing 32 and 13 per cent of foreign projects, but combined only 
about 16% per cent of the foreign investment amount. It is reflected in the investment scale of 
projects, with manufacturing having by far the largest mean scale of projects. The emphasis 
of FDI on the manufacturing sector only partly reflect the importance of the oil sector (see 
Table 5.11 below), but primarily it reflects the nature of investment in an economy that is 
relatively under-developed and still developing. 
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Table 5.5: Foreign and Domestic Projects by Sector, 1960-2005 
 
  Foreign  Domestic 
ISIC 
Code 
Sector 
No. of 
Projects 
Share 
of 
Projects 
(%( 
Total 
Investment 
Amount  
(SR m) 
Average 
Investment 
Scale 
(SR m) 
 
No. of 
Projects 
Share 
of 
Projects 
(%) 
Total 
Investment 
Amount  
(SR m) 
Average 
Investment 
Scale 
(SR m) 
           
1 Agriculture 21 (0.42( 145 6.90 
 
0 - - - 
3 Manufacturing 2,227 )44.44( 283,058 127.45 
 
13,881 )99.41) 457,036 33.04 
5 Construction 1,589 )31.79( 23,760 14.95 
 
4 (0.03( 10 2.50 
6 
 
Wholesale and 
Retail Trade  
192 (3.84) 747 3.89  1 (0.01) 2 2.00 
7 
 
Transport and 
Communication 
68 (1.36) 5,450 80.15 
 
25 (0.17) 438 18.21 
8 
 
Financing and 
Real Estate 
637 (12.73) 32,962 51.83 
 
1 (0.01) 1 1.00 
9 Social Services  261 (5.22) 1,696 6.50 
 
1 (0.01) 2 2.00 
- Missing 3 )0.06) 3,638 1,212.67  0 - - - 
- Total 4,998 (100.00) 351,456 70.32  13,913 (100.00( 457,488 32.88 
 
Source: Investment Database, Saudi Ministry of Commerce and Industry. 
Note: Investments measured at constant 2000 prices. ISIC = International Standard Industrial Classification of 
economic activities, Revision 2, United Nations, New York. Table shows total investment amount, including 
domestic contribution. Average scale is calculated for projects only where investment size is known.  
 
5.3.4   Regional Location 
 
The geographical distribution of projects between the five regions of Saudi Arabia is given in 
Table 5.6. It shows that the pattern of both foreign and domestic projects in these regions is 
similar, in that they are mainly clustered in the Middle, Eastern and Western regions. This is 
due to the fact that these are the centres of population and industry. The table shows that by 
number of projects, around half of foreign and domestic projects are located in the Middle 
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region, but they have a much lower share of total investment, at 20 to 23 per cent. It shows 
that these regions attract relatively smaller projects. 
 
Table 5.6: Foreign and Domestic Projects by Location, 1960-2005 
 
 Foreign  Domestic 
Region 
No. of 
Projects 
% 
Total 
Investment 
Amount*  
(SR m) 
Average 
Investment 
Scale 
(SR m) 
 
No. of 
Projects 
% 
Total 
Investment 
Amount*  
(SR m) 
Average 
Investment 
Scale 
(SR m) 
          
Middle 2,258 45.2 71,220 31.54  6,278 45.1 105,111 16.74 
Western 1,630 32.6 122,517 75.16  3,684 26.5 125,930 34.18 
Eastern 1,043 20.9 153,644 147.31  2,782 20.0 189,375 68.07 
Southern 42 0.8 761 18.12  581 4.2 11,363 19.56 
Northern 25 0.5 3,314 132.56  588 4.2 25,710 43.72 
Total 4,998 100.0 351,456 70.32  13,913 100.0 457,488 32.88 
 
Source: Investment Database, Saudi Ministry of Commerce and Industry. 
Note: Investments measured at constant 2000 prices. Table shows total investment amount, including domestic 
contribution. Average scale is calculated for projects only where investment size is known. 
 
The Western region, which is ranked second in terms of number of projects, has 1,630 
foreign and 3,684 domestic projects, representing around 33 and 27 per cent respectively of 
the total number of projects. The investment amount is higher in this region compared with 
the Middle region, as it accounts for around 35% of foreign investment and 28% of domestic 
investment. The Eastern region accounts for a fifth of both foreign and domestic projects, but 
this region has the largest amount of investment, accounting for 44% of foreign and 41% of 
domestic investment. This is related to the location of the oil fields (see Chapter 2) and it is 
reflected in the largest average investment scale of all of the regions. Finally, the distribution 
of investments into the remaining regions is very small, especially for FDI, although foreign 
projects in the Northern region are large in scale. Both regions are relatively undeveloped. 
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5.3.5   Prospective Jobs 
 
The pattern of jobs in the foreign and domestic projects is now considered, although details 
are known for only half of the foreign projects (see above). These are the jobs that investors 
plan to have in their projects. In total, there are 967,781 jobs in the 16,083 projects, as shown 
in Table 5.7. Notwithstanding the missing cases, most jobs are in domestic projects. 
 
Table 5.7 shows that there is an increasing number of jobs over time, with the majority of 
jobs created after 1991. The period 1991-05 accounts for two-thirds of foreign and domestic 
project jobs, and which are created by 80 per cent of projects. The period 2001-05 is perhaps 
more striking, where one-third of the foreign jobs come from 57% of the projects (likewise 
one-third of domestic jobs from 38% of domestic projects). These suggest two things: first, 
foreign projects tend to produce more jobs on average (Table 5.7 shows that foreign projects 
have 86 jobs on average, whereas domestic projects have only 56 jobs); and second, that as 
the number of projects has increased over time the average size of project has diminished.   
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Table 5.7: Foreign and Domestic Projects by Jobs, 1960-2005 
 
 Foreign  Domestic 
 
No. of Projects 
(where jobs 
known) 
No. of Jobs  
No. of Projects 
(where jobs 
known) 
No. of Jobs 
Period Total Average  Total Average 
        
1960-65 3 103 34  27 3,201 119 
1966-70 16 1,954 122  100 10,119 101 
1971-75 43 7,917 184  170 32,542 191 
1976-80 124 22,406 181  726 67,861 93 
1981-85 107 12,906 121  748 66,752 89 
1986-90 122 20,368 167  963 63,447 66 
1991-95 218 29,769 137  2,491 149,259 60 
1996-00 322 27,532 86  3,395 156,599 46 
2001-05 1,264 67,089 53  5,244 227,957 43 
Missing 2,779 - -  49 - - 
Total Non-
missing 
2,219 190,044 86  13,864 777,737 56 
 
Source: Investment Database, Saudi Ministry of Commerce and Industry. 
Note: Table shows total project jobs. Average scale is calculated for projects where job size is known. 
 
5.3.6   Summary 
 
The section used the Investment Dataset to compare foreign and domestic projects. The 
analysis considers the differences in terms of number of projects, the investment size and 
amount, and the sector, region and number of jobs. It was not until the year 2000 that Saudi 
Arabia witnessed a remarkable growth of foreign investment, with these foreign projects also 
being larger in scale compared to domestic projects. Both foreign and domestic investment is 
heavily concentrated in the manufacturing sector, as well as in specific regions of the 
country. We now examine the characteristics of the foreign projects in greater detail.  
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5.4   Characteristics of Foreign Projects 
 
It was mentioned in Section 5.2 that the foreign investment in the Investment Dataset can be 
analyzed in each of three ways: (i) by project, that is, if there is any foreign involvement in a 
project, (ii) by investor, since each foreign project has one or more foreign investors, and (iii) 
by investment, whereby investors from the same country are aggregated together for each 
project. In this section the data are analyzed by at the project level, before considering foreign 
investment at the level of the investor and for investors from different countries  
 
5.4.1   Projects by Investment Size 
 
We begin by examining the distribution of foreign investment according to the number of 
projects and investment scale. This is for the 4,998 foreign projects over the period 1960-05, 
where the investments scale is known for 4,991 projects. The distribution of the investment is 
shown in Table 5.8 according to the number of projects in each size band.   
 
The table shows that 4,166 projects were undertaken with an initial investment below SRs 10 
million (about £1.6 million), representing 83 per cent of total foreign projects, and indicating 
the skewed nature of the investment data. Indeed, there is a striking degree of concentration 
in projects with investment scales between SRs 1 and 5 million (i.e. £160,000 and £800,000), 
which account for 2,871 (or 58%) of projects. A further 27 per cent of projects have a scale 
between SRs 5 and 50 million, such that 93 per cent of total projects have an investment scale 
below SRs 50 million. Of course, the other seven per cent of projects can be very large, so 
that 7 projects have a scale above SRs 10 billion, and 18 are above SRs 5 billion. 
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Table 5.8: Distribution of Foreign Projects by Investment Scale, 1960-2005 
 
Band of Investment Scale  
(SR m) 
No. of Projects % 
   
0 - 0.5 151 3.0 
0.5 - 1 286 5.7 
1 - 5 2,871 57.4 
5 - 10 858 17.2 
10 - 50 487 9.7 
50 - 100 113 2.3 
100 - 500 141 2.8 
500 - 1,000 31 0.6 
1,000 - 5,000 35 0.7 
5,000 - 10,000 11 0.2 
> 10,000 7 0.1 
Missing 7 0.1 
Total 4,998 100.0 
 
Source: Investment Database, Saudi Ministry of Commerce and Industry. 
Note: Investment data at constant 2000 prices. „0.5 – 1‟ means investment scales greater than 0.5 but no greater 
than 1, and so on. 
 
5.4.2   Projects by Foreign Share 
 
The distribution of the foreign projects according to the degree of foreign ownership is shown 
in Table 5.9. The ownership structure is determined at the time of establishment, since a firm 
is required by law to articulate the share of every partner in the project.   
 
The table shows that 2,523 projects are under full foreign ownership (50.4 per cent). Of the 
remainder, only 1.1 per cent has less than a 10 per cent foreign ownership share, while 1,272 
(25.4% of 4,998) are in minority ownership. Another 11.1% have equal ownership, while 
13.1% are in majority foreign ownership. Overall, this suggests that foreign investors either 
invest fully or as minority holder in a joint venture. 
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Table 5.9: Projects by Foreign Share, 1960–2005 
 
Share Range (%) No. of Projects Cum. % 
   
 0 - 10 56 1.1 
10 - 25 222 5.6 
25 107 7.7 
25 - 50 887 25.5 
50 558 36.6 
50 - 75 311 42.8 
75 172 46.3 
75 - 90 74 47.8 
90 - 100 88 49.5 
100 2,523 100.0 
Total 4,998 - 
 
Source: Investment Database, Saudi Ministry of Commerce and Industry. 
Note: ‟10 – 25‟ means greater than 10 and less then 25, and so on. 
 
5.4.3   Projects by Country of Origin  
 
The distribution of foreign projects according to the country of origin of owner is shown in 
Table 5.10. Around half of the projects originate from the West Asia part of the MENA 
region, which indicates the cultural proximity and ties with Saudi Arabia. This is followed by 
Western Europe, but with a much smaller number of projects, representing 15 per cent of the 
total. However, by investment size, North America accounts for around one-third of total 
investment, which arises from only 545 projects (11 per cent of projects). Investment from 
the Far East is striking since it represents the smallest number of projects (4 per cent), but 
with a large amount of investment, SRs 73,336 million (21 per cent of total investment), so 
that projects from this region have the largest average project scale. 
 
Table 5.10 also gives a breakdown of each source region according to the leading countries 
within each region. It reveals some further high concentration of FDI in certain countries, 
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such that four countries account for more than half of all investment: the US (SRs 68,157 
million, or 19.4 per cent of investment), Japan (SRs 64,694 million, or 18.4 per cent), France 
(SRs 31,099 million, or 8.9 per cent) and Kuwait (SRs 29,476 million, or 8.4 per cent).
17
 This 
large share of investment (55.1 per cent) comes from only 10 per cent of foreign projects.
18
 It 
shows that the four countries (US, Japan, France and Kuwait) account for most of investment 
amount within their regions. Kuwait accounts for around 43 per cent of investment from the 
West Asia part of the MENA region, but only 54 projects (2.3 per cent). Jordan lies in second 
place in the West Asia region accounting for around 12 per cent of total investment, from 519 
projects (22 per cent). The vast majority of the projects and investment from the North Africa 
part of the MENA region comes from Egypt (91 and 93 per cent respectively).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17 By adding a further country (Bermuda) this rises to 61.7 per cent of total investment, although Bermuda is 
potentially a source for offshore holding companies, which may ultimately arise from other countries. 
18 A further breakdown according to all countries within each region is shown in Appendix Table 5.1. 
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Table 5.10: Foreign Projects by Country of Origin, 1960-2005 
 
Source Region / Country 
No. of 
Projects 
Total Investment 
Amount (SR m) 
)%( 
Average Investment 
Scale (SR m) 
     
MENA (West Asia) 2,356 68,578 19.51 29.17 
     Kuwait (54) (29,476) (8.39) (556.15) 
     Jordan (519) (8,366) (2.38) (16.15) 
     Bahrain (52) (8,027) (2.28) (154.37) 
MENA (North Africa) 487 3,947 1.12 8.1 
     Egypt (442) (3,666) (1.04) (8.29) 
Western Europe 774 78,269 22.27 101.38 
     France (108) (31,099) (8.85) (287.95) 
     Netherlands (64) (10,008) (2.85) (156.38) 
North America 545 96,948 27.58 177.89 
     US (404) (68,157) (19.39) (168.71) 
     Bermuda (17) (23,988) (6.83) (1,411.06) 
Far East 216 73,336 20.87 339.52 
     Japan (57) (64,694) (18.41) (1,134.98) 
Rest of the world 547 22,060 6.28 40.33 
     Panama (28) (8,677) (2.47) (309.89) 
Not classified 73 8,318 2.37 113.95 
Total 4,998 351,456 100 70.32 
 
Source: Investment Database, Saudi Ministry of Commerce and Industry. 
Note: Investments measured at constant 2000 prices. Not classified where projects from different countries have 
equal largest shares. Average investment scale calculated where investment size known. 
 
5.4.4   Projects by Sector 
 
A breakdown of foreign projects by 2-digit industry sector is shown over the page in Table 
5.11. Around 45 per cent of projects and 81 per cent of total investment is concentrated in the 
manufacturing sector. This is followed by the construction sector in terms of the number of 
projects, at around 32 per cent, and the financial and real estate sector in terms of the total 
investment, but with only 9 per cent. A comparison between industries within the sectors 
indicates that most of the foreign investment went to the chemicals and petroleum products 
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industry (68.6 per cent of total investment size), followed by the construction and financial 
institutions industries (6.8 and 5.6 per cent). However, in terms of the number of projects the 
chemicals and petroleum products industry accounts for only 11 per cent of projects, and is 
ranked in third place behind the construction and real estate industries, which account for 
31.8 and 11.7 per cent of total projects respectively. Thus, while investment is oil-related, 
most projects are outside this industry. 
 
The average project investment scale is SRs 70.3 million (£11.25 m), but much higher for the 
chemicals and financial institutions industries, at SRs 441 million, which reflects the much 
larger scales in this industry. The financial institutions industry is on average larger, with an 
average investment scale of SRs 679 million, but this is because of 30 very large investment 
projects undertaken with a total investment amount of SRs 19,690 million. 
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Table 5.11: Foreign Projects by Sector, 1960-2005 
 
ISIC Sector 
No. of 
Projects 
Total 
Investment 
Amount  
(SR m) 
Average 
Investment 
Scale 
(SR m) 
      
1  Agriculture 21 145 6.90 
 11      Agriculture (21) (145) (6.90) 
3  Manufacturing 2,227 283,058 127.45 
 31      Food and Beverages  (224) (7,445) (33.24) 
 32      Textile, Wearing Apparel and Leather  (142) (2,029) (14.29) 
 33      Wood and Wood Products (125) (947) (7.58) 
 34      Paper and Paper Products and Printing (62) (3,210) (52.62) 
 35      Chemicals and Petroleum Products (546) (240,993) (441.38) 
 36      Non-Metallic Mineral Products (226) (9,962) (44.47) 
 37      Basic Metal  (430) (10,132) (23.56) 
 38      Fabricated Metal Products (381) (7,604) (20.01) 
 39      Other Manufacturing  (89) (737) (8.28) 
5  Construction 1,589 23,760 14.95 
 50      Construction (1,589) (23,760) (14.95) 
6  Wholesale and Retail Trade   192 747 3.89 
 63      Restaurants and Hotels (192) (747) (3.89) 
7  Transport and Communication  68 5,450 80.15 
 71      Transport and Storage (68) (5,450) (80.15) 
8  Financial and Real Estate   636 32,962 51.83 
 81      Financial Institutions (30) (19,690) (678.97) 
 82      Insurance (23) (4,302) (187.04) 
 83      Real estate and Business Services (584) (8,970) (15.36) 
9  Social Services  261 1,696 6.50 
 92      Sanitary and Similar Services (33) (117) (3.55) 
 93      Social and Related Community  (108) (1,338) (12.39) 
 94      Recreational and Cultural Services (6) (15) (2.50) 
 95      Personal and Household Services (114) (226) (1.98) 
  Missing 3 3,638 1212.67 
  Total 4,998 351,456 70.32 
 
Source: Investment Database, Saudi Ministry of Commerce and Industry. 
Note: Investments measured at constant 2000 prices. ISIC = International Standard Industrial Classification, 
Rev. 2. Average investment scale is calculated for projects where investment size is known. 
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5.4.5   Projects by Sector and Source 
 
The cross-tabulation of industrial activity by supra-national source is shown in Table 5.12.  
This is for the number of projects and investment amount. It reveals that most projects from 
the West Asia part of MENA are in manufacturing, and which is the case for the total 
investment from other sources. Appendix Table 5.2 gives a breakdown for the manufacturing 
industry, showing the importance of the oil sector for FDI from outside of the MENA region. 
 
Table 5.12: Sector by Supra-national Origin 
 
Source: Investment Database, Saudi Ministry of Commerce and Industry. 
Note: Investments measured at constant 2000 prices. 
Sector 
MENA 
(West 
Asia) 
MENA 
(North 
Africa) 
Western 
Europe 
North 
America 
Far East 
Rest of 
the 
world 
Total 
        
(a) Number of Projects        
Agriculture 15 1 1 2 1 1 21 
Manufacturing 1,273 158 288 186 57 265 2,227 
Construction 695 204 263 165 121 141 1,589 
Wholesale and Retail Trade   94 30 19 15 8 26 192 
Transport and Communication  8 5 28 12 2 13 68 
Financing and Real Estate   198 64 145 136 27 67 637 
Social Services  106 30 41 43 3 38 261 
Missing - 1 2 - - - 3 
Total 2,389 493 787 559 219 551 4,998 
        
(b) Investment Scale (SR m)        
Agriculture 94 2 2 2 43 2 145 
Manufacturing 56,015 1,995 53,972 79,323 72,677 19,076 283,058 
Construction 6,345 441 1,580 13,516 493 1,385 23,760 
Wholesale and Retail Trade   552 64 26 30 17 58 747 
Transport and Communication  45 6 5,303 60 5 31 5,450 
Financing and Real Estate   9,878 1,389 16,954 3,616 347 778 32,962 
Social Services  313 63 119 447 6 748 1,696 
Missing - 2 3,636 - - - 3,638 
Total 73,242 3,963 81,591 96,993 73,589 22,078 351,456 
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5.4.6   Projects by Region and Province 
 
The distribution of inward investment is given in Table 5.13 according to location across the 
five regions in Saudi Arabia, and its thirteen provinces.
19
   
 
Table 5.13: Foreign Projects by Region and Provinces, 1960-2005 
 
Region / Province No. of Projects 
Total Investment 
Amount (SR m) 
Average Investment 
Scale (SR m) 
    
Middle 2,258 71,220 31.58 
     Riyadh (2,237) (71,114) (31.83) 
     AlQassim (21) (106) (5.05) 
Western 1,630 122,517 75.30 
     Makka (1,505) (68,539) (45.60) 
     Almadinah (125) (53,978) (435.31) 
Eastern 1,043 153,644 147.31 
     Eastern (1,043) (153,644) (147.31) 
Southern 42 761 18.56 
     Asir (26) (119) (4.76) 
     Jazan (11) (396) (36.00) 
     Albaha (3) (14) (4.67) 
     Najran (2) (232) (116.00) 
Northern 25 3,314 132.56 
     Tabuk (15) (567) (37.80) 
     Aljawf (4) (19) (4.75) 
     Hail (3) (2,031) (677.00) 
     Northern frontier (3) (697) (232.33) 
Total 4,998 351,456 70.32 
 
Source: Investment Database, Saudi Ministry of Commerce and Industry. 
Note: Investments measured at constant 2000 prices. Average investment scale is calculated for projects where 
investment size is known. 
 
                                                 
19  Analysis by region and the supra-nations source is shown in Appendix Table 5.3. 
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It shows that the projects and investment were unequally distributed between provinces over 
1960-05. Around half of the projects are located in the Middle region, of which Riyadh has 
the majority of projects (44.8 per cent of the total projects), followed by the Makka and the 
Eastern provinces (30.1 and 20.9 per cent respectively). However, around 44 per cent of the 
total investment is concentrated in the Eastern province within the Eastern region. This is not 
surprising since the oil related projects, which require huge capital, are mainly located in this 
province, and which is reflected in the average investment scale per project, at SRs 147.3 
million. The Riyadh province has the second highest amount of total investment, receiving 
20.2 per cent of total investment, followed by the Makka and the Almadinah provinces (19.5 
and 15.4 per cent respectively). 
 
Overall, across the thirteen provinces, there is a very high concentration of projects and 
investment, with around 96.0 per cent of projects and 83.5 per cent of the investment amount 
occurring in Riyadh, Makka and the Eastern provinces. When Almadinah province is added, 
these reach 98.3 and 98.8 per cent respectively, showing that little FDI occurs elsewhere in 
Saudi Arabia outside of these provinces.
20
  
 
5.4.7   Single and Multiple Investors 
 
The foreign ownership of projects can be considered according to whether there is a single or 
multiple foreign investors involved, i.e. whether the foreign investors work in partnership or 
not. A breakdown of the distribution of projects between single and multiple investors is 
shown in Table 5.14. It reveals that the vast majority of foreign investments involve a single 
foreign investor (i.e. 4,021 of 4,998, or 80.5%). Further, in each case, half the projects are in 
                                                 
20  Although the Hail and the Northern Frontier provinces have very large average investment scales, there are 
only three projects in each of these provinces.  
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whole foreign ownership (i.e. either through a single investor or foreign investors combined), 
but on average these appear to be fairly small projects, representing only 12.5 and 17.2 per 
cent respectively of the total investment amount. In terms of projects with less than 100 per 
cent ownership, the table shows that there is a similar distribution for both kinds of project, 
with a concentration of ownership in the number of projects that have a total foreign investor 
share between 26 and 75 per cent. However, while the investment for the single investors is 
concentrated in projects with 50 per cent ownership, for multiple investors the investment is 
concentrated in projects with less than a 10 per cent share. This is reflected in the average 
project investment scales, which are much larger for the multiple investors.  
 
Table 5.14: Foreign Projects by Single and Multiple Investors 
 
 Single Investor  Multiple  Investors 
Share Range 
No. Of 
Projects 
Total 
Investment 
Amount  
(SR m) 
Average 
Investment 
Scale 
(SR m) 
 
No. Of 
Projects 
Total 
Investment 
Amount  
(SR m) 
Average 
Investment 
Scale 
(SR m) 
        
 0 - 10 44 8,114 184.4  12 27,776 2,314.7 
10 - 25 179 9,033 50.5  43 19,824 461.0 
25 97 20,647 207.4  10 102 10.2 
25 - 50 737 40,210 54.4  150 10,954 73.0 
50 457 138,406 303.3  101 1,587 15.7 
50 - 75 209 4,571 21.1  102 2,745 26.9 
75 136 1,271 9.4  36 11,033 307.5 
75 - 90 47 290 13.3  27 4,704 174.2 
90 - 100 56 1,470 35.1  32 344 10.7 
100 2,059 31,960 15.5  464 16,417 35.4 
Total 4,021 255,972 63.7  977 95,486 97.7 
 
Source: Investment Database, Saudi Ministry of Commerce and Industry. 
 Note: Investments measured at constant 2000 prices. Average investment scale is calculated for projects where 
investment size is known.  ‟10 – 25‟ means greater than 10 and less then 25, and so on. 
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5.4.8   Summary 
 
This section has given a greater emphasis to analyzing the pattern of foreign investment at the 
project level over the period 1960-05, examining this according to the number of projects, 
investment scale, sector, region and jobs. It reveals many interesting things about the nature 
and pattern of inward FDI, but highlighting a concentrated pattern of investment in terms of 
its scale, activity and location within Saudi Arabia. In particular, this section finds that there 
is a relatively large number of smaller projects (i.e. below SRs 10 million), that most projects 
are in manufacturing, especially the chemicals and petroleum products industry, and located 
in the Middle region, especially around the capital city of Riyadh. However, reflecting the 
location of the oilfields, and some extremely large investment scales, the Eastern region is the 
largest recipient of FDI by the amount of investment.    
 
5.5   Characteristics of Foreign Investors    
 
The above analysis finds that about a fifth of the foreign investment projects have more than 
one foreign investor, such that the 4,998 projects in the Investment Dataset were carried out 
by a total of 6,566 foreign investors. The characteristics of the investors are now considered.   
It is these foreign investors that form the basis for the analysis of Chapter 6. 
 
5.5.1   Investors by Supra-national Origin  
 
The distribution of the number of foreign investors according to the supra-national region of 
origin is shown in Table 5.15. It indicates that most investors over the period 1960-05 come 
from the West Asia part of MENA region, followed by Western Europe, North America, 
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North Africa part of the MENA and finally the Far East. The total number of investors from 
of the MENA region is 3,992 investors, representing more than 60 per cent of the total. This 
indicates a striking degree of involvement, although perhaps it is not surprising as it reflects 
the role of the cultural and geographical proximity as a determinant of FDI in Saudi Arabia. 
 
By investment size, which is measured as the amount invested by foreign investors, almost 
one-third of the total investment comes from the North America region, totalling SRs 52,749 
million, followed by Western Europe and the Far East. Total investment from MENA in fact 
represents only 15 per cent of the total investment, at SRs 25,443 million. It indicates that 
while there are a large number of investors from the MENA, they engage in generally small 
projects. This can be seen in the average investment scale per investor from the MENA 
region, which is SRs 10.3 million, the lowest of all the reported regions. 
 
Table 5.15: Foreign Investors by Supra-national Origin, 1960-2005 
 
Supra-national Origin No. of Investors 
Total Investment 
Amount (SR m) 
Average 
Investment Scale 
(SR m) 
    
MENA (West Asia) 3,329 23,253 7.00 
MENA (North Africa) 663 2,190 3.30 
Western Europe 912 41,561 45.72 
North America 683 52,749 77.92 
Far East 257 38,214 148.69 
Rest of the World 722 12,120 16.79 
Total 6,566 170,087 25.90 
 
Source: Investment Database, Saudi Ministry of Commerce and Industry. 
Note: Investments measured at constant 2000 prices. MENA excludes Saudi Arabia. Total investment is the 
foreign investment only. Average investment is calculated for projects where the scale is known. 
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5.5.2   Investors by Sector  
 
The distribution of foreign investors by industrial activity is shown in Table 5.16. It is clear 
that manufacturing is the dominant sector both in terms of the number of investors and in 
terms of the investment amount. Looking at the motivations for FDI from Chapter 3 this is 
perhaps because Saudi Arabia is rich in natural resources, which consolidates and attracts 
more investors to natural-resource industries. It can be seen that around half of the investors 
are in the manufacturing sector, and that it is 73 per cent of investment amount. This is 
followed by the construction sector, with around one-third of investors, but 11 per cent of the 
investment. Financing and real estate sector received less than half the number of investors of 
the construction sector, but it accounts for almost the same investment amount (10%). Of 
course, within manufacturing, Table 5.16 shows that the largest in terms of the number of 
investors and investment amount is chemicals and petroleum products. This attracted 11.6 per 
cent of investors, but a staggering 61 per cent of the total investment. Overall, the pattern 
follows the distribution of the foreign projects in Section 5.4. 
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Table 5.16: Foreign Investors by Industrial Activity, 1960-2005 
 
ISIC 
Code 
Sector 
No. of 
Investors 
Total 
Investment 
Amount  
(SR m) 
Average 
Investment 
Scale 
(SR m) 
      
1  Agriculture 24 100 4.16 
 11      Agriculture (24) (100) (4.16) 
3  Manufacturing 3,126 124,147 39.70 
 31      Food and Beverages  (306) (3,525) (11.52) 
 32      Textile, Wearing Apparel and Leather  (191) (1,197) (6.27) 
 33      Wood and Wood Products (181) (717) (3.96) 
 34      Paper and Paper Products and Printing (83) (1,718) (21.21) 
 35      Chemicals and Petroleum Products (762) (103,642) (136.01) 
 36      Non-Metallic Mineral Products (297) (4,368) (14.86) 
 37      Basic Metal  (626) (4,849) (7.75) 
 38      Fabricated Metal Products (536) (3,666) (7.04) 
 39      Other Manufacturing  (144) (466) (3.24) 
5  Construction 1,938 18,523 9.56 
 50      Construction (1,938) (18,523) (9.56) 
6  Wholesale and Retail Trade   263 527 2.00 
 63      Restaurants and Hotels (263) (527) (2.00) 
7  Transport and Communication  88 5,317 60.43 
 71      Transport and Storage (88) (5,317) (60.43) 
8  Financing and Real Estate   794 17,073 21.47 
 81      Financial Institutions (52) (7,055) (138.33) 
 82      Insurance (41) (1,404) (34.25) 
 83      Real estate and Business Services (702) (8,613) (12.27) 
9  Social Services  329 765 2.32 
 92      Sanitary and Similar Services (39) (68) (1.74) 
 93      Social and Related Community  (138) (512) (3.71) 
 94      Recreational and Cultural Services (6) (12) (1.97) 
 95      Personal and Household Services (146) (174) (1.19) 
  Missing 3 3,635 1,211.71 
    Total 6,566 170,087 25.90 
 
Source: Investment Database, Saudi Ministry of Commerce and Industry. 
Note: Investment measured at constant 2000 prices. ISIC = International Standard Industrial Classification, Rev. 
2. Total investment is the foreign investment only. Average investment is calculated for projects where the scale 
is known. 
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5.5.3   Investors by Location 
 
The distribution of foreign investors according to location by regions and provinces is shown 
in Table 5.17. Overall, and again, the most attractive area to investors is the Middle region, 
with 45.7 per cent of investors locating their investments in this region. It is followed by the 
Western and Eastern regions (32.8 and 20.3 per cent respectively). In total these three regions 
cover 98.9 per cent of total investors. Of course, when the investment amount is considered, 
the Eastern region ranked as the largest recipient of the total investment, like before, reaching 
42.6 per cent. This is followed by the Western and Middle regions (29.4 and 27.4 per cent 
respectively). In total, around 99.4 per cent of total foreign investment goes to these three 
regions when analyzed at the individual investor level. 
 
Again, a further breakdown by province shows a very high concentration of investors in the 
Riyadh, Makka and Eastern provinces, representing 95.6 per cent of the total investors. The 
Riyadh province accounts for more than 45 per cent of total investors, followed by the Makka 
and Eastern provinces. However, the Eastern province is the largest recipient of investment, 
with around 43 per cent of the total investment concentrated in this province. This indicates 
that investing in the Eastern province requires larger investment scale.        
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Table 5.17: Foreign Investors by Region and Province, 1960-2005 
 
Region and Province No. of Investors 
Total Investment 
Amount (SR m) 
Average 
Investment Scale 
(SR m) 
    
Middle 3,003 46,560 15.55 
     Riyadh (2,979) (46,504) (15.65) 
     AlQassim (24) (56) (2.33) 
Western 2,155 49,941 23.26 
     Makka (1,964) (35,189) (17.94) 
     Almadinah (191) (14,753) (79.32) 
Eastern 1,333 72,534 54.41 
     Eastern (1,333) (72,534) (54.41) 
Southern 48 403 9.37 
     Asir (31) (75) (2.88) 
     Jazan (12) (201) (16.75) 
     Albaha (3) (9) (3.00) 
     Najran (2) (118) (59.00) 
Northern 27 648 24.00 
     Tabuk (17) (353) (20.76) 
      Aljawf (4) (14) (3.50) 
      Hail (3) (106) (35.33) 
      The Northern frontier (3) (175) (58.33) 
Total 6,566 170,087 25.90 
 
Source: Investment Database, Saudi Ministry of Commerce and Industry. 
Note: Investments measured at constant 2000 prices. Total investment is the foreign investment only. Average 
investment is calculated for projects where the scale is known. 
 
5.5.4   Summary 
 
This section has described the pattern of FDI in Saudi Arabia at the investor level over the 
period 1960-05. The analysis again considers different characteristics associated with foreign 
investors, including the number of projects, investment size, sector, region and origin. The 
section finds that most investors come from the MENA region, particularly West Asia, but 
that the majority of investment amount comes from North America and Western Europe. It 
 160 
finds that the most investors tend to invest in the manufacturing sector and choose to locate in 
the Middle region, although the Eastern region is the most attractive region according to the 
scale of investment, again reflecting the location of the oilfields.  
 
5.6   Source Country Characteristics 
 
In this section we complete the analysis of the Investment Database. Initially, we examined 
the pattern of FDI according to the characteristics of projects. This gave a good picture of the 
pattern of investment, although in analyzing the source country there is a potentially 
difficulty as projects may involve many foreign investors from different countries, so that 
these were attributed to the largest investor. In this section the pattern of FDI is analyzed 
according to total investment arising from each source country. This is useful for Chapter 7 
that analyzes the data by the source country characteristics. It gives 5,432 observations on 
4,998 projects. Of course, since multiple investor projects account for only a fifth of total 
projects (see Table 5.14), the overall pattern is not too dissimilar to that found previously 
analyzed, so that the focus of this section is on the extent to which projects are multiply 
funded from the same source country, but also the extent to which they rely on funding from 
elsewhere. 
 
5.6.1   By Supra-national Origin 
 
The analysis of foreign investment according to its source is important in order to understand 
its nature. The distribution of investment, aggregating investors from the same country in 
each project, is shown in Table 5.18 according to supra-national region of origin. It gives the 
number of investments (i.e. from the same source region in different projects), and shows the 
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average number of investors and the mean share of investments from each region. Again, 
about half of investments come from the West Asia part of the MENA region, while the table 
shows that a greater number of investors from this region tend to participate in a project, so 
that the mean share is relatively high at 74 per cent. It was shown above that these projects 
tend to be smaller in scale (Table 5.15), so that this is not so much a risk sharing strategy (i.e. 
for larger projects), but rather it may reflect the more limited resources of the investors and 
the greater reluctance of other investors to get involved, including from the host. 
 
Table 5.18: Investment by Supra-national Origin, 1960-2005 
 
Supra-national Region 
No. of 
Investments 
Average No. of 
Investors* 
Mean Investments 
Share (%) ** 
    
MENA (West Asia) 2,609 1.28 74 
MENA (North Africa) 523 1.27 76 
Western Europe 849 1.07 56 
North America 623 1.10 60 
Far East 225 1.14 61 
Rest of the world 603 1.20 70 
Total 5,432 1.21 59 
 
Source: Investment Database, Saudi Ministry of Commerce and Industry. 
* = This is the ratio of total number of investors from each supra-national region divided by total number of 
investments. ** = Mean investments share by supra-national region of origin.  
 
The table shows that investors from the Western Europe, North America and the Far East 
regions tend not to engage in projects with many partners from the same source country (the 
investors per project are 1.07, 1.10 and 1.14 respectively), but they rely more on investors 
from other countries, and presumably Saudi Arabia itself (the mean investment shares are 56, 
61 and 62 per cent respectively). In a sense these projects are intrinsically „international‟, 
involving investors from many different countries. It may reflect the greater scale of these 
projects, which tend to be larger in size (Table 5.15) 
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A further breakdown by countries within each region is reported in Appendix Table 5.4. It 
can be seen that 37 per cent of investments came from only four countries, of which three are 
Arab countries, comprising Jordan, Syria, Egypt and the US respectively. Jordan accounts for 
around 22 per cent of total investments from the West Asia part of the MENA region, and 
Syria accounts for 21 per cent, while Egypt represents the source of the vast majority of total 
investments from the North Africa part of the MENA region (88.5 per cent). Furthermore, a 
fairly a large number of investors from the MENA region tends to participate together in one 
investment, and combined invest at a higher share compared to other source countries.  
 
5.6.2   By Sector  
 
The distribution of foreign investments between sectors is shown in Table 5.19. Again, it 
reveals that the manufacturing sector is dominant, with 45 per cent of total investment going 
to this sector, followed by the construction sector. Compared to other sectors, a large number 
of investors tends to share in one investment when entering the manufacturing and wholesale 
sectors, although in the case of manufacturing they tend to do so at smaller shares. At the 2-
digit industry, chemicals and petroleum industries, construction and real estate account for 
more than half of investments. The overall pattern for manufacturing is reflected in its 2-digit 
industries, while in construction a small number of source country investors are involved and 
they to own higher share, no doubt due to the absence of local partners. 
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Table 5.19: Investment by Sector, 1960-2005 
 
ISIC  Sector 
No. of 
Investments 
Average 
No. of 
Investors* 
Mean 
Investments 
Share (%) ** 
1  Agriculture 22 1.09 66 
 11      Agriculture (22) (1.09) (66) 
3  Manufacturing 2,464 1.27 64 
 31      Food and Beverages  (243) (1.26) (63) 
 32      Textile, Wearing Apparel and Leather  (149) (1.28) (76) 
 33      Wood and Wood Products (139) (1.30) (75) 
 34      Paper and Paper Products and Printing (68) (1.22) (57) 
 35      Chemicals and Petroleum Products (633) (1.20) (52) 
 36      Non-Metallic Mineral Products (244) (1.22) (69) 
 37      Basic Metal  (459) (1.36) (70) 
 38      Fabricated Metal Products (435) (1.23) (60) 
 39      Other Manufacturing  (94) (1.53) (80) 
5  Construction 1,679 1.15 75 
 50      Construction (1,679) (1.15) (75) 
6  Wholesale and Retail Trade   207 1.27 78 
 63      Restaurants and Hotels (207) (1.27) (78) 
7  Transport and Communication  76 1.16 55 
 71      Transport and Storage (76) (1.16) (55) 
8  Financing and Real Estate   708 1.12 70 
 81      Financial Institutions (37) (1.41) (54) 
 82      Insurance (33) (1.24) (22) 
 83      Real estate and Business Services (638) (1.10) (73) 
9  Social Services  273 1.21 73 
 92      Sanitary and Similar Services (35) (1.11) (70) 
 93      Social and Related Community  (116) (1.19) (68) 
 94      Recreational and Cultural Services (6) (1.00) (86) 
 95      Personal and Household Services (116) (1.26) (79) 
  Missing 3 1.00 60 
   Total 5,432 1.21 69 
 
Source: Investment Database, Saudi Ministry of Commerce and Industry. 
Note: Investments measured at constant 2000 prices. ISIC = International Standard Industrial Classification, 
Rev. 2. * = Ratio of total number of investors from each industry divided by total number of investments. ** = 
Mean investment share by industry.  
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5.6.3   By Location 
 
Finally, the spatial distribution of investment from the same country is now considered. Table 
5.20 shows the distribution of foreign investments between the regions and provinces within 
Saudi Arabia over the period 1960-05. The Middle region ranks as the most attractive region, 
accounting for 45 per cent of total investments, followed by the Western and Eastern regions 
(32.3 and 21.5 per cent), which is like before. The table shows that investors tend to share 
much more in a project when locating in the Middle and Western regions, and take a greater 
share. However, investors in the Eastern region collaborate less with partners from the same 
country and have smallest share, reflecting the scale of these projects. 
 
In terms of the provinces, again, Riyadh, Makka and Eastern attract more investments (45, 30 
and 21 per cent of total investment). By aggregating investors, Almadinah province has, on 
average, the largest number of investors sharing one project (1.33 investors), but this is not 
reflected in a higher share (63 per cent). By comparison, Riyadh and Makka are second in 
terms of number of investors (1.23 and 1.22 respectively), but they have a fairly higher share 
per investment (71 and 72 per cent), and so appear to be less reliant on partners from outside 
the source country. Investors in provinces in the Southern and Northern regions tend to have 
less partners, although these areas are not important as locations for investment, as they have 
only one per cent of total investment locating in these areas.  
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Table 5.20: Investment by Region and Province, 1960-2005 
 
Region and Province No. of Investments 
Average No. of 
Investors* 
Mean Investments 
Share (%) ** 
    
Middle 2,440 1.23 72 
     Riyadh (2,419) (1.23) (71) 
     AlQassim (21) (1.14) (79) 
Western 1,754 1.23 72 
     Makka (1,610) (1.22) (72) 
     Almadinah (144) (1.33) (63) 
Eastern 1,167 1.14 58 
     Eastern (1,167) (1.14) (58) 
Southern 46 1.04 74 
     Asir (29) (1.07) (81) 
     Jazan (12) (1.00) (56) 
     Albaha (3) (1.00) (77) 
     Najran (2) (1.00) (75) 
Northern 25 1.08 80 
     Tabuk (15) (1.13) (90) 
     Aljawf (4) (1.00) (88) 
     Hail (3) (1.00) (42) 
     The Northern frontier (3) (1.00) (55) 
Total 5,432 1.21 69 
 
Source: Investment Database, Saudi Ministry of Commerce and Industry. 
Note: Investments measured at constant 2000 prices. * = Ratio of total number of investors from each province 
divided by total number of investments. ** = Mean investments share by province. 
 
5.6.4   Summary 
 
This section has analyzed the inward investment projects according to the number of partners 
and share of total project investment arising from different source countries. Generally, it 
finds that the West Asia part of MENA is the main source of investment when analyzed in 
this way, while the dominant sector is manufacturing and the most attractive location is the 
Middle region. It shows that some kinds of investment appear to require more partners from 
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the same source country, while other kinds require a greater funding from outside the source 
economy, including the host country. In particular, projects from MENA, in manufacturing 
and locating in the Middle region tend to have more source country partners, and those from 
MENA and in manufacturing are funded at a greater extent from the source country. In the 
case of MENA these tend to be smaller projects, so that it may just reflect the characteristics 
of investors, while for manufacturing they are larger projects and it may reflect risk sharing. 
 
5.7   Conclusions  
 
This chapter has outlined the nature of the data available to this study in the form of the 
Investment Database, and has analyzed the nature of both domestic and foreign investments 
in Saudi Arabia over the period 1960-05. The dataset identifies around 18,911 projects of 
which 4,998 (26.4 per cent) are foreign projects (i.e. involve some foreign ownership) and the 
rest are domestic. These foreign projects are important, as they account for approximately 44 
per cent of the total investment in Saudi Arabia since 1960. The chapter describes the nature 
of the foreign projects relative to domestic projects, and then focuses on the pattern of foreign 
investment. This is analyzed at the project and investor levels, but also for source country by 
aggregating investments within a project from the source country. In total, Saudi Arabia has 
received investment from 90 different countries since 1960.  
 
The analysis reveals significant facts about the nature and pattern of investment. First, it 
reveals that FDI has increased dramatically, so that about two-thirds of projects over 1960-05 
have occurred since the year 2000, and accounting for about half the total foreign investment 
of SRs 350 billion (about £56 billion; all at year 2000 prices) in Saudi Arabia. It compares 
with about SRs 460 billion in domestic investment over the same period. On average, foreign 
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investments tend to be twice the size of domestic investments, at SRs 70 million, but the 
distribution of investment scales is highly skewed, so that seven projects over 1960-05 had a 
scale in excess of SRs 10 billion, and eighteen at more than SRs 5 billion. In its nature and 
location pattern the FDI is highly concentrated. Thus, like domestic investment, the FDI is 
mainly in the manufacturing sector and located in the Middle region in Saudi Arabia, around 
Riyadh, although there is significant investment around the Eastern oilfields, which in terms 
of the amount of foreign investment is the largest recipient. Chemicals and petroleum-related 
projects account for around 11 per cent of foreign projects, but nearly 70 per cent of total 
foreign investment, related to some very large foreign investments. 
 
Interestingly, the main source of investment by number of projects is the Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA) region, and in particular the West Asia part. Combined these account 
for over half of the projects, but about 20 per cent of investment. Jordan and Syria account 
for 43 per cent of investment from the West Asia part of MENA, while Egypt represents the 
vast majority of total investment from the North Africa part (89 per cent), indicating the 
importance of proximity and cultural similarity. These tend to be smaller investments that 
involve a relatively large number of investors from the same source country and account for a 
large share of the project cost. It contrasts with the FDI from elsewhere, such that the largest 
investment flows arise from North America, followed by the Western Europe. It indicates the 
different nature of the investment flowing from the different sources, but which overall tends 
to be highly concentrated in its activity and by its location.  
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Appendix Table 5.1: Foreign Projects by Origin, 1960-2005 
Country 
No. of 
Projects 
Total Investment 
Amount (SR m) 
% 
Average Investment 
Scale (SR m) 
     
MENA (West Asia) 2,356 68,578 19.51 29.2 
     Kuwait (54) (29,476) (8.39) (556.2) 
     Jordan (519) (8,366) (2.38) (16.2) 
     Bahrain (52) (8,027) (2.28) (154.4) 
     United Arab Emirates (76) (7,310) (2.08) (96.2) 
     Lebanon (363) (6,812) (1.94) (18.8) 
     Syria (515) (3,692) (1.05) (7.2) 
     Palestine (376) (1,536) (0.44) (4.1) 
     Yemen (258) (1,292) (0.37) (5.0) 
     Iran (26) (844) (0.24) (36.7) 
     Turkey (80) (632) (0.18) (7.9) 
     Iraq (14) (346) (0.10) (24.7) 
     Cyprus (18) (176) (0.05) (9.8) 
     Qatar (4) (66) (0.02) (16.4) 
     Oman (1) (2) (0.001) (2.0) 
MENA (North Africa) 487 3,947 1.12 8.1 
     Egypt (442) (3,666) (1.04) (8.3) 
     Sudan (26) (187) (0.05) (7.2) 
     Morocco (11) (48) (0.01) (4.3) 
     Algeria (3) (32) (0.01) (10.6) 
     Tunisia (5) (14) (0.004) (2.8) 
Western Europe 774 78,269 22.27 101.4 
     France (108) (31,099) (8.85) (288.0) 
     Netherlands (64) (10,008) (2.85) (156.4) 
     Italy (55) (8,991) (2.56) (163.5) 
     Germany (121) (8,821) (2.51) (73.5) 
     Sweden (23) (8,405) (2.39) (365.4) 
     United Kingdom (210) (6,088) (1.73) (29.0) 
     Switzerland (72) (3,035) (0.86) (42.8) 
     Denmark (12) (732) (0.21) (61.0) 
     Norway (13) (355) (0.10) (27.3) 
     Belgium (11) (163) (0.05) (14.8) 
 
 169 
Appendix Table 5.1   (continued) 
 
Country 
No. of 
Projects 
Total Investment 
Amount (SR m) 
% 
Average Investment 
Scale (SR m) 
     
     Spain (12) (102) (0.03) (8.5) 
     Finland (12) (94) (0.03) (7.8) 
     UK (Jersey) (9) (93) (0.03) (10.3) 
     Luxembourg (6) (80) (0.02) (13.3) 
     Austria (13) (63) (0.02) (4.8) 
     Greece (6) (36) (0.01) (6.1) 
     Liechtenstein (5) (33) (0.01) (6.5) 
     Ireland (6) (29) (0.01) (4.8) 
     Portugal (2) (12) (0.004) (6.2) 
     Poland (4) (8) (0.002) (2.0) 
     UK (Channel Islands) (4) (8) (0.002) (2.0) 
     UK (Isle Of Man) (2) (8) (0.002) (3.8) 
     Romania (2) (2) (0.001) (1.2) 
     Hungary (1) (2) (0.001) (2.0) 
     Slovakia (1) (0.1) (0.00003) (0.1) 
North America 545 96,948 27.58 177.9 
     US (404) (68,157) (19.39) (168.7) 
     Bermuda (17) (23,988) (6.83) (1,411.1) 
     Canada (124) (4,803) (1.37) (38.7) 
Far East 216 73,336 20.87 339.5 
     Japan (57) (64,694) (18.41) (1,135.0) 
     Korea Republic of (60) (2,531) (0.72) (42.2) 
     Taiwan (7) (2,529) (0.72) (361.4) 
     China (36) (1,909) (0.54) (53.0) 
     Malaysia (21) (1,465) (0.42) (69.8) 
     Singapore (12) (126) (0.04) (10.5) 
     Philippines (11) (52) (0.01) (4.7) 
     Russia (4) (16) (0.005) (4.1) 
     Hong Kong (5) (9) (0.002) (1.7) 
     Indonesia (2) (3) (0.001) (1.5) 
     Thailand (1) (2) (0.001) (2.0) 
Rest of the world 547 22,060 6.28 40.3 
     Panama (28) (8,677) (2.47) (309.9) 
     Cayman Islands (43) (4,145) (1.18) (96.4) 
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Appendix Table 5.1   (continued) 
 
Country 
No. of 
Projects 
Total Investment 
Amount (SR m) 
% 
Average Investment 
Scale (SR m) 
     
     South Africa (12) (2,612) (0.74) (217.7) 
     Pakistan (223) (2,033) (0.58) (9.1) 
     India (129) (1,870) (0.53) (14.5) 
     British Virgin Islands (25) (1,191) (0.34) (47.6) 
     Australia (19) (1,018) (0.29) (53.6) 
     Afghanistan (13) (80) (0.02) (6.2) 
     New Zealand (1) (77) (0.02) (76.7) 
     Nepal (1) (63) (0.02) (63.1) 
     Bangladesh (10) (55) (0.02) (5.5) 
     Ethiopia (3) (46) (0.01) (15.3) 
     Croatia (1) (34) (0.01) (33.7) 
     Liberia (3) (27) (0.01) (9.0) 
     Trinidad And Tobago (1) (20) (0.01) (19.9) 
     Venezuela (2) (20) (0.01) (9.8) 
     Bahamas (7) (17) (0.005) (2.4) 
     Brazil (2) (16) (0.004) (7.8) 
     Sri Lanka (3) (12) (0.003) (4.0) 
     Nigeria (2) (6) (0.002) (3.0) 
     Tanzania (3) (6) (0.002) (2.0) 
     Somalia (2) (6) (0.002) (2.9) 
     Mauritius (3) (6) (0.002) (1.8) 
     Kenya (1) (5) (0.001) (5.1) 
     Barbados (1) (5) (0.001) (5.1) 
     Dominican Republic of (1) (5) (0.001) (5.0) 
     Eritrea (2) (4) (0.001) (2.0) 
     Ukraine (2) (3) (0.001) (1.3) 
     Netherlands Antilles (1) (2) (0.001) (2.0) 
Bosnia And Herzegovina (1) (2) (0.001) (2.0) 
     Belize (1) (1) (0.0001) (0.5) 
     Turkmenistan (1) (0.2) (0.0001) (0.2) 
Not classified* 73 8,318 2.37 113.9 
Total 4,998 351,456 100.00 70.3 
 
Source: Investment Database, Saudi Ministry of Commerce and Industry. 
Note: Investments measured at constant 2000 prices. Not classified is where several countries have equal largest 
shares.  Average investment scale is calculated for projects where investment size is known. 
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Appendix Table 5.2: Manufacturing Sector by Supra-national Source 
 
Source: Investment Database, Saudi Ministry of Commerce and Industry. 
Note: Investments measured at constant 2000 prices.  
 
 
 
 
 
Industry 
MENA 
(West 
Asia) 
MENA 
(North 
Africa) 
Western 
Europe 
North 
America 
Far East 
Rest of 
the 
world 
Total 
        
(a) Number of Projects        
Food and Beverages  124 20 36 12 4 28 224 
Textiles, clothes and leather 86 12 7 4 2 31 142 
Wood and wood products 93 15 4 4 1 8 125 
Paper and printing 41 7 5 6 2 1 62 
Chemicals and petroleum 234 34 109 70 21 78 546 
Non-metallic minerals 144 16 29 15 6 16 226 
Basic metal 284 26 33 28 10 49 430 
Fabricated metal products 208 23 64 43 10 35 383 
Other Manufacturing  59 5 1 4 1 19 89 
Total 1,273 158 288 186 57 265 2,227 
        
(b) Investment Scale (SR m)        
Food and Beverages  2,960 459 2,227 958 25 817 7,445 
Textiles, clothes and leather 871 112 284 153 195 414 2,029 
Wood and wood products 752 75 35 28 10 47 947 
Paper and printing 1,861 45 678 94 515 17 3,210 
Chemicals and petroleum 36,731 338 44,246 74,484 68,965 16,229 240,993 
Non-metallic minerals 4,886 557 2,073 175 2,001 269 9,962 
Basic metal 4,920 182 2,137 1,717 648 527 10,132 
Fabricated metal products 2,616 200 2,141 1,679 312 655 7,604 
Other Manufacturing  418 27 150 36 5 102 737 
Total 56,015 1,995 53,972 79,323 72,677 19,076 283,058 
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Appendix Table 5.3: Regional Location by Supra-national Source 
 
Source: Investment Database, Saudi Ministry of Commerce and Industry. 
Note: Investments measured at constant 2000 prices. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Region 
MENA 
(West 
Asia) 
MENA 
(North 
Africa) 
Western 
Europe 
North 
America 
Far East 
Rest of 
the 
world 
Total 
        
(a) Number of Projects        
Middle 1,078 228 333 269 93 257 2,258 
Eastern 426 112 195 128 57 125 1,043 
Western 852 143 244 160 67 164 1,630 
Southern 18 8 10 1 2 3 42 
Northern 15 2 5 1 - 2 25 
Total 2,389 493 787 559 219 551 4,998 
        
(b) Investment Scale (SR m)        
Middle 22,946 2,696 60,054 36,907 67,661 7,989 198,254 
Eastern 11,240 426 8,585 3,018 681 3,008 26,957 
Western 38,885 795 12,558 56,355 5,243 10,945 124,782 
Southern 92 42 303 362 4 125 928 
Northern 79 4 90 350 - 11 535 
Total 73,242 3,963 81,591 96,993 73,589 22,078 351,456 
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Appendix Table 5.4: Foreign Investments by Origin, 1960-2005 
Country 
No. of 
Investments 
Average No. of 
Investors* 
Mean Investment  
Share (%) ** 
MENA (West Asia) 2,609 1.28 74 
     Jordan (568) (1.27) (74) 
     Syria (551) (1.28) (83) 
     Lebanon (397) (1.32) (65) 
     Palestine (396) (1.27) (85) 
     Yemen (270) (1.24) (84) 
     United Arab Emirates (93) (1.13) (56) 
     Turkey (89) (1.15) (69) 
     Kuwait (78) (1.67) (42) 
     Bahrain (74) (1.12) (48) 
     Iran (27) (1.67) (74) 
     Cyprus (20) (1.1) (63) 
     Iraq (18) (1.06) (51) 
     Qatar (18) (1.11) (20) 
     Oman (10) (1.1) (15) 
MENA (North Africa) 523 1.27 76 
     Egypt (463) (1.28) (77) 
     Sudan (29) (1.1) (71) 
     Morocco (13) (1.38) (69) 
     Tunisia (11) (1.09) (52) 
     Algeria (4) (1.25) (44) 
     Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (3) (1.33) (02) 
Western Europe 849 1.07 56 
     United Kingdom (225) (1.08) (62) 
     Germany (134) (1.13) (48) 
     France (121) (1.07) (61) 
     Netherlands (75) (1.03) (55) 
     Switzerland (75) (1.01) (50) 
     Italy (58) (1.14) (52) 
     Sweden (23) (1.09) (58) 
     Spain (17) (1.12) (50) 
     Belgium (16) (1.13) (34) 
     Austria (14) (1) (55) 
     Norway (14) (1) (62) 
     Denmark (13) (1.08) (64) 
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Appendix Table 5.4   (continued) 
Country 
No. of 
Investments 
Average No. of 
Investors* 
Mean Investment  
Share (%) ** 
     Finland (13) (1) (45) 
     UK (Jersey) (9) (1) (52) 
     Greece (8) (1.13) (47) 
     Ireland (6) (1) (58) 
     Liechtenstein (6) (1) (44) 
     Luxembourg (6) (1) (57) 
     Poland (4) (1) (45) 
     UK (Channel Islands) (4) (1) (66) 
     Portugal (2) (1) (63) 
     Romania (2) (1) (100) 
     UK (Isle Of Man) (2) (1) (98) 
     Hungary (1) (1) (30) 
     Slovakia (1) (1) (100) 
North America 623 1.10 60 
     US (452) (1.09) (59) 
     Canada (153) (1.11) (63) 
     Bermuda (18) (1.19) (62) 
Far East 225 1.14 61 
     Korea Republic of (61) (1.03) (68) 
     Japan (59) (1.41) (52) 
     China (37) (1.08) (72) 
     Malaysia (22) (1.05) (59) 
     Singapore (14) (1.07) (61) 
     Philippines (11) (1) (45) 
     Taiwan (8) (1) (55) 
     Hong Kong (6) (1.17) (56) 
     Russia (4) (1) (85) 
     Indonesia (2) (1) (75) 
     Thailand (1) (1) (50) 
Rest of the world 603 1.20 70 
     Pakistan (238) (1.27) (80) 
     India (137) (1.23) (68) 
     Cayman Islands (48) (1.06) (53) 
     British Virgin Islands (34) (1.03) (59) 
     Panama (30) (1.07) (51) 
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Appendix Table 5.4   (continued) 
Country 
No. of 
Investments 
Average No. of 
Investors* 
Mean Investment  
Share (%) ** 
     Australia (22) (1.05) (54) 
     Afghanistan (15) (1.4) (78) 
     South Africa (13) (1) (49) 
     Bangladesh (11) (1.55) (92) 
     Bahamas (8) (1) (63) 
     Mauritius (5) (1) (64) 
     Brazil (4) (1) (45) 
     Sri Lanka (4) (1) (54) 
     Tanzania (4) (1) (87) 
     Eritrea (3) (1) (72) 
     Ethiopia (3) (1) (71) 
     Liberia (3) (1) (62) 
     Venezuela (3) (1) (55) 
     Nigeria (2) (1) (70) 
     Somalia (2) (2) (74) 
     Ukraine (2) (1) (75) 
     Argentina (1) (1) (17) 
     Barbados (1) (1) (100) 
     Belize (1) (1) (50) 
     Bosnia And Herzegovina (1) (1) (30) 
     Croatia (1) (1) (38) 
     Dominican Republic (1) (1) (75) 
     Kenya (1) (1) (40) 
     Nepal (1) (1) (03) 
     Netherlands Antilles (1) (1) (49) 
     New Zealand (1) (1) (48) 
     Trinidad And Tobago (1) (1) (80) 
     Turkmenistan (1) (1) (50) 
Total 5,432 1.21 59 
 
Source: Investment Database, Saudi Ministry of Commerce and Industry. 
Notes: * = Ratio of total number of investors from each country divided by total number of investments.  
** = Mean investments share by country. 
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Chapter 6 
Political Risk and the Foreign Ownership Structure of 
Equity Joint Venture Projects 
 
6.1   Introduction 
 
There is an incentive to internalize ownership when undertaking foreign direct investment 
(FDI) in order to protect firm-specific advantages, and this has featured prominently as a 
motive for FDI (see chapter 3).  However, greater ownership brings with it greater risk, and a 
result in the empirical literature is that increased country risk will cause firms to relinquish 
their equity stake in projects (see Tsang, 2005), and to enter as a joint venture rather than by 
whole ownership (e.g. Erramilli and Rao, 1993; Benito, 1996; Bontempi and Prodi, 2008). 
However, risk may also cause joint ventures to enter at lower equity shares (see Shan, 1991), 
but as we have seen in chapter 4 this relationship is little explored, and where mixed results 
have been obtained (Asiedu and Esfahani, 2001; Indro and Richards, 2007).
21
 
 
Ownership also brings with it greater control over the assets (Grossman and Hart, 1986), as it 
equips an investor with the means to combat opportunistic behaviour by firms, partners and 
                                                 
21
 In the international business literature the motive for FDI has been explored through the entry mode, but 
nearly always as a choice between a joint or whole venture (e.g. Gomes-Casseres, 1990; Hennart, 1991; Pan, 
1996; Tatoglu et al, 2003; Tsang, 2005). Occasionally, the discrete choice between majority, equal and minority 
partnerships is considered, such as in Gatignon and Anderson (1988) and Barbosa and Louri (2002). This 
literature pays relatively little attention to different kinds of risk, which are measured in a single composite form 
and sometimes quite crudely. Traditionally, this is as a simple binary or categorical measure of risk is used, such 
as in Erramilli and Rao (1993) and Benito (1996), but more recently risk is measured either for a single country 
over time, such as Tsang (2005) and Bontempi and Prodi (2008), or using a more detailed index but for a 
relatively small number of countries, such as in Richards and Yang (2007) and Indro and Richards (2007). 
Elsewhere, more attention is paid to risk, such as in literature on political economy (Busse and Hefeker, 2007) 
and international economics (Ali et al, 2010), but it is explored in relation to the net FDI inflows. 
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even governments (Anderson and Gatignon, 1986; Hill and Hellriegel, 1994), enabling it to 
better respond or to anticipate events (Cyert and March, 1992).  This raises the possibility 
that as a response to political risk an investor may increase its project equity stake in a project 
to take control.  This has not been considered in the literature, as the presumption is that the 
sunk nature of investment causes foreign firms to take a smaller equity stake (Richards and 
Yang, 2007).  However, if ownership brings control then it is plausible that a higher stake 
will actually facilitate exit as a response to an adverse event. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the effect of country political risk on the foreign-
owned equity share in joint venture projects. Two hypotheses are derived from a model of the 
optimal equity share under risk, in which ownership brings control and mitigates the effect of 
a bad state.  The first is that a foreign investor will reduce its equity stake in response to risk, 
which is the standard result, but that for more serious risks it will increase its equity share to 
secure project control. In this case, under low levels of risk the foreign multinational 
corporation (MNC) is assumed to cut its share in a project in order to not expose to such risk, 
but in the case of high levels of risk cutting the share will not prevent its exposure to risk, and 
instead the MNC might choose to increase its share in order to control the project. The 
second hypothesis is that these responses are stronger for equity shares that are relatively 
high but imply low control.  So, by choosing a large share, the MNC will control the project 
and hence become more able to prevent the reduction in the profits in the event of bad state.  
 
The hypotheses are examined with the Investment Dataset that was outlined in chapter 5.  
This is for Saudi Arabia on equity joint venture projects in the Kingdom involving foreign 
investment.  The advantage of Saudi Arabia in this context is that FDI requires a government 
license, so that there is good data on the projects and their equity shares.  The data that are 
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considered in this chapter is for foreign investment over 1985-2005, which arises from 59 
source countries.  The political risk data are taken from the country-level data from the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), which has found recent widespread application in 
the literature.
22
 The ICRG distinguishes between different kinds of political risk, which in 
this chapter are classified in terms of their level of seriousness in order to test the hypotheses. 
In general, political risks are events in the formal and informal rules that govern economic 
activity that adversely affects business profits (see Henisz, 2000; Ali et al, 2010).
23
  The risk 
is measured in relative terms as the difference between the source and host countries.
24
 The 
results of this chapter support the two main hypotheses, but indicate that what is important is 
majority ownership, as this brings control. 
 
The next section sets out the two hypotheses to be tested.  This is based on a model that was 
developed jointly with my supervisors and is set out in detail in Appendix 6.1.  As far as I am 
aware, for the first time, this model analyses the relationship between the optimal project 
equity share and country political risk. The empirical specification is set out in section 6.3, 
and section 6.4 describes the data and variables.  The results are presented in section 6.5, and 
section 6.6 concludes.  To keep the focus of the main text on the key points, this chapter 
includes a large number of appendix tables. 
 
 
 
                                                 
22
 The ICRG index is used in composite form by Agarwal (1994), Chan and Gemayal (2004) and Richards and 
Yang (2007). Elsewhere, the indicators making up the aggregate ICRG index are used by Asiedu and Eshfahani 
(2001), Harms and Ursprung (2002), Glaeser et al (2004), Egger and Winner (2005), Busse and Hefeker (2007), 
Mishra and Daly (2007) and Ali et al (2010), among others. 
23
 These are sometimes called country, institutional or environmental risks. 
24
 The data cover 3,330 foreign joint venture equity shares in 2,156 projects over 1985-2005. Investment arises 
from a further 31 countries and territories, but these observations are omitted for the reasons given below. The 
vast majority of foreign investment projects in Saudi Arabia are non-oil related. The measurement of risk in 
relative terms is discussed below, where it is argued that it brings certain advantages. 
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6.2   The Hypotheses 
 
Appendix 6.1 sets out the model, which provides the proofs to the two hypotheses that are 
examined in this chapter.  This model is original and was developed jointly with my 
supervisors.  Basically, it considers the optimal equity share s* for a foreign investor in the 
presence of risk, which is some positive probability p that a bad state will occur, in which 
case the overall project return is lower.  The novelty of the model is that while an increased 
equity share will increase the exposure of the foreign investor to this risk, it also brings 
greater control over the project, which is denoted by β(s). This is because the foreign investor 
has some specific knowledge invested in the assets, so that it is able to mitigate the loss in the 
event of the bad state occurring, bringing a greater project return.  Greater control means that 
for more severe risks (i.e. bad events that have a higher probability of occurrence) it may be 
optimal for the investor to actually increase its equity share in the project as this brings it 
greater control.   The two hypotheses are derived in Appendix 6.1, where the exact conditions 
are set out (involving s*, p and β(s)), but basically they are as follows. 
 
Proposition 1: The optimal equity share is negatively related to political risk for low levels of 
risk, but positively related for sufficiently high-risk levels. 
 
Proposition 2: The optimal equity share is less responsive to risk for both small and large 
equity shares, but in the latter case provided the MNC ownership implies a sufficiently strong 
effect on the project return in the adverse state. 
 
Figure 6.1 illustrates the effects of political risk on the MNC equity share when the project 
return depends on this share.  First, if the risk p is relatively low [high] the MNC will cut 
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[increase] its share to reduce its loss (Proposition 1).  This gives the lines below [above] the 
horizontal axis in figure 6.1.  Second, if greater control implied by a higher share β(s) has a 
strong effect on the project return then the equity share is also unresponsive to risk at the 
higher equity stakes (Proposition 2). In this case the relationships in figure 6.1 bend back 
towards the horizontal axis, whether from above or below this axis.  The rationale for 
Proposition 2 is that an ownership share that is relatively high but which does not offer 
control, is most vulnerable to the bad state and therefore the most responsive to risk.  This 
explains the two outer curves in the figure, which are labelled „β(s) weak‟. 
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Figure 6.1: The Relationship between the Equity Share and its Responsiveness to Risk  
 
 
 
 
Note: The figure shows the relationship between the optimal foreign joint venture equity share (s*) 
and the effect that the risk (the probability of a bad state p) has on this equity share (ds* / dp). 
 
 
6.3   Empirical Specification 
 
The MNC joint venture equity share is the outcome of a three-stage investment decision:  
 
(i) Whether to invest or not;  
(ii) Given (i), the entry mode either as a whole or joint venture; and  
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(iii)  Given (i) and (ii), the optimal joint venture equity share.  
 
It has been shown in chapter 4 that the international business literature focuses on decision 
(ii), whereas attention in this chapter is on (iii). The share is measured continuously, and 
denoted by 
  
EQUITY  (
  
0 < EQUITY <1).  In practice, the project investment scale, 
  
SCALE, 
and number of other project investors, 
  
INVTOT, are determined jointly with the equity share, 
so that the empirical model is specified in a simultaneous equations form as: 
 
  
EQUITY = a0 + a1POL + a2 FIN + a3 SCALE + a4 INVTOT + ea. (6.1) 
  
SCALE = b0 + b1 ECON + dummies + eb .    (6.2) 
  
INVTOT = g0 + g1 ECON + dummies+ eg .    (6.3) 
 
The 
  
POL, 
  
ECON and 
  
FIN are vectors of variables for the political risk and for economic 
and financial factors, where these are measured at the country level and described in section 
6.4. The dummies are at the investor level and control for factors affecting the scale and 
number of investors, while the 
  
e are error terms. The endogenous variables are the three left-
hand side terms, and the other terms are treated as pre-determined.  Interest is in the first of 
these three equations, where estimation is at the individual foreign investor level. This is in 
two stages, with (6.2) and (6.3) used to instrument for 
  
SCALE and 
  
INVTOT in (6.1). 
 
As motivation for this specification, the financial terms are included in (6.1) to control for 
financial factors affecting the equity stake, but the economic terms and the dummies are 
excluded to help identify the instruments. There is strong support for economic factors 
affecting FDI flows (Roberts and Almahmood, 2009), which is consistent with larger scales, 
while those factors that generate a larger scale may make it more attractive for other firms to 
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participate in the project. Asiedu and Esfahani (2001) find that economic factors have little or 
no effect on the equity share. The specification is tested below, including the possibility that 
political risks could affect the investment scale and the number of other investors. 
 
The model is regressed for investors from 59 source countries investing in the single host 
country of Saudi Arabia. This has advantages as it permits the data to be collected on the 
project characteristics, including the investment scale and equity share for each investor 
arising from different countries, which appears to have inhibited previous work in this area. It 
also means that various unmeasured host-country effects can be held constant, such as the 
fiscal, legal and cultural environment, as well as restrictions on FDI that have been shown to 
influence the entry mode (Gomes-Casseres, 1989; Cho and Padmanabhan, 2005).  However, 
it means the risk must be measured in relative terms as the difference in risks between the 
host and source countries.  Elsewhere, risk is typically measured in absolute terms for the 
host country (Harms and Ursprung, 2002; Jensen, 2003; Busse, 2004), and only occasionally 
for the source country (Mishra and Daly, 2007), but it is consistent with a growing literature 
that examines the source country characteristics of FDI, in which the determinants mirror 
those that are found in the cross-country location studies.
25
 
 
As support for the notion of relative risk, it is plausible that the host-country risk will be 
perceived differently according to whether the MNC investor is itself from a high- or low-
risk country. Further, assuming that the investor may otherwise invest in its source country 
then it is reasonable that the relative risk is relevant. This is consistent with the motive for 
FDI arising from firm-specific ownership advantages (e.g. superior technology, management 
or working methods), but supposing that the advantages that are embodied in the investor can 
                                                 
25
 FDI location studies traditionally use cross-country data (Bloningen, 2005), but those using source country 
characteristics include Grosse and Trevino (1996) on US inward FDI; Thomas and Grosse (2001) on Mexico; 
Driffield (2002) on the UK; Pan (2003) on China; and Roberts and Almahmood (2009) on Saudi Arabia. 
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be exploited in the source country.  Like elsewhere, the assets do not have application outside 
the host and source countries.
26
  Of course, ultimately, it is an empirical matter whether it is 
the relative or absolute risk that is relevant. The approach taken holds the latter constant, 
while research that examines the absolute risk ignores the relative risk. 
 
6.4   The Data and Variables 
 
The FDI project data are for the host country of Saudi Arabia. All investments have to be 
licensed by the government in the Kingdom, while prior to the year 2000 FDI had to be in 
sectors not reserved for the government or domestic firms, involve foreign technical expertise 
and could be wholly foreign-owned in exceptional circumstances only.  Since then, there has 
been a relaxation of these restrictions, while the issuing of licenses to foreign investors has 
been fast tracked in order to liberalize the economy and promote private investment (see 
chapter 2).
27
 When coupled with tax reforms it has led to a three-fold increase in FDI, such 
that Saudi Arabia is now the largest recipient of FDI in the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) region, exceeding that of Turkey (UNCTAD, 2008). 
 
The data used in this chapter derive from two main sources: the investor data from the 
Investment Dataset that was described in chapter 5, except that the analysis is for the period 
1985-2005 only; and country-level data from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) of 
the Political Risk Services (PRS) group. These are now described. 
 
 
                                                 
26
 Reflecting this, the literature tends to use a logistic regression (Benito, 1996), although Louri et al (2002) use 
a multinomial logit model, but to discriminate between full, majority and minority ownership. 
27
 Some restrictions were retained such as in oil exploration and military equipment (Khyeda, 2007). Saudi 
Arabia acceded to the World Trade Organization, but towards the end of November 2005.  
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6.4.1   Investor Level Data 
 
The Saudi investor data were derived from the Investment Dataset, which was obtained from 
the Saudi Ministry of Commerce and Industry, and described in detail in chapter 5. As the 
chapter makes clear, the data on investors go back to 1960, but since political data are 
available from 1984 only, it is sensible to restrict the analysis in this chapter to the period 
1985-2005. This comprises information on 3,860 projects either wholly or partly in foreign 
ownership. They include some reinvestments and acquisitions, but the vast majority of 
projects are new ventures.  As mentioned in chapter 3, the definition of FDI is like that used 
by the IMF and OECD, although 3 per cent of projects have less than a 10% foreign equity 
share (see table 6.2 below).  The data omit observations on investors where there either are a 
small number of investors from a single source, where they are likely to be a holding 
company or where there are no country data.
28
 Of the 3,860 projects, 1,704 (44%) are whole 
investments by a single foreign investor, and the other 2,156 projects are joint ventures that 
involve 3,330 foreign investors from 59 different countries. Like elsewhere, a joint venture 
may involve foreign investors only, while a host country partner is a firm or individual.  
Summary statistics on the joint venture projects are given in table 6.1 at the investor level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
28
 The dropped cases are: 40 investors from a total of 25 countries; 76 investors from four territories that are 
likely to be holding companies (Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands and the UK Channel Islands); 
and 477 investors from Palestine (456 investors) and Afghanistan (21), for which there are no country data. The 
former are problematic as the risks are at the country level, which could give these a disproportionate effect.  
 186 
Table 6.1: Summary Statistics for Joint Venture Investors 
 
 Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
     
 Variables:     
Equity share (
  
EQUITY ) 0.372 0.226 0.0001 0.99 
Investment scale (
  
SCALE) 
(natural log, SR, year 2000 prices) 
18.699 1.693 11.24 24.13 
Number of other investors (
  
INVTOT) 2.450 2.713 1 26 
Control variables:     
Distance from source to host country (
  
DIST) (000‟s km) 
3.79 3.7 0.41 13.35 
Foreign Investment Act (
  
FIA) 0.631 - 0 1 
Host country involvement (
  
DOM) 0.717 - 0 1 
Share of other project investors from:     
Same source country (
  
PARTS) 0.315 0.415 0 1 
Other non-host country (
  
PARTO) 0.117 0.272 0 1 
 Other dummies:     
Industry (
  
IND)a - - 0 13 
Saudi Arabia location (
  
REGION)b - - 0 4 
Supranational source (
  
SOURCE)c - - 0 5 
 
Source: Investment Database, Saudi Ministry of Commerce and Industry, 1985-2005. 
Notes: SR = Saudi Riyal.  Dummy variables in binary form, as follows: 
a. Six 1-digit industries, codes 1, 5 – 9, and nine 2-digit manufacturing industries, codes 31- 39, under United 
Nations ISIC, rev. 2.  Base case in regressions is other manufacturing. 
b. Western, Eastern, Southern, Northern and Middle regions. 
c. Middle East, North Africa, Western Europe, North America, Far East and elsewhere. 
 
The mean equity share is 37% and the mean project scale is Saudi Riyal 132.1 million, but 
ranging from about SR 75,000 to SR 30 billion (at 2000 prices; 1 US dollar = SR 3.75). The 
mean number of other project investors is 2.45 (3.45 including the investor), of which on 
average 31.5% originate from the same source country, 56.8% from the host and 11.7% from 
elsewhere. A host country investor is involved with 72% of foreign investors. 
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The distribution of foreign equity shares is shown for the joint ventures in table 6.2, at both 
the investor and project levels. Two-thirds of investors have a minority stake, but only 43.2% 
of projects are in minority foreign ownership. A further one-sixth of investors have a fifty per 
cent stake, while 18.5% of projects are equally owned by foreign and host investors. Table 
6.2 shows that 16.1% (347 projects) of joint ventures do not involve any host investor.  
 
Table 6.2: Foreign Equity Shares in Joint Ventures 
 
Equity Share (
  
EQUITY ) 
Investor  Project 
Cum. (%) Diff. (%)  Cum. (%) Diff. (%)  
      
 10% 16.5 16.5  3.4 3.4 
 20% 29.1 12.6  8.9 5.5 
 30% 44.6 15.5  18.2 9.3 
 40% 56.6 12.0  28.4 10.2 
< 50% 66.6 10.0  43.2 14.8 
 50% 83.3 16.7  61.7 18.5 
 60% 87.9 4.6  67.7 6.0 
 70% 90.3 2.4  71.8 4.1 
 80% 95.8 5.5  79.8 8.0 
 90% 98.6 2.8  83.0 3.2 
<100% 100.0 1.4  83.9 0.9 
 100% 100.0 0.0  100.0 16.1 
 
Source: Investment Database, Saudi Ministry of Commerce and Industry, 1985-05.   
Notes: For 3,330 investors and 2,156 projects.   Diff. gives difference in the cumulative percentage, Cum. 
 
Overall, 66% of joint venture projects have a single foreign investor, 24% have two foreign 
investors, 5% have three and a further 5% have more than this (all the way up to 14 foreign 
investors in a single project). The mean number of foreign investors per project is 1.54.  
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6.4.2   Political Risk Variables 
 
The ICRG index assesses the political stability of countries on a subjective but comparable 
basis, and is recognized as a high-quality measure of country risk (Hoti and McAleer, 2004). 
This is according to twelve indicators, which form the political risk variables, 
  
POL, and are 
described in table 6.3. The twelve indicators were collected for 60 countries (including Saudi 
Arabia) on an annual basis for more recent years but at a greater interval prior to this time.
29
 
About half of the indicators are reported on a 24-point scale (including half points), but 
otherwise on a 12 or 8-point scale in one case. Each is scaled to lie on the unit interval, and 
the respective Saudi value is deducted in order to make the coefficients comparable. A higher 
value of a 
  
POL risk variable indicates a lower relative risk. The indicators represent the 
probability of an adverse event, so that by Proposition 1 positive [negative] signs are to be 
expected for lower [higher] risks, and by Proposition 2 the magnitude of these coefficients 
should be higher for equity shares that are neither too small nor too high. 
 
                                                 
29
 The ICRG data are generally available from 1984 but on a commercial basis, and since 79% of the 3,860 
projects relate to the 2000-05, they were collected for each year over 2000-04, but at four-yearly intervals prior 
to this time, i.e. 1996, 1992, 1988 and 1984. In the regressions they are lagged one year, or to the preceding 
value of the variable where this is not known. There are some missing values, mainly for 1984, but these are 
assigned using the next value, as the indicators change little from year to year. More detailed descriptions of the 
ICRG indicators can be found at www.prsgroup.com. 
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Table 6.3: Country-Level Variables 
 
Variable and Label Description 
  
Political variables (
  
POL):  
Government stability (
  
GOVST ) Ability of government to carry out its policies and 
stay in office. Subcomponents: government unity, 
legislative strength and popular support. 
Bureaucratic quality (
  
BUREAU) Institutional strength and quality of bureaucracy. 
Corruption (
  
CORR) Actual and potential corruption. 
Socioeconomic conditions (
  
SOCIO) Pressures that might elevate social dissatisfaction or 
restrain government action. Subcomponents: 
unemployment, consumer confidence and poverty. 
Religious tensions (
  
RELIG) Stemming from domination of society and / or 
governance by single religious group seeking to 
exclude other religions from political process. 
Ethnic tensions (
  
ETHNIC) Due to racial, nationality or language divisions. 
Investment profile (
  
INVEST) Other investment risk factors. Subcomponents: 
contract viability / expropriation, profits repatriation 
and payment delays. 
Law and order (
  
LAW ) Strength and impartiality of legal system. 
Democratic accountability (
  
DEMOC) Responsiveness of government to citizens, and to 
civil liberties and political rights. 
Military (
  
MILIT) Military influence in government. 
Internal conflict (
  
INTCON) Actual or potential internal conflicts impacting on 
governance. Subcomponents: terrorism / political 
violence, civil war / coup threat and civil disorder. 
External conflict (
  
EXTCON) Risk to incumbent government. Subcomponents: 
foreign / diplomatic pressure / trade sanctions, cross-
border conflicts and all-out war. 
  
Economic Variables (
  
ECON):  
Output (GDP ) Gross domestic product in US dollars, 2000 prices. 
Per capita output (GDPHD ) GDP per head of population. 
Growth rate (GROWTH ) Real annual growth rate in GDP. 
Inflation rate ( INFL) Annual rate based on consumer price index. 
Budget balance (BUDGET ) Government budget balance as % of GDP. 
Current account (
  
TRADE ) Current account balance as % of GDP. 
  
Financial Variables (
  
FIN):  
International capital (
  
FUNDS) Foreign debt as a percentage of GDP. 
Exchange rate stability (
  
EXCH) Variability of currency against US dollar. 
Export propensity (
  
EXPORT) Current account as percentage of exports of goods 
and services. 
 
Source: ICRG, PRS group (www.prsgroup.com). 
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The political risk terms are included separately in the regressions, which is supported by the 
analysis below.  However, in so doing it is necessary to form expectations about which of the 
political risk indicators form more serious threats to the business environment in order to 
examine the above two hypotheses and the different patterns of response exhibited in figure 
6.1. The literature is not very helpful in this respect, as studies differ in their coverage of 
kinds of country (e.g. developed, emerging, transition, etc) and in the measurement of risk. 
Further, many studies consider a single risk, while when risks are considered together it tends 
to be for aggregate FDI inflows rather than for equity shares.
30
  Nevertheless, it is possible to 
form hypotheses about which risks are likely to be more serious. 
 
In his book, North (1990) distinguishes between two main kinds of institutional risk: those 
that affect transaction costs and economic exchange, and those that are due to factors that 
affect production costs (see Ali et al, 2010).  From the point of a foreign investor, the former 
may be seen as a less serious risk as they primarily affect the legal system and the rules for 
enforcing contracts.  These may include such things as bureaucratic adequacy and corruption. 
They may also include government stability, which will affect the regulatory environment.  In 
the case of the factors that affect production costs these potentially pose a more serious risk 
to the investor, although they range between those that are moderate and those risks that are 
serious.  The former include those things that affect the conditions under which an investment 
is carried out, e.g. law and order, investment profile and social tensions (societal, religious 
and ethnic), while other risks may affect the constitution itself and the appropriation of the 
                                                 
30
 Studies focusing on a single risk include Henisz (2000) on expropriation, Harms and Ursprung (2002) on 
repression, Egger and Winner (2005) on corruption and Jensen (2008) on democratic institutions. Busse and 
Hefeker (2007) consider all twelve of the ICRG indicators, of which eight have a significant positive effect on 
FDI inflows. Of these, GOVST, INTCON, EXTCON and LAW are each significant at the one per cent level (see 
Appendix 6.1). Ali et al (2010) aggregate eleven of the ICRG indicators into five measures of risk to examine 
FDI inflows, but only institutional quality (an average of investment profile and law and order) is significant. 
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assets (see Henisz, 2000; Busse, 2004), either by government or other agents.  These include 
democratic accountability, the military in government and internal and external conflict. 
 
The political risk variables are set out in table 6.4, which groups these variables according to 
whether they are believed to constitute low, moderate or high risks.  Given the nature of the 
existing evidence outlined above, this categorization may not be definitive, but it represents 
the a priori view on the likely seriousness of different political risks.  The expected signs are 
also given in table 6.4, which shows that positive signs are expected for the less serious risks, 
negative signs for more serious ones, while risks that are intermediate are insignificant.  In 
the case of corruption, the expected effect may be ambiguous, as while some studies find a 
positive effect on FDI inflows (Busse and Hefeker, 2007), others argue that corruption makes 
a country more attractive in the presence of excessive regulatory controls (Egger and Winner, 
2005).  Overall, given the paucity of existing evidence this is reasonable categorization. 
 
Table 6.4: Expected Signs of the Political Risk Variables 
 
Risk Category List of Variables Expected Sign 
   
Low Government stability 
Bureaucratic quality 
Corruption 
Positive 
   
Moderate Law and order  
Investment profile 
Socioeconomic conditions 
Religious tensions 
Ethnic tensions 
Insignificant 
   
High Democratic accountability 
Military 
Internal conflict 
External conflict 
Negative 
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6.4.3   Economic and Financial Variables 
 
The ICRG also produces objective indicators on the economic and financial risks for the 60 
countries, and these are used to form the 
  
ECON and 
  
FIN variables in (6.1) to (6.3). These 
data have found application elsewhere (Harms, 2002; Chan and Gemayel, 2004), and they are 
shown in table 6.3. The economic terms comprise GDP, per capita output, the growth rate, 
inflation rate, current account (as a percentage of GDP) and government budget balance. The 
first two are often found to have a strong effect on FDI flows, and it is reasonable that these 
will be associated with larger scales. They are generally recorded on a 20-point scale, but 
scaled to lie on the unit interval. A higher value indicates better economic conditions, which 
is expected to increase both the investment scale and number of other investors. 
 
The data on financial risks assesses a country‟s „ability to pay its way‟ according to its 
official, commercial and trade debt obligations (PRS Group, 2010). These are included to 
capture financial factors that affect an investor‟s ability or willingness to engage in FDI given 
that the scale and number of other investors are controlled for in (6.1). There are three terms 
(table 6.3), which are measured in a similar way to the economic variables (a further two 
terms are always insignificant and are dropped). They include terms to measure a country‟s 
access to international capital markets, which is given by the amount of foreign debt relative 
to GDP (
  
FUNDS), for which a negative sign is expected. Exchange rate stability (
  
EXCH) 
makes trade more attractive relative to FDI, so that a negative sign is expected. It may also 
reduce the repatriation risk from FDI, but this is captured by the 
  
INVEST political risk term 
(see table 6.3). Finally, they include a term to measure a country‟s export propensity, which 
is measured by the current account relative to export (
  
EXPORT). At the country level trade 
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is seen as a necessary for step FDI (Johanson and Wiedersheim, 1975) and is viewed as 
complementary, so that a positive sign is expected on this term. 
 
6.4.4   Dummies and Other Controls 
 
The political, economic and financial variables are measured at the country level, so investor-
level dummies are included in (6.2) and (6.3) to improve the instruments. These are binary 
terms for the industry (
  
IND) and location (
  
REGION) of a project, and for the source country 
of the investor (
  
SOURCE).31 These characteristics of investors were described in chapter 5 
over a longer time period, whereas to aid interpretation broad classifications of these are now 
adopted, and given in the note to table 6.1. The chemicals and petroleum industry accounts 
for 70% of investment, but 14% of investors, so that the majority of observations are non-oil 
related.  Saudi Arabia has five regions, with about the half the FDI taking place in the Middle 
region around Riyadh. These projects are smaller than for the Eastern region, in which the 
oilfields are mainly located (SR 62m against SR 244m), while the nature of agglomeration 
economies may differ between these. Six supranational source regions are identified to 
capture „cultural distance‟, which features as a motive for FDI (see Kogut and Singh, 1988).32  
 
Ideally, I would have liked other firm, project and investor-level data, but these are not 
available for a large dataset.
33
 Nevertheless, I am able to construct other variables for 
inclusion in (6.1) to (6.3), and that find support in the literature. Distance makes FDI less 
                                                 
31
 They are in addition to yearly time dummies, but which when included in (6.1) tend to wash-out other effects, 
possibly due to correlation with the instruments, so that all these dummies are omitted from (6.1). 
32
 These separately identify the Middle East and North African countries of the MENA region. Just over half the 
investors are from MENA, of which 82% are from the Middle East. MENA projects are smaller than that from 
elsewhere (means of SR 101m and SR 172m). Outside of MENA, 16% of investors are from Western Europe 
(mean scale of SR 101m), 11% from North America (SR 275m) and 5% from the Far East (SR 441m). 
33
 Using a smaller sample Asiedu and Esfahani (2001) include a range of firm characteristics, but only a few are 
significant in explaining the joint venture equity share. Stopford and Wells (1972) find that larger MNCs take 
larger equity shares, but firm size is likely to be positively correlated with the investment scale. 
 194 
attractive, which is attributed to management and transport issues (Thomas and Grosse, 2001; 
Gao, 2005), so that the distance between Saudi Arabia and the source country capital city (
  
DIST) is included, which is expected to have a negative sign. The mean distance is 3,800 km 
(see table 6.1), so that investments are not purely „local‟. With the inclusion of output it gives 
(6.2) and (6.3) the form of a gravity-type model. A dummy is also included for the period 
after the 2000 Foreign Investment Act (
  
FIA), which made foreign investment more attractive 
(see chapter 2). 
 
Finally, it is necessary to control for risk factors associated with the project, which are 
different from the political risk and not captured by the number of other investors. Brouthers 
and Hennart (2007) point to the importance of host-country involvement for reducing risk, so 
that a dummy (
  
DOM) is included for this. This is the case for 72% of foreign investors (see 
table 6.1) and 84% of projects. Irrespective of the Saudi involvement risk may be reduced by 
the number of partners from outside of the host country, so that terms are included for the 
proportion of these from the same source (
  
PARTS) and other non-host countries (
  
PARTO). 
Since the proportion of other investors from the same source country is correlated with the 
overall number of other investors they are included in the investment scale equation only.  
The results are robust to the exclusion of these two terms. 
 
6.5   Estimation Results 
 
The result from regressing equations (6.2) and (6.3) is presented in table 6.5. The first column 
is that for the investment scale, SCALE , and the second column for the total number of other 
investors, 
  
INVTOT, which is estimated using the Poisson distribution.  To help interpret the 
results the latter is also presented with the dependent variable measured as the number of 
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other investors from either the same source country or from Saudi Arabia.  The goodness-of-
fit for SCALE  suggests that it may well serve as a good instrument, but it is on the low side 
for 
  
INVTOT, so that further instruments for this are considered below. 
 
Table 6.5 shows that where significant, the economic variables have a positive effect on the 
scale and total number of other investors, as expected. The GDP and per capita output are 
significant throughout, although the latter is negative for the other source country investors, 
but which suggests that higher per capita output creates less need for partners from the same 
country. This is also the case for the growth rate and current account surplus, so that faster-
growing economies or with a greater propensity to export have less need for co-investors 
from the same source. The government budget surplus generally comes through as positive 
and significant, and this possibly reflects better economic conditions and lower interest rates.  
Its insignificance for the number of host-country investors supports this interpretation. 
 
The geographic distance (
  
DIST) has a consistently negative effect, while the new policy 
regime (
  
FIA) appears to have led to smaller investment scales, but possibly because the 
larger investments were undertaken as whole investments after the liberalization. There is a 
larger investment scale if a host country investor involved (
  
DOM) or more partners from 
either the same source (
  
PARTS) or other non-host countries (
  
PARTO), suggesting that these 
reduce risk. The involvement of a Saudi investor increases the total number of investors, but 
reduces those from the source country. Finally, the industry, region and source dummies add 
further plausibility to the results. Larger scales are in chemicals and petroleum, while those 
outside of manufacturing are generally smaller. The Eastern and Western regions attract 
larger projects, while conditional on the other factors larger projects come from the 
culturally similar MENA countries, although without conditioning these are smaller. 
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Table 6.5: Results for the Scale and Number of Other Investors 
 
 
Notes: OLS estimation of (6.2) with robust standard errors and Poisson estimation of (6.3). Variables described 
in tables 1 and 3. Time dummies added in each case. Final two columns measure dependent variable as number 
of investors from source country and Saudi Arabia. Base cases are „Other manufacturing‟ for industry, „Middle‟ 
for region and „Other‟ for source.  Significant at *** = 1%, ** = 5% and * = 10% levels. 
Dependent Variable: SCALE  
Number of Other Investors 
INVTOT  Source Only Host Only 
Constant  15.57*** -0.018 3.668*** -1.420** 
     
Output (GDP ) 0.094*** 0.049*** 0.056** 0.089*** 
Per capita output (GDPHD ) 1.067*** 0.247** -0.679*** 0.714*** 
Growth rate (GROWTH ) -0.451 0.002 -3.411*** 1.409*** 
Inflation rate ( INFL) 0.062 0.504* 1.349*** 0.707 
Budget balance (BUDGET ) 0.830*** 0.487** 1.605*** -0.135 
Current account (
  
TRADE ) -0.014 0.035 -0.622** -0.004 
Distance (DIST ) -0.061*** -0.068*** -0.308*** -0.074*** 
Foreign Investment Act (FIA) -0.987*** 0.106 0.139 -0.222 
Host country involvement (DOM ) 0.805*** 0.338*** -0.905*** - 
Same source country (
  
PARTS) 0.638*** - - - 
Other non-host country (
  
PARTO) 0.917*** - - - 
     Industry (
  
IND):     
Agriculture -0.406 -0.527*** -0.863** 0.088 
Food and beverages 0.674*** 0.020 0.002 0.340** 
Textiles, clothes and leather 0.550*** -0.230** -0.111 -0.062 
Wood and wood products 0.314** -0.283** -1.008*** -0.166 
Paper and printing 1.315*** 0.009 -0.449* 0.665*** 
Chemicals and petroleum 1.258*** 0.099 -0.102 0.477*** 
Non-metallic minerals 0.576*** -0.326*** -0.501*** 0.060 
Basic metal 0.514*** -0.006 0.100 -0.148 
Fabricated metal products 0.454*** -0.138* -0.217 0.180 
Construction -0.688*** -0.261*** -0.392*** 0.014 
Wholesale and retail -0.608*** 0.068 0.117 -0.028 
Transport and communications -0.764*** -0.137 -0.208 0.001 
Financing and real estate -0.405*** 0.153* -0.576*** 0.553*** 
Social services -0.924*** -0.093 -0.017 0.176 
     Saudi Arabia location (
  
REGION):     
Eastern 0.148** -0.091* -0.545*** -0.001 
Western 0.286*** -0.025 -0.116** 0.030 
Southern 0.763 0.141 -1.399** 0.858* 
Northern 0.720 -0.195 -0.985*** 0.358* 
     Supranational source (
  
SOURCE):     
MENA, Middle East -0.169* 0.073 -0.495*** -0.179 
MENA, North Africa -0.071 0.186 0.226** -0.118 
Western Europe -0.795*** -0.557*** -1.907*** -0.232 
North America -1.206*** -0.244* -0.082 0.032 
Far East -0.143 -0.308*** 0.008 -0.017 
Number of observations 3,330 3,330 3,330 3,330 
R-squared  [pseudo R-squared] 0.404 [0.094] [0.204] [0.109] 
F-value [Wald value] 44.18*** [629***] [1604***] [599***] 
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In addition to the above results for equation (6.2) and (6.3), we made other attempts to test 
alternative specifications.  The investment scale was re-estimated excluding some terms and 
control dummies, and the results are presented in Appendix Table 6.1.  These show that there 
are changes in the magnitude and significance of coefficients, but that including instruments 
for the number of host investors, source investors and investors from non-Saudi and non-
source countries, as well as excluding the control dummies, produces a less good fit.   
 
The equation for the number of investors was also specified in other ways.  Some terms and 
control dummies were excluded in turn to examine the robustness, and the results are shown 
in Appendix Table 6.2.  It shows that including instruments for the partners form the source 
countries and the host country, as well as excluding control dummies lead to less significant 
results, but it was much weaker when including instruments for the number of host investors 
and source investors. 
 
Equation (6.3) was re-estimated using investors from non-Saudi and non-source countries 
and non-host investors as dependent variables, and the results are presented in Appendix 
Table 6.3. These show that there are changes in the magnitude and significance of 
coefficients, but overall they are smaller in size and less significant in comparison with using 
source investors or host investors as dependent variables. Another attempt was made to test 
alternative specifications using the number of investors according to their source as 
dependent variables, but including only country dummies as explanatory variables. The 
results are presented in Appendix Table 6.4, and show that the magnitudes of their 
coefficients vary according to countries, confirming the relevance of the number of investors 
according to their sources in equation (6.3). 
 
 198 
In Appendix Table 6.5 and 6.6 the regressions in Appendix Table 6.3 and 6.4 are re-
estimated, but using the traditional Ordinary Least Squares method rather than the Poisson 
regression.  The results are weaker, although this is not surprising since this method is not 
suitable when the dependent variable is in the form of a count variable.    
 
6.5.1   Equity Share 
 
The result from regressing (6.1) for the equity share is reported in table 6.6, where (6.2) and 
(6.3) are used to instrument for the project scale and total number of other investors. The first 
set gives the result for the model, while the second set of results adds the economic and 
financial variables to each of (6.1) to (6.3) to examine the specification. The equations are 
estimated as a generalized linear model (GLM) using a logit link function (Liao, 1994), 
which is like a logistic regression.  The marginal effects are evaluated at the means. The 
exogeneity of 
  
SCALE and 
  
INVTOT is rejected, which supports the use of instruments.34  
The equity share is negatively related to the scale and number of investors. 
 
The estimates on the financial terms for the model conform to prior expectations in table 6.6, 
but when the economic terms are included in the second set of results, these and the financial 
terms are generally insignificant. Further, when the political risk terms are added to (6.2) and 
(6.3), none of these is significant at the 5 per cent in explaining the investment scale, while 
only ethnic tension is significant for the number of other investors.
35
  These provide good 
support for the model, so that the first set of results in table 6.6 is now the focus. 
 
                                                 
34
 This is a Hausman-type test that involves estimating (6.1) without instruments, then adding the instruments 
and testing for their significance. It gives an LR test statistic of 2(2) = 19.93, against 2(2)0.01 = 9.21. 
35
 Including the twelve political risk terms in (6.2) and (6.3), the signs on the risk terms are more or less 
identical for the first set of results in table 6.5, but only three of these terms are significant at the 5 per cent 
level. 
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Table 6.6: Results for the Equity Share 
 
 Dependent Variable: EQUITY  
Model With economic terms 
Estimate 
Marg. 
Effect 
Estimate 
Marg. 
Effect 
     
Constant  2.665*** - 2.321*** - 
     
Political risk terms:     
Government stability (GOVST ) 0.344** 0.080 0.318* 0.074 
Bureaucratic quality (
  
BUREAU) 0.322** 0.075 0.290* 0.067 
Corruption (
  
CORR) 0.343** 0.080 0.360** 0.083 
Socioeconomic conditions ( SOCIO ) -0.040 -0.009 -0.019 -0.004 
Religious tensions (
  
RELIG) 0.109 0.025 0.155 0.036 
Ethnic tensions (
  
ETHNIC) 0.058 0.013 0.237* 0.055 
Investment profile (
  
INVEST) 0.290* 0.067 0.205 0.048 
Law and order (
  
LAW ) 0.088 0.020 0.034 0.008 
Democratic Account. (
  
DEMOC) -0.281*** -0.065 -0.212** -0.049 
Military (
  
MILIT) -0.257** -0.060 -0.316** -0.073 
Internal conflict (
  
INTCON) -0.447** -0.104 -0.499*** -0.116 
External conflict (
  
EXTCON) 0.219 0.051 0.212 0.049 
     
Financial terms:     
International capital (
  
FUNDS) -0.810*** -0.188 -0.622*** -0.144 
Exchange rate stability (
  
EXCH) -0.407*** -0.095 -0.182 -0.042 
Export propensity (
  
EXPORT) 0.810*** 0.188 0.371 0.086 
     
Other terms:     
Distance (DIST ) -0.001 -0.002 -0.018* -0.004 
Foreign Investment Act (FIA) 0.046 0.011 0.037 0.008 
Host country involvement (DOM ) 0.041 0.009 0.065 0.015 
     
Instruments:     
Investment scale ( LEASC ˆ ) -0.161*** -0.037 -0.177*** -0.041 
Number of other investors ( OTTINV ˆ ) -0.406*** -0.094 -0.477*** -0.111 
    
Economic terms:     
Output (GDP ) - 0.018 0.004 
Per capita output (GDPHD ) - 0.011 0.003 
Growth rate (GROWTH ) - 0.344 0.080 
Inflation rate ( INFL) - 0.073 0.017 
Budget balance (BUDGET ) - 0.675*** 0.156 
Current account (
  
TRADE ) - -0.176 -0.041 
    
Number of observations 3,330 3,330 
Log-likelihood 364.7 371.9 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) -0.206 -0.207 
   
 
Notes: The first set of results estimates (6.1) using GLM with logit link function and instruments SCALE and 
INVTOT using (6.2) and (6.3). The second set adds all economic and financial variables to (6.1) to (6.3). The 
marginal effects evaluated at means. Significant at *** = 1%, ** = 5% and * = 10% levels. 
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The interest is in the political risk terms 
  
POL, of which half are significant at the 5% level or 
higher in table 6.6. They offer good support for Proposition 1 since risks that are expected to 
be less serious (government stability, bureaucratic quality and corruption) have a significant 
positive effect on the equity share (see table 6.4), while risks that are of a more serious nature 
(democratic accountability, military in government and internal conflict) have a significant 
negative effect (table 6.4). Further, risks that are intermediate (socio-economic conditions, 
ethnic and religious tensions) are insignificant.  If anything, the source dummies in table 6.5 
suggest that cultural differences are more important for the scale and number of investors.  
 
The other political risk terms in table 6.6 are either insignificant or do not conform to prior 
expectation (these are investment profile, law and order and external conflict, where the 
former is significant at the 10% level but positive). Of course, the risks tend to be positively 
correlated with one another, although the partial correlation coefficients are not excessive.
36
 
To examine this issue, the risks were excluded one at a time, but making little difference to 
the results (see above). Further, those risks that are broadly measuring the same thing were 
aggregated into six terms by taking simple averages, following Ali et al (2010). The result 
from estimating the model with these is given as column 1 in table 6.7. The positive 
[negative] signs are again obtained for the less [more] serious risks, although the estimate on 
internal conflict is now insignificant once aggregated with external conflict.  The positive but 
insignificant estimate found for this last term was often found, and which perhaps suggests 
that control carries little or no meaning for firms investing in this circumstance. 
                                                 
36
 No partial coefficient is greater than 0.75, while those with correlations above 0.60 are LAW, (with 3 other 
risk terms), BUREAU (2), MILIT (4) and RELIG (4). To save space the correlation matrix is not reported. 
Omitting LAW and BUREAU and RELIG in turn makes virtually no difference to the sign and significance of 
the estimates, while excluding MILIT reduces the significance of investment profile and corruption terms. 
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Table 6.7: Robustness Tests 
 
Dependent Variable: EQUITY  
Aggregation 
of Risks 
Additional 
Instruments 
Tobit 
Regression 
Period 
2000-05 
Data 
Truncation 
Column: 1 2 3 4 5 
      
Constant  2.628*** 2.967*** 0.575*** 1.980*** 1.456*** 
      
Political risk terms:      
Government stability (GOVST ) 0.425*** 0.436*** 0.141** 0.523* 0.116** 
Bureaucratic quality (
  
BUREAU) 
} 0.528*** 
0.154 -0.083 0.380* 0.117** 
Corruption (
  
CORR) 0.370** 0.119** 0.118 0.129** 
Socioeconomic conditions ( SOCIO ) 
} 0.057 
-0.058 0.077 -0.078 -0.022 
Religious tensions (
  
RELIG) 0.093 -0.015 0.191 0.050 
Ethnic tensions (
  
ETHNIC) 0.024 -0.056 -0.053 0.017 
Investment profile (
  
INVEST) 
} 0.324* 
0.217 -0.097* 0.570*** 0.115** 
Law and order (
  
LAW ) 0.079 -0.003 -0.046 0.024 
Democratic Account. (
  
DEMOC) 
} -0.377*** 
-0.210** 0.046 -0.507*** -0.097*** 
Military (
  
MILIT) -0.365** -0.043 -0.148 -0.109*** 
Internal conflict (
  
INTCON) 
} -0.217 
-1.440** -0.122* -0.449** -0.153** 
External conflict (
  
EXTCON) -0.174 -0.048 0.185 0.089* 
      
Financial terms:      
International capital (
  
FUNDS) -0.798*** -0.706*** -0.270*** -0.827*** -0.277*** 
Exchange rate stability (
  
EXCH) -0.426*** -0.308*** -0.007 -0.505*** -0.133*** 
Export propensity (
  
EXPORT) 0.892*** 0.773*** 0.452*** 0.739** 0.262*** 
      
Other terms:      
Distance (DIST ) -0.010* -0.014* -0.001*** -0.001 -0.003 
Foreign Investment Act (FIA) -0.038 0.067 0.045** - 0.019 
Host country involvement (DOM ) 0.050 0.137*** - 0.038 0.012 
      
Instruments:      
Investment scale ( LEASC ˆ ) -0.159*** -0.172*** -0.001*** -0.088*** -0.059*** 
Number of other investors ( OTTINV ˆ ) -0.417*** -0.758*** -0.397*** -0.469*** -0.143*** 
Host investors ( HVIN ˆ ) - 0.269*** - - - 
Other investors ( OVIN ˆ ) - 0.062** - - - 
      
Number of observations 3,330 3,330 5,034 2,315 3,330 
Log-likelihood [pseudo] 358.0 376.3 -2,797 163.8 [657.2] 
Wald [LR] - - [2,469***] - 313.3*** 
Pseudo R-squared
 
- - 0.306 - - 
 
Notes: Columns 1, 2 and 4 re-estimate (6.1) under glm with logit link function, 3 as a tobit including 100 per cent equity 
shares and 5 using the TRUNC routine in Stata. All regressions instrument for SCALE and INVTOT using (6.2) and 
(6.3), with 2 adding further instruments and 4 for 2000-05 only. DOM is zero for whole investments and omitted from 
column 3. Significant at *** = 1%, ** = 5% and * = 10% levels. 
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Rather than include the twelve political risk terms separately, these were aggregated into a 
single risk measure of risk (
  
RISK), which is like elsewhere.  This was done in either of two 
ways.  First, by taking a simple average, and second using the weights that are assumed in the 
ICRG composite index.
37
  In each case, these were included RISK in a quadratic form to 
allow for a possibly non-linear effect. Of course, the model above suggests that the risk terms 
should be signed differently, but this is a test how well the usual measure of risk is likely to 
perform in such a framework.  What we find is that the RISK term is levels is insignificant 
whatever approach is used: on the first measure the estimate is 0.005 (z value = 0.40) and on 
the second it is -0.296 (z value = 1.46).  This suggests that the usual risk measure does not 
perform very well.
38
  However, in either case, the quadratic RISK term was significant and 
positively signed, indicating that there is negative relationship between risk and the equity 
share for sufficiently high risks, so that only for these relatively extreme cases does it seem to 
perform at all, while it suggests that the „bad‟ risks may dominate the „good‟ risks.39 
 
Finally, it was mentioned above that the goodness-of-fit for the total number of other 
investors 
  
INVTOT in table 6.5 is on the low side, while in the remainder of this table some of 
the explanatory variables have different effects on the number of investors according to their 
source. Column 2 of table 6.7 reports the result from regressing equation (6.1) with additional 
instruments for the number of other investors from the host (
  
INVH) and non-source, non-
host (
  
INVO) countries. A broadly similar pattern of estimates is obtained for the risk terms. 
 
                                                 
37
 Five of the indicators (GOVST, INVEST, INTCON, EXTCON and SOCIO) have a weight of 0.12 in the ICRG 
composite index, six have a weight of 0.06, and the other term (DEMOC) has a weight of 0.04. 
38
 The results are not reported, but much the same estimates are obtained for the other terms. The log-likelihood 
for the first measure of risk is 349.5 and for the ICRG weighting it is 349.8.  The AIC is -0.203 for each of 
these, but the log-likelihoods are much smaller. Adding a quadratic to each of the twelve risk terms individually 
is heavily rejected by the data, with an LR statistic of 2(12) = 3.94, against 2(12)0.10 = 18.55. 
39 
The estimates on the quadratic risk term were 0.013 (z value = 3.20) and 1.126 (3.18) respectively. 
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In addition to the above results for equation (6.1), we made other attempts to test alternative 
specifications. The equity share was re-estimated using different estimations for the 
investment scale term derived from Appendix Table 6.1. The results are presented in columns 
(2) and (3) of Appendix Table 6.7, and it shows that the coefficients differ in the magnitude 
and significance, but In general less significant results were found.     
 
The equation for the equity share was also specified in other ways. Different estimates for the 
number of other investors term, derived from the Appendix Table 6.2, were used in turn in 
the regressions, and the results are shown in columns (2) and (3) of Appendix Table 6.8. In 
general, it produces smaller magnitude and less significant coefficients. In the case of 
including different instruments, in turn, for the number of investors according to their source 
derived form Appendix Table 6.3. The results are weaker as shown in columns (2) and (3) of 
Appendix Table 6.9. Finally, the results given in columns (2) and (3) of Appendix Table 6.10 
show that the number of other investors according to the source, which was derived from 
Appendix Table 6.4, produce different estimates, but in general they are less significant and 
weaker goodness of fit test than those reported above. 
 
6.5.2   Robustness of the Estimates 
 
These regressions provide support for Proposition 1, although it was mentioned at the start of 
section 6.3 that the joint venture equity share can be viewed as the final stage of a three-stage 
investment decision, so that the estimates are conditional on this.  The choice at the second 
stage is between a joint venture and whole ownership, and this is examined in column 3 of 
table 6.7. It estimates (6.1) as a tobit model, including the censored observations for foreign 
equity shares of 100 per cent. The estimates on the risk terms are now quite poor, and such 
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that a clear pattern in the signs on the risk terms is no longer discernible.  This may reflect the 
inadequacies of the tobit model, which we are unable to address here.
40
 Equally, a consistent 
finding in the literature is that risk makes a joint venture more likely than a whole investment 
(e.g. Erramilli and Rao, 1993; Benito, 1996; Bontempi and Prodi, 2008), whereas for more 
serious risks we find that it may actually increase the equity share. It is consistent with the 
GLM regression in column 4 of table 6.7, which estimates the model for the period 2000-05 
only, when the more liberal regime was in force. FDI was much more likely to be through 
whole ownership, but much poorer results are again obtained for the risk terms.
41
 
 
This suggests that different factors explain the FDI entry mode at stages (ii) and (iii) between 
whether to enter as a joint venture or under whole ownership. Column 5 of table 6.7 allows 
for the decision at the first stage (i.e. whether to invest at all) by regressing the model using 
the TRUNC routine in Stata. This allows for the data truncation that arises from the 
unobserved zero equity shares, and the estimates, which can be compared to the marginal 
effects for the model in table 6.6, offer further support for Proposition1. 
 
6.5.3   Quantile Regression 
 
Finally, Proposition 2 is that the coefficients on the risk terms should be larger in magnitude 
for equity shares that are neither too small nor too large. The model was estimated using a 
generalized quantile regression, with a total of nineteen quantiles selected corresponding to 
                                                 
40
 The tobit supposes that the factors determining the whole or joint ownership decision are identical in nature, 
sign and in magnitude. The Heckman two-step procedure relaxes these assumptions, but in a probit selection 
model for the choice between a whole and joint venture using the full set of pre-determined variables (excluding 
DOM, PARTS and PARTO), none of the POL, ECON and FIN variables is significant at the 5% level (even the 
policy term FIA is picked-up by year dummies), so that our model does not capture this decision at all. 
41
 Just over a half of projects over 2000-05 are wholly owned by a single foreign investor, compared with 15% 
of projects prior to 2000. In addition, a joint venture project may have no host-country investor. The weaker 
results over 2000-005 could also reflect reduced variation in the risk terms over shorter time horizons. 
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investor equity shares of 5%, 10%, 15%, …, 95%.42  The full results are given in Appendix 
Table 6.11.  This involves transforming the dependent variable using the logistic function, 
and evaluating the marginal effects at the respective quantiles.  The coefficients for the 
marginal effects are reported in Appendix Table 6.12, and graphed in figure 6.2 for the six 
risk terms that are significant at the 5 per cent level in table 6.6.
 
  The graphs for all twelve of 
the risk terms are given in Appendix Figure 6.1.
43
  
 
Figure 6.2: Quantile Regression Results 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
42
 This is the SQREG routine in Stata. Table 6.2 gives the number of observations in each of these quantiles. In 
total it has 380 regressors, with pseudo R-squared lying between 0.01 and 0.15 for the different quantiles. 
43
 The corresponding results for the quantiles of 5%, 10%, 15%, and so on are reported in Appendix Tables 6.14 
and 6.15.  Appendix Figure 6.2 graphs the results for the twelve risk terms.  This is just the same as Appendix 
Figure 6.1 in fact, except that the horizontal axis has been rescaled. 
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The graphs in figure 6.2 conform to the pattern sketched in figure 6.1, although they suggest 
that it is not whole ownership that matters for control, but majority ownership at an equity 
stake at 50% (the model in the appendix can easily be reworked to give control at a majority 
stake).  Within this range support is found for Proposition 2, with greater responses to risk for 
project equity shares that are neither too small nor too large. 
 
6.6   Conclusions 
 
Increased foreign ownership in a project enables the investor to protect its specific advantage, 
but also to control the assets themselves, leading to the possibility that increased political risk 
will cause a foreign investor to enter at a higher equity share. This issue is explored in this 
chapter using data from Saudi Arabia on foreign-owned equity shares in joint venture 
projects over 1985-2005. To my knowledge, this is the first time that these techniques have 
been utilized to explore the risk-ownership relationship, and also this has been considered in 
the context of Saudi Arabia. The central result is that for more serious risks firms will 
increase their equity share on entry, but that for less serious risks they will reduce it. Since 
these responses are greater for equity shares at less than majority ownership, the former 
response supports the contention that the increase in ownership is in order to exercise control.   
 
The results appear to be at odds with the existing literature, which finds that firms will reduce 
their equity share in response to country political risk, although this is for the choice of entry 
mode between whole and joint ownership. The chapter finds that the determinants for entry 
choice by either whole or joint ownership appear to differ from that of the joint venture 
equity share, so that the results are consistent with the literature. Conditional on entry as a 
joint venture it suggests that the investor will vary its equity share according to the risk. Of 
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course, risk is measured in relative terms, reflecting the availability of data. As detailed data 
become available on foreign investments in many different countries it will be interesting to 
see whether the results can be replicated. Certainly, the evidence to date in the studies that 
examine the source-country determinants of FDI suggests that this will be the case. 
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Appendix 6.1: The Model 
 
To model the relationship between the joint venture equity share and risk it is supposed that 
there is a single investment project of fixed scale 
  
I and two investors: a foreign multinational 
corporations (MNCs) that freely varies its project equity share, 
  
s 0 £ s £1( ), and a home 
investor that acts passively in supplying the remaining share.
44
 Project returns are divided 
according to these shares. Investment is subject to political risk, which is modelled as the 
exogenous probability of a bad state, 
  
p 0 £ p £1( ). To keep matters simple, the MNC 
ownership share has no effect on the overall project return in a good state, but increasing its 
share mitigates the reduction in this return in the bad state. This does not occur for the home 
investor due to the specificity of the MNC knowledge required to ensure the integrity of the 
assets.
45
 
 
Formally, the (present value) return on the investment is denoted 
  
R > I( ), but in a bad state 
this is 
  
b s( ) R, where 
  
b s( ) captures the relationship between the MNC equity share and the 
return, such that 
  
0 < b s( ) £1 and 
  
b' s( ) ³ 0. At the extremes, it is supposed 
  
b 0( ) = b > 0, so 
that the project makes a non-zero return if the MNC does not invest (i.e. 
  
s = 0), and that 
  
b 1( ) =1, so that the project makes 
  
R with certainty if the MNC has whole ownership (
  
s =1). 
Physical assets
  
I, which represent the project cost, are available from competitive markets, so 
that the project investment scale is independent of the MNC equity share. 
                                                 
44
 More generally, the equity share results from bargaining between the MNC and other investors, but the focus 
is on what Richards and Yang (2007) refer to as environmental rather than behavioural risks, i.e. risks external 
to the joint venture contract. Bargaining may affect the number of other investors and investment scale, which 
are controlled for in the empirical work. Bargaining is analyzed by Asiedu and Esfahani (2000) and considered 
empirically by Gomes-Casseres (1990) and Pan (1996). For ease of analysis, the expression allows for zero and 
unity equity shares s, but of course interest is in shares that are interior to the unit interval. 
45
 In practice, political risks may act differently on the integrity of the assets, e.g. bureaucratic inadequacy may 
affect production efficiency, while a lack of democratic accountability may pose a risk to property rights and 
asset repatriation. The risks modelled here affect the present value return on the assets. 
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The home investor is assumed to be risk neutral, so that it makes non-negative profits, 
  
p b s( ) + 1- p( ){ }R ³ I, but the MNC operates in a foreign environment and it is risk averse.  
The MNC utility function is ( ) aa -= - 11wwu , where 
  
a is constant relative risk aversion and
  
0 < a <1.
46
 The MNC maximises its expected utility, 
  
EU, which is: 
 
  
  
EU = p u s b s( ) R[ ] + 1 - p( ) u s R( ) - s I.  (A1) 
 
First of all, consider the special case in which ownership has no effect on the project return, 
so that 
  
b' s( ) = 0 and 
  
b s( ) = b 0( ) = b . Substituting this for 
  
b s( ) in (A1), then with the above 
utility function, the MNC expected utility is maximised at an equity share of: 
 
   
  
s* =
p b1-a + 1- p( ){ } R1-a
I
é 
ë 
ê 
ê 
ù 
û 
ú 
ú 
1/a
.    (A2) 
 
This lies in the range 
  
0 < s*<1, and it is consistent with the home investor participation 
constraint given above. It increases with
  
R, decreases with
  
I, while 
  
b  has a positive effect, 
which are each plausible. Differentiating this with respect to 
  
p gives: 
 
   
  
¶s*
¶p
=
- 1- b1-a( ) s*R( )
1-a
a I
< 0.   (A3) 
 
                                                 
46
 If there are many risk-neutral home investors in the project the same inequality holds for each.  In the case of 
the MNC, risk aversion is when  > 0 (  1), but a negative relationship exists between s* and R when  > 1.  
It arises because as the project return R increases the firm can cut its equity share and still get a higher return, s 
R.  If the MNC is sufficiently risk averse the latter effect dominates, but this is ruled out as implausible. 
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An increase in the political risk, i.e. the probability of a bad state, reduces the optimal MNC 
equity share, which gives the standard result. Since 
  
¶2s* ¶s*¶p < 0 and 
  
¶3s* ¶2s*¶p > 0 it 
increases at a decreasing rate with
  
s*, so that higher shares are more responsive to risk. 
 
Reverting to the more general case, 
  
b' s( ) > 0, then substituting 
  
b s*( ) directly for 
  
b  in (A2), 
and differentiating this implicitly with respect to 
  
p gives:47 
 
  
  
¶s*
¶p
=
1- b s*( )
1-a
1- a( ) b' s*( ) p b s*( )
-a
- a I s* R( )
a-1
.  (A4) 
 
The numerator is positive, so that (A4) is signed according to 
  
0 < s*<1( ): 
 
  
  
¶s*
¶p
< >[ ] 0 iff a I b s*( )
a
> <[ ] 1- a( ) b' s*( ) p s* R( )
1-a
. (A5) 
 
Two propositions follow, which form the hypotheses for the empirical work. 
 
Proposition 1: The optimal equity share is negatively related to political risk for low levels of 
risk, but positively related for sufficiently high-risk levels such that: 
 
   
  
p >
a I b s*( )
a
1- a( ) b ' s*( ) s* R( )
1-a
.    (A6) 
 
Proof:  This follows directly from (A5), where rearrangement gives the condition.   
                                                 
47
 For tractability the substitution is made into (2) rather than (1), so that the indirect effect of s on EU through 
its effect on (s) is ignored. A full working of this solution for this is available from the authors. 
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The intuition behind the result is straightforward. Small levels of risk cause the MNC to cut 
its equity share to reduce its exposure, but for higher risk levels this is not worthwhile as its 
exposure remains high. In this case it increases its equity share to take a greater control of the 
project, which serves to limit the reduction in profits in an adverse state.   
 
To consider the responsiveness of the equity share to risk it is necessary to give 
  
b s( ) a more 
explicit form. This is necessary, since otherwise asymptotes are always present, but which are 
not observed in the data.
48
 It is specified as 
  
b s( ) = b + 1- b( ) sa, which satisfies the above 
conditions, 
  
0 < b s( ) £1, 
  
b' s( ) ³ 0, 
  
b 0( ) = b and 
  
b 1( ) =1. Hence, 
  
b' s( ) s1-a = a 1- b( ) in 
(A6), such that asymptotic behaviour is no longer inevitable, and (A4) becomes: 
 
  
  
¶s*
¶p
=
1- b s*( )
1-a
{ } s*1-a
a 1- a( ) 1- b( ) p b s*( )
-a
- a I Ra-1
.   (A7) 
 
Proposition 2: The optimal equity share is less responsive to risk for both small and large 
equity shares, but in the latter case provided the MNC ownership implies a sufficiently strong 
effect on the project return in an adverse state. 
 
Proof: Differentiating (A7) with respect to 
  
s*, where 
  
X º a 1- a( ) 1- b( ) b s*( )
-a
, gives: 
 
  
¶2s*
¶s*¶p
pX - a I Ra-1[ ]
2
= pX - a I Ra-1[ ] . 1- b s*( )
-a
{ } 1- a( ) s-a - X[ ] 
                
  
+ b s*( )
-1
- b s*( )
-a
{ } p X a 2 1- b( )[ ]. (A8) 
                                                 
48
 This can be seen by noting that if ‟(0) is finite and (A6) is satisfied when s* = 1, then as s* tends to zero the 
sign on the inequality in (A6) is always reversed, which implies (4) has an asymptote. 
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This is not defined when 
  
pX = a I Ra-1, so attention is restricted to the cases where either 
  
pX < a I Ra-1 or 
  
pX > a I Ra-1 for all s*.
49
 The derivative in (A8) is signed according to the 
three right-hand side terms in square brackets of (A1), where the function 
  
b s( ) changes 
smoothly in s and has the properties 
  
0 < b s( ) £1, 
  
b' s( ) > 0, 
  
b 0( ) = b > 0 and 
  
b 1( ) =1.   
 
(i) 
  
pX < a I Ra-1:  Then 
  
¶s* ¶p < 0 from (A7). As  then  (the 
second term in square brackets tends to plus infinity, while the first term is negative), and as 
 then  (the first two terms in square brackets are negative, while 
the third term tends to zero). It follows that there exists 
  
s*Î 0,1( ) such that 
  
¶2s* ¶s*¶p = 0.  
Further, since 
  
¶3s* ¶2s*¶p > 0, it follows that this is a minimum. 
 
(ii) 
  
pX > a I Ra-1:  Now, 
  
¶s* ¶p > 0 from (A7). As  then  (the 
first term is now positive), while as  then  (where again, the first 
term is now positive). It again follows that there exists 
  
s*Î 0,1( ) such that 
  
¶2s* ¶s*¶p = 0. 
Further, since 
  
¶3s* ¶2s*¶p < 0 then it is now a maximum. 
 
This shows that there is at most a single turning point, which is a maximum or minimum 
depending on whether (A6) is satisfied or not. Further, 
  
¶s* ¶p tends to zero in (A7) as 
  
s* 
tends to zero or unity, since 
  
b 0( ) = b and 
  
b 1( ) =1. The turning point may not exist if the 
share does not have a strong effect on the return, i.e. 
  
b 1( ) <1, since 
  
¶s* ¶p no longer tends 
to zero as 
  
s* tends to unity in (A7).
50
        
                                                 
49
 The first of these means (A6) does not hold when s* = 0, so that (1 - ) (1 - ) R1- <  I by (A7), while the 
second means (A6) holds when s* = 1, which gives (1 - ) (1 - ) R1- > I. For intermediate values,  I < (1 - ) 
(1 - ) R1- < I, s* / p will change sign, but this is ruled out as it implies an asymptote. 
50
 A function with this property and satisfying the above conditions is (s) =  + ( - ) s, where  <  < 1. 
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Appendix Table 6.1: Alternative Specifications for the Investment Scale  
Dependent Variable: SCALE  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant  15.57*** 15.371*** 12.673*** 14.038*** 
Output (GDP ) 0.094*** 0.064*** 0.132*** 0.079*** 
Per capita output (GDPHD ) 1.067*** 0.847*** 0.468*** 0.201 
Growth rate (GROWTH ) -0.451 -0.694 1.094*** 0.345 
Inflation rate ( INFL) 0.062 -0.269 0.491 0.408 
Budget balance (BUDGET ) 0.830*** 0.539* 1.597*** 1.396*** 
Current account (CURRENT ) -0.014 -0.043 0.087 0.051 
Distance (DIST ) -0.061*** -0.028 -0.013*** -0.087*** 
Host country involvement ( DOM ) 0.805*** 0.040 1.050*** 0.134** 
Foreign Investment Act ( FIA ) -0.987*** 0.285 -0.050 0.014 
Other investors ( OVIN ˆ ) - 0.287*** - 0.282*** 
Source investors ( SVIN ˆ ) - 0.144*** - 0.171*** 
Host investors ( HVIN ˆ ) - 0.221*** - 0.231*** 
Same source country ( PARTS ) 0.638*** - 0.863*** - 
Other non-host country ( PARTO ) 0.917*** - 1.065*** - 
Industry (
  
IND):     
Agriculture -0.406 -0.214 - - 
Food and beverages 0.674*** 0.636*** - - 
Textiles, clothes and leather 0.550*** 0.626*** - - 
Wood and wood products 0.314*** 0.324*** - - 
Paper and printing 1.315*** 1.237*** - - 
Chemicals and petroleum 1.258*** 1.132*** - - 
Non-metallic minerals 0.576*** 0.650*** - - 
Basic metal 0.514*** 0.515*** - - 
Fabricated metal products 0.454*** 0.458*** - - 
Construction -0.688*** -0.666*** - - 
Wholesale and retail -0.608*** -0.666*** - - 
Transport and communications -0.764*** -0.823*** - - 
Financing and real estate -0.405*** -0.628*** - - 
Social services -0.924*** -0.941*** - - 
Saudi Arabia location (
  
REGION):     
Eastern 0.148** 0.147*** - - 
Western 0.286*** 0.258*** - - 
Southern 0.763 0.548 - - 
Northern 0.720 0.695 - - 
Supranational source (
  
SOURCE):     
MENA, West Asia -0.169* -0.208** - - 
MENA, North Africa -0.071 -0.143 - - 
Western Europe -0.795*** -0.553*** - - 
North America -1.206*** -1.086*** - - 
Far East -0.143 0.019 - - 
Number of observations 3,330 3,330 3,330 3,330 
R-squared  [pseudo R-squared] 0.404 0.510 0.211 0.325 
F-value [Wald value] 44.18*** 62.59*** 28.10*** 46.44*** 
Notes: OLS estimation with robust standard errors.  Time dummies are added in each case.  Significant at *** = 
1%, ** = 5% and * = 10% levels. 
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Appendix Table 6.2: Alternative Specifications for the Number of Investors 
Dependent Variable: INVTOT   (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Constant  -0.018 -0.117 -0.403 -0.655** 
Output (GDP ) 0.049*** 0.047*** 0.019** 0.111*** 
Per capita output (GDPHD ) 0.247** 0.211** 0.174 0.273*** 
Growth rate (GROWTH ) 0.002 0.320 0.318 1.171*** 
Inflation rate ( INFL) 0.504* 0.539** 0.050 0.064 
Budget balance (BUDGET ) 0.487** 0.229 0.196 0.336** 
Current account (CURRENT ) 0.035 0.111 -0.115 0.069 
Distance (DIST ) -0.068*** -0.049*** 0.098 -0.090*** 
Host country involvement ( DOM ) 0.338*** 1.192*** 0.263*** 0.339*** 
Foreign Investment Act ( FIA ) 0.106 -0.123 -0.061 0.069 
Source investors ( SVIN ˆ ) - - 0.258*** - 
Host investors ( HVIN ˆ ) - - 0.141*** - 
Same source country ( PARTS ) - -0.077 - - 
Host country ( PARTH ) - -1.307*** - - 
Industry (
  
IND):     
Agriculture -0.527*** -0.460*** -0.065 - 
Food and beverages 0.020 0.046 0.056 - 
Textiles, clothes and leather -0.230** -0.177** -0.075 - 
Wood and wood products -0.283** -0.194* 0.110 - 
Paper and printing 0.009 0.122 0.009 - 
Chemicals and petroleum 0.099 0.136** 0.021 - 
Non-metallic minerals -0.326*** -0.196** -0.085* - 
Basic metal -0.006 -0.054 0.002 - 
Fabricated metal products -0.138* -0.085 -0.041 - 
Construction -0.261*** -0.134** -0.067* - 
Wholesale and retail 0.068 0.080 0.128** - 
Transport and communications -0.137 0.052 0.079 - 
Financing and real estate 0.153* 0.249*** 0.118** - 
Social services -0.093 -0.003 0.032 - 
Saudi Arabia location (
  
REGION):     
Eastern -0.091* -0.014 -0.026 - 
Western -0.025 0.055 0.049** - 
Southern 0.142 0.433 0.109 - 
Northern -0.195 0.044 0.088 - 
Supranational source (
  
SOURCE):     
MENA, West Asia 0.073 0.077 0.171*** - 
MENA, North Africa 0.186 0.095 0.298*** - 
Western Europe -0.557*** -0.286** -0.066 - 
North America -0.244* -0.107 -0.181* - 
Far East -0.308*** -0.228** -0.065 - 
Number of observations 3,330 3,330 3,330 3,330 
R-squared  [pseudo R-squared] 0.094 0.153 0.292 0.070 
F-value [Wald value] 629*** 2639*** 7365*** 415*** 
Notes: Poisson regression with robust standard errors. Time dummies are added in each case. Significant at 
*** = 1%, ** = 5% and * = 10% levels. 
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Appendix Table 6.3: Number of Investors by Source: Poisson 
Dependent Variable:  
INVTOT  
Source Only Host Only Others
+
 Non-host 
     
Constant  3.668*** -1.420** -6.990*** 0.443 
Output (GDP ) 0.056* 0.089*** 0.053 0.039** 
Per capita output (GDPHD ) -0.679*** 0.714*** 0.837*** -0.053 
Growth rate (GROWTH ) -3.411*** 1.409*** 1.945** -0.996* 
Inflation rate ( INFL) 1.349*** 0.707 0.324 0.536 
Budget balance (BUDGET ) 1.605*** -0.135 2.007*** 1.440*** 
Current account (CURRENT ) -0.622** -0.004 -0.932 -0.263 
Distance (DIST ) -0.308*** -0.074*** 0.011** 0.021*** 
Host country involvement ( DOM ) -0.905*** - 0.078 -0.631*** 
Foreign Investment Act ( FIA ) 0.139 -0.222 1.373*** 0.488* 
Industry (
  
IND):     
Agriculture -0.863** 0.088 0.047 -0.696** 
Food and beverages 0.002 0.340** 0.386 0.026 
Textiles, clothes and leather 
 
-0.111 -0.062 -0.308 -0.216 
Wood and wood products -1.008*** -0.166 0.869** -0.377* 
Paper and printing -0.449* 0.665*** -0.319 -0.523*** 
Chemicals and petroleum -0.102 0.477*** 0.343 -0.052 
Non-metallic minerals -0.501*** 0.060 -0.483 -0.567*** 
Basic metal 0.100 -0.148 0.396 0.115 
Fabricated metal products -0.217 0.180 0.161 -0.242** 
Construction -0.392*** 0.014 -0.206 -0.409*** 
Wholesale and retail 0.117 -0.028 0.677** 0.190 
Transport and communications -0.208 0.001 0.323 -0.166 
Financing and real estate -0.576*** 0.553*** 0.848*** -0.110 
Social services -0.017 0.176 -0.568* -0.173 
Saudi Arabia location (
  
REGION):     
Eastern -0.545*** -0.001 0.170 -0.230*** 
Western -0.116** 0.030 -0.063 -0.089* 
Southern -1.399** 0.858* -1.122* -1.325*** 
Northern -0.985*** 0.358* -13.730*** -1.271*** 
Supranational source (
  
SOURCE):     
MENA, West Asia -0.495*** -0.179 1.208*** 0.147 
MENA, North Africa 0.226* -0.118 1.696*** 0.539*** 
Western Europe -1.907*** -0.232 0.262 -1.163*** 
North America -0.082 0.032 -0.352 -0.704*** 
Far East 0.008 -0.017 -0.353 -0.638*** 
Number of observations 3,330 3,330 3,330 3,330 
R-squared  [pseudo R-squared] 0.204 0.109 0.188 0.144 
F-value [Wald value] 1604*** 599*** 1458*** 1105*** 
 
Notes: Poisson regression with robust standard errors. Time dummies are added in each case. Significant at *** 
= 1%, ** = 5% and * = 10% levels. 
+
 other investors, i.e. both non-Saudi and non-source investors. 
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Appendix Table 6.4: Number of Investors by Source Country: Poisson 
Dependent Variable:  
INVTOT  
All Others Source Only Host Only Others
+
 
     
Constant  0.994*** 0.623*** -0.334*** -2.107*** 
Algeria 0.564 -1.316*** 0.739*** 3.118*** 
Australia -0.563*** -18.487*** 0.408** 1.334** 
Austria -0.013 -18.487*** 1.081*** 1.519 
Bahamas -0.483 -18.487*** 0.334*** 1.701* 
Bahrain 0.754*** -1.771*** 1.740*** 2.406*** 
Bangladesh -0.161 0.070 -1.276** -0.196 
Belgium 0.467 -1.604*** 1.493*** 1.819*** 
Brazil -0.183 -18.487*** -1.053 2.800*** 
Canada -0.422*** -1.660*** 0.343*** 1.213*** 
China -0.529*** -1.840*** 0.534*** -0.496 
Cyprus -0.039 -2.233** 0.516*** 2.289*** 
Denmark -0.589*** -2.009*** 0.557** -14.095*** 
Egypt -0.086 -0.417*** 0.380*** 0.512 
Ethiopia 1.714*** -18.487*** 3.042*** -14.095*** 
Finland -0.771*** -18.487*** 0.334*** 0.721 
France -0.340*** -2.495*** 0.602*** 1.334*** 
Germany -0.149 -2.009*** 0.893*** 0.997** 
Greece -0.388*** -1.722*** 0.621*** 0.315 
Hong Kong -0.994*** -1.029** -0.765 -14.095*** 
India -0.08 -0.483** 0.541*** -0.056 
Iran -0.004 -0.097 0.334*** -14.095*** 
Iraq 0.526 -18.487*** 0.334 3.380*** 
Ireland -0.707*** -18.487*** 0.621*** -14.095*** 
Italy -0.605*** -2.281*** 0.310** 0.934 
Japan 0.071 -0.810*** 0.938*** 0.696 
Jordan -0.115 -0.584*** 0.384*** 0.963*** 
Korea,republic of -0.444*** -1.945*** 0.596*** 0.315 
Kuwait 0.693*** 0.213 1.010*** 2.231*** 
Lebanon -0.076 -0.605*** 0.536*** 0.773** 
Liberia 0.259** -1.316* 0.739 2.512*** 
Luxembourg -0.994*** -18.487*** 0.334*** -14.095*** 
Malaysia -0.355 -2.874*** 0.757** 0.772 
Morocco 0.578** -0.131 -0.455 3.110*** 
Netherlands -0.478*** -3.456*** 0.569*** 1.065*** 
Norway -0.707*** -18.487*** 0.439** 0.603 
Oman 0.760*** -2.127*** 0.909*** 3.436*** 
Pakistan -0.251** -0.581*** 0.220 0.315 
Panama -0.783*** -2.763*** 0.334** -0.033 
Philippines -0.388** -18.487*** 0.488 1.701*** 
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Appendix Table 6.4 (Continued) 
 
Dependent Variable:  
INVTOT  
All Others Source Only Host Only Others
+
 
     
Poland -0.771*** -18.487*** 0.557*** -14.095*** 
Qatar 1.131*** -2.702*** 1.838*** 3.429*** 
Russia -0.301*** -18.487*** 0.334*** 2.107*** 
Singapore -0.615*** -2.495*** 0.408 0.641 
South Africa -0.684*** -18.487*** 0.421*** 0.808 
Spain -0.370** -1.945*** 0.191 1.797*** 
Sri Lanka 0.104 -18.487*** 1.181*** 1.701*** 
Sudan 0.279 -2.164*** 0.467*** 2.902*** 
Sweden -0.524*** -1.134** 0.334 -14.095*** 
Switzerland -0.511*** -18.487*** 0.766*** -0.406 
Syria -0.195** -0.418*** -0.002 0.842** 
Taiwan -0.994*** -18.487*** 0.046 0.721 
Tanzania -0.994*** -18.487*** -12.361*** 2.107*** 
Tunisia 0.51 -18.487*** 0.334 3.360*** 
Turkey -0.618*** -1.120*** -0.061 0.358 
United Arab Emirates 0.360** -1.374*** 1.061*** 2.394*** 
United Kingdom -0.390*** -2.025*** 0.648*** 0.572 
United States -0.230** -1.843*** 0.745*** 1.037*** 
Venezuela -0.301*** -18.487*** 0.334*** 2.107*** 
Number of observations 3,330 3,330 3,330 3,330 
R-squared  [pseudo R-squared] 0.068 0.136 0.067 0.164 
F-value [Wald value] - 3880*** - 1200*** 
 
Notes: Poisson regression with robust standard errors. Time dummies are added in each case. Significant at *** 
= 1%, ** = 5% and * = 10% levels. 
+
 = other investors (non-Saudi and non-source). 
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Appendix Table 6.5: Number of Investors by Source: OLS 
Dependent Variable:  
INVTOT  
Source Only Host Only Others
+
 Non-host 
     
Constant  3.816*** -1.099 -1.528** 2.288*** 
Output (GDP ) 0.003 0.122*** 0.034** 0.037** 
Per capita output (GDPHD ) -0.468*** 0.917*** 0.503** 0.034 
Growth rate (GROWTH ) -2.171*** 1.776*** 0.597 -1.574** 
Inflation rate ( INFL) 0.454 1.067 0.269 0.723 
Budget balance (BUDGET ) 0.965*** 0.109 1.305*** 2.271*** 
Current account (CURRENT ) -0.115 0.242 -0.375 -0.489 
Distance (DIST ) -0.011*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 
Host country involvement ( DOM ) -0.897***  0.027 -0.870*** 
Foreign Investment Act ( FIA ) -0.207 -0.340 0.225** 0.017 
Industry (
  
IND):     
Agriculture -0.851*** -0.013 0.059 -0.791*** 
Food and beverages -0.173 0.356** 0.116 -0.057 
Textiles, clothes and leather 
 
-0.325 -0.088 -0.069 -0.393** 
Wood and wood products -1.034*** -0.144 0.405* -0.629** 
Paper and printing -0.587*** 0.916** -0.107 -0.694*** 
Chemicals and petroleum -0.269 0.611*** 0.135** -0.134 
Non-metallic minerals -0.626*** 0.036 -0.144** -0.769*** 
Basic metal 0.030 -0.211* 0.177*** 0.207 
Fabricated metal products -0.393** 0.144 0.028 -0.365** 
Construction -0.498*** 0.011 -0.034 -0.532*** 
Wholesale and retail -0.042 -0.029 0.263** 0.221 
Transport and communications -0.434** -0.035 0.098 -0.336 
Financing and real estate -0.622*** 0.778*** 0.414*** -0.208 
Social services -0.212 0.159 -0.068 -0.280* 
Saudi Arabia location (
  
REGION):     
Eastern -0.281*** 0.032 0.068 -0.213*** 
Western -0.101* 0.059 -0.023 -0.124** 
Southern -0.685*** 1.550 -0.300*** -0.985*** 
Northern -0.732*** 0.535 -0.315** -1.047*** 
Supranational source (
  
SOURCE):     
MENA, West Asia -0.120 -0.135 0.305*** 0.185 
MENA, North Africa 0.229** -0.182 0.577*** 0.805*** 
Western Europe -0.967*** -0.442 -0.356** -1.323*** 
North America -0.433*** -0.016 -0.403** -0.836*** 
Far East -0.298*** -0.109 -0.319** -0.617*** 
Number of observations 3,330 3,330 3,330 3,330 
R-squared  [pseudo R-squared] 0.247 0.117 0.115 0.194 
F-value [Wald value] 26.22*** 7.65*** 3.69*** 22.44*** 
 
Notes: OLS estimation with robust standard errors. Time dummies are added in each case. Significant at *** = 
1%, ** = 5% and * = 10% levels. 
+
 = other investors (non-Saudi and non-source). 
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Appendix Table 6.6: Number of Investors by Source Country: OLS 
Dependent variable:  
INVTOT  
All others Source only Host only Others
+
 
Constant  2.703*** 1.865*** 0.716*** 0.122*** 
Algeria 2.047 -1.365*** 0.784*** 2.628 
Australia -1.164*** -1.865*** 0.361** 0.340 
Austria -0.036 -1.865*** 1.395* 0.434 
Bahamas -1.036* -1.865*** 0.284*** 0.545 
Bahrain 3.043*** -1.547*** 3.363*** 1.228*** 
Bangladesh -0.403 0.135 -0.516*** -0.022 
Belgium 1.610 -1.490*** 2.471* 0.628** 
Brazil -0.453 -1.865*** -0.466** 1.878 
Canada -0.930*** -1.510*** 0.293** 0.287*** 
China -1.110*** -1.569*** 0.506*** -0.048 
Cyprus -0.103 -1.665*** 0.484** 1.078*** 
Denmark -1.203*** -1.615*** 0.534* -0.122*** 
Egypt -0.223 -0.635*** 0.331*** 0.081 
Ethiopia 12.297*** -1.865*** 14.284*** -0.122*** 
Finland -1.453*** -1.865*** 0.284*** 0.128 
France -0.780*** -1.711*** 0.591*** 0.340*** 
Germany -0.373 -1.615*** 1.034*** 0.208** 
Greece -0.869*** -1.532*** 0.617*** 0.045 
Hong Kong -1.703*** -1.198*** -0.383 -0.122*** 
India -0.207 -0.714*** 0.514*** -0.007 
Iran -0.010 -0.173 0.284*** -0.122*** 
Iraq 1.869 -1.865*** 0.284 3.450* 
Ireland -1.369*** -1.865*** 0.617** -0.122*** 
Italy -1.227*** -1.674*** 0.260** 0.188 
Japan 0.200 -1.036*** 1.113*** 0.122 
Jordan -0.293 -0.825*** 0.335*** 0.197*** 
Korea,republic of -0.969*** -1.598*** 0.584*** 0.045 
Kuwait 2.704*** 0.443 1.251*** 1.010*** 
Lebanon -0.197 -0.847*** 0.508*** 0.142** 
Liberia 0.797** -1.365*** 0.784 1.378 
Luxembourg -1.703*** -1.865*** 0.284*** -0.122*** 
Malaysia -0.808 -1.760*** 0.810 0.142 
Morocco 2.115 -0.229 -0.262 2.606** 
Netherlands -1.026*** -1.806*** 0.548** 0.231** 
Norway -1.369*** -1.865*** 0.395** 0.101 
Oman 3.075** -1.643*** 1.062** 3.656*** 
Pakistan -0.601** -0.822*** 0.176 0.045 
Panama -1.467*** -1.747*** 0.284** -0.004 
Philippines -0.869*** -1.865*** 0.450 0.545 
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Appendix Table 6.6 (Continued) 
 
Dependent Variable:  
INVTOT  
All Others Source Only Host Only Others
+
 
Poland -1.453*** -1.865*** 0.534** -0.122*** 
Qatar 5.672*** -1.740*** 3.784** 3.628*** 
Russia -0.703*** -1.865*** 0.284*** 0.878*** 
Singapore -1.241*** -1.711*** 0.361 0.109 
South Africa -1.339*** -1.865*** 0.375** 0.151 
Spain -0.836*** -1.598*** 0.150 0.612*** 
Sri Lanka 0.297 -1.865*** 1.617** 0.545** 
Sudan 0.869 -1.651*** 0.427*** 2.093 
Sweden -1.103*** -1.265*** 0.284 -0.122*** 
Switzerland -1.081*** -1.865*** 0.824*** -0.041 
Syria -0.478** -0.637*** -0.002 0.161** 
Taiwan -1.703*** -1.865*** 0.034 0.128 
Tanzania -1.703*** -1.865*** -0.716*** 0.878*** 
Tunisia 1.797 -1.865*** 0.284 3.378* 
Turkey -1.246*** -1.256*** -0.042 0.052 
United Arab Emirates 1.172** -1.393*** 1.353*** 1.212*** 
United Kingdom -0.872*** -1.619*** 0.653*** 0.094 
United States -0.555** -1.570*** 0.793*** 0.222*** 
Venezuela -0.703*** -1.865*** 0.284*** 0.878*** 
Number of observations 3,330 3,330 3,330 3,330 
R-squared  [pseudo R-squared] 0.129 0.157 0.091 0.151 
F-value [Wald value] - - - - 
 
Notes: OLS estimation with robust standard errors. Time dummies are added in each case. Significant at *** = 
1%, ** = 5% and * = 10% levels. 
+
 = other investors (non-Saudi and non-source). 
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Appendix Table 6.7: Equity Share with Different Scale Instruments  
Dependent Variable: EQUITY  
Specification 
(1) (2) (3) 
Estimate 
Marg. 
Effect 
Estimate 
Marg. 
Effect 
Estimate 
Marg. 
Effect 
Constant  2.665*** - 4.328*** - 7.282*** - 
Political risk terms:       
Government stability (GOVST ) 0.344** 0.080 0.305* 0.071 0.342** 0.079 
Bureaucratic quality (
  
BUREAU) 0.322** 0.075 0.410*** 0.095 0.626*** 0.145 
Corruption (
  
CORR) 0.343** 0.080 0.357** 0.083 0.296 0.069 
Socioeconomic conditions ( SOCIO ) -0.040 -0.009 -0.064 -0.015 -0.090 -0.021 
Religious tensions (
  
RELIG) 0.109 0.025 0.138 0.032 0.164 0.038 
Ethnic tensions (
  
ETHNIC) 0.058 0.013 0.042 0.010 -0.173 -0.040 
Investment profile (
  
INVEST) 0.290* 0.067 0.347** 0.080 0.345** 0.080 
Law and order (
  
LAW ) 0.088 0.020 0.140 0.032 0.314* 0.073 
Democ. Account. (
  
DEMOC) -0.281*** -0.065 -0.355*** -0.082 -0.467*** -0.108 
Military (
  
MILIT) -0.257** -0.060 -0.290** -0.067 -0.198 -0.046 
Internal conflict (
  
INTCON) -0.447** -0.104 -0.474*** -0.110 -0.599*** -0.139 
External conflict (
  
EXTCON) 0.219 0.051 0.215 0.050 0.304** 0.071 
Financial terms:       
International capital (
  
FUNDS) -0.810*** -0.188 -0.918*** -0.212 -1.115*** -0.258 
Exchange rate stability (
  
EXCH) -0.407*** -0.095 -0.464*** -0.107 -0.392*** -0.091 
Export propensity (
  
EXPORT) 0.810*** 0.188 1.000*** 0.231 1.340*** 0.310 
Other terms:       
Distance (DIST ) -0.001 -0.021 -0.010 -0.024 -0.025*** -0.058 
Foreign Investment Act (FIA) 0.046 0.009 0.033 0.008 0.126*** 0.029 
Host country involvement (DOM ) 0.041 0.011 -0.020 -0.005 -0.135** -0.031 
Instruments:       
Investment scale ( LEASC ˆ ) 
 
-0.161*** -0.037 -0.270*** -0.062 -0.460*** -0.107 
Number of other investors ( OTTINV ˆ ) -0.406*** -0.094 -0.276*** -0.064 -0.275*** -0.064 
       
Number of observations 3,330 - 3,330 - 3,330 - 
Log-likelihood [pseudo] 364.7 - 443.6 - 405.2 - 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) -0.206 - -0.256 - -0.191 - 
 
Notes: Estimation using glm with a logit link function. Significant at *** = 1%, ** = 5% and * = 10% levels. 
Column (1) instruments scale using result in column (1) of Appendix Table 6.1, column (2) uses column (2) of 
Appendix Table 6.1, and column (3) uses column (3) of Appendix Table 6.1.   
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Appendix Table 6.8: Equity Share with Different Number of Investors 
Dependent Variable: EQUITY  
Specification 
(1) (2) (3) 
Estimate 
Marg. 
Effect 
Estimate 
Marg. 
Effect 
Estimate 
Marg. 
Effect 
Constant  2.665*** - 0.616* - 2.376*** - 
Political risk terms:       
Government stability (GOVST ) 0.344** 0.080 0.527*** 0.122 0.461*** 0.105 
Bureaucratic quality (
  
BUREAU) 0.322** 0.075 0.201 0.046 0.145 0.033 
Corruption (
  
CORR) 0.343** 0.080 0.243 0.056 0.293** 0.067 
Socioeconomic conditions ( SOCIO ) -0.040 -0.009 0.245* 0.057 -0.134 -0.031 
Religious tensions (
  
RELIG) 0.109 0.025 -0.068 -0.016 -0.151 -0.034 
Ethnic tensions (
  
ETHNIC) 0.058 0.013 -0.234** -0.054 0.184* 0.042 
Investment profile (
  
INVEST) 0.290* 0.067 -0.053 -0.012 0.292** 0.067 
Law and order (
  
LAW ) 0.088 0.020 0.301* 0.069 0.232 0.053 
Democ. Account. (
  
DEMOC) -0.281*** -0.065 -0.227** -0.052 -0.202** -0.046 
Military (
  
MILIT) -0.257** -0.060 -0.076 -0.018 -0.142 -0.032 
Internal conflict (
  
INTCON) -0.447** -0.104 -0.509*** -0.118 -0.686*** -0.156 
External conflict (
  
EXTCON) 0.219 0.051 0.252* 0.058 0.237* 0.054 
Financial terms:       
International capital (
  
FUNDS) -0.810*** -0.188 -0.878*** -0.203 -0.885*** -0.202 
Exchange rate stability (
  
EXCH) -0.407*** -0.095 -0.125 -0.029 -0.174 -0.040 
Export propensity (
  
EXPORT) 0.810*** 0.188 0.852*** 0.197 1.121*** 0.256 
Other terms:       
Distance (DIST ) -0.001 -0.021 -0.016** -0.036 -0.011 -0.025 
Foreign Investment Act (FIA) 0.046 0.009 0.076 0.017 -0.040 0.038 
Host country involvement (DOM ) 0.041 0.011 0.110*** 0.025 0.169*** -0.009 
Instruments:       
Investment scale ( LEASC ˆ ) 
 
-0.161*** -0.037 -0.014*** -0.003 -0.128*** -0.029 
Number of other investors ( OTTINV ˆ ) -0.406*** -0.094 -1.064* -0.246 -1.317*** -0.300 
       
Number of observations 3,330 - 3,330 - 3,330 - 
Log-likelihood [pseudo] 364.7 - 590.8 - 693.5 - 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) -0.206 - -0.342 - -0.403 - 
 
Notes: Estimation using glm with a logit link function. Significant at *** = 1%, ** = 5% and * = 10% levels. 
Column (1) instruments number of other investors using result in column (1) of Appendix Table 6.2, column (2) 
uses column (2) of Appendix Table 6.2, and column (3) uses column (3) of Appendix Table 6.2.   
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Appendix Table 6.9: Share Estimates with Varying Number of Investors 
Dependent Variable: EQUITY  
Basic Specification 
(1) (2) (3) 
Estimate 
Marg. 
Eff. 
Estimate 
Marg. 
Eff. 
Estimate 
Marg. 
Eff. 
Constant  2.665*** - 2.350*** - 2.347*** - 
Political risk terms:       
Government stability (GOVST ) 0.344** 0.080 0.368** 0.085 0.371 0.085 
Bureaucratic quality (
  
BUREAU) 0.322** 0.075 -0.128 -0.030 -0.131 -0.030 
Corruption (
  
CORR) 0.343** 0.080 0.402*** 0.093 0.398*** 0.092 
Socioeconomic conditions ( SOCIO ) -0.040 -0.009 -0.011 -0.003 0.011 0.003 
Religious tensions (
  
RELIG) 0.109 0.025 -0.305*** -0.070 -0.307*** -0.071 
Ethnic tensions (
  
ETHNIC) 0.058 0.013 0.311*** 0.072 0.299*** 0.069 
Investment profile (
  
INVEST) 0.290* 0.067 0.091 0.021 0.063 0.015 
Law and order (
  
LAW ) 0.088 0.020 -0.125 -0.029 -0.129 -0.030 
Democ. Account. (
  
DEMOC) -0.281*** -0.065 -0.249** -0.057 -0.241** -0.055 
Military (
  
MILIT) -0.257** -0.060 -0.043 -0.010 -0.044 -0.010 
Internal conflict (
  
INTCON) -0.447** -0.104 -0.064 -0.015 -0.051 -0.012 
External conflict (
  
EXTCON) 0.219 0.051 0.007 0.002 0.007 0.002 
Financial terms:       
International capital (
  
FUNDS) -0.810*** -0.188 -0.455*** -0.105 -0.453*** -0.104 
Exchange rate stability (
  
EXCH) -0.407*** -0.095 -0.196* -0.045 -0.188* -0.043 
Export propensity (
  
EXPORT) 0.810*** 0.188 0.143 0.033 0.136 0.031 
Other terms:       
Distance (DIST ) -0.001 -0.021 -0.039 -0.026 -0.011 -0.027 
Foreign Investment Act (FIA) 0.046 0.009 0.083 -0.146 0.076 0.017 
Host country involvement (DOM ) 0.041 0.011 -0.618*** 0.019 -0.602*** -0.142 
Instruments:       
Investment scale ( LEASC ˆ ): -0.161*** -0.037 -0.166*** -0.038 -0.164*** -0.038 
Number of other investors ( OTTINV ˆ ) -0.406*** -0.094 - - -0.035 -0.008 
Other investors ( OVIN ˆ ) - - -0.641*** -0.148 - - 
Source investors ( SVIN ˆ ) - - -0.360*** -0.083 -0.352*** -0.081 
Host investors ( HVIN ˆ ) - - -0.010 -0.002 -0.633*** -0.146 
       
Number of observations 3,330 - 3,330 - 3,330 - 
Log-likelihood [pseudo] 364.7 - 615.9 - 615.8 - 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) -0.206 - -0.210 - -0.212 - 
Notes: Estimation using glm with a logit link function. Significant at *** = 1%, ** = 5% and * = 10% levels.  
Column (1) instruments number of other investors using result in column (1) of Appendix Table 6.2. Column 
(2) instruments other investors, source investors and host investors using result in column (3), (1) and (2) of 
Appendix Table 6.3. Column (3) instruments number of other investors using result in column (1) of Appendix 
Table 6.2, and source investors and host investors using result in column (1) and (2) of Appendix Table 6.3. 
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Appendix Table 6.10: Share Estimates with Varying Number of Investors 
Dependent Variable: EQUITY  
Basic Specification 
(1) (2) (3) 
Estimate 
Marg. 
Eff. 
Estimate 
Marg. 
Eff. 
Estimate 
Marg. 
Eff. 
Constant  2.665*** - 3.216*** - 3.366*** - 
Political risk terms:       
Government stability (GOVST ) 0.344** 0.080 0.361** 0.084 0.240 0.056 
Bureaucratic quality (
  
BUREAU) 0.322** 0.075 0.389** 0.090 0.378** 0.088 
Corruption (
  
CORR) 0.343** 0.080 0.255 0.059 0.373** 0.087 
Socioeconomic conditions ( SOCIO ) -0.040 -0.009 -0.189 -0.044 -0.184 -0.043 
Religious tensions (
  
RELIG) 0.109 0.025 0.060 0.014 0.199 0.046 
Ethnic tensions (
  
ETHNIC) 0.058 0.013 0.029 0.007 0.128 0.030 
Investment profile (
  
INVEST) 0.290* 0.067 0.456*** 0.106 0.435*** 0.101 
Law and order (
  
LAW ) 0.088 0.020 0.222 0.051 0.063 0.015 
Democ. Account. (
  
DEMOC) -0.281*** -0.065 -0.351*** -0.081 -0.319*** -0.074 
Military (
  
MILIT) -0.257** -0.060 -0.209** -0.048 -0.272** -0.063 
Internal conflict (
  
INTCON) -0.447** -0.104 -0.512*** -0.119 -0.432** -0.100 
External conflict (
  
EXTCON) 0.219 0.051 0.144 0.033 0.158 0.037 
Financial terms:       
International capital (
  
FUNDS) -0.810*** -0.188 -0.854*** -0.198 -0.611*** -0.142 
Exchange rate stability (
  
EXCH) -0.407*** -0.095 -0.355*** -0.082 -0.467*** -0.108 
Export propensity (
  
EXPORT) 0.810*** 0.188 0.998*** 0.231 0.542*** 0.126 
Other terms:       
Distance (DIST ) -0.001 -0.021 -0.080 -0.019 -0.013** -0.031 
Foreign Investment Act (FIA) 0.046 0.009 0.053 0.012 0.058 -0.021 
Host country involvement (DOM ) 0.041 0.011 -0.090** -0.021 -0.088** 0.013 
Instruments:       
Investment scale ( LEASC ˆ ): -0.161*** -0.037 -0.190*** -0.044 -0.218*** -0.051 
Number of other investors ( OTTINV ˆ ) -0.406*** -0.094 -0.491*** -0.114 - - 
Other investors ( OVIN ˆ ) - - - - -0.010** -0.002 
Source investors ( SVIN ˆ ) - - - - -0.019 -0.004 
Host investors ( HVIN ˆ ) - - - - -0.017* -0.004 
       
Number of observations 3,330 - 3,330 - 3,330 - 
Log-likelihood [pseudo] 364.7 - 363.4 - 351.2 - 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) -0.206 - -0.205 - -0.197 - 
Notes: Estimation using glm with a logit link function. Significant at *** = 1%, ** = 5% and * = 10% levels. 
Column (1) instruments number of other investors using result in column (1) of Appendix Table 6.2, column (2) 
uses column (1) of Appendix Table 6.4, and Column (3) instruments other investors, source investors and host 
investors using result in column (4), (2) and (3) in Appendix Table 6.4.  
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Appendix Table 6.11: Quantile Regression Results for Investor Equity Share 
  Bootstrap     
SHARELOGIT Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 
[95% 
Conf. 
Interval] 
       
q5       
Government stability  1.366 0.385 3.550 0.000 0.612 2.120 
Socioeconomic conditions -0.088 0.453 -0.200 0.845 -0.976 0.799 
Investment profile -1.111 0.495 -2.240 0.025 -2.082 -0.139 
Internal conflict 0.299 0.735 0.410 0.684 -1.142 1.740 
External conflict -0.088 0.481 -0.180 0.855 -1.032 0.855 
Corruption 0.425 0.356 1.190 0.234 -0.274 1.124 
Military 0.208 0.327 0.640 0.523 -0.432 0.849 
Religious tensions 0.383 0.235 1.630 0.103 -0.077 0.844 
Law and order -1.166 0.610 -1.910 0.056 -2.361 0.029 
Ethnic tensions -0.046 0.448 -0.100 0.917 -0.924 0.831 
Democ. Account. 0.497 0.458 1.090 0.277 -0.400 1.394 
Bureaucratic quality -0.736 0.633 -1.160 0.245 -1.977 0.505 
Foreign debt 0.022 0.343 0.060 0.949 -0.651 0.695 
Current account -0.431 0.442 -0.980 0.330 -1.298 0.436 
Exchange rate stability -1.088 0.548 -1.990 0.047 -2.162 -0.015 
Distance -0.018 0.000 -1.360 0.175 0.000 0.000 
Foreign Investment Act -0.363 0.247 -1.470 0.141 -0.848 0.121 
Host country involvement 0.197 0.122 1.620 0.105 -0.041 0.436 
Number of other investors -1.048 0.215 -4.880 0.000 -1.469 -0.627 
Investment scale -0.140 0.056 -2.500 0.013 -0.250 -0.030 
Constant 1.284 1.039 1.240 0.217 -0.753 3.321 
       
q13       
Government stability  0.979 0.550 1.780 0.075 -0.100 2.058 
Socioeconomic conditions -0.398 0.367 -1.080 0.279 -1.118 0.322 
Investment profile -0.146 0.352 -0.410 0.678 -0.837 0.545 
Internal conflict -0.134 0.511 -0.260 0.793 -1.135 0.867 
External conflict -0.155 0.436 -0.360 0.722 -1.010 0.700 
Corruption 0.399 0.349 1.140 0.253 -0.286 1.084 
Military -0.409 0.239 -1.710 0.087 -0.878 0.060 
Religious tensions 0.272 0.299 0.910 0.364 -0.315 0.859 
Law and order -0.414 0.345 -1.200 0.230 -1.089 0.262 
Ethnic tensions 0.166 0.317 0.520 0.601 -0.456 0.788 
Democ. Account. 0.462 0.261 1.770 0.077 -0.050 0.974 
Bureaucratic quality -0.300 0.444 -0.680 0.499 -1.171 0.571 
Foreign debt -0.467 0.341 -1.370 0.171 -1.135 0.201 
Current account 0.343 0.527 0.650 0.515 -0.690 1.377 
Exchange rate stability -1.101 0.232 -4.760 0.000 -1.555 -0.647 
Distance -0.029 0.000 -0.990 0.324 0.000 0.000 
Foreign Investment Act -0.229 0.164 -1.400 0.162 -0.550 0.092 
Host country involvement 0.291 0.066 4.420 0.000 0.162 0.420 
Number of other investors -0.891 0.136 -6.530 0.000 -1.158 -0.623 
Investment scale -0.079 0.071 -1.110 0.266 -0.217 0.060 
Constant 0.426 1.196 0.360 0.722 -1.920 2.771 
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Appendix Table 6.11 (continued) 
 
  Bootstrap     
SHARELOGIT Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 
[95% 
Conf. 
Interval] 
       
q21       
Government stability  0.579 0.346 1.670 0.094 -0.099 1.256 
Socioeconomic conditions -0.531 0.292 -1.810 0.070 -1.104 0.043 
Investment profile 0.519 0.424 1.230 0.220 -0.311 1.350 
Internal conflict -0.424 0.370 -1.150 0.252 -1.149 0.302 
External conflict 0.138 0.378 0.360 0.716 -0.603 0.878 
Corruption 0.417 0.442 0.940 0.346 -0.450 1.284 
Military -0.686 0.365 -1.880 0.061 -1.402 0.031 
Religious tensions 0.423 0.345 1.230 0.220 -0.253 1.099 
Law and order -0.272 0.348 -0.780 0.435 -0.955 0.411 
Ethnic tensions 0.225 0.288 0.780 0.434 -0.339 0.790 
Democ. Account. 0.032 0.276 0.120 0.907 -0.509 0.574 
Bureaucratic quality 0.433 0.381 1.140 0.255 -0.313 1.179 
Foreign debt -0.751 0.251 -3.000 0.003 -1.242 -0.259 
Current account 0.747 0.411 1.820 0.069 -0.059 1.553 
Exchange rate stability -0.829 0.178 -4.670 0.000 -1.177 -0.481 
Distance -0.029 0.000 -2.590 0.010 0.000 0.000 
Foreign Investment Act -0.043 0.160 -0.270 0.788 -0.357 0.271 
Host country involvement 0.326 0.105 3.120 0.002 0.121 0.531 
Number of other investors -0.892 0.172 -5.200 0.000 -1.229 -0.556 
Investment scale -0.154 0.045 -3.420 0.001 -0.243 -0.066 
Constant 1.860 0.748 2.490 0.013 0.393 3.326 
       
q27       
Government stability  0.610 0.237 2.570 0.010 0.145 1.074 
Socioeconomic conditions -0.539 0.273 -1.980 0.048 -1.074 -0.004 
Investment profile 0.584 0.338 1.730 0.084 -0.079 1.246 
Internal conflict -0.720 0.329 -2.190 0.029 -1.365 -0.074 
External conflict 0.231 0.307 0.750 0.452 -0.371 0.834 
Corruption 0.470 0.337 1.400 0.163 -0.190 1.131 
Military -0.582 0.331 -1.760 0.079 -1.232 0.067 
Religious tensions 0.529 0.306 1.730 0.084 -0.071 1.128 
Law and order -0.158 0.310 -0.510 0.610 -0.766 0.450 
Ethnic tensions 0.586 0.257 2.280 0.023 0.083 1.089 
Democ. Account. -0.011 0.195 -0.060 0.956 -0.393 0.371 
Bureaucratic quality 0.267 0.259 1.030 0.304 -0.242 0.776 
Foreign debt -0.794 0.146 -5.430 0.000 -1.081 -0.507 
Current account 0.747 0.345 2.170 0.030 0.071 1.422 
Exchange rate stability -0.983 0.192 -5.120 0.000 -1.359 -0.606 
Distance -0.022 0.000 -2.010 0.044 0.000 0.000 
Foreign Investment Act 0.049 0.096 0.510 0.612 -0.140 0.237 
Host country involvement 0.267 0.085 3.130 0.002 0.099 0.434 
Number of other investors -0.821 0.138 -5.940 0.000 -1.092 -0.550 
Investment scale -0.173 0.050 -3.470 0.001 -0.271 -0.075 
Constant 2.547 0.776 3.280 0.001 1.026 4.069 
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Appendix Table 6.11 (continued) 
 
  Bootstrap     
SHARELOGIT Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 
[95% 
Conf. 
Interval] 
       
q35       
Government stability  0.668 0.170 3.930 0.000 0.335 1.002 
Socioeconomic conditions -0.218 0.209 -1.040 0.297 -0.629 0.192 
Investment profile 0.088 0.217 0.400 0.686 -0.339 0.514 
Internal conflict -1.088 0.316 -3.440 0.001 -1.709 -0.468 
External conflict 0.384 0.219 1.750 0.080 -0.045 0.814 
Corruption 0.228 0.302 0.750 0.451 -0.365 0.820 
Military -0.360 0.260 -1.380 0.167 -0.870 0.151 
Religious tensions 0.485 0.251 1.940 0.053 -0.006 0.977 
Law and order 0.000 0.231 0.000 0.999 -0.453 0.452 
Ethnic tensions 0.477 0.167 2.870 0.004 0.151 0.804 
Democ. Account. -0.067 0.158 -0.420 0.671 -0.377 0.243 
Bureaucratic quality 0.512 0.259 1.980 0.048 0.004 1.019 
Foreign debt -0.691 0.215 -3.210 0.001 -1.113 -0.269 
Current account 0.633 0.330 1.920 0.055 -0.015 1.281 
Exchange rate stability -0.552 0.181 -3.040 0.002 -0.908 -0.196 
Distance -0.012 0.000 -1.230 0.220 0.000 0.000 
Foreign Investment Act -0.013 0.102 -0.130 0.897 -0.213 0.186 
Host country involvement 0.262 0.082 3.200 0.001 0.101 0.423 
Number of other investors -0.741 0.134 -5.530 0.000 -1.004 -0.479 
Investment scale -0.223 0.043 -5.130 0.000 -0.309 -0.138 
Constant 3.258 0.623 5.230 0.000 2.036 4.479 
       
q42       
Government stability  0.576 0.254 2.260 0.024 0.077 1.075 
Socioeconomic conditions -0.211 0.187 -1.130 0.258 -0.577 0.155 
Investment profile 0.128 0.243 0.530 0.599 -0.349 0.604 
Internal conflict -1.115 0.255 -4.370 0.000 -1.615 -0.615 
External conflict 0.296 0.225 1.320 0.187 -0.144 0.737 
Corruption 0.544 0.256 2.130 0.034 0.042 1.046 
Military -0.437 0.275 -1.590 0.112 -0.977 0.102 
Religious tensions 0.552 0.255 2.170 0.030 0.053 1.051 
Law and order -0.065 0.284 -0.230 0.819 -0.623 0.493 
Ethnic tensions 0.388 0.146 2.660 0.008 0.102 0.674 
Democ. Account. -0.147 0.148 -0.990 0.322 -0.438 0.144 
Bureaucratic quality 0.572 0.235 2.430 0.015 0.111 1.033 
Foreign debt -0.833 0.242 -3.450 0.001 -1.307 -0.360 
Current account 0.718 0.368 1.950 0.051 -0.003 1.438 
Exchange rate stability -0.298 0.180 -1.650 0.099 -0.652 0.056 
Distance -0.054 0.000 -0.470 0.639 0.000 0.000 
Foreign Investment Act -0.005 0.086 -0.060 0.951 -0.175 0.164 
Host country involvement 0.132 0.084 1.580 0.115 -0.032 0.297 
Number of other investors -0.539 0.099 -5.420 0.000 -0.734 -0.344 
Investment scale -0.219 0.035 -6.260 0.000 -0.287 -0.150 
Constant 3.086 0.585 5.280 0.000 1.939 4.232 
 
 
 
228
Appendix Table 6.11 (continued) 
 
  Bootstrap     
SHARELOGIT Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 
[95% 
Conf. 
Interval] 
       
q49       
Government stability  0.409 0.246 1.660 0.097 -0.074 0.892 
Socioeconomic conditions -0.202 0.148 -1.360 0.173 -0.492 0.088 
Investment profile 0.367 0.215 1.710 0.087 -0.054 0.789 
Internal conflict -0.648 0.231 -2.810 0.005 -1.101 -0.196 
External conflict 0.385 0.182 2.110 0.035 0.027 0.742 
Corruption 0.514 0.250 2.050 0.040 0.023 1.005 
Military -0.409 0.211 -1.940 0.053 -0.823 0.005 
Religious tensions 0.305 0.255 1.200 0.231 -0.194 0.805 
Law and order -0.042 0.296 -0.140 0.888 -0.622 0.538 
Ethnic tensions 0.147 0.191 0.770 0.442 -0.227 0.520 
Democ. Account. -0.467 0.122 -3.830 0.000 -0.706 -0.228 
Bureaucratic quality 0.678 0.270 2.510 0.012 0.148 1.208 
Foreign debt -0.957 0.219 -4.370 0.000 -1.386 -0.528 
Current account 0.769 0.309 2.490 0.013 0.163 1.374 
Exchange rate stability -0.388 0.153 -2.540 0.011 -0.687 -0.088 
Distance -0.017 0.000 -0.160 0.874 0.000 0.000 
Foreign Investment Act 0.045 0.087 0.510 0.609 -0.126 0.215 
Host country involvement 0.101 0.095 1.060 0.287 -0.085 0.288 
Number of other investors -0.465 0.098 -4.730 0.000 -0.658 -0.272 
Investment scale -0.237 0.032 -7.390 0.000 -0.300 -0.174 
Constant 3.848 0.567 6.790 0.000 2.736 4.959 
       
q54       
Government stability  0.501 0.216 2.320 0.020 0.078 0.925 
Socioeconomic conditions -0.349 0.171 -2.040 0.041 -0.685 -0.014 
Investment profile 0.505 0.217 2.320 0.020 0.079 0.932 
Internal conflict -0.515 0.243 -2.120 0.034 -0.992 -0.038 
External conflict 0.301 0.196 1.540 0.124 -0.083 0.684 
Corruption 0.474 0.218 2.170 0.030 0.046 0.901 
Military -0.387 0.178 -2.170 0.030 -0.736 -0.038 
Religious tensions 0.278 0.233 1.200 0.232 -0.178 0.735 
Law and order 0.157 0.243 0.640 0.519 -0.319 0.633 
Ethnic tensions 0.095 0.156 0.610 0.540 -0.210 0.401 
Democ. Account. -0.550 0.118 -4.680 0.000 -0.780 -0.319 
Bureaucratic quality 0.610 0.202 3.020 0.003 0.214 1.007 
Foreign debt -0.941 0.217 -4.330 0.000 -1.367 -0.515 
Current account 0.811 0.298 2.730 0.006 0.228 1.395 
Exchange rate stability -0.403 0.155 -2.590 0.010 -0.707 -0.098 
Distance -0.061 0.000 -0.720 0.469 0.000 0.000 
Foreign Investment Act 0.120 0.105 1.140 0.253 -0.086 0.325 
Host country involvement 0.017 0.099 0.170 0.863 -0.177 0.211 
Number of other investors -0.391 0.087 -4.480 0.000 -0.563 -0.220 
Investment scale -0.237 0.025 -9.660 0.000 -0.286 -0.189 
Constant 4.025 0.412 9.770 0.000 3.218 4.833 
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Appendix Table 6.11 (continued) 
 
  Bootstrap     
SHARELOGIT Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 
[95% 
Conf. 
Interval] 
       
q59       
Government stability  0.429 0.155 2.770 0.006 0.126 0.732 
Socioeconomic conditions -0.210 0.145 -1.450 0.148 -0.493 0.074 
Investment profile 0.375 0.204 1.840 0.066 -0.025 0.776 
Internal conflict -0.475 0.247 -1.930 0.054 -0.958 0.009 
External conflict 0.298 0.162 1.840 0.066 -0.020 0.616 
Corruption 0.423 0.204 2.070 0.039 0.022 0.823 
Military -0.389 0.142 -2.740 0.006 -0.668 -0.111 
Religious tensions 0.270 0.183 1.470 0.141 -0.089 0.629 
Law and order 0.010 0.224 0.040 0.966 -0.430 0.449 
Ethnic tensions 0.089 0.151 0.590 0.557 -0.208 0.385 
Democ. Account. -0.360 0.128 -2.810 0.005 -0.611 -0.109 
Bureaucratic quality 0.514 0.179 2.870 0.004 0.163 0.865 
Foreign debt -0.827 0.221 -3.740 0.000 -1.260 -0.394 
Current account 0.747 0.289 2.590 0.010 0.181 1.314 
Exchange rate stability -0.347 0.133 -2.600 0.009 -0.609 -0.086 
Distance -0.023 0.000 -0.310 0.760 0.000 0.000 
Foreign Investment Act 0.062 0.106 0.580 0.560 -0.146 0.270 
Host country involvement -0.017 0.098 -0.170 0.863 -0.209 0.175 
Number of other investors -0.299 0.096 -3.120 0.002 -0.486 -0.111 
Investment scale -0.209 0.029 -7.190 0.000 -0.266 -0.152 
Constant 3.505 0.443 7.910 0.000 2.636 4.375 
       
q75       
Government stability  0.197 0.143 1.380 0.168 -0.083 0.478 
Socioeconomic conditions 0.082 0.126 0.660 0.512 -0.164 0.329 
Investment profile 0.158 0.170 0.930 0.351 -0.174 0.491 
Internal conflict -0.113 0.165 -0.690 0.493 -0.436 0.210 
External conflict 0.260 0.180 1.440 0.150 -0.094 0.613 
Corruption 0.328 0.215 1.520 0.128 -0.094 0.751 
Military -0.206 0.115 -1.800 0.072 -0.431 0.019 
Religious tensions -0.017 0.126 -0.130 0.893 -0.263 0.229 
Law and order -0.001 0.134 -0.010 0.995 -0.263 0.261 
Ethnic tensions -0.165 0.101 -1.640 0.102 -0.362 0.033 
Democ. Account. -0.233 0.118 -1.970 0.049 -0.465 -0.001 
Bureaucratic quality 0.217 0.165 1.320 0.188 -0.106 0.541 
Foreign debt -0.477 0.198 -2.410 0.016 -0.865 -0.089 
Current account 0.333 0.217 1.540 0.125 -0.092 0.759 
Exchange rate stability -0.108 0.087 -1.250 0.213 -0.278 0.062 
Distance -0.039 0.000 -0.610 0.543 0.000 0.000 
Foreign Investment Act 0.025 0.050 0.510 0.613 -0.072 0.122 
Host country involvement 0.021 0.045 0.470 0.637 -0.067 0.109 
Number of other investors -0.249 0.096 -2.600 0.009 -0.437 -0.062 
Investment scale -0.092 0.038 -2.400 0.016 -0.167 -0.017 
Constant 1.841 0.782 2.360 0.019 0.308 3.373 
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Appendix Table 6.11 (continued) 
 
  Bootstrap     
SHARELOGIT Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 
[95% 
Conf. 
Interval] 
       
q85       
Government stability  0.533 0.346 1.540 0.124 -0.146 1.213 
Socioeconomic conditions 0.287 0.262 1.100 0.273 -0.226 0.800 
Investment profile 0.491 0.223 2.200 0.028 0.054 0.929 
Internal conflict -0.346 0.136 -2.540 0.011 -0.614 -0.079 
External conflict 0.200 0.370 0.540 0.590 -0.526 0.925 
Corruption 0.592 0.351 1.690 0.092 -0.096 1.281 
Military -0.218 0.186 -1.170 0.242 -0.583 0.147 
Religious tensions -0.157 0.228 -0.690 0.491 -0.605 0.290 
Law and order 0.452 0.299 1.510 0.131 -0.134 1.038 
Ethnic tensions -0.428 0.219 -1.950 0.051 -0.857 0.002 
Democ. Account. -0.456 0.104 -4.390 0.000 -0.659 -0.252 
Bureaucratic quality 0.134 0.263 0.510 0.610 -0.381 0.649 
Foreign debt -1.212 0.296 -4.090 0.000 -1.793 -0.631 
Current account 1.073 0.472 2.270 0.023 0.147 1.999 
Exchange rate stability -0.716 0.237 -3.020 0.003 -1.180 -0.251 
Distance 0.044 0.000 0.310 0.755 0.000 0.000 
Foreign Investment Act 0.116 0.108 1.080 0.282 -0.095 0.328 
Host country involvement -0.253 0.137 -1.850 0.064 -0.521 0.015 
Number of other investors -0.559 0.182 -3.080 0.002 -0.915 -0.203 
Investment scale -0.215 0.038 -5.640 0.000 -0.290 -0.141 
Constant 5.258 0.661 7.950 0.000 3.962 6.555 
       
q87       
Government stability  0.569 0.340 1.670 0.095 -0.098 1.236 
Socioeconomic conditions 0.274 0.228 1.200 0.230 -0.174 0.722 
Investment profile 0.596 0.203 2.940 0.003 0.198 0.994 
Internal conflict -0.343 0.187 -1.830 0.067 -0.710 0.025 
External conflict 0.080 0.402 0.200 0.842 -0.708 0.868 
Corruption 0.518 0.323 1.600 0.109 -0.116 1.152 
Military -0.138 0.202 -0.680 0.495 -0.534 0.258 
Religious tensions -0.084 0.247 -0.340 0.734 -0.568 0.400 
Law and order 0.245 0.310 0.790 0.429 -0.363 0.853 
Ethnic tensions -0.343 0.192 -1.780 0.075 -0.720 0.034 
Democ. Account. -0.522 0.138 -3.780 0.000 -0.792 -0.251 
Bureaucratic quality 0.325 0.322 1.010 0.313 -0.306 0.956 
Foreign debt -1.305 0.258 -5.060 0.000 -1.811 -0.800 
Current account 1.159 0.443 2.620 0.009 0.290 2.029 
Exchange rate stability -0.745 0.210 -3.540 0.000 -1.157 -0.333 
Distance 0.033 0.000 0.250 0.800 0.000 0.000 
Foreign Investment Act 0.119 0.102 1.160 0.245 -0.081 0.319 
Host country involvement -0.331 0.110 -3.010 0.003 -0.546 -0.115 
Number of other investors -0.563 0.176 -3.200 0.001 -0.908 -0.217 
Investment scale -0.267 0.047 -5.700 0.000 -0.359 -0.175 
Constant 6.307 0.641 9.840 0.000 5.050 7.563 
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Appendix Table 6.11 (continued) 
 
  Bootstrap     
SHARELOGIT Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 
[95% 
Conf. 
Interval] 
       
q88       
Government stability  0.628 0.314 2.000 0.045 0.013 1.244 
Socioeconomic conditions 0.235 0.250 0.940 0.348 -0.256 0.726 
Investment profile 0.691 0.233 2.970 0.003 0.236 1.147 
Internal conflict -0.327 0.233 -1.400 0.160 -0.784 0.129 
External conflict -0.042 0.414 -0.100 0.919 -0.854 0.770 
Corruption 0.401 0.330 1.210 0.225 -0.247 1.048 
Military -0.055 0.221 -0.250 0.804 -0.488 0.379 
Religious tensions -0.063 0.265 -0.240 0.812 -0.583 0.457 
Law and order 0.266 0.351 0.760 0.448 -0.421 0.954 
Ethnic tensions -0.330 0.216 -1.530 0.126 -0.752 0.093 
Democ. Account. -0.547 0.144 -3.790 0.000 -0.830 -0.264 
Bureaucratic quality 0.394 0.315 1.250 0.211 -0.223 1.011 
Foreign debt -1.383 0.282 -4.900 0.000 -1.937 -0.829 
Current account 1.308 0.484 2.700 0.007 0.360 2.256 
Exchange rate stability -0.721 0.234 -3.080 0.002 -1.179 -0.262 
Distance 0.022 0.000 0.160 0.872 0.000 0.000 
Foreign Investment Act 0.060 0.119 0.500 0.615 -0.174 0.294 
Host country involvement -0.378 0.120 -3.140 0.002 -0.614 -0.142 
Number of other investors -0.534 0.194 -2.750 0.006 -0.915 -0.153 
Investment scale -0.325 0.047 -6.840 0.000 -0.418 -0.232 
Constant 7.314 0.624 11.720 0.000 6.091 8.537 
       
q90       
Government stability  0.628 0.395 1.590 0.112 -0.147 1.403 
Socioeconomic conditions 0.180 0.318 0.570 0.571 -0.444 0.805 
Investment profile 0.744 0.342 2.170 0.030 0.072 1.415 
Internal conflict -0.117 0.265 -0.440 0.658 -0.637 0.402 
External conflict 0.032 0.368 0.090 0.930 -0.690 0.754 
Corruption 0.331 0.372 0.890 0.373 -0.397 1.060 
Military -0.010 0.285 -0.040 0.971 -0.569 0.548 
Religious tensions 0.030 0.265 0.110 0.911 -0.489 0.548 
Law and order 0.020 0.356 0.060 0.955 -0.678 0.718 
Ethnic tensions -0.315 0.225 -1.400 0.161 -0.756 0.125 
Democ. Account. -0.618 0.163 -3.790 0.000 -0.938 -0.299 
Bureaucratic quality 0.592 0.322 1.840 0.066 -0.040 1.225 
Foreign debt -1.368 0.324 -4.220 0.000 -2.004 -0.732 
Current account 1.115 0.465 2.400 0.017 0.203 2.027 
Exchange rate stability -0.750 0.244 -3.070 0.002 -1.229 -0.271 
Distance -0.023 0.000 -0.150 0.880 0.000 0.000 
Foreign Investment Act 0.122 0.137 0.890 0.373 -0.147 0.391 
Host country involvement -0.524 0.128 -4.090 0.000 -0.775 -0.272 
Number of other investors -0.393 0.230 -1.710 0.087 -0.843 0.057 
Investment scale -0.358 0.060 -5.950 0.000 -0.476 -0.240 
Constant 8.103 0.746 10.870 0.000 6.641 9.565 
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Appendix Table 6.11 (continued) 
 
  Bootstrap     
SHARELOGIT Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 
[95% 
Conf. 
Interval] 
       
q92       
Government stability  0.279 0.404 0.690 0.490 -0.514 1.072 
Socioeconomic conditions 0.190 0.309 0.610 0.540 -0.417 0.796 
Investment profile 0.803 0.423 1.900 0.058 -0.027 1.633 
Internal conflict 0.135 0.398 0.340 0.734 -0.645 0.916 
External conflict -0.057 0.452 -0.130 0.899 -0.944 0.829 
Corruption 0.515 0.468 1.100 0.272 -0.403 1.432 
Military -0.057 0.353 -0.160 0.871 -0.749 0.635 
Religious tensions 0.051 0.316 0.160 0.873 -0.570 0.671 
Law and order 0.079 0.402 0.200 0.844 -0.708 0.867 
Ethnic tensions -0.283 0.296 -0.960 0.339 -0.862 0.297 
Democ. Account. -0.738 0.195 -3.790 0.000 -1.120 -0.356 
Bureaucratic quality 0.702 0.329 2.140 0.033 0.058 1.346 
Foreign debt -1.650 0.264 -6.240 0.000 -2.168 -1.131 
Current account 1.606 0.484 3.320 0.001 0.656 2.556 
Exchange rate stability -0.793 0.236 -3.360 0.001 -1.256 -0.330 
Distance -0.016 0.000 -1.040 0.301 0.000 0.000 
Foreign Investment Act 0.212 0.145 1.460 0.144 -0.072 0.495 
Host country involvement -0.591 0.132 -4.460 0.000 -0.851 -0.332 
Number of other investors -0.240 0.221 -1.080 0.278 -0.673 0.194 
Investment scale -0.414 0.069 -6.040 0.000 -0.549 -0.280 
Constant 8.928 0.961 9.290 0.000 7.043 10.812 
       
q95       
Government stability  -0.050 0.553 -0.090 0.928 -1.135 1.035 
Socioeconomic conditions 0.634 0.324 1.960 0.050 0.000 1.269 
Investment profile 0.987 0.472 2.090 0.037 0.061 1.913 
Internal conflict 0.355 0.511 0.690 0.487 -0.647 1.358 
External conflict 0.230 0.487 0.470 0.636 -0.725 1.186 
Corruption 0.933 0.526 1.780 0.076 -0.097 1.964 
Military -0.156 0.374 -0.420 0.676 -0.890 0.577 
Religious tensions 0.023 0.414 0.050 0.956 -0.789 0.834 
Law and order 0.300 0.547 0.550 0.584 -0.773 1.373 
Ethnic tensions -0.803 0.465 -1.730 0.084 -1.715 0.109 
Democ. Account. -0.805 0.241 -3.340 0.001 -1.277 -0.332 
Bureaucratic quality 0.145 0.445 0.330 0.744 -0.726 1.017 
Foreign debt -1.427 0.404 -3.530 0.000 -2.219 -0.635 
Current account 0.911 0.595 1.530 0.126 -0.255 2.077 
Exchange rate stability -0.640 0.296 -2.160 0.031 -1.220 -0.060 
Distance -0.025 0.000 -1.340 0.179 0.000 0.000 
Foreign Investment Act 0.329 0.202 1.630 0.103 -0.067 0.725 
Host country involvement -0.788 0.109 -7.210 0.000 -1.003 -0.574 
Number of other investors -0.072 0.223 -0.320 0.746 -0.510 0.365 
Investment scale -0.449 0.060 -7.440 0.000 -0.567 -0.330 
Constant 10.062 0.920 10.930 0.000 8.257 11.866 
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Appendix Table 6.11 (continued) 
 
  Bootstrap     
SHARELOGIT Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 
[95% 
Conf. 
Interval] 
       
q96       
Government stability  0.203 0.627 0.320 0.746 -1.026 1.433 
Socioeconomic conditions 0.461 0.350 1.320 0.187 -0.224 1.147 
Investment profile 1.367 0.529 2.590 0.010 0.330 2.404 
Internal conflict 0.259 0.473 0.550 0.584 -0.668 1.187 
External conflict 0.173 0.548 0.320 0.752 -0.901 1.248 
Corruption 0.843 0.509 1.650 0.098 -0.156 1.841 
Military -0.209 0.443 -0.470 0.637 -1.078 0.660 
Religious tensions 0.215 0.459 0.470 0.640 -0.686 1.115 
Law and order 0.287 0.529 0.540 0.587 -0.750 1.324 
Ethnic tensions -0.761 0.428 -1.780 0.075 -1.601 0.078 
Democ. Account. -0.835 0.253 -3.300 0.001 -1.330 -0.340 
Bureaucratic quality 0.349 0.509 0.680 0.494 -0.650 1.348 
Foreign debt -1.354 0.410 -3.300 0.001 -2.158 -0.549 
Current account 0.778 0.572 1.360 0.174 -0.344 1.900 
Exchange rate stability -0.491 0.388 -1.270 0.206 -1.253 0.270 
Distance -0.035 0.000 -1.630 0.103 0.000 0.000 
Foreign Investment Act 0.313 0.221 1.420 0.156 -0.119 0.746 
Host country involvement -0.755 0.110 -6.850 0.000 -0.971 -0.539 
Number of other investors -0.046 0.223 -0.210 0.837 -0.483 0.391 
Investment scale -0.496 0.066 -7.530 0.000 -0.625 -0.367 
Constant 10.882 1.162 9.370 0.000 8.604 13.160 
       
q97       
Government stability  0.147 0.600 0.250 0.806 -1.029 1.323 
Socioeconomic conditions 0.128 0.434 0.290 0.769 -0.724 0.979 
Investment profile 1.556 0.596 2.610 0.009 0.387 2.725 
Internal conflict 0.176 0.526 0.330 0.738 -0.855 1.207 
External conflict 0.262 0.497 0.530 0.599 -0.713 1.236 
Corruption 1.124 0.610 1.840 0.066 -0.072 2.320 
Military -0.385 0.415 -0.930 0.353 -1.199 0.428 
Religious tensions 0.029 0.436 0.070 0.947 -0.827 0.885 
Law and order 0.242 0.694 0.350 0.727 -1.119 1.603 
Ethnic tensions -0.473 0.398 -1.190 0.234 -1.253 0.307 
Democ. Account. -0.917 0.373 -2.460 0.014 -1.649 -0.186 
Bureaucratic quality 0.353 0.478 0.740 0.461 -0.585 1.290 
Foreign debt -1.283 0.455 -2.820 0.005 -2.174 -0.391 
Current account 1.031 0.601 1.710 0.086 -0.148 2.210 
Exchange rate stability -0.574 0.381 -1.510 0.132 -1.321 0.173 
Distance -0.042 0.000 -1.650 0.099 0.000 0.000 
Foreign Investment Act 0.431 0.205 2.110 0.035 0.030 0.832 
Host country involvement -0.793 0.120 -6.600 0.000 -1.029 -0.558 
Number of other investors -0.006 0.247 -0.020 0.980 -0.490 0.478 
Investment scale -0.538 0.084 -6.380 0.000 -0.703 -0.372 
Constant 11.566 1.440 8.030 0.000 8.741 14.390 
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Appendix Table 6.11 (continued) 
 
  Bootstrap     
SHARELOGIT Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 
[95% 
Conf. 
Interval] 
       
q99       
Government stability  0.650 0.619 1.050 0.294 -0.564 1.863 
Socioeconomic conditions 0.824 0.644 1.280 0.201 -0.438 2.086 
Investment profile 1.805 0.759 2.380 0.017 0.317 3.292 
Internal conflict -0.736 0.880 -0.840 0.403 -2.461 0.988 
External conflict -0.213 0.723 -0.290 0.768 -1.631 1.204 
Corruption 0.471 0.746 0.630 0.528 -0.992 1.934 
Military -1.325 0.758 -1.750 0.080 -2.811 0.160 
Religious tensions 0.924 0.859 1.080 0.282 -0.761 2.608 
Law and order 0.320 0.881 0.360 0.717 -1.407 2.047 
Ethnic tensions -0.595 0.448 -1.330 0.184 -1.473 0.283 
Democ. Account. -0.301 0.472 -0.640 0.524 -1.227 0.624 
Bureaucratic quality 1.197 0.910 1.320 0.188 -0.586 2.980 
Foreign debt -0.601 0.653 -0.920 0.357 -1.881 0.678 
Current account -0.113 1.189 -0.100 0.924 -2.444 2.218 
Exchange rate stability -0.322 0.525 -0.610 0.540 -1.352 0.708 
Distance -0.065 0.000 -1.480 0.138 0.000 0.000 
Foreign Investment Act -0.136 0.241 -0.560 0.573 -0.608 0.336 
Host country involvement -0.740 0.151 -4.900 0.000 -1.036 -0.443 
Number of other investors 0.244 0.281 0.870 0.385 -0.306 0.795 
Investment scale -0.418 0.146 -2.860 0.004 -0.704 -0.132 
Constant 10.191 2.060 4.950 0.000 6.152 14.229 
Number of observations 3,330      
R-squared     .05 Pseudo R2= 0.0896   
    .13 Pseudo R2= 0.0500   
    .21 Pseudo R2= 0.0620   
    .27 Pseudo R2= 0.0582   
    .35 Pseudo R2= 0.0508   
    .42 Pseudo R2= 0.0574   
    .49 Pseudo R2= 0.0590   
    .54 Pseudo R2= 0.0555   
    .59 Pseudo R2= 0.0493   
    .75 Pseudo R2= 0.0061   
 .85 Pseudo R2= 0.0554   
 .87 Pseudo R2= 0.0733   
 .88 Pseudo R2= 0.0833   
 .90 Pseudo R2= 0.0908   
 .92 Pseudo R2= 0.0886   
 .95 Pseudo R2= 0.1170   
 .96 Pseudo R2= 0.1350   
 .97 Pseudo R2= 0.1264   
 .99 Pseudo R2= 0.1454   
 
Note: Quantile regression results, where quantiles q5, q13, q21 correspond to investor equity shares of 5% 10%, 
15% and so on. 
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Appendix Table 6.12: Marginal Effects from Regressions in Appendix Table 6.11 
 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 
Government stability  0.065 0.111 0.096 0.120 0.152 0.140 0.102 
Investment profile -0.053 -0.017 0.086 0.115 0.020 0.031 0.092 
Law and order -0.055 -0.047 -0.045 -0.031 -0.0001 -0.016 -0.010 
Bureaucratic quality -0.035 -0.034 0.072 0.053 0.116 0.139 0.169 
Corruption 0.020 0.045 0.069 0.093 0.052 0.133 0.129 
Democ. Account. 0.024 0.052 0.005 -0.002 -0.015 -0.036 -0.117 
Military 0.010 -0.046 -0.114 -0.115 -0.082 -0.107 -0.102 
Internal conflict 0.014 -0.015 -0.070 -0.142 -0.248 -0.272 -0.162 
External conflict -0.004 -0.018 0.023 0.046 0.087 0.072 0.096 
Socioeconomic conditions -0.004 -0.045 -0.088 -0.106 -0.050 -0.051 -0.050 
Religious tensions 0.018 0.031 0.070 0.104 0.110 0.134 0.076 
Ethnic tensions -0.002 0.019 0.037 0.116 0.109 0.094 0.037 
 
 40% 45% 50% 55% 60% 65% 70% 
Government stability  0.124 0.104 0.037 0.068 0.064 0.066 0.057 
Investment profile 0.126 0.091 0.030 0.063 0.067 0.073 0.067 
Law and order 0.039 0.002 -0.0001 0.058 0.028 0.028 0.002 
Bureaucratic quality 0.152 0.124 0.041 0.017 0.037 0.042 0.053 
Corruption 0.118 0.102 0.062 0.076 0.059 0.042 0.030 
Democ. Account. -0.137 -0.087 -0.044 -0.058 -0.059 -0.058 -0.056 
Military -0.096 -0.094 -0.039 -0.028 -0.016 -0.006 -0.001 
Internal conflict -0.128 -0.115 -0.021 -0.044 -0.039 -0.035 -0.011 
External conflict 0.075 0.072 0.049 0.025 0.009 -0.004 0.003 
Socioeconomic conditions -0.087 -0.051 0.015 0.037 0.031 0.025 0.016 
Religious tensions 0.069 0.065 -0.003 -0.020 -0.009 -0.007 0.003 
Ethnic tensions 0.024 0.022 -0.031 -0.055 -0.039 -0.035 -0.028 
 
 75% 80% 85% 90% 95%   
Government stability  0.021 -0.002 0.008 0.004 0.006   
Investment profile 0.059 0.047 0.052 0.045 0.018   
Law and order 0.006 0.014 0.011 0.007 0.003   
Bureaucratic quality 0.052 0.007 0.013 0.010 0.012   
Corruption 0.038 0.044 0.032 0.033 0.005   
Democ. Account. -0.054 -0.038 -0.032 -0.027 -0.003   
Military -0.004 -0.007 -0.008 -0.011 -0.013   
Internal conflict 0.010 0.017 0.010 0.005 -0.007   
External conflict -0.004 0.011 0.007 0.008 -0.002   
Socioeconomic conditions 0.014 0.030 0.018 0.004 0.008   
Religious tensions 0.004 0.001 0.008 0.001 0.009   
Ethnic tensions -0.021 -0.038 -0.029 -0.014 -0.006   
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Appendix Table 6.13: Quantile Regression Results for Investors Equity Share by Percent  
  Bootstrap     
SHARELOGIT Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 
[95% 
Conf. 
Interval] 
       
q5       
Government stability  1.366 0.495 2.760 0.006 0.394 2.337 
Socioeconomic conditions -0.088 0.328 -0.270 0.788 -0.732 0.555 
Investment profile -1.111 0.461 -2.410 0.016 -2.015 -0.207 
Internal conflict 0.299 0.447 0.670 0.504 -0.578 1.176 
External conflict -0.088 0.477 -0.180 0.853 -1.023 0.847 
Corruption 0.425 0.501 0.850 0.397 -0.558 1.408 
Military 0.208 0.483 0.430 0.666 -0.739 1.156 
Religious tensions 0.383 0.304 1.260 0.207 -0.213 0.979 
Law and order -1.166 0.568 -2.050 0.040 -2.279 -0.052 
Ethnic tensions -0.046 0.450 -0.100 0.918 -0.930 0.837 
Democ. Account. 0.497 0.349 1.420 0.155 -0.188 1.182 
Bureaucratic quality -0.736 0.515 -1.430 0.153 -1.745 0.273 
Foreign debt 0.022 0.554 0.040 0.968 -1.064 1.108 
Current account -0.431 0.702 -0.610 0.539 -1.808 0.946 
Exchange rate stability -1.088 0.411 -2.650 0.008 -1.894 -0.283 
Distance -0.029 0.000 -1.420 0.157 0.000 0.000 
Foreign Investment Act -0.363 0.181 -2.000 0.045 -0.719 -0.008 
Host country involvement 0.197 0.146 1.350 0.177 -0.089 0.484 
Number of other investors -1.048 0.221 -4.750 0.000 -1.480 -0.616 
Investment scale -0.140 0.060 -2.320 0.020 -0.258 -0.022 
Constant 1.284 1.187 1.080 0.279 -1.043 3.611 
       
q10       
Government stability  0.794 0.522 1.520 0.128 -0.230 1.817 
Socioeconomic conditions -0.154 0.408 -0.380 0.706 -0.953 0.646 
Investment profile -0.131 0.544 -0.240 0.810 -1.198 0.936 
Internal conflict 0.252 0.393 0.640 0.522 -0.519 1.022 
External conflict 0.019 0.288 0.070 0.946 -0.545 0.584 
Corruption 0.463 0.318 1.460 0.145 -0.160 1.086 
Military -0.226 0.281 -0.810 0.421 -0.777 0.325 
Religious tensions 0.093 0.210 0.440 0.657 -0.318 0.505 
Law and order -0.557 0.509 -1.090 0.274 -1.556 0.442 
Ethnic tensions 0.007 0.427 0.020 0.986 -0.831 0.845 
Democ. Account. 0.401 0.273 1.470 0.142 -0.134 0.937 
Bureaucratic quality -0.698 0.230 -3.040 0.002 -1.148 -0.248 
Foreign debt -0.430 0.388 -1.110 0.268 -1.192 0.332 
Current account 0.312 0.502 0.620 0.535 -0.672 1.295 
Exchange rate stability -1.351 0.418 -3.230 0.001 -2.171 -0.531 
Distance -0.018 0.000 -0.820 0.410 0.000 0.000 
Foreign Investment Act -0.255 0.273 -0.930 0.351 -0.790 0.280 
Host country involvement 0.273 0.132 2.060 0.039 0.014 0.531 
Number of other investors -0.815 0.208 -3.920 0.000 -1.223 -0.408 
Investment scale -0.119 0.047 -2.510 0.012 -0.211 -0.026 
Constant 1.170 0.980 1.190 0.233 -0.752 3.092 
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Appendix Table 6.13 (continued) 
 
  Bootstrap     
SHARELOGIT Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 
[95% 
Conf. 
Interval] 
       
q15       
Government stability  0.862 0.516 1.670 0.095 -0.150 1.875 
Socioeconomic conditions -0.605 0.386 -1.570 0.117 -1.362 0.152 
Investment profile 0.071 0.451 0.160 0.875 -0.814 0.956 
Internal conflict -0.501 0.304 -1.650 0.100 -1.096 0.095 
External conflict -0.119 0.401 -0.300 0.767 -0.906 0.668 
Corruption 0.284 0.456 0.620 0.534 -0.610 1.178 
Military -0.318 0.279 -1.140 0.255 -0.864 0.229 
Religious tensions 0.298 0.226 1.320 0.188 -0.146 0.742 
Law and order -0.338 0.462 -0.730 0.465 -1.244 0.568 
Ethnic tensions 0.148 0.281 0.530 0.598 -0.403 0.698 
Democ. Account. 0.146 0.297 0.490 0.623 -0.436 0.728 
Bureaucratic quality 0.119 0.417 0.290 0.775 -0.698 0.936 
Foreign debt -0.576 0.285 -2.020 0.043 -1.134 -0.018 
Current account 0.626 0.380 1.650 0.100 -0.120 1.371 
Exchange rate stability -1.033 0.335 -3.090 0.002 -1.689 -0.377 
Distance -0.029 0.000 -1.360 0.175 0.000 0.000 
Foreign Investment Act -0.158 0.225 -0.700 0.481 -0.598 0.282 
Host country involvement 0.397 0.144 2.750 0.006 0.114 0.680 
Number of other investors -0.956 0.211 -4.530 0.000 -1.369 -0.542 
Investment scale -0.146 0.054 -2.710 0.007 -0.252 -0.041 
Constant 1.627 0.965 1.690 0.092 -0.265 3.518 
       
q20       
Government stability  0.635 0.456 1.390 0.164 -0.260 1.530 
Socioeconomic conditions -0.445 0.398 -1.120 0.264 -1.225 0.336 
Investment profile 0.487 0.491 0.990 0.321 -0.476 1.449 
Internal conflict -0.293 0.395 -0.740 0.458 -1.068 0.482 
External conflict 0.092 0.351 0.260 0.793 -0.596 0.780 
Corruption 0.235 0.418 0.560 0.574 -0.584 1.053 
Military -0.647 0.247 -2.620 0.009 -1.132 -0.162 
Religious tensions 0.424 0.303 1.400 0.162 -0.171 1.018 
Law and order -0.207 0.325 -0.640 0.523 -0.844 0.429 
Ethnic tensions 0.035 0.241 0.150 0.883 -0.436 0.507 
Democ. Account. -0.003 0.242 -0.010 0.990 -0.478 0.472 
Bureaucratic quality 0.401 0.359 1.120 0.264 -0.303 1.105 
Foreign debt -0.750 0.241 -3.120 0.002 -1.222 -0.278 
Current account 0.656 0.373 1.760 0.079 -0.075 1.387 
Exchange rate stability -0.825 0.254 -3.250 0.001 -1.323 -0.328 
Distance -0.026 0.000 -1.480 0.138 0.000 0.000 
Foreign Investment Act -0.072 0.207 -0.350 0.730 -0.478 0.335 
Host country involvement 0.338 0.127 2.660 0.008 0.089 0.587 
Number of other investors -0.944 0.196 -4.820 0.000 -1.328 -0.560 
Investment scale -0.138 0.049 -2.820 0.005 -0.233 -0.042 
Constant 1.699 0.784 2.170 0.030 0.163 3.236 
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Appendix Table 6.13 (continued) 
 
  Bootstrap     
SHARELOGIT Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 
[95% 
Conf. 
Interval] 
       
q25       
Government stability  0.619 0.433 1.430 0.153 -0.230 1.467 
Socioeconomic conditions -0.566 0.387 -1.460 0.144 -1.326 0.193 
Investment profile 0.727 0.459 1.590 0.113 -0.172 1.626 
Internal conflict -0.468 0.390 -1.200 0.231 -1.233 0.297 
External conflict 0.251 0.307 0.820 0.413 -0.350 0.852 
Corruption 0.377 0.291 1.300 0.195 -0.194 0.947 
Military -0.628 0.221 -2.850 0.004 -1.061 -0.196 
Religious tensions 0.434 0.279 1.560 0.120 -0.113 0.980 
Law and order -0.257 0.351 -0.730 0.464 -0.945 0.431 
Ethnic tensions 0.433 0.272 1.590 0.112 -0.101 0.967 
Democ. Account. 0.090 0.180 0.500 0.615 -0.262 0.443 
Bureaucratic quality 0.215 0.278 0.770 0.440 -0.330 0.760 
Foreign debt -0.715 0.206 -3.480 0.001 -1.118 -0.312 
Current account 0.795 0.420 1.890 0.059 -0.029 1.619 
Exchange rate stability -0.802 0.251 -3.200 0.001 -1.294 -0.310 
Distance -0.020 0.000 -1.210 0.228 0.000 0.000 
Foreign Investment Act 0.026 0.158 0.160 0.872 -0.285 0.336 
Host country involvement 0.309 0.091 3.400 0.001 0.131 0.488 
Number of other investors -0.865 0.169 -5.130 0.000 -1.196 -0.534 
Investment scale -0.167 0.034 -4.850 0.000 -0.235 -0.100 
Constant 2.101 0.617 3.400 0.001 0.891 3.312 
       
q30       
Government stability  0.522 0.300 1.740 0.082 -0.066 1.110 
Socioeconomic conditions -0.271 0.275 -0.990 0.324 -0.810 0.268 
Investment profile 0.382 0.280 1.360 0.173 -0.167 0.931 
Internal conflict -0.893 0.313 -2.850 0.004 -1.507 -0.279 
External conflict 0.309 0.272 1.140 0.256 -0.224 0.841 
Corruption 0.389 0.322 1.210 0.227 -0.243 1.022 
Military -0.488 0.225 -2.170 0.030 -0.930 -0.047 
Religious tensions 0.369 0.252 1.470 0.143 -0.125 0.863 
Law and order -0.085 0.251 -0.340 0.734 -0.577 0.406 
Ethnic tensions 0.585 0.198 2.960 0.003 0.197 0.972 
Democ. Account. 0.017 0.172 0.100 0.921 -0.321 0.355 
Bureaucratic quality 0.285 0.205 1.390 0.165 -0.117 0.687 
Foreign debt -0.737 0.231 -3.190 0.001 -1.190 -0.284 
Current account 0.783 0.390 2.000 0.045 0.017 1.548 
Exchange rate stability -0.823 0.243 -3.390 0.001 -1.299 -0.346 
Distance -0.021 0.000 -1.230 0.217 0.000 0.000 
Foreign Investment Act -0.014 0.106 -0.140 0.892 -0.223 0.194 
Host country involvement 0.267 0.068 3.950 0.000 0.134 0.399 
Number of other investors -0.761 0.143 -5.330 0.000 -1.041 -0.481 
Investment scale -0.225 0.041 -5.500 0.000 -0.306 -0.145 
Constant 3.299 0.620 5.320 0.000 2.084 4.513 
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Appendix Table 6.13 (continued) 
 
  Bootstrap     
SHARELOGIT Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 
[95% 
Conf. 
Interval] 
       
q35       
Government stability  0.668 0.267 2.500 0.012 0.144 1.193 
Socioeconomic conditions -0.218 0.229 -0.950 0.340 -0.667 0.230 
Investment profile 0.088 0.213 0.410 0.680 -0.330 0.506 
Internal conflict -1.088 0.223 -4.880 0.000 -1.526 -0.651 
External conflict 0.384 0.187 2.060 0.040 0.018 0.750 
Corruption 0.228 0.331 0.690 0.491 -0.421 0.877 
Military -0.360 0.186 -1.930 0.054 -0.725 0.006 
Religious tensions 0.485 0.220 2.210 0.028 0.054 0.917 
Law and order 0.000 0.217 0.000 0.999 -0.426 0.425 
Ethnic tensions 0.477 0.166 2.880 0.004 0.153 0.802 
Democ. Account. -0.067 0.191 -0.350 0.726 -0.442 0.308 
Bureaucratic quality 0.512 0.252 2.030 0.042 0.018 1.006 
Foreign debt -0.691 0.281 -2.460 0.014 -1.242 -0.140 
Current account 0.633 0.410 1.540 0.123 -0.172 1.438 
Exchange rate stability -0.552 0.179 -3.080 0.002 -0.904 -0.200 
Distance -0.012 0.000 -0.790 0.428 0.000 0.000 
Foreign Investment Act -0.013 0.104 -0.130 0.899 -0.216 0.190 
Host country involvement 0.262 0.056 4.670 0.000 0.152 0.372 
Number of other investors -0.741 0.097 -7.650 0.000 -0.931 -0.551 
Investment scale -0.223 0.031 -7.300 0.000 -0.283 -0.163 
Constant 3.258 0.477 6.830 0.000 2.322 4.193 
       
q40       
Government stability  0.690 0.247 2.790 0.005 0.204 1.175 
Socioeconomic conditions -0.183 0.201 -0.910 0.362 -0.578 0.211 
Investment profile 0.067 0.188 0.360 0.721 -0.301 0.435 
Internal conflict -1.005 0.237 -4.230 0.000 -1.471 -0.540 
External conflict 0.257 0.223 1.150 0.250 -0.180 0.694 
Corruption 0.532 0.346 1.540 0.124 -0.146 1.209 
Military -0.385 0.232 -1.660 0.097 -0.840 0.070 
Religious tensions 0.486 0.211 2.310 0.021 0.074 0.899 
Law and order -0.160 0.254 -0.630 0.528 -0.659 0.338 
Ethnic tensions 0.373 0.176 2.110 0.035 0.027 0.718 
Democ. Account. -0.147 0.198 -0.740 0.457 -0.534 0.240 
Bureaucratic quality 0.561 0.252 2.220 0.026 0.066 1.056 
Foreign debt -0.885 0.251 -3.530 0.000 -1.377 -0.393 
Current account 0.826 0.470 1.760 0.079 -0.095 1.747 
Exchange rate stability -0.421 0.196 -2.140 0.032 -0.807 -0.036 
Distance -0.090 0.000 -0.790 0.430 0.000 0.000 
Foreign Investment Act -0.046 0.086 -0.530 0.597 -0.215 0.124 
Host country involvement 0.173 0.048 3.640 0.000 0.080 0.267 
Number of other investors -0.630 0.101 -6.210 0.000 -0.829 -0.431 
Investment scale -0.217 0.034 -6.370 0.000 -0.283 -0.150 
Constant 3.146 0.580 5.420 0.000 2.009 4.283 
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Appendix Table 6.13 (continued) 
 
  Bootstrap     
SHARELOGIT Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 
[95% 
Conf. 
Interval] 
       
q45       
Government stability  0.521 0.271 1.920 0.054 -0.010 1.051 
Socioeconomic conditions -0.235 0.152 -1.550 0.122 -0.533 0.063 
Investment profile 0.361 0.225 1.600 0.109 -0.080 0.803 
Internal conflict -0.855 0.227 -3.760 0.000 -1.300 -0.409 
External conflict 0.270 0.219 1.230 0.218 -0.160 0.700 
Corruption 0.656 0.296 2.220 0.027 0.076 1.237 
Military -0.560 0.217 -2.580 0.010 -0.985 -0.134 
Religious tensions 0.473 0.199 2.380 0.017 0.083 0.863 
Law and order -0.071 0.186 -0.380 0.702 -0.437 0.294 
Ethnic tensions 0.280 0.196 1.430 0.153 -0.104 0.663 
Democ. Account. -0.257 0.166 -1.550 0.122 -0.582 0.069 
Bureaucratic quality 0.574 0.192 2.990 0.003 0.197 0.951 
Foreign debt -0.963 0.243 -3.970 0.000 -1.439 -0.487 
Current account 0.808 0.356 2.270 0.023 0.110 1.506 
Exchange rate stability -0.392 0.170 -2.310 0.021 -0.725 -0.059 
Distance -0.034 0.000 -0.330 0.742 0.000 0.000 
Foreign Investment Act -0.024 0.109 -0.220 0.827 -0.236 0.189 
Host country involvement 0.112 0.046 2.430 0.015 0.021 0.203 
Number of other investors -0.453 0.109 -4.170 0.000 -0.667 -0.240 
Investment scale -0.235 0.038 -6.260 0.000 -0.308 -0.161 
Constant 3.523 0.570 6.180 0.000 2.405 4.640 
       
q50       
Government stability  0.459 0.271 1.690 0.091 -0.074 0.991 
Socioeconomic conditions -0.212 0.204 -1.040 0.300 -0.613 0.189 
Investment profile 0.343 0.234 1.460 0.144 -0.117 0.803 
Internal conflict -0.569 0.252 -2.260 0.024 -1.063 -0.075 
External conflict 0.410 0.207 1.980 0.048 0.004 0.816 
Corruption 0.489 0.270 1.810 0.070 -0.040 1.019 
Military -0.421 0.159 -2.640 0.008 -0.733 -0.108 
Religious tensions 0.284 0.216 1.310 0.189 -0.140 0.707 
Law and order 0.008 0.198 0.040 0.969 -0.380 0.395 
Ethnic tensions 0.049 0.162 0.300 0.761 -0.269 0.368 
Democ. Account. -0.428 0.190 -2.250 0.024 -0.800 -0.055 
Bureaucratic quality 0.620 0.217 2.850 0.004 0.194 1.046 
Foreign debt -0.932 0.217 -4.310 0.000 -1.357 -0.508 
Current account 0.733 0.303 2.420 0.016 0.138 1.328 
Exchange rate stability -0.400 0.189 -2.110 0.035 -0.771 -0.029 
Distance -0.058 0.000 -0.060 0.950 0.000 0.000 
Foreign Investment Act 0.035 0.115 0.300 0.763 -0.191 0.261 
Host country involvement 0.082 0.067 1.230 0.219 -0.049 0.213 
Number of other investors -0.462 0.109 -4.220 0.000 -0.676 -0.247 
Investment scale -0.230 0.040 -5.820 0.000 -0.308 -0.153 
Constant 3.793 0.573 6.620 0.000 2.670 4.917 
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Appendix Table 6.13 (continued) 
 
  Bootstrap     
SHARELOGIT Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 
[95% 
Conf. 
Interval] 
       
q55       
Government stability  0.519 0.266 1.950 0.051 -0.002 1.040 
Socioeconomic conditions -0.336 0.206 -1.630 0.103 -0.739 0.068 
Investment profile 0.484 0.225 2.150 0.031 0.044 0.925 
Internal conflict -0.546 0.281 -1.950 0.052 -1.096 0.004 
External conflict 0.291 0.170 1.710 0.087 -0.042 0.624 
Corruption 0.428 0.255 1.680 0.094 -0.072 0.928 
Military -0.382 0.166 -2.300 0.021 -0.708 -0.056 
Religious tensions 0.248 0.203 1.220 0.222 -0.150 0.647 
Law and order 0.227 0.243 0.940 0.349 -0.248 0.703 
Ethnic tensions 0.041 0.167 0.250 0.805 -0.286 0.368 
Democ. Account. -0.501 0.176 -2.850 0.004 -0.846 -0.157 
Bureaucratic quality 0.553 0.212 2.600 0.009 0.137 0.969 
Foreign debt -0.976 0.181 -5.400 0.000 -1.330 -0.622 
Current account 0.917 0.275 3.330 0.001 0.377 1.456 
Exchange rate stability -0.435 0.157 -2.780 0.006 -0.742 -0.128 
Distance -0.049 0.000 -0.510 0.610 0.000 0.000 
Foreign Investment Act 0.093 0.124 0.750 0.452 -0.150 0.336 
Host country involvement 0.014 0.049 0.280 0.777 -0.082 0.109 
Number of other investors -0.372 0.105 -3.540 0.000 -0.579 -0.166 
Investment scale -0.238 0.037 -6.510 0.000 -0.309 -0.166 
Constant 4.032 0.545 7.400 0.000 2.964 5.100 
       
q60       
Government stability  0.451 0.277 1.630 0.104 -0.093 0.995 
Socioeconomic conditions -0.188 0.193 -0.970 0.331 -0.566 0.191 
Investment profile 0.330 0.254 1.300 0.193 -0.168 0.828 
Internal conflict -0.475 0.264 -1.800 0.072 -0.993 0.042 
External conflict 0.283 0.119 2.370 0.018 0.049 0.517 
Corruption 0.354 0.201 1.760 0.078 -0.039 0.748 
Military -0.400 0.153 -2.620 0.009 -0.699 -0.101 
Religious tensions 0.214 0.141 1.510 0.131 -0.064 0.491 
Law and order 0.086 0.255 0.340 0.736 -0.415 0.587 
Ethnic tensions 0.033 0.167 0.190 0.846 -0.295 0.361 
Democ. Account. -0.284 0.189 -1.500 0.133 -0.654 0.087 
Bureaucratic quality 0.465 0.191 2.440 0.015 0.091 0.839 
Foreign debt -0.813 0.215 -3.780 0.000 -1.235 -0.391 
Current account 0.813 0.300 2.710 0.007 0.225 1.402 
Exchange rate stability -0.332 0.136 -2.440 0.015 -0.599 -0.065 
Distance -0.014 0.000 -0.130 0.894 0.000 0.000 
Foreign Investment Act 0.011 0.095 0.120 0.906 -0.175 0.197 
Host country involvement -0.019 0.053 -0.370 0.712 -0.123 0.084 
Number of other investors -0.299 0.095 -3.140 0.002 -0.485 -0.112 
Investment scale -0.205 0.027 -7.460 0.000 -0.259 -0.151 
Constant 3.421 0.491 6.960 0.000 2.457 4.384 
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Appendix Table 6.13 (continued) 
 
  Bootstrap     
SHARELOGIT Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 
[95% 
Conf. 
Interval] 
       
q65       
Government stability  0.294 0.221 1.330 0.183 -0.139 0.727 
Socioeconomic conditions -0.208 0.170 -1.220 0.222 -0.542 0.126 
Investment profile 0.362 0.256 1.410 0.157 -0.140 0.865 
Internal conflict -0.293 0.236 -1.240 0.216 -0.756 0.171 
External conflict 0.291 0.093 3.140 0.002 0.109 0.473 
Corruption 0.222 0.139 1.590 0.111 -0.051 0.495 
Military -0.370 0.144 -2.570 0.010 -0.653 -0.087 
Religious tensions 0.195 0.158 1.230 0.217 -0.115 0.505 
Law and order 0.027 0.195 0.140 0.892 -0.356 0.410 
Ethnic tensions -0.053 0.112 -0.470 0.636 -0.272 0.166 
Democ. Account. -0.272 0.137 -1.990 0.046 -0.540 -0.005 
Bureaucratic quality 0.531 0.173 3.070 0.002 0.192 0.870 
Foreign debt -0.568 0.194 -2.930 0.003 -0.949 -0.188 
Current account 0.547 0.273 2.000 0.045 0.012 1.081 
Exchange rate stability -0.207 0.114 -1.820 0.069 -0.429 0.016 
Distance -0.077 0.000 -0.880 0.377 0.000 0.000 
Foreign Investment Act 0.030 0.070 0.430 0.666 -0.106 0.166 
Host country involvement -0.043 0.039 -1.090 0.275 -0.121 0.034 
Number of other investors -0.225 0.086 -2.600 0.009 -0.394 -0.055 
Investment scale -0.160 0.026 -6.090 0.000 -0.212 -0.109 
Constant 2.738 0.463 5.910 0.000 1.829 3.646 
       
q70       
Government stability  0.112 0.190 0.590 0.556 -0.260 0.483 
Socioeconomic conditions 0.010 0.144 0.070 0.946 -0.272 0.292 
Investment profile 0.188 0.176 1.070 0.287 -0.158 0.533 
Internal conflict -0.228 0.180 -1.270 0.204 -0.580 0.124 
External conflict 0.277 0.102 2.710 0.007 0.076 0.478 
Corruption 0.318 0.117 2.700 0.007 0.087 0.548 
Military -0.350 0.094 -3.720 0.000 -0.534 -0.165 
Religious tensions 0.118 0.108 1.090 0.274 -0.094 0.331 
Law and order -0.002 0.190 -0.010 0.993 -0.374 0.370 
Ethnic tensions -0.073 0.099 -0.740 0.460 -0.268 0.121 
Democ. Account. -0.205 0.100 -2.050 0.040 -0.400 -0.009 
Bureaucratic quality 0.341 0.159 2.150 0.032 0.030 0.652 
Foreign debt -0.484 0.176 -2.740 0.006 -0.829 -0.138 
Current account 0.460 0.238 1.930 0.053 -0.006 0.926 
Exchange rate stability -0.087 0.108 -0.810 0.416 -0.298 0.123 
Distance -0.041 0.000 -0.530 0.596 0.000 0.000 
Foreign Investment Act 0.051 0.048 1.060 0.288 -0.043 0.145 
Host country involvement -0.009 0.035 -0.270 0.787 -0.078 0.059 
Number of other investors -0.215 0.098 -2.200 0.028 -0.407 -0.023 
Investment scale -0.117 0.023 -5.190 0.000 -0.162 -0.073 
Constant 1.974 0.404 4.880 0.000 1.181 2.767 
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Appendix Table 6.13 (continued) 
 
  Bootstrap     
SHARELOGIT Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 
[95% 
Conf. 
Interval] 
       
q75       
Government stability  0.197 0.168 1.170 0.240 -0.132 0.526 
Socioeconomic conditions 0.082 0.139 0.590 0.553 -0.190 0.355 
Investment profile 0.158 0.183 0.870 0.386 -0.200 0.517 
Internal conflict -0.113 0.192 -0.590 0.555 -0.489 0.263 
External conflict 0.260 0.122 2.120 0.034 0.020 0.499 
Corruption 0.328 0.156 2.100 0.036 0.022 0.635 
Military -0.206 0.103 -2.010 0.045 -0.408 -0.005 
Religious tensions -0.017 0.089 -0.190 0.849 -0.191 0.157 
Law and order -0.001 0.162 0.000 0.996 -0.319 0.317 
Ethnic tensions -0.165 0.109 -1.510 0.130 -0.378 0.049 
Democ. Account. -0.233 0.094 -2.480 0.013 -0.417 -0.049 
Bureaucratic quality 0.217 0.135 1.610 0.107 -0.047 0.481 
Foreign debt -0.477 0.218 -2.180 0.029 -0.905 -0.049 
Current account 0.333 0.265 1.260 0.208 -0.186 0.853 
Exchange rate stability -0.108 0.080 -1.350 0.179 -0.265 0.049 
Distance -0.039 0.000 -0.520 0.600 0.000 0.000 
Foreign Investment Act 0.025 0.050 0.500 0.617 -0.073 0.123 
Host country involvement 0.021 0.045 0.470 0.641 -0.068 0.110 
Number of other investors -0.249 0.123 -2.030 0.043 -0.491 -0.008 
Investment scale -0.092 0.031 -2.980 0.003 -0.152 -0.031 
Constant 1.841 0.568 3.240 0.001 0.728 2.954 
       
q80       
Government stability  0.306 0.221 1.380 0.167 -0.128 0.740 
Socioeconomic conditions 0.136 0.203 0.670 0.503 -0.262 0.534 
Investment profile 0.321 0.261 1.230 0.219 -0.191 0.833 
Internal conflict -0.281 0.303 -0.930 0.355 -0.875 0.314 
External conflict 0.388 0.191 2.030 0.042 0.014 0.762 
Corruption 0.428 0.270 1.590 0.112 -0.101 0.956 
Military -0.236 0.128 -1.840 0.065 -0.488 0.015 
Religious tensions -0.013 0.177 -0.070 0.940 -0.360 0.333 
Law and order 0.162 0.296 0.550 0.584 -0.418 0.742 
Ethnic tensions -0.305 0.209 -1.460 0.145 -0.716 0.105 
Democ. Account. -0.376 0.133 -2.830 0.005 -0.636 -0.116 
Bureaucratic quality 0.212 0.183 1.160 0.247 -0.147 0.571 
Foreign debt -0.668 0.269 -2.480 0.013 -1.195 -0.140 
Current account 0.437 0.360 1.220 0.224 -0.268 1.142 
Exchange rate stability -0.180 0.149 -1.210 0.226 -0.471 0.112 
Distance -0.042 0.000 -0.430 0.664 0.000 0.000 
Foreign Investment Act 0.097 0.074 1.310 0.191 -0.048 0.242 
Host country involvement -0.037 0.094 -0.390 0.695 -0.221 0.147 
Number of other investors -0.400 0.158 -2.530 0.012 -0.711 -0.090 
Investment scale -0.126 0.036 -3.440 0.001 -0.197 -0.054 
Constant 2.833 0.691 4.100 0.000 1.479 4.188 
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Appendix Table 6.13 (continued) 
 
  Bootstrap     
SHARELOGIT Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 
[95% 
Conf. 
Interval] 
       
q85       
Government stability  0.533 0.385 1.390 0.166 -0.221 1.288 
Socioeconomic conditions 0.287 0.254 1.130 0.258 -0.211 0.784 
Investment profile 0.491 0.303 1.620 0.105 -0.103 1.086 
Internal conflict -0.346 0.362 -0.960 0.338 -1.055 0.363 
External conflict 0.200 0.309 0.650 0.518 -0.406 0.805 
Corruption 0.592 0.331 1.790 0.074 -0.057 1.242 
Military -0.218 0.161 -1.360 0.174 -0.533 0.097 
Religious tensions -0.157 0.203 -0.780 0.438 -0.554 0.240 
Law and order 0.452 0.343 1.320 0.187 -0.220 1.124 
Ethnic tensions -0.428 0.249 -1.720 0.086 -0.916 0.061 
Democ. Account. -0.456 0.202 -2.260 0.024 -0.852 -0.060 
Bureaucratic quality 0.134 0.309 0.430 0.665 -0.472 0.740 
Foreign debt -1.212 0.251 -4.830 0.000 -1.705 -0.720 
Current account 1.073 0.372 2.880 0.004 0.344 1.802 
Exchange rate stability -0.716 0.219 -3.270 0.001 -1.145 -0.286 
Distance 0.044 0.000 0.290 0.770 0.000 0.000 
Foreign Investment Act 0.116 0.120 0.970 0.333 -0.119 0.352 
Host country involvement -0.253 0.144 -1.760 0.079 -0.536 0.030 
Number of other investors -0.559 0.139 -4.030 0.000 -0.831 -0.287 
Investment scale -0.215 0.066 -3.240 0.001 -0.346 -0.085 
Constant 5.258 1.158 4.540 0.000 2.988 7.529 
       
q90       
Government stability  0.628 0.437 1.440 0.151 -0.228 1.485 
Socioeconomic conditions 0.180 0.266 0.680 0.498 -0.341 0.702 
Investment profile 0.744 0.344 2.160 0.031 0.069 1.418 
Internal conflict -0.117 0.416 -0.280 0.778 -0.932 0.698 
External conflict 0.032 0.354 0.090 0.927 -0.662 0.727 
Corruption 0.331 0.428 0.770 0.439 -0.508 1.171 
Military -0.010 0.238 -0.040 0.965 -0.476 0.456 
Religious tensions 0.030 0.305 0.100 0.923 -0.568 0.627 
Law and order 0.020 0.346 0.060 0.954 -0.659 0.699 
Ethnic tensions -0.315 0.343 -0.920 0.359 -0.988 0.358 
Democ. Account. -0.618 0.237 -2.600 0.009 -1.084 -0.153 
Bureaucratic quality 0.592 0.290 2.040 0.041 0.023 1.162 
Foreign debt -1.368 0.236 -5.790 0.000 -1.831 -0.905 
Current account 1.115 0.305 3.660 0.000 0.518 1.713 
Exchange rate stability -0.750 0.193 -3.890 0.000 -1.128 -0.372 
Distance -0.023 0.000 -0.150 0.880 0.000 0.000 
Foreign Investment Act 0.122 0.138 0.880 0.376 -0.149 0.393 
Host country involvement -0.524 0.164 -3.190 0.001 -0.845 -0.202 
Number of other investors -0.393 0.210 -1.870 0.062 -0.806 0.019 
Investment scale -0.358 0.064 -5.560 0.000 -0.484 -0.232 
Constant 8.103 0.970 8.360 0.000 6.202 10.004 
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Appendix Table 6.13 (continued) 
 
  Bootstrap     
SHARELOGIT Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 
[95% 
Conf. 
Interval] 
       
q95       
Government stability  -0.050 0.620 -0.080 0.936 -1.265 1.165 
Socioeconomic conditions 0.634 0.378 1.680 0.093 -0.106 1.375 
Investment profile 0.987 0.584 1.690 0.091 -0.158 2.132 
Internal conflict 0.355 0.434 0.820 0.413 -0.495 1.206 
External conflict 0.230 0.450 0.510 0.608 -0.651 1.112 
Corruption 0.933 0.636 1.470 0.143 -0.314 2.181 
Military -0.156 0.431 -0.360 0.716 -1.001 0.688 
Religious tensions 0.023 0.444 0.050 0.959 -0.848 0.894 
Law and order 0.300 0.513 0.580 0.559 -0.706 1.306 
Ethnic tensions -0.803 0.391 -2.050 0.040 -1.571 -0.036 
Democ. Account. -0.805 0.295 -2.730 0.006 -1.383 -0.226 
Bureaucratic quality 0.145 0.500 0.290 0.772 -0.835 1.126 
Foreign debt -1.427 0.382 -3.730 0.000 -2.176 -0.677 
Current account 0.911 0.424 2.150 0.032 0.079 1.742 
Exchange rate stability -0.640 0.290 -2.200 0.028 -1.209 -0.071 
Distance -0.025 0.000 -2.020 0.044 0.000 0.000 
Foreign Investment Act 0.329 0.193 1.710 0.088 -0.049 0.707 
Host country involvement -0.788 0.178 -4.440 0.000 -1.136 -0.440 
Number of other investors -0.072 0.260 -0.280 0.780 -0.581 0.437 
Investment scale -0.449 0.091 -4.940 0.000 -0.626 -0.271 
Constant 10.062 1.483 6.780 0.000 7.153 12.970 
Number of observations 3,330      
R-squared     .05 Pseudo R2= 0.0896    
    .10 Pseudo R2= 0.0681    
    .15 Pseudo R2= 0.0512    
    .20 Pseudo R2= 0.0626    
    .25 Pseudo R2= 0.0622    
    .30 Pseudo R2= 0.0592    
    .35 Pseudo R2= 0.0508    
    .40 Pseudo R2= 0.0562    
    .45 Pseudo R2= 0.0577    
    .50 Pseudo R2= 0.0594    
 .55 Pseudo R2= 0.0541    
 .60 Pseudo R2= 0.0464    
 .65 Pseudo R2= 0.0254    
 .70 Pseudo R2= 0.0119    
 .75 Pseudo R2= 0.0061    
 .80 Pseudo R2= 0.0122    
 .85 Pseudo R2= 0.0554    
 .90 Pseudo R2= 0.0908    
 .95 Pseudo R2= 0.1170    
 
Note: Quantile regression results, where q5, q10, q15 correspond to the quantiles 5% 10%, 15% and so on. 
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Appendix Table 6.14: Marginal Effects from Regressions in Appendix Table 6.13 
 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 
Government stability  0.065 0.071 0.110 0.102 0.116 0.110 0.152 
Investment profile -0.053 -0.012 0.009 0.078 0.136 0.080 0.020 
Law and order -0.055 -0.050 -0.043 -0.033 -0.048 -0.018 -0.0001 
Bureaucratic quality -0.035 -0.063 0.015 0.064 0.040 0.060 0.116 
Corruption 0.020 0.042 0.036 0.038 0.071 0.082 0.052 
Democ. Account. 0.024 0.036 0.019 -0.0005 0.017 0.004 -0.015 
Military 0.010 -0.020 -0.041 -0.104 -0.118 -0.103 -0.082 
Internal conflict 0.014 0.023 -0.064 -0.047 -0.088 -0.188 -0.248 
External conflict -0.004 0.002 -0.015 0.015 0.047 0.065 0.087 
Socioeconomic conditions -0.004 -0.014 -0.077 -0.071 -0.106 -0.057 -0.050 
Religious tensions 0.018 0.008 0.038 0.068 0.081 0.077 0.110 
Ethnic tensions -0.002 0.001 0.019 0.006 0.081 0.123 0.109 
 
 40% 45% 50% 55% 60% 65% 70% 
Government stability  0.165 0.129 0.115 0.128 0.108 0.067 0.023 
Investment profile 0.016 0.089 0.086 0.120 0.079 0.082 0.039 
Law and order -0.039 -0.018 0.002 0.056 0.021 0.006 -0.0004 
Bureaucratic quality 0.135 0.142 0.155 0.137 0.112 0.121 0.072 
Corruption 0.128 0.162 0.122 0.106 0.085 0.051 0.067 
Democ. Account. -0.035 -0.064 -0.107 -0.124 -0.068 -0.062 -0.043 
Military -0.092 -0.139 -0.105 -0.095 -0.096 -0.084 -0.073 
Internal conflict -0.241 -0.212 -0.142 -0.135 -0.114 -0.067 -0.048 
External conflict 0.062 0.067 0.102 0.072 0.068 0.066 0.058 
Socioeconomic conditions -0.044 -0.058 -0.053 -0.083 -0.045 -0.047 0.002 
Religious tensions 0.117 0.117 0.071 0.061 0.051 0.044 0.025 
Ethnic tensions 0.089 0.069 0.012 0.010 0.008 -0.012 -0.015 
 
 75% 80% 85% 90% 95%   
Government stability  0.037 0.049 0.068 0.057 -0.002   
Investment profile 0.030 0.051 0.063 0.067 0.047   
Law and order -0.0001 0.026 0.058 0.002 0.014   
Bureaucratic quality 0.041 0.034 0.017 0.053 0.007   
Corruption 0.062 0.068 0.076 0.030 0.044   
Democ. Account. -0.044 -0.060 -0.058 -0.056 -0.038   
Military -0.039 -0.038 -0.028 -0.001 -0.007   
Internal conflict -0.021 -0.045 -0.044 -0.011 0.017   
External conflict 0.049 0.062 0.025 0.003 0.011   
Socioeconomic conditions 0.015 0.022 0.037 0.016 0.030   
Religious tensions -0.003 -0.002 -0.020 0.003 0.001   
Ethnic tensions -0.031 -0.049 -0.055 -0.028 -0.038   
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Appendix Figure 6.1: Quantile Regression Results for the Investor Equity Share 
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Appendix Figure 6.2: Quantile Regression Results for Equity Share by Percent 
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Chapter 7 
Source Country Characteristics and 
FDI Inflows to Saudi Arabia 
 
7.1   Introduction 
 
As we have seen in Chapter 3 there has been growing interest in foreign direct investment 
(FDI) in Arab countries, partly driven by the concern about the relatively small amount of 
foreign investment in relation to the position of these countries in the world economy (Bolbol 
and Fatheldin, 2006). As possible explanations, Gemayel (2004) demonstrates that the 
investment risk associated with the instability of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 
countries is a critical factor in explaining the level of FDI into these areas, although there are 
doubtless other factors related to incomes and geographical and cultural proximity. 
 
Thus, in a time-series analysis of the FDI inflows into Saudi Arabia, Abdel-Rahman (2002) 
investigates conventional factors for attracting inward FDI, such as market size, economic 
integration via international trade, wage rates and country risk. Using Granger causality tests, 
he finds that Saudi Arabia was successful in attracting FDI because of its overall economic 
performance, and that FDI inflows have impacted on growth. However, Sadik and Bolbol‟s 
(2001) find that FDI generated benefits have not yet materialized in Arab countries.  It 
justifies more emphasis on the sources of FDI rather than a mere preoccupation with the 
factors affecting the location of FDI into particular countries or regions. 
 
 
 
250
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the source country determinants of incoming FDI to 
Saudi Arabia. It contributes to the existing FDI literature in a number of ways. First, it 
provides a comprehensive analysis of inward FDI for a country that falls in-between the 
traditional developed and developing countries.  Second, it draws attention to the sensitivity 
of the results to the specification of the dependent variable. Using a count measure of foreign 
entries according to the number of projects produces results different from the ones obtained 
when FDI activity is measured by investment expenditure.  This should perhaps not wholly 
surprise us given the pattern of projects and investment analyzed in Chapter 5.  Finally, the 
results confirm the need to account for unobservable country-specific effects to identify the 
determinants of FDI and to link them to the characteristics of investing countries. 
 
To analyze the determinants of incoming FDI, a gravity-type model is used, i.e. a model that 
includes the economic size and the geographical distance from Saudi Arabia to the investing 
country. This is based on the Investment Dataset that was described in Chapter 5, except that 
the data are aggregated at the country level, and the analysis is for the period 1980-2005 only. 
This is so we may collect other data on explanatory variables, but as we have seen it covers 
the period when most FDI has taken place in Saudi Arabia. The explanatory variables include 
a range of socio-economic and political variables for a total of 33 countries. As indicated 
above, two different measures of FDI are used: the number of investment projects incoming 
in each year from each country and the total amount of investment inflow. Techniques such 
as a negative binomial and Tobit regression are used to analyze the data. Overall, the chapter 
finds that a large number of factors affect the decision to invest in Saudi Arabia, but that 
relatively few of these explain the aggregate size of the investment amount. 
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In the next section, a rationale for the choice of explanatory variables is provided. The data 
sources and the empirical model are considered in Section 7.3, while the empirical results are 
presented in Section 7.4.  Finally, Section 7.5 draws conclusions. 
 
7.2   The Variables  
 
The analysis is for 33 countries investing in Saudi Arabia over 1980-2005.  This is so we can 
collect good source country data for each year over this period. We restrict the analysis in this 
chapter to 33 countries to rule out offshore financial centres (e.g. British Virgin Islands) since 
it is difficult to identify the ultimate country of origin for these projects (see UNCTAD 2006) 
and we also remove countries with small numbers of projects that lead to a lot of zero 
investments over time. In practice these countries account for a relatively small number of 
foreign investment projects in Saudi Arabia (details of these can be found in Appendix Table 
5.4). Our choice of the explanatory variables is influenced by the literature review in Chapter 
3, the use of the gravity model and also existing studies of source country characteristics. 
These variables are collected at the country level and are as follows. They include terms for 
the source country size, distance, „economic freedom‟, bilateral trade and past investment and 
cover the variables that are identified in both the theoretical and empirical literature. 
 
7.2.1   Source Country Size 
 
Grosse and Trevino (1996) indicate that large economies contain a large number of firms that 
are capable of expanding their operations in foreign markets. Larger and implicitly more 
affluent economies, should have the capital and resources necessary for operating abroad, 
 
 
252
such as technical knowledge and marketing expertise, and be able to meet different consumer 
demands in the host country. While occasionally, different signs are obtained (e.g. Thomas 
and Grosse, 2001, obtain a negative relationship for Mexico) in most of the earlier studies 
market size has been a major significant positive determinant of FDI (e.g. Grosse and 
Trevino, 1996, for the US; Kimino et al., 2007, for Japan; and Gao, 2005, for China).  Thus, 
we expect a positive relationship between source country size and FDI. 
 
7.2.2   Distance 
 
Greater distance between the source and host country (i.e. Saudi Arabia) may discourage the 
flow of FDI.  In a trade context, the geographical distance refers to the cost of transportation 
and potential barriers to trade. In the case of FDI, greater distance implies not only 
transportation costs but the difficulties in obtaining information and managing the business, 
as well as differences in legal, institutional and other factors, which increase costs. Most 
studies find a negative relationship between distance and the flow of FDI to the country (e.g. 
Gao, 2005, for China). Some find a statistically insignificant effect for the effect of 
geographical distance on FDI, (e.g. Liu et al, 1997), which is attributed to technological 
progress in transport and communications, while Thomas and Grosse (2001) find a positive 
relationship between distance and FDI, although we earlier noted a difficulty with this study. 
Thus, in general, we expect a negative relationship between distance and inward FDI. 
 
It is not just geographical distance that is expected to reduce the flow of FDI between 
countries, but also cultural differences. Cultural similarities may be captured by a common 
language or by the existence of a common border (Gao, 2005), but in the case of Saudi 
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Arabia, all neighbouring and close-by countries are also Arab-speaking, so we do not include 
either a language or border dummy variable. Instead, we use the Hofstede (2001) index as a 
proxy for transaction costs arising from cultural differences.
51
  This index evaluates cultural 
values for individual countries according to four categories: „power distance‟, „uncertainty 
avoidance‟, „individualism ⁄ collectivism‟ and „masculinity ⁄ femininity‟.52  Cultural distance 
is measured by the sum of the absolute difference in these four categories between the home 
country and that for Saudi Arabia.  
 
We also measure differences between Saudi Arabia and the countries from which the 
investment originates by the difference in per capita GDP. In the context of trade models, 
similarities in the per capita incomes of the trading partners leads to more trade in accordance 
with the Linder hypothesis (see McPherson et al., 2001).  Grosse and Trevino (1996) expect a 
similar link to hold for FDI, so that firms from more affluent countries should be more likely 
to invest in the US, and so on. We include the difference in the per capita incomes without a 
prior expectation about the sign, since, unlike other traditional developing and developed 
countries, per capita income in Saudi Arabia is reasonably high due to its oil revenues.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
51
 Forty countries are included in the Hofstede (2001) study but only a single score is given to Arab countries as 
they share the same faith and culture. 
52
 The power distance category relates to the degree to which power is distributed unequally in a particular 
society and to what extent this society accepts this distribution. The uncertainty avoidance is defined as the 
degree of acceptance of uncertainty and ambiguity in the society.  Individualism ⁄ collectivism refers on the 
individualism side to the loose relationships between individuals within the society and the extent to which they 
look for their interest. At the opposite, collectivism relates to the extent that people are integrated into strong, 
cohesive in groups, where the interests of the group have the priority. Finally, masculinity ⁄ femininity refers to 
the degree the country tends to reinforce the role of masculine values that are very assertive and competitive or 
reinforce the feminine values that are more caring.  
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7.2.3   „Economic Freedom‟ 
 
Studies on the determinants of FDI invariably come to the conclusion that the economic 
stability of the host country, the quality of its institutions and the general climate for foreign 
investment are important in attracting FDI (e.g. Gemayel, 2004; Me´on and Sekkat, 2004). 
The concept of „economic freedom‟ is measured by the Heritage Foundation Index (2007), 
and embraces the removal of legislative obstacles as well as the creation of a general climate 
for stimulating investment, so that it can be used to measure these kinds of effect.
53
  Many 
empirical studies confirm that „economic freedom‟ has a positive effect on FDI inflows. For 
example, Quazi (2007) finds that „economic freedom‟ increased FDI in East Asian countries. 
Similarly, Bengoa and Sanchez-Robles (2003) find a positive relationship between „economic 
freedom‟ and FDI in Latin America. 
 
While the „economic freedom‟ of the host country plays an important role in attracting FDI, 
the significance of this in the case of the source country is not clear, but for which our data 
relate (e.g. we use the Heritage Foundation Index to measure the „economic freedom‟ of the 
investing country rather than Saudi Arabia).  On the one hand, a high value for the index of 
„economic freedom‟ in the source country might indicate an environment conducive to 
entrepreneurship, which is necessary for foreign expansion, in which case a positive 
relationship between „economic freedom‟ of the home country and FDI outflow is expected. 
On the other hand, a good business climate in the source country may make firms less likely 
                                                 
53
 Details of the index can be found at www.heritage.org. The economic freedom index was created by the 
Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street Journal in 1995, and it measures the economic freedom according to an 
average of ten components, assigning a grade to each of these using a scale from 0 to 100, where 100 represents 
the maximum freedom. The ten components of economic freedom are: Business Freedom, Trade Freedom, 
Fiscal Freedom, Government Spending, Monetary freedom, Investment Freedom, Financial Freedom, Property 
rights, Freedom from Corruption and Labour Freedom.  
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to invest abroad, implying a negative relationship.  Thus, including the term in this fashion 
suggests that we are measuring the relative effect, but which is like that of the political risk 
terms that were considered in Chapter 6. 
 
The empirical evidence for sign on these is mixed. Kimino et al. (2007) conclude that a stable 
and favourable business climate in the home country increases FDI inflows from these 
countries to Japan.  However, in their analysis of FDI in Mexico, Thomas and Grosse (2001) 
show that as political risk increases and business environment of the home country 
deteriorates firms are more likely to escape or diversify away from that political risk by 
investing abroad.  Of course, this issue was investigated more fully in Chapter 6, and the 
index of economic freedom is included as a way of investigating the characteristics of the 
countries from where the investment arises. 
 
7.2.4   Bilateral Trade 
 
As well as the entry mode of FDI considered in Chapters 3 and 6, exports and FDI are two 
alternative modes for multinationals to enter foreign markets. At the firm level, trade and FDI 
are often substitutes, but at an aggregate level it is not clear whether these are substitutes or 
complements as there is empirical ambiguity regarding this issue. The view that trade and 
FDI complement each other rests on the assumption that engagement in international trade 
improves the ability of firms to undertake FDI. Exporting requires fewer up-front resources 
than FDI, and offers a way for a firm to obtain information about the market and business 
environment of the host country before making a commitment in the form of investment.  
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In practice, most studies confirm the positive and complementary effect of trade on FDI.  
Again, Thomas and Grosse (2001) find strong support for existing levels of trade being 
positively associated with FDI in Mexico, while Liu et al. (1997) identify a high degree of 
integration between a host and home country represented by exports and imports as an 
important determinant of FDI in China.  More recent evidence for China in Zhao (2003) also 
confirms that FDI and bilateral trade complement each other. However, in contrast to this, 
Kimino et al. (2007) find a substitution rather than complementary effect between export 
performance and FDI, which they attribute to the nature of foreign investment in Japan as a 
recent phenomenon, as well as to the fact that FDI might occur while there is still no slow 
growth of exports. With such conflicting results, the substitutability or complementarity 
between FDI and trade is examined, but without any prior expectations about this. 
 
7.2.5   Past Investment 
 
Past inward investment can be a determinant of current investment. Agglomeration effects, as 
measured by the number of previous FDI entries into a particular location, have a very strong 
impact on attracting future investment, as shown by List (2001).  Girma (2002) confirms the 
importance of agglomeration effects, where new investments cluster in the sectors already 
characterized by a strong foreign presence. Clearly, past investment might be an important 
consideration when choosing between different locations, be it different countries, regions or 
industries. With a single host country, and an emphasis on source country characteristics, the 
importance of past investment is best seen in the context of an approach that stresses the fixed 
set-up cost of FDI (Razin et al., 2003). Previous FDI indicates that an investor has already 
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borne a cost in the past, and this may help to reduce the set-up cost of a new investment to the 
same country. Following this, a positive effect of past FDI on current investment is expected. 
 
7.3   Data Description and the Model  
 
In this chapter the focus is on the source country determinants of FDI flows, and the purpose 
is to identify the characteristics that lead countries to invest in Saudi Arabia. For this, the 
Investment Dataset is used, which was obtained from the Saudi Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry, and described in detail in Chapter 5.  As this chapter makes clear, the data on 
investments go back to 1960, but that initially few investments took place (see Table 5.4). 
Since some of the data on source country characteristics is measured at a single point of time 
(and are reasonably time invariant), it is sensible to restrict the analysis in this chapter to the 
period 1980–2005. Further, in order to obtain consistent data on source country 
characteristics, and to rule out offshore financial centres (e.g. British Virgin Islands), for 
which it is difficult to identify the ultimate country of origin (UNCTAD, 2006), the focus 
here is on 33 countries.
54
 
 
A summary of foreign investment projects included in this chapter is shown in Table 7.1, 
which also indicates the number of excluded projects. In total, there are 4,998 projects, but 
the table shows that 365 of these occurred prior to 1980, while a further 657 projects are in 
the countries and offshore financial centres that are not included from this chapter. It gives a 
total of 3,976 foreign investment projects, which is about 80% of the total, and represents 
                                                 
54
 It means 57 countries are excluded, which are reported in full in Appendix Table 5.1 in Chapter 5.  
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82.4% of the total investment (Table 7.1). This is because the included investment projects 
tend to be slightly smaller on average after 1980 compared to earlier years.  
 
Table 7.1: The Number and Investment Scale of Included Projects 
 
Country 
No. of 
Projects 
Investment Amount 
(SR m) 
(%) 
Average Investment 
Scale (SR m) 
     
33 countries, 1980-05 3,976 289,678 82.4 72.86 
Other countries, 1980-05 657 35,914 10.2 54.66 
(Sub-total) (4,633) (325,592) (92.6) (70.28) 
All countries, 1960-79 365 25,864 7.4 70.86 
Grand total 4,998 351,456 100.0 70.32 
 
Source: Investment Database, Saudi Ministry of Commerce and Industry. 
Note: Investments measured at constant 2000 prices. 
 
A breakdown of foreign projects according to the 33 source countries is shown in Appendix 
Table 7.1. It reveals that most projects arise from the neighbouring MENA countries, with 
1,886 (47.4% of 3,976) from West Asia (principally Jordan, Syria and Lebanon) and 463 
(11.6%) from North Africa (mainly Egypt), although combined these account for only 20% 
of FDI by value, so that these projects tend to be smaller in scale. Larger investments come 
from developed countries, with 20% of total investment from Far East, 20% from the North 
America and 18% from Western Europe. Outside of MENA, the major source countries by 
the number of projects are the US, UK and Canada, but substantial amounts of investment by 
value arises from France, Germany, Italy and Sweden. Outside these areas, the main other 
source of FDI is the Indian sub-continent. 
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7.3.1   Empirical Model and Variables  
 
On the basis of the above discussion, the panel model is specified as: 
 
 
 
 
where the right-hand side terms represent the explanatory variables, the country subscript is i 
= 1, …, 33 and the time subscript is t = 0, …, 25 for the years 1980–2005. The time sub-
scripts in (7.1) indicate that some variables are measured for each year, but that others are 
measured across the 33 countries only. In some specifications, we include the effect of past 
FDI. 
 
The definition and source of the variables used in this chapter are given in Table 7.2. The 
variables are included based on the earlier discussion of the theoretical and empirical 
literature on source country characteristics, and that point to the use of a gravity-type model 
(see for example Wei, 2000 and Tong, 2005). The size, geographical distance, exports and 
imports are expressed in logarithmic form. FDI inflows are assessed on the basis of the 
register of new investment projects maintained by the Saudi Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry (see Chapter 5). Table 7.2 shows that the bilateral trade flows come from the 
International Monetary Fund Directory of Trade Statistics. The Hofstede cultural indices and 
Heritage Economic Freedom indices are taken from the relevant websites. The remaining 
variables were obtained from the World Bank World Development Indicators.  
 
    FDIit =  + 1 Sizeit + 2 Distancei + 3 Cultural Distancei + 4 Economic Distanceit + 
        5 Economic Freedomi + 6 Bilateral Tradeit + error term.             (7.1)                              
(5.1)    
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Table 7.2: Variable Definitions and Sources 
 
Variable Description Source 
   
FDI Inflow of FDI from a given source 
country, measured by: 
- number of projects. 
- total real investment. 
Saudi Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry 
    
Size Size of source country measured by its 
real GDP. 
World Development 
Indicators, World Bank 
   
Distance Geographical distance in kilometers 
between Riyadh and capital city of 
each source country. 
http://www.indo.com 
   
Cultural distance Sum of absolute differences in index 
between Saudi Arabia and source 
country according to each of four 
components („power distance‟, 
„uncertainty avoidance‟, 
„individuality‟, and „masculinity‟) 
Hofstede cultural index 
   
Economic distance Difference between source country and 
Saudi real GDP per capita. 
World Development 
Indicators, World Bank 
   
Economic freedom Heritage Index of Economic Freedom. Heritage Economic 
Freedom indices 
   
Bilateral trade Measured by: 
- real exports from the source 
country to Saudi Arabia. 
- real imports from Saudi Arabia. 
Directory of Trade 
Statistics, International 
Monetary Fund 
   
Past investment 
projects 
Mean number of FDI projects in the 
past three years. 
Saudi Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry 
 
The correlation between the above variables is shown in Table 7.3. As nearby countries can 
be similar in their respective characteristics, then given that these account for a large number 
of the overall number of projects, the respective variables can be highly correlated.   
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Table 7.3: Correlation Matrix for the Variables 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
        
1 Size 1       
2 Distance 0.62 1      
3 Cultural distance 0.71 0.75 1     
4 Economic distance 0.61 0.30 0.60 1    
5 Economic freedom 0.54 0.53 0.73 0.72 1   
6 Exports from source country 0.50 0.13 0.30 0.40 0.45 1  
7 Imports from Saudi Arabia 0.40 -0.06 0.11 0.25 0.24 0.56 1 
 
In the case of the dependent variable in (7.1) this is measured for each source country i at 
year t in relation to Saudi Arabia, and in either of two ways: the number of projects and as the 
logarithm of the total real foreign investment.  Apart from the traditional determinants of FDI 
used in the gravity model, we also investigate the impact of past investment. In the context of 
panel data with non-zero values of dependent variables, this leads to a dynamic panel data 
approach (see e.g. Driffield, 2002) with the possibility of investigating time lags. With our 
dependent variable being either count data or FDI flow data with a substantial number of 
zeros, we look for a consistent way of introducing past investment. Somewhat arbitrary, we 
measure past investment as the average number of investment projects in the previous three 
years (Table 7.2).
 55
  Past investment defined in this way enters the list of explanatory 
variables in the negative binomial regression and it is also used to test the hypothesis of the 
fixed set-up cost of FDI flows (Razin et al., 2004). 
 
 
                                                 
55
 The inclusion of lagged dependent variables in the model can lead to errors in variable problem and a 
potential bias in the coefficients.  A way to overcome this problem is to employ Arellano and Bond GMM 
dynamic panel estimation (see for example Driffield, 2002); however, this is for standard panel data analysis 
and not for the negative Binomial estimation technique, which we believe is the correct estimation technique 
given the nature of our data discussed above. The issue of lagged dependent variables also becomes irrelevant 
when we analyse the model for investment flows, since past investment is measured by the number of projects 
and not by inflows. In addition to this we also measure past investment projects as an average of the previous 
three years investment projects.   
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7.4   Empirical Results 
 
7.4.1   The Number of Projects 
 
The initial interest is in the number of foreign investments from each country in each year. 
The estimation results for equation (7.1) are presented in Table 7.4. We start with the simple 
pooled negative binomial regression, ignoring possible country-specific effects. We explore 
the panel nature of the data in the fixed and random effects negative binomial regressions. In 
the notes to Table 7.4 the results of several statistical tests are reported. First, a test of the 
over-dispersion parameter alpha is carried out. When alpha is zero, the negative binomial 
distribution is equivalent to a Poisson distribution. In this case, alpha is significantly different 
from zero confirming the negative binomial model. The second test favours the random 
effects model over a pooled regression with a single constant term. A pooled regression does 
not control for unobserved heterogeneity among countries and might lead to statistically 
meaningless results. Both the fixed and random effects versions produce similar results, but 
the Hausman statistic suggests that the random effects version is statistically justifiable. 
 
With the inflow of FDI measured by the number of foreign projects, the main gravity-type 
variables, namely size and geographical distance, display the expected signs and are 
statistically significant in each case in Table 7.4. The coefficient on the cultural difference 
has the right sign but is significant only in the pooled regression, while once country-specific 
heterogeneity is controlled for, it is statistically insignificant. Economic distance, which is 
measured by the difference in per capita income, is negatively related to the number of 
foreign projects in all versions, suggesting that Saudi Arabia tends to receive investment from 
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the countries with lower levels of development. The index of economic freedom is always 
positive and significant, so that the investments also originate from countries characterized by 
an advanced business and investment environment.  They confirm the above tabular analyses. 
  
Table 7.4: Number of Foreign Investments: Negative Binomial Regressions 
 
 Pooled Fixed Effects Random Effects 
       
Size of source country  0.2754*** (5.89)  0.3939*** (3.29)  0.4509*** (4.48) 
Geographical distance -0.4529*** (5.05) -0.9145*** (3.11) -0.7824*** (3.48) 
Cultural distance -0.0122*** (6.75)  0.0120 (0.31) -0.0041 (0.88) 
Economic distance -0.0281*** (3.91) -0.0704*** (3.69) -0.0727*** (4.37) 
Economic freedom  0.0614*** (6.28)  0.1230*** (5.71)  0.1123*** (6.07) 
Exports from source country  0.0513*** (3.60)  0.0055 (0.27)  0.0064 (0.32) 
Imports from Saudi Arabia -0.0158 (1.00) -0.0242 (1.17) -0.0289 (1.44) 
Past investment projects  0.0444*** (6.05)  0.0028 (1.49)  0.0035*** (2.00) 
       
Log L -1,517.13 -1,217.84 -1,408.55 
 
 
Notes: n = 693; year dummies included; t-statistics in parentheses; t-statistics based on robust standard errors in 
pooled regression; ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively. 
Test statistics: Poisson vs negative binomial test of alpha = 0: Chi-sq(1) = 2,379.98***; 
Pooled vs random effects: Chi-sq(1) = 410.01***; 
Fixed vs random effects Hausman test: Chi-sq(30) = 2.19. 
 
Table 7.4 shows that there is an insignificant relationship between trade and FDI, as captured 
by exports and imports. Although there is a positive coefficient on exports from the source 
country to Saudi Arabia and that this suggests that the penetration by trade accompanies FDI, 
this is significant in the pooled regression only. Imports are insignificant in all three 
specifications, so the existence of some economic links between the countries, such as those 
involved in importing, does not seem to be important for investment in Saudi Arabia. 
However, familiarity of the source country with the host economy through past investment in 
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the preceding three years has a positive impact on FDI in the pooled regression and in the 
random effects version, so would seem to be a more important factor for determining FDI 
flows compared to trade links. 
 
7.4.2   The Investment Inflow 
 
We also analyze FDI in terms of investment inflows rather than the number of projects. The 
dependent variable is the value of investment inflow in equation (7.1). It is censored at zero, 
and we consider three alternative approaches to deal with these zero flows. First, we estimate 
investment by OLS using only positive observations on inflows. Second, a Tobit model is 
used to take into account the observations where no investment arises from a country in a 
particular year. Third, we pool all the year-country observations and as explore the panel 
nature of the data in the random effects model.
56
   The Tobit model supposes that the same set 
of factors determines the value of uncensored observation (how much is invested) and if an 
observation is censored (whether a country invests at all). This assumption is relaxed in the 
Heckman (1979) sample selection approach. We use Heckman‟s two-step procedure to 
estimate the flow of FDI and to identify the factors affecting participation in FDI (i.e. a probit 
regression is run on whether each country invests in Saudi Arabia (= 1) or not (= 0) in each 
year, which forms the selection equation). The results are presented in Table 7.5, where the 
list of explanatory variables is the same as in Table 7.4. 
 
 
                                                 
56
 Only a random effects model is included in the following analysis as the standard econometric packages do 
not provide an adequate estimation method for the fixed effects version (Stata, 2005). 
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Table 7.5: Determinants of Foreign Investment Inflows 
 
 
OLS on Non-zero 
Values (n = 475) 
 
Pooled Tobit 
 
Random Effects 
Tobit 
Heckman 
FDI Inflow Selection 
Size of source country 0.0102 (0.23) 0.1002** (2.25) 0.1042* (1.79) -0.0079 (-0.26) 0.1200* (1.76) 
Geographical distance 0.1289 (1.35) -0.0912 (-1.49) -0.1172 (-0.99) 0.1610 (1.51) -0.2803** (-2.20) 
Cultural distance -0.0018 (-0.63) -0.0045* (-1.72) -0.0047* (-1.98) -0.0013 (-0.56) -0.0047* (-1.97) 
Economic distance 0.0243*** (2.15) 0.00212** (2.17) 0.0213** (2.27) 0.0233** (2.08) 0.0251** (2.37) 
Economic freedom -0.0126 (-1.35) 0.0094 (1.40) 0.0110 (1.06) -0.0153** (-1.96) 0.0231** (2.22) 
Exports from source country 0.0012 (0.14) -0.0118 (-1.19) -0.0140 (-0.83) 0.0051 (0.66) -0.0779*** (-3.78) 
Imports from Saudi Arabia 0.0116 (1.16) 0.0002 (0.02) -0.0027 (-0.16) 0.0116 (1.23) 0.0142 (0.67) 
Past investment projects 0.0024 (1.05) 0.0041* (1.79) -0.0001 (-0.01)  0.4468*** (4.05) 
           
Rho      -0.1859 (-0.93) 
R-squared 0.1098      
Log L   -722.20 -717.05 -899.25 
 
Notes: n = 693; number of censored observations = 218; year dummies included; t-statistics based on robust standard errors in parentheses; ***, **, * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively; likelihood-ratio test for pooled versus random effects for Tobit: Chi-sq(1) = 10.31***. 
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As regards the results in Table 7.5, the OLS estimation based only on non-zero flows 
provides relatively little insight into the determinants of FDI, as economic distance is the only 
significant variable. The Tobit results offer a range of explanations, with many significant 
variables displaying the expected signs. For the Heckman two-step procedure, the variables 
affecting selection must be identified from those affecting the size of the investment inflow.
57
 
In this respect it is posited that past investments affects selection only, with the remaining 
variables determining both the decision to invest in Saudi Arabia and the amount of FDI. Past 
investment, measured by the number of projects undertaken in the past rather than the overall 
size of investment, is intended to test the hypothesis of fixed set-up costs of FDI flows (Razin 
et al., 2004).  The discussion below is based on the Tobit and Heckman results. 
 
Overall, when the value of investment inflow rather than the number of projects is analyzed, 
then a slightly different picture emerges. The size of the source economy remains significant 
and positive in most specifications, but the geographical distance is no longer an obstacle to 
FDI, although a cultural distance between the source and the recipient country is. In contrast 
to the results in Table 7.4, when the investment activity is measured by the size of FDI inflow 
it turns out that the coefficient on economic distance is consistently positive. Neither 
economic freedom nor trade links with the source countries are significant in the Tobit 
specifications. Past investment projects are a significant determinant only in the pooled Tobit 
regression but according to the likelihood-ratio test there are significant source-country 
effects, which make inference from the pooled regression inappropriate. 
 
                                                 
57
 Although the procedure can be carried out with the same set of variables, Wooldridge (2006) argues for an 
exclusion restriction to distinguish sample selection from a mis-specified functional form. 
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The results for the Heckman model deserve separate discussion. First, there are a large 
number of factors affecting selection compared with relatively few significant determinants 
of the size of the flow. Moreover, some of the factors work in the opposite direction. This 
gives support to the selection model as preferable the Tobit model, where the same factors 
affect censored and uncensored observations and the marginal effects display the same sign 
for both categories. The size of the source country and distance, both geographical and 
cultural, affect the selection into becoming an investor in Saudi Arabia, although they do not 
determine the size of the flow.  
 
Countries characterized by a high index of economic freedom and high income per capita are 
more likely to become investors, but the size of investment inflow is positively related to 
economic distance and negatively to economic freedom. From the selection equation, there is 
some evidence that investing in Saudi Arabia does not coincide with exporting to this market. 
The negative coefficient indicates that source countries exporting to Saudi Arabia are less 
likely to establish production facilities there. A similar substitution rather than 
complementary effect was identified for Japan, which Kimino et al. (2007) attribute to the 
characteristics of the Japanese economy that make it an unlikely location for outsourcing or 
an export platform for the region. In the case of Saudi Arabia, more research is required to 
identify the sectors in which FDI occurs in order to provide satisfactory explanations. 
 
The inclusion of past investment projects in the selection equation was dictated by 
identification of this equation (separate from (7.1)), and motivated by an attempt to verify the 
hypothesis of the existence of set-up costs of FDI.  If set-up costs play an important role in 
determining whether a source country undertakes an investment, then there should be a 
negative correlation between the error terms of the flow and the participation equation (Razin 
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et al., 2004). For example, if a foreign investor has already undertaken a project in the host 
country, this implies a reduction in the setting-up of a new investment in the same country, 
which in turn will encourage increased flows of FDI, and hence a negative correlation 
between the equations. In Table 7.4, past investment projects are positive and significant in 
the selection equation. However, the coefficient of correlation between the flow and 
participation equations (rho), although negative as expected, turns out to be insignificant. 
Table 7.5 shows that the past investment in the selection equation is found to be a positive 
and significant determinant.     
 
7.5   Conclusions 
 
The objective of this chapter is to investigate to what extent source country characteristics 
explain the inflow of FDI into Saudi Arabia. To my knowledge, this is the first time that this 
has been considered in the context of Saudi Arabia.  The unique dataset that was obtained 
from the Saudi Ministry of Commerce and Industry, which lists all new investment projects 
involving foreign ownership, was used to construct a panel of 33 countries for the 1980–2005 
period.  The number of investment projects is estimated using negative binomial regression, 
and total investment inflow is modelled using the Tobit regression and Heckman selection 
procedure, in order to account for some country-year observations with zero FDI flows.  
 
The conclusions drawn from the analysis employing panel-based techniques differ from the 
results obtained from pooled regression models. Once unobservable country-specific effects 
are taken into account some coefficients become statistically insignificant. The determinants 
of FDI also differ depending on whether foreign investment is measured in terms of the 
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number of individual foreign projects or the investment expenditure. When investigating total 
FDI inflows, it turns out that there are a large number of factors affecting the decision to 
invest in Saudi Arabia compared with few determinants of the actual size of the investment.  
With Saudi Arabia being a developing country but with a relatively high income per capita 
due to oil exports one could expect the determinants of FDI to be different from those for 
traditional developing or developed countries. Standard gravity-type explanations hold to a 
great extent, with the size of the source economy positively related and the distance 
negatively related to the inflow of FDI. It is the geographical distance that hinders investment 
when FDI is measured in terms of the number of foreign projects, while cultural distance 
matters if FDI is measured by the total investment expenditure. In many specifications a 
positive impact of past investments is apparent, indicating that set-up costs may be lower for 
an investing country which has already acquired some familiarity with the Saudi economy.  
 
Certain characteristics of the investing countries are also identified, making it possible to 
speculate about the scope for possible spillovers. It is reassuring that the coefficient on 
economic freedom is positive and significant in most specifications as it suggests that the 
investing countries are characterized by an advanced business environment. However, it is 
not clear whether the investment comes from more technologically advanced countries. The 
coefficient on economic distance is negative when FDI is measured by the number of 
investment projects. The size of investment is positively related to economic distance 
suggesting that volume-wise important investments come from countries characterized by 
high income per capita. The commonly acknowledged relationship between FDI and bilateral 
trade does not apply to Saudi Arabia and there is some evidence that the countries that export 
to Saudi Arabia do not invest there. 
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Compared with other regions and types of economies, there is a limited amount of research 
on FDI in Arab countries. This chapter is the first attempt to analyze the inflow of FDI into 
Saudi Arabia from the perspective of source country characteristics. Saudi Arabia receives 
FDI from a range of countries, including most advanced industrialized economies as well as 
neighbouring Arab countries. The analysis demonstrates that some determinants of inward 
FDI previously established for developed and developing countries as the target recipients of 
FDI do not necessarily hold for Saudi Arabia. With the increasing importance of South–South 
investment recognized by UNCTAD (2006), more research using disaggregate data is needed 
to identify factors affecting FDI and attribute them to the unique characteristics of Arab 
countries and oil-exporting countries.  
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Appendix Table 7.1: Number and Investment Scale of Projects by 33 Countries, 1980-05 
Country 
No. of 
Projects 
Total Investment 
Amount (SR m) 
(%) 
Average Investment 
Scale (SR m) 
     
MENA (West Asia) 1,886 67,579 19.23 35.83 
     Kuwait (47) (29,343) (8.35) (624.31) 
     Jordan (511) (8,194) (2.33) (16.04) 
     Bahrain (52) (8,561) (2.44) (164.63) 
     United Arab Emirates (71) (7,148) (2.03) (100.67) 
     Lebanon (329) (6,716) (1.91) (20.41) 
     Syria (509) (3,644) (1.04) (7.16) 
     Yemen (257) (1,286) (0.37) (5.00) 
     Iran (20) (1,790) (0.51) (89.48) 
     Turkey (78) (618) (0.18) (7.93) 
     Iraq (12) (279) (0.08) (23.28) 
MENA (North Africa) 463 3,792 1.08 8.19 
     Egypt (438) (3,605) (1.03) (8.23) 
     Sudan (25) (187) (0.05) (7.49) 
Western Europe 591 64,926 18.47 109.86 
     France (98) (26,063) (7.42) (265.95) 
     Netherlands (52) (1,744) (0.50) (33.53) 
     Italy (49) (10,490) (2.98) (214.08) 
     Germany (102) (8,197) (2.33) (80.36) 
     Sweden (19) (8,223) (2.34) (432.79) 
     United Kingdom (182) (7,247) (2.06) (39.82) 
     Switzerland (54) (2,463) (0.70) (45.61) 
     Belgium (12) (183) (0.05) (15.27) 
     Spain (12) (283) (0.08) (23.58) 
     Austria (11) (33) (0.01) (2.97) 
Northern America 477 70,687 20.11 148.19 
     US (352) (65,904) (18.75) (187.23) 
     Canada (125) (4,783) (1.36) (38.26) 
Far East 162 70,309 20.01 434.01 
     Japan (49) (64,442) (18.34) (1,315.15) 
     Korea Republic of (55) (2,488) (0.71) (45.24) 
     China (37) (1,914) (0.54) (51.74) 
     Malaysia (21) (1,465) (0.42) (69.75) 
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Appendix Table 7.1 (continued) 
 
Country 
No. of 
Projects 
Total Investment 
Amount (SR m) 
(%) 
Average Investment 
Scale (SR m) 
Rest of the world 397 12,384 3.52 31.19 
     Panama (22) (8,265) (2.35) (375.68) 
     Pakistan (222) (1,485) (0.42) (6.69) 
     India (130) (1,875) (0.53) (14.42) 
     Australia (13) (704) (0.20) (54.19) 
     Bangladesh (10) (55) (0.02) (5.51) 
Total 3,976 289,678 82.42 72.86 
Grand Total 4,998 351,456 100.0 70.32 
 
Source: Investment Database, Saudi Ministry of Commerce and Industry. 
Note: Investments measured at constant 2000 prices. 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
8.1   Introduction 
 
In Saudi Arabia, the encouragement of foreign direct investment (FDI) is viewed by policy-
makers as a primary means for diversifying the economy and to improve the participation of 
the private sector in the economy.  Currently, the private sector accounts for only about one-
third of Saudi GDP, so that FDI is seen as an important way to reduce the heavy reliance on 
oil revenues.  The attraction of foreign investment is achieved by focusing on those factors 
that affect the generation and location of FDI, which at the micro and macroeconomic levels 
include such things as the political risk of the host economy and the characteristics of the 
source countries from which the FDI arises.  The purpose of this thesis is to explore these two 
factors, by examining the role of political risk in influencing foreign equity ownership level 
in joint ventures and in determining FDI inflows to Saudi Arabia.  Ultimately, the aim is to 
help to enhance the level of (foreign) private sector investment in the Saudi economy. 
 
Over the last few decades, research in developed and developing countries has shown that the 
relationship between country political risk and the foreign equity share is negative, implying 
that countries with low levels of risk will attract more FDI than countries with high levels of 
risk.  In particular, countries with lower risk are more likely to attract whole investments than 
those with high risk, suggesting that policies that improve the stability of the country will 
potentially make the country more attractive. Specifically, in the international business 
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literature the motive for FDI has been explored through the entry mode, but nearly always as 
a choice between a joint or whole venture and occasionally, the discrete choice between 
majority, equal and minority partnerships is considered. This literature pays relatively little 
attention to different kinds of risk, which are measured in a single composite form and 
sometimes quite crudely. In this thesis attention is paid to the different types of political risk 
and the effect of this risk on investors equity shares, where to my knowledge, this is the first 
time this has been explored in the literature. Further, there have been an increasing number of 
studies for developed and developing countries looking at the source characteristics of FDI.  
These determinants tend to mirror those factors that are explored in the studies of host-
country characteristics, and offer further clues on how to increase FDI.  The thesis 
contributed in this issue by examining the importance of source-country characteristics to 
Saudi Arabia, which is a country that falls in-between the traditional developed and 
developing countries and drawing the attention to the sensitivity of the results to the 
specification of the dependent variable. To examine both of these issues the thesis has 
obtained a large micro dataset on foreign and domestics projects from the Saudi Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry.  It is the first time these data have been released for academic study 
and in itself is a major contribution to the thesis. The three main contributions to the literature 
to be pursued:  
 
 To examine the detailed pattern of FDI in Saudi Arabia from 1960 to 2005. 
 To investigate the effect of risk on the foreign joint venture equity share. 
 To explore the source country determinants of incoming FDI to Saudi Arabia. 
 
In addition to the introduction and concluding chapters, the thesis has been organized in two 
Parts, containing six chapters. Chapter 2 discusses the general geographical, political, social 
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and economic background of Saudi Arabia, including the legislation in relation to FDI. The 
literature review on the determinants of FDI from both theoretical and empirical perspectives 
is discussed in Chapter 3, while the literature on the FDI ownership structure is considered in 
Chapter 4. Chapters 5 to 7, which make up the second Part of the thesis, are the empirical part 
of the study and represent its three main contributions.  The detailed analysis of the pattern of 
FDI in Saudi Arabia is presented in Chapter 5. The other two chapters are for the examination 
of the effect of country political risk on the foreign joint venture equity share (Chapter 6) and 
the analysis of the source country determinants of incoming FDI (Chapter 7). 
 
In this chapter the thesis is concluded. Section 8.2 summarizes and draws out the findings of 
three analyses, covering the pattern of FDI; country risk and the foreign joint venture equity 
share; and the source determinants of incoming FDI.  Section 8.3 discusses some limitations 
of the study, including the data, and suggests possible area for future research. Finally, 
section 8.4 presents the overall conclusions, outlining policy implications and 
recommendations.  
 
8.2   Main Findings 
 
The main findings of the thesis are summarized according to each of the three objectives 
outlined above. The analyses were undertaken at different levels (i.e., the project, individual 
investor and country), and for different time periods.
58
 
 
 
                                                 
58
 The first analysis was undertaken for the period from 1960 to 2005, the second between 1985 and 2005, and 
the third for the period 1980-2005.  As we have seen, most FDI has in fact occurred over the period since the 
introduction of the 2000 Foreign Investment Act. 
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8.2.1   The Pattern of FDI 
 
This analysis aimed to describe, in detail, the nature of FDI in Saudi Arabia, and in particular, 
the nature of foreign investment relative to domestic investment, but focusing mainly on the 
former.  The results show that FDI has increased sharply, especially after the implementation 
of the 2000 Foreign Investment Act.  It shows that the amount of foreign investment over the 
period 2001-2005 represents half of the total foreign investment since the year 1960. In 
addition, foreign investment is highly concentrated in its activity and by its location. 
 
The nature and pattern of FDI can be described not only at the project and investor levels, but 
in terms of total investment from the same source country. This is analyzed according to the 
number of projects, investment size, industrial sector, regional location, country of origin and 
perspective jobs. It reveals that the distribution of investment is highly skewed, so that it is 
concentrated in certain activities and locations.  Manufacturing is the main recipient of FDI, 
especially in the chemicals and petroleum industry, while by location FDI is mainly located 
in the Middle region in Saudi Arabia, around Riyadh. However, there is a significant amount 
investment in the Eastern oilfields, which in terms of the amount of foreign investment is the 
largest recipient of all activities, but much less so by the number of projects.   
 
In terms of the number of projects, the main source of investment is the West Asia part of the 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, indicating the role of proximity and cultural 
similarity, but these tend to be relatively smaller investments that involve a relatively large 
number of investors from the same source country and account for a large share of the project 
cost.  In terms of the total amount of investment inflow, North America, followed by the 
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Western Europe are the main sources of FDI.  In general, it indicates the different nature of 
the investments that arise from the different sources.  
 
8.2.2   Risk on the Foreign Equity Share 
 
The investor level analysis sought to examine the effect of country political risk on the 
foreign-owned equity share in joint venture projects.  The main result of the chapter is that 
for more serious risks firms will increase their equity share on entry to take greater control of 
the investment project, but that for less serious risks they will reduce it to cut their exposure 
to risk and reduce their potential losses.  This is a new finding that is in contrast with research 
elsewhere, which has typically analyzed the choice between whole and joint ventures.  This 
other literature finds that risks causes firms to use the second entry mode, but the finding here 
is conditional on entry as joint venture firms may adopt different strategies in relation to their 
equity share according to the level of risk, and may actually increase their share.   
 
Of course, high risk may cause some firms not to invest at all, and the determinants appear to 
differ between the choice of the entry mode (between a whole or joint venture) and the choice 
of the joint venture equity share, but where firms do enter as a joint venture it suggests that 
high risk may actually cause them to increase their share.  The chapter finds that the equity 
share in joint ventures that induces control is majority ownership at an equity stake at 50%.  
Minority equity share are much more responsive to risk than shares above this level. 
 
 
 
 
 
278
8.2.3   The Source Country Determinants of Incoming FDI 
 
Given that political country risk affects the equity share in joint venture projects in Saudi 
Arabia, then this country-level analysis sought to investigate the extent to which source 
country characteristics explain the inflow of FDI into Saudi Arabia. In general, the results are 
consistent with the theories that explain the determinants of FDI inflows and with empirical 
work carried out elsewhere for both developed and developing countries.  It was found that 
the determinants of FDI differ depending on whether foreign investment is measured in terms 
of the number of individual foreign projects or the investment expenditure. While the size of 
the source economy remains significant and has a positive effect in most specifications, it is 
the geographical distance that impedes investment when FDI is measured in terms of the 
number of foreign projects. However, when it is measured by the total amount of investment 
the cultural distance matters and is negatively related to FDI 
 
In addition, past investment is found to have a positive effect on FDI, implying that the cost 
of setting-up a project will be lower if an investing country has acquired familiarity with the 
Saudi economy. In terms of „economic freedom‟, a positive and significant relationship exists 
between this and total FDI inflows, suggesting that the investments originate from countries 
characterized by a more liberal business environment.  
 
8.2.4   The Overall Picture 
 
The overall results from the study of the nature and pattern of FDI show that FDI is described 
by important characteristics, whether considered at the project, investor or country level. The 
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results show that there is a skewed nature of investment, and indeed there is a striking degree 
of concentration in certain activities and locations. The sector for FDI is manufacturing, and 
especially the chemicals and petroleum products industry in terms of volume, but investments 
are mainly concentrated in the Middle region in Saudi Arabia, around Riyadh. It was also 
found that projects originate mainly from the West Asia part in the MENA region, although 
these are smaller investments involving number of investors from the same source country. 
The largest investment amount arises from the North America, followed by Western Europe. 
 
The foreign equity share in joint venture projects is associated with the country political risk. 
This implies that for an increase in the political risk the investor may actually be encouraged 
to enter via greater stake in order to control the project and also protect the return. But, for 
less risk investor will cut his exposure to risk and reduce the loss. It also finds that it is not 
the whole ownership that matters for control but the majority ownership.  
 
Finally, the results find that incoming FDI is associated with the characteristics of the source 
countries, but the effects of these characteristics differ when measuring foreign investment 
according to the number of individual foreign projects or the investment expenditure (as we 
have seen the oil sector accounts for a major share of total investment, but relatively small 
minority of total projects).  It was found that the size of the source country has a positive and 
significant effect in most specifications. In addition, while the geographical distance hinders 
investment if FDI is measured in terms of the number of projects, when it is measured by 
investment expenditure, then the cultural distance is more important. It was also found that 
countries with past foreign investment experience are more likely to undertake FDI.     
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8.3   Limitations and Prospects for Future Research 
 
The current study utilizes a unique, comprehensive and relatively large dataset relating to FDI 
in Saudi Arabia. This is the Investment Dataset of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. 
Up until now, such a dataset has not been available for academic study, so that this is a major 
achievement of the thesis. However, perhaps inevitable, the data have some limitations.  We 
now consider these limitations, and indicate some directions for future research. 
 
8.3.1   Limitations of the Study 
 
The limitations of our study mainly relate to the data. Firstly, although the data include all of 
the foreign projects over 1960-2005, they include some missing data on jobs, which are 
available for only around 44 per cent of total foreign projects in Saudi Arabia. However, the 
investment scale is known in each case, and this is a rarity, as often we find that the jobs can 
be more-easily measured and the scale is not known, representing an advantage of the data. A 
second issue is that the data on foreign projects comprise start-ups of either a joint venture or 
whole investment, but it does not include information related to whether the project is a 
reinvestment, merger or acquisition.  In some respects, this may weaken the power of the 
results, especially in relation to the effect of country political risk and foreign equity share, 
although it is likely that most of the investments are the new ventures.  
 
Third, although the data include the start date of all foreign projects, the information on 
whether these projects still operate or close is not known.  Thus, it was not possible to track 
the investments, and to know if the changes in the political and economic environment have 
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effects on their status.  Fourth, the information on the name of firms or investors was not 
supplied with the data, because these data are highly confidential. For this reason there is no 
way to know whether the past experience tends to encourage or deter an investor‟s ownership 
level.  In the analysis of Chapter 6 it was necessary to include a large number of dummy 
variables to control for these potentially adverse effects. 
 
Fifth, related to this last point, there are no information on some key variables, such as R&D 
intensity, marketing expenditure and industry growth, in order to explain FDI inflows or 
equity share in joint venture projects, as this kind of information is not collected by the 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry.  Finally, the project-level data are not available on the 
profitability of firms, no doubt because the sensitivity of such information.  Consequently, we 
are unable to analyze whether high profits leads to higher equity shares. Nevertheless, despite 
all these shortcomings, the Investment Dataset are the best available information for the study 
of FDI in Saudi Arabia, and, according to my knowledge, such data are not available for 
academic study in many if not most developing countries. Overall, what is important is that 
the general thrust of the results are comparable with the findings obtained elsewhere, 
including studies carried out in developed countries using large datasets and the relatively 
small number of studies in developing countries using much smaller samples of firms.  
 
8.3.2   Prospects of Future Research 
 
This thesis has made important inroads in examining the impact of country political risk on 
equity share in joint venture projects and the source country characteristics on incoming FDI, 
but many issues are left for future research. We now briefly consider some of these. Access to 
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more exhaustive firm-level data is perhaps one of the most important pre-requisites for future 
work.  For some data, such as profitability of a firm, our aim is to inform the Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry of Saudi Arabia about the importance this variable for future work. 
For example, it will enable the effect of profitability to be considered, such as whether the 
equity share is related to a firm‟s profitability. Possible interactions between profitability and 
incoming FDI could also be examined, which would enable a more comprehensive study to 
be undertaken using a range of techniques.   
 
Some other interesting and related topics for future research on the Saudi Arabian economy 
are as follows. First, it would be useful to analyze the relationship between the effect of risk 
and source country characteristics including the years after 2005 in order to study the impact 
of the 2000 Foreign Investment Act over a longer time period, including the recent global 
recession, which has affected some countries more than others. It would also be interesting to 
analyze the performance of firms over a long period of time to identify the possible effects of 
the changes in the business environment and the reform efforts.  Second, with the increasing 
importance of South–South investment that is recognized by UNCTAD (2006), analyzing the 
factors that affect FDI and attribute them to the unique characteristics of Arab countries and 
oil-exporting countries will be an important topic for future research. 
 
I hope these brief suggestions for future work will encourage others to conduct research in 
this broad area, in order to advance our knowledge about FDI, its determinants, and the effect 
of risk in equity share in a rapidly-developing country such as Saudi Arabia.  
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8.4   Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
 
The thesis attempts to provide a broad overview of the pattern of FDI in Saudi Arabia, and to 
understand the factors that contribute to determining the inflows of foreign investment in 
general, and the effect of country risk on equity stake of foreign investors in particular. This 
is for the period between 1980 and 2005. Generally, the empirical findings of this study show 
that the foreign ownership shares and FDI inflows exhibit systematic patterns, being the 
results of conscious decisions taken by many different investors. Based on a review of the 
relevant literature, along with the analysis of the data provided by the Ministry of Commerce 
and Industry of Saudi Arabia, this thesis has identified various factors at the country, project 
and individual investor levels that explain FDI.  We also gain an understanding of the effect 
of the country risk on equity share of foreign investors, and identify the impact of the source 
country characteristics on FDI inflows into Saudi Arabia. The results of this study are broadly 
consistent with other empirical research conducted for developed and developing countries. 
The empirical evidence presented in this thesis suggests that the effect of risk on equity share 
and the impact of the source country characteristics in Saudi Arabia are shaped by country-, 
project- and investor-related characteristics. These factors have a considerable influence on 
incoming FDI, as well as on the foreign-owned equity share. 
 
We believe that the thesis has some valuable implications for policymakers. For example, if 
the determinants of FDI are considered to be an important aim of public policy, then perhaps 
one of the most important conclusions of the thesis is that source country characteristics 
matter in determining FDI. According to the results, the size of the source country has a 
positive effect on FDI inflows, which implies that larger size of source country market can 
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play a relatively greater role in the inflows of FDI.  Indeed, the effect of the geographical and 
cultural distance is significant in both measures of FDI. The past investment experience also 
plays a substantial role in incoming FDI in Saudi Arabia, as well as the economic freedom, 
which has a positive and significant impact on FDI inflows.  
 
There are a number of other factors that are important for the inflows of FDI and the decision 
of foreign investors on the equity share in joint venture projects, which all have implications 
for policy. We find that factors having a consistent effect both at the country and investor 
level are some of the political variables. Government policy could encourage foreign 
investors to increase their equity stake in projects by providing foreign investors with 
incentives, such as government guarantees to encourage them to increase their investment 
stake, as well as implementing programmes that could improve the business environment. 
Further, since the size of the source country matters and has a positive and significant effect 
on FDI inflows at the country level, this may mean, for example, enhancing trade ties with 
such countries and implementing programmes that promote business opportunities, since 
investors from these countries are more likely to boost FDI levels in the country. Countries 
with past investments are also likely to set-up future investments, so that providing investors 
with more incentives would help to attract further investments in the future. 
 
Apart from this, the thesis shows that the nature of FDI indicates a high concentration level in 
some activities and regions. The results show that FDI is concentrated mainly in the 
manufacturing sector, especially in the chemicals and petroleum-related projects, and located 
in the Middle region in Saudi Arabia, around Riyadh.  This has important policy implications, 
as promoting investment in other regions and sectors is a main aim of Saudi policymakers.  
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Policy should support attracting FDI into these activities and locations to help diversify the 
Saudi economy. 
  
Before ending, we would like to make three specific recommendations for policymakers that 
arise from the thesis. These are about the data, the organization for the study of FDI and 
programmes for improving the business environment and promoting FDI. While FDI can 
play a significant role in the economy, comprehensive data on projects characteristics are 
essential to produce good information on the nature and effects of FDI.  Further, although in 
many developed countries there are organizations for the study of FDI, there is no such body 
for the study of FDI in Saudi Arabia, so that the creation of such an organization at the local 
and/or national level, as well as academic courses for the study of FDI, are recommended. 
Finally, the experience of other countries, especially those that have a good performance in 
attracting FDI is important.  For example, the UK has initiated many schemes for improving 
the business environment and attracting FDI, and it is important to examine these.  
 
Overall, it is reasonable to believe that FDI can make a strong contribution and that it can 
serve as a remedy for the dependence of the Saudi Arabian economy on oil revenues.  Of 
course, this thesis cannot claim to offer a definitive judgment on the importance of FDI, but 
rather it should be viewed as a first step in this direction.  The study suggests that more work 
is necessary to better understand the contribution of FDI in general and in particular to the 
process of attracting foreign investment to Saudi Arabia.  
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